IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
Miyuki Maureen Johnson, Trustee for C/A No. 3:25-cv-6165-JFA-PJG MMJ Enterprise Foreign Express Trust,
Plaintiff,
v. ORDER City of Columbia Water,
Defendant.
I. INTRODUCTION Miyuki Maureen Johnson as Trustee for MMJ Enterprise Foreign Express Trust (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, brings this action averring several claims against City of Columbia Water. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the case was referred to the Magistrate Judge for initial review. After performing an initial review of the complaint1, the Magistrate Judge prepared a thorough Report and Recommendation (“Report”). (ECF No. 6). Within the Report, the Magistrate Judge opines the Complaint is subject to summary dismissal for numerous reasons. Id. The Report sets forth, in detail, the relevant facts and standards of law on this matter, and this Court incorporates those facts and standards without a recitation.
1 Plaintiff filed her complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss a case upon a finding that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). Thereafter, Plaintiff filed objections along with numerous supporting exhibits. (ECF No. 17). Plaintiff also submitted dozens of pages of additional documents and exhibits in
subsequent filings. (ECF Nos. 14, 15, 16, 18, 19). Thus, this matter is ripe for review. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with the Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976). A district court is only required to conduct a de novo review of the specific portions of the Magistrate
Judge’s Report to which an objection is made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); Carniewski v. W. Virginia Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 974 F.2d 1330 (4th Cir. 1992). In the absence of specific objections to portions of the Magistrate’s Report, this Court is not required to give an explanation for adopting the recommendation. See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983). Thus, the Court must only review those portions of the
Report to which Petitioner has made a specific written objection. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 316 (4th Cir. 2005). “An objection is specific if it ‘enables the district judge to focus attention on those issues—factual and legal—that are at the heart of the parties’ dispute.’” Dunlap v. TM Trucking of the Carolinas, LLC, No. 0:15-cv-04009-JMC, 2017 WL 6345402, at *5 n.6
(D.S.C. Dec. 12, 2017) (citing One Parcel of Real Prop. Known as 2121 E. 30th St., 73 F.3d 1057, 1059 (10th Cir. 1996)). A specific objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Report thus requires more than a reassertion of arguments from the complaint or a mere citation to legal authorities. See Workman v. Perry, No. 6:17-cv-00765-RBH, 2017 WL 4791150, at *1 (D.S.C. Oct. 23, 2017). A specific objection must “direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate’s proposed findings and recommendations.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687
F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). “Generally stated, nonspecific objections have the same effect as would a failure to object.” Staley v. Norton, No. 9:07-0288-PMD, 2007 WL 821181, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 2, 2007) (citing Howard v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991)). The Court reviews portions “not objected to—including those portions to which only ‘general and conclusory’ objections have been made—for clear error.” Id.
(citing Diamond, 416 F.3d at 315; Camby, 718 F.2d at 200; Orpiano, 687 F.2d at 47) (emphasis added). Because Plaintiff is representing herself, these standards must be applied while liberally construing her filings in this case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). III. DISCUSSION
As stated above, the relevant facts and standards of law on this matter are incorporated from the Report and therefore no further recitation is necessary here. (ECF No. 6). The Report ultimately concludes that this case should be dismissed for a variety of reasons including frivolity. In her response to the Report, Plaintiff has submitted a series of incoherent
ramblings that fail to elucidate her claims or in any way address the Report. Many of her statements echo those previously asserted and described as “legally frivolous” by the Magistrate Judge. (ECF No. 6, p. 4). Thus, Plaintiff has failed to provide proper objections to the Report or otherwise show why this action should not be summarily dismissed. Plaintiff’s filing fails to offer any specific reference to the Report which would allow the undersigned to focus on any issue, either factual or legal, with which Plaintiff feels has
been reached in error. “Generally stated, nonspecific objections have the same effect as would a failure to object.” Staley v. Norton, No. 9:07-0288-PMD, 2007 WL 821181, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 2, 2007). Because Plaintiff has failed to offer any specific objections which would allow for a de novo review, the court is only required to review the Report for clear error and is not required to give an explanation for adopting the recommendation. See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983). Consequently, this court has reviewed
the Report and finds no error which would warrant any further action or correction. To the extent anything in Plaintiff’s filing could be considered specific objections, they would nevertheless be overruled. Plaintiff has asserted a series of disjointed, baseless, and conclusory statements that fail to offer any support for her position. For instance, Plaintiff states: “Plaintiff has brought valid, well-documented claims arising from unlawful
utility shutoffs and denial of trust authority by the Defendant, which resulted in damages and, constitutional violations.” (ECF No. 17, p. 3). Additionally, “Plaintiff also invokes protection under the ADA due to disability-related hardship and the essential nature of utilities to maintain health and safety. Defendant's refusal to communicate with the trustee and continued threats of shutoff create undue burden and raise legitimate questions of
discrimination and unequal treatment.” Id.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
Miyuki Maureen Johnson, Trustee for C/A No. 3:25-cv-6165-JFA-PJG MMJ Enterprise Foreign Express Trust,
Plaintiff,
v. ORDER City of Columbia Water,
Defendant.
I. INTRODUCTION Miyuki Maureen Johnson as Trustee for MMJ Enterprise Foreign Express Trust (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, brings this action averring several claims against City of Columbia Water. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the case was referred to the Magistrate Judge for initial review. After performing an initial review of the complaint1, the Magistrate Judge prepared a thorough Report and Recommendation (“Report”). (ECF No. 6). Within the Report, the Magistrate Judge opines the Complaint is subject to summary dismissal for numerous reasons. Id. The Report sets forth, in detail, the relevant facts and standards of law on this matter, and this Court incorporates those facts and standards without a recitation.
1 Plaintiff filed her complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss a case upon a finding that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). Thereafter, Plaintiff filed objections along with numerous supporting exhibits. (ECF No. 17). Plaintiff also submitted dozens of pages of additional documents and exhibits in
subsequent filings. (ECF Nos. 14, 15, 16, 18, 19). Thus, this matter is ripe for review. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with the Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976). A district court is only required to conduct a de novo review of the specific portions of the Magistrate
Judge’s Report to which an objection is made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); Carniewski v. W. Virginia Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 974 F.2d 1330 (4th Cir. 1992). In the absence of specific objections to portions of the Magistrate’s Report, this Court is not required to give an explanation for adopting the recommendation. See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983). Thus, the Court must only review those portions of the
Report to which Petitioner has made a specific written objection. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 316 (4th Cir. 2005). “An objection is specific if it ‘enables the district judge to focus attention on those issues—factual and legal—that are at the heart of the parties’ dispute.’” Dunlap v. TM Trucking of the Carolinas, LLC, No. 0:15-cv-04009-JMC, 2017 WL 6345402, at *5 n.6
(D.S.C. Dec. 12, 2017) (citing One Parcel of Real Prop. Known as 2121 E. 30th St., 73 F.3d 1057, 1059 (10th Cir. 1996)). A specific objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Report thus requires more than a reassertion of arguments from the complaint or a mere citation to legal authorities. See Workman v. Perry, No. 6:17-cv-00765-RBH, 2017 WL 4791150, at *1 (D.S.C. Oct. 23, 2017). A specific objection must “direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate’s proposed findings and recommendations.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687
F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). “Generally stated, nonspecific objections have the same effect as would a failure to object.” Staley v. Norton, No. 9:07-0288-PMD, 2007 WL 821181, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 2, 2007) (citing Howard v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991)). The Court reviews portions “not objected to—including those portions to which only ‘general and conclusory’ objections have been made—for clear error.” Id.
(citing Diamond, 416 F.3d at 315; Camby, 718 F.2d at 200; Orpiano, 687 F.2d at 47) (emphasis added). Because Plaintiff is representing herself, these standards must be applied while liberally construing her filings in this case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). III. DISCUSSION
As stated above, the relevant facts and standards of law on this matter are incorporated from the Report and therefore no further recitation is necessary here. (ECF No. 6). The Report ultimately concludes that this case should be dismissed for a variety of reasons including frivolity. In her response to the Report, Plaintiff has submitted a series of incoherent
ramblings that fail to elucidate her claims or in any way address the Report. Many of her statements echo those previously asserted and described as “legally frivolous” by the Magistrate Judge. (ECF No. 6, p. 4). Thus, Plaintiff has failed to provide proper objections to the Report or otherwise show why this action should not be summarily dismissed. Plaintiff’s filing fails to offer any specific reference to the Report which would allow the undersigned to focus on any issue, either factual or legal, with which Plaintiff feels has
been reached in error. “Generally stated, nonspecific objections have the same effect as would a failure to object.” Staley v. Norton, No. 9:07-0288-PMD, 2007 WL 821181, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 2, 2007). Because Plaintiff has failed to offer any specific objections which would allow for a de novo review, the court is only required to review the Report for clear error and is not required to give an explanation for adopting the recommendation. See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983). Consequently, this court has reviewed
the Report and finds no error which would warrant any further action or correction. To the extent anything in Plaintiff’s filing could be considered specific objections, they would nevertheless be overruled. Plaintiff has asserted a series of disjointed, baseless, and conclusory statements that fail to offer any support for her position. For instance, Plaintiff states: “Plaintiff has brought valid, well-documented claims arising from unlawful
utility shutoffs and denial of trust authority by the Defendant, which resulted in damages and, constitutional violations.” (ECF No. 17, p. 3). Additionally, “Plaintiff also invokes protection under the ADA due to disability-related hardship and the essential nature of utilities to maintain health and safety. Defendant's refusal to communicate with the trustee and continued threats of shutoff create undue burden and raise legitimate questions of
discrimination and unequal treatment.” Id. However, Plaintiff fails to support these assertions with any coherent evidence or proper legal argument. Accordingly, the court has conducted de novo review of Plaintiff’s filings and finds no error in the Report. Thus, Plaintiff’s objections are overruled. IV. CONCLUSION After a thorough review of the Report, the applicable law, and the record of this case, the Court finds no clear error in the Report. After a de novo review of each part of the Report to which Plaintiff specifically objected, the Court hereby adopts the Report and Recommendation. (ECF No. 6). For the reasons discussed above and in the Report, this action is summarily dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. IT IS SO ORDERED. Oneaeh 4 August 8, 2025 Joseph F. Anderson, Jr. Columbia, South Carolina United States District Judge