Johnson v. Belcher

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Georgia
DecidedFebruary 8, 2024
Docket1:20-cv-03409
StatusUnknown

This text of Johnson v. Belcher (Johnson v. Belcher) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Johnson v. Belcher, (N.D. Ga. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER JOHNSON, Plaintiff, Civil Action No. v. 1:20-cv-03409-SDG CHANCE BELCHER, Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER This case is before the Court on Plaintiff Christopher Johnson’s motion for leave to add Rob Kirschner and Matt Legerme as Defendants [ECF 68]. For the following reasons, Johnson’s motion is DENIED. I. Background The Court has already addressed Johnson’s allegations in detail in two separate orders and recaps them only briefly here. Johnson’s claims stem from the early-morning execution of a valid search warrant on his home in October 2019. During the search, Johnson was handcuffed and detained outside for a period of time, while entirely naked and in view of the public.1 Johnson originally named as defendants twelve police officers—including Kirschner and Legerme—and various John Does.2

1 ECF 34, ¶¶ 16, 20–25. 2 ECF 1. All the named defendants moved to dismiss. In granting their motions, the Court found Johnson’s original pleading deficient because it lacked allegations

about how each defendant allegedly participated in his seizure.3 The Court dismissed the Complaint but gave Johnson leave to replead certain claims.4 In his First Amended Complaint, Johnson named only Chance Belcher as a defendant,

along with various John Does (in place of the other specific defendants he had originally named).5 After another round of motion to dismiss briefing, the Court permitted Johnson to proceed on his claims against Belcher for (1) the allegedly unreasonable manner in which Johnson was seized and (2) attorneys’ fees. The

Court dismissed with prejudice Johnson’s state-law claims and his Section 1983 claim based on his allegedly unreasonable seizure.6 Belcher answered,7 and the discovery period began.

3 ECF 32, at 11–14. 4 See generally ECF 32. 5 ECF 34. 6 ECF 50. 7 ECF 53. After discovery had closed, been reopened, and closed again, Johnson filed the instant motion.8 Belcher responded,9 as did Kirschner and Legerme.10

Kirschner and Legerme did not, however, move to intervene in the case. II. Applicable Legal Standard Johnson seeks leave to add Kirschner and Legerme as defendants under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15.11 Although the appropriate rule seems to be Fed. R. Civ. P. 21,

which provides that the Court may add or drop a party “on just terms,” the applicable standard is effectively the same under either rule. Loggerhead Turtle v. Cnty. Council of Volusia Cnty., 148 F.3d 1231, 1255 (11th Cir. 1998) (indicating that,

under the facts of the case, the standard for deciding a motion to file an amended complaint to add a party was the same under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) or 21). However, when leave to amend is sought after the deadline imposed by a scheduling order, a heightened standard applies. In such instances, Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 comes into play.

Rule 16 provides that “[a] schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Once a scheduling order has been entered, the schedule should not be modified unless it cannot be met

8 ECF 68. 9 ECF 72. 10 ECF 71. 11 See, e.g., ECF 68, ¶¶ 1–2; ECF 69-1, at 4–6. “despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.” Sosa v. Airprint Sys., Inc., 133 F.3d 1417, 1418 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b) advisory

committee’s note to 1983 amendment). In assessing diligence in the context of a belated motion to amend a complaint, the Eleventh Circuit has indicated that a court should consider whether the plaintiff (1) failed to ascertain the relevant facts

before initiating suit or early in the discovery period; (2) had access to the information supporting the proposed amendment before filing suit; and (3) delayed seeking leave to amend. Id. at 1419. Put a bit differently, diligence should be assessed by a party’s “attempts to gather relevant information during

discovery, the timing of when the information became available, and how soon the party moved to amend after discovering the information.” Snadon v. Sew- Eurodrive, Inc., 859 F. App’x 896, 897 (11th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). A lack of

diligence ends the inquiry. Sosa, 133 F.3d at 1418. III. Discussion Before turning to Johnson’s request to add defendants, the Court addresses the opposition brief filed by Kirschner and Legerme themselves.

A. Kirschner and Legerme’s response Kirschner and Legerme are no longer parties to this action, the claims against them having been dismissed by the Court’s order on the original Complaint.12 Johnson omitted them entirely from his First Amended Complaint, pursuing claims only against Belcher and unidentified John Does.13 Even though

they are not parties, Kirschner and Legerme filed a “response” in opposition to Johnson’s motion to amend.14 But they did not seek to intervene under Rule 24 or supply any basis for the Court to consider a brief filed by non-parties. Cf. Auto-

Owners Ins. Co. v. Tabby Place Homeowners Ass’n, CV421-346, 2022 WL 17327497 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 29, 2022) (granting a motion to intervene by proposed defendants for purposes of opposing a motion for leave to amend to add them as parties). If the Court were to grant Johnson’s motion, Kirschner and Legerme would

have the opportunity to move to dismiss any operative complaint against them and thereby protect their interests. Likewise, they can suffer no prejudice if the Court denies Johnson’s request for leave since they will not become defendants.

Accordingly, the Court declines to consider Kirschner and Legerme’s filing. B. Johnson has not demonstrated good cause. A review of the timeline in this case amply demonstrates why Johnson has failed to show the good cause required by Rule 16 to amend his pleading at this

12 ECF 32. See also ECF 50, at 9–10 (holding that Belcher was the only named defendant in the First Amended Complaint). 13 ECF 34; ECF 50, at 11–14. 14 ECF 71. late stage. Belcher answered the First Amended Complaint on October 21, 2022.15 Accordingly, discovery began on November 21, 2022, and ended on April 20,

2023.16 LR 26.2 & App’x F, NDGa. Proposed amendments to the pleadings were due by December 21, 2022—thirty days after the start of discovery. LR 7.1(A)(2), NDGa. After that, and pursuant to the Court’s Local Rules, requests to amend the

pleadings were subject to Rule 16’s good-cause standard. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4); Sosa, 133 F.3d at 1418.17 There is no indication on the docket that Johnson attempted to serve or take any discovery before the close of the period. Nearly a month after discovery

closed, and three days before dispositive motions were due, the parties moved to reopen discovery for 45 days so that they could depose each other.18 The Court granted the motion and set July 3, 2023 as the new deadline for the close of

discovery, with dispositive motions due by August 1.19 A week after the close of the second discovery period—on July 10, 2023—Johnson first noticed Belcher’s

15 ECF 53. 16 Feb. 17, 2023 D.E. Discovery was briefly stayed from January 4 through February 17, 2023. Id.; ECF 54.

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Johnson v. Belcher, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnson-v-belcher-gand-2024.