Johnson v. City of New York
This text of Johnson v. City of New York (Johnson v. City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
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Bureau Thomas J.K. Smith, State Reporter
Johnson v City of New York
2026 NY Slip Op 04184
July 1, 2026
Appellate Division, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.
Anita Johnson, appellant,
v
City of New York, et al., respondents.
Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
Decided on July 1, 2026
2024-06588, (Index No. 506692/18)
Betsy Barros, J.P.
Helen Voutsinas
Lourdes M. Ventura
Donna-Marie E. Golia, JJ.
Harris Keenan & Goldfarb, PLLC, New York, NY (Jason Steinberg, Judith F. Stempler, and Waleed Rehman of counsel), for appellant.
Steven Banks, Corporation Counsel, New York, NY (Jamison Davies and Janet L. Zaleon of counsel), for respondents City of New York and Emily G. Harris.
Baker, McEvoy & Moskovits (Marjorie E. Bornes, Freeport, NY, of counsel), for respondent Umar Shahzad.
DECISION & ORDER
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Richard J. Montelione, J.), entered March 4, 2024. The judgment, upon a jury verdict in favor of the defendants on the issue of liability, is in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with one bill of costs to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
On the night of August 12, 2017, the defendant Emily G. Harris, a New York City police officer, and her partner were on patrol when they were flagged down by the plaintiff. The plaintiff informed Harris and her partner that the plaintiff's 17-year-old son was missing and asked them to help locate him. The police officers placed the plaintiff into the rear of their vehicle and proceeded to look for the plaintiff's son, with Harris driving and her partner in the front passenger seat. While proceeding down Chauncey Street in Brooklyn, they learned the location of the plaintiff's son from her ex-husband by telephone. Within seconds of obtaining that information, the police vehicle collided with a vehicle driven by the defendant Umar Shahzad at the intersection of Chauncey Street and Howard Avenue. At the time of the accident, Harris was driving the police vehicle without the aid of emergency lights or sirens. Chauncey Street was governed by a stop sign, while Howard Avenue was not.
The plaintiff commenced the instant action against Harris, Shahzad, and the defendant City of New York to recover damages for personal injuries. Subsequently, upon a jury verdict in favor of the defendants on the issue of liability, the Supreme Court entered judgment in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff dismissing the complaint. The plaintiff appeals.
The plaintiff contends that the Supreme Court erroneously instructed the jury that, in deciding whether Harris and the City were liable for the collision with Shahzad's vehicle, the jury [*2]was to apply a reckless disregard standard set forth in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(b)(2) for the driver of an emergency vehicle when involved in an emergency operation. However, the plaintiff failed to preserve this issue for appellate review because she did not object to the jury charge or the verdict sheet before the court submitted it to the jury (see CPLR 4110-b; Figueroa-Burgos v Bieniewicz, 135 AD3d 810, 812-813; Matter of State of New York v Todd L., 118 AD3d 805, 807). In any event, the plaintiff's contention is without merit, since Harris was operating an authorized emergency vehicle (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 101) engaged in the emergency operation of "responding to, or working or assisting . . . a police call" (id. § 114-b). That the police vehicle's emergency lights and sirens were off did not mean that Harris was not engaged in an emergency operation (see Criscione v City of New York, 97 NY2d 152, 157; Proce v Town of Stony Point, 185 AD3d 975, 976).
Further, the jury verdict in favor the defendants was not contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. "A jury verdict in favor of a defendant should not be set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence unless the evidence preponderates so heavily in the plaintiff's favor that the verdict could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence" (Lawrence v New York Methodist Hosp., 232 AD3d 693, 695 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Berlich v Maimonides Med. Ctr., 208 AD3d 1148, 1149). "When a verdict can be reconciled with a reasonable view of the evidence, the successful party is entitled to the presumption that the jury adopted that view" (Lawrence v New York Methodist Hosp., 232 AD3d at 695 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Berlich v Maimonides Med. Ctr., 208 AD3d at 1149).
"The manner in which a police officer operates his or her vehicle in an emergency situation may not form the basis for civil liability to an injured third party unless the officer acted with reckless disregard for the safety of others" (Robinson v County of Suffolk, 219 AD3d 1542, 1543 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Beverly v County of Suffolk, 227 AD3d 652, 653). The reckless disregard standard under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) "demands more than a showing of a lack of 'due care under the circumstances'— the showing typically associated with ordinary negligence claims" (Frezzell v City of New York, 24 NY3d 213, 217 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Anderson v Commack Fire Dist., 39 NY3d 495, 502). "Rather, there must be evidence that the actor has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow and has done so with conscious indifference to the outcome" (Anderson v Commack Fire Dist., 39 NY3d at 502 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Frezzell v City of New York, 24 NY3d at 217). "This standard requires a showing of more than a momentary lapse in judgment" (Beverly v County of Suffolk, 227 AD3d at 654 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Alonso v Crest Transp. Serv., Inc., 226 AD3d 634, 635).
Here, Harris testified that she inched the police vehicle forward into the intersection, looked to the left and to the right, and did not see Shahdad's vehicle, possibly because her view was obscured by a white van on the corner. The jury's finding that Harris did not act with reckless disregard for the safety of others when she drove the police vehicle into the intersection was based on a fair interpretation of the evidence and, thus, not contrary to the weight of the evidence.
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Johnson v. City of New York, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnson-v-city-of-new-york-nyappdiv-2026.