Johnson v. Andrus

56 So. 2d 257, 1952 La. App. LEXIS 432
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedJanuary 23, 1952
DocketNo. 3490
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 56 So. 2d 257 (Johnson v. Andrus) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Johnson v. Andrus, 56 So. 2d 257, 1952 La. App. LEXIS 432 (La. Ct. App. 1952).

Opinion

LOTTINGER, Judge.

This is a workmen’s compensation proceeding wherein the plaintiff seeks to recover for total permanent disability. He alleges in his petition that the defendant, from November, 1947 until present, has been engaged in the raising of cattle and horses, a business which requires the use of a gasoline pump in order to water the animals and the operation of a truck to haul feed and care for them. He alleges further that he was hired -by defendant in October or November, 1947, at a wage of $3.50 per day, and that among his duties he was to operate both the gasoline water pump and the truck.

The accident upon which the suit is based is alleged to have occurred during either November or December, 1947, when plaintiff, while in the performance of his duties, attempted to start the gasoline pump engine. Due to a mechanical failure the crank handle flew from the fly wheel and struck plaintiff on his right knee. At this time, he avers, he suffered no disability or pain and it was not until approximately February 5, 1948, when his knee pained him to1 the extent that he required medical treatment. On or about April 1, 1948, the petition states that he was discharged by defendant because of his inability to perform the services required of him. Upon visiting a doctor he learned he had infectious arthritis, a condition which was finally remedied by a fusion operation which left him with a stiff knee.

The defendant filed exceptions of vagueness, no cause and no' right of action, and a plea of prescription and then, reserving his rights under the exceptions, filed an answer in which all pertinent allegations of the plaintiff’s petition were denied.

The trial judge referred the exceptions to the merits. After the completion of the trial, but prior to the filing of the plaintiff’s brief, the latter filed a motion to reopen the case in order to take additional rebuttal testimony. The rebuttal testimony sought to be adduced was for the purpose of disproving the contention made by the defendant that plaintiff -had been disabled prior to the time he came to his place. After argument the motion was refused.

Briefs were later submitted and judgment was rendered in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff then filed an application for a new trial which was denied. The case is now before us on a devolutive appeal taken by the plaintiff.

Before proceeding to a review of the merits of the case we will first address ourselves to the question of the correctness of the trial judge’s ruling with respect to the application for a new trial. In his written reasons for judgment the trial court concluded :

“From the testimony in the case the Court concludes that plaintiff has not shown that an injury occurred in this case and granting for purposes of argument that an injury did occur, the time of the accident is too remote that the Court cannot establish with certainty when the alleged injury took place. The Court realizes that this is a Workmen’s Compensation case but is of the opinion plaintiff has not made out his case with that certainty required by law of him in civil cases. The Court having come to this conclusion it is not necessary to determine whether plaintiff was employed by the defendant on the date of the alleged injury.
“Plaintiff moved for either a rehearing or a new trial. The Court is not certain which was -applied for because at this writing the application is not in the record. However, the case had been continued on several occasions and ample time was granted to plaintiff to prepare his case and the evidence sought to be had on new trial or rehearing, in the opinion of the Court, would have added nothing to the case, but would have merely been cumulative; accordingly the application was denied.”

Both the motion to reopen the case and the application for a new trial were based upon evidence which plaintiff wished to introduce to show that he was not injured or incapacitated previous to the time he was employed by defendant. Attached to his application for a new trial were five affidavits, all of which were .to the effect that plaintiff, previous to the time he moved on defendant’s farm, was able to perform a full day’s work and was not suffering from arthritis or crippled in any way.

[259]*259According to our appreciation of the trial judge’s holding he ruled that the plaintiff did. not prove that an injury did occur. The evidence which plaintiff wished to introduce in a new trial would not have been concerned with the fact of injury, but only with plaintiff’s physical condition at the time he went to live on the farm of the defendant. Testimony of this nature, while it may to some extent have shown the probability of the disabling condition developing during the time plaintiff lived at defendant’s farm, would not, to our way of thinking, in any way have shown the occurrence of an injury or accident as required by our compensation law. Certainly we find no such abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge as would justify a reversal of his ruling.

The conflicts to be found in the record in this case are many and varied. Not the least of these is the question of whether the plaintiff was ever an employee of the defendant or merely living on the farm through the good graces of the latter. Be that as it may, we will proceed by examining the correctness of the trial judge’s ruling to the effect that the plaintiff failed to prove the occurrence of an injury.

As so often happens no one else was present when the crank allegedly struck the plaintiff’s knee. Aside from the testimony of the plaintiff himself, we have only the testimony of his son, Mr. Allen Johnson, and his son-in-law, Mr. Harry Conner, both of whom testified that the plaintiff had complained to them of having been hit by the crank.

As opposed to the testimony of the plaintiff and his witnesses we have that of the defendant, who not only contends that no injury occurred but also that plaintiff’s knee was disabled when he first came to the farm.

The record contains the testimony of two doctors, one of whom testified on behalf of each litigant. The pertinent part of the defendant’s expert, Dr. Harry S. Snatic, is as follows:

“Q. Would you state what you found, what he came to you for and what was the result of your examination and treatment? A. I first saw Mr. Lawrence Johnson in my office on August 23, 1948. At this time he came in with complaint of pain in the right knee. There was demonstrable swelling of the knee, floating of the knee cap, with fluid in the knee joint. I asked Mr. Johnson if he had hurt himself at that time and he gave no history of injury whatsoever.
“The Court: What was that, Doctor ? A. I asked Mr. Johnson if he had hurt his knee, and he gave no history of injury. I aspirated the- knee and got about 75 c.c. of fluid from the knee joint, which is typical of chronic arthritis, you find in chronic arthritis conditions, and felt he had infectious arthritis. His knee was hot, swollen, tender and the man was actually ill. I sent him to the hospital and treated him as acute infection. Examination of the knee showed no evidence of any fractures or dislocations of the knee joints, no bone injury, with exception of chronic arthritic condition of long • standing. I sent him into the hospital that date, and treated him there. Had him in my office August 28, five days later, and aspirated his knee again, at which time I got in the neighborhood of 25 or 30 c.c. .of the same type of fluid.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Theriot v. Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp.
131 So. 2d 94 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1961)
Costanzo v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co.
124 So. 2d 621 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1960)
Broussard v. Dumas Chevrolet Company
120 So. 2d 863 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1960)
Card v. Southern Builders, Inc.
117 So. 2d 675 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1960)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
56 So. 2d 257, 1952 La. App. LEXIS 432, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnson-v-andrus-lactapp-1952.