Johnson v. Alexander

219 So. 2d 66, 1969 Fla. App. LEXIS 6137
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedFebruary 26, 1969
DocketNo. 2105
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 219 So. 2d 66 (Johnson v. Alexander) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Johnson v. Alexander, 219 So. 2d 66, 1969 Fla. App. LEXIS 6137 (Fla. Ct. App. 1969).

Opinion

McCAIN, Judge.

Pursuant to F.S.1965, Section 205.411 (1), F.S.A.,1 relator Katherine Johnson made application to the Board of County Commissioners of Seminole County for a permit and license to practice palmistry. Her application was accompanied by supporting evidence as required by the statute [67]*67and the clerk’s investigation report reflected that nothing could be found to prohibit the issuance of a license. Nevertheless the board declined to issue the permit. Katherine Johnson then sought mandamus to compel the board to issue her a permit. The alternative writ issued and then was quashed. It is from this order quashing the writ that relator now appeals. We reverse.

The legislature has determined the requisites for the practice of palmistry and embodied them in the language of F.S. 1965, Section 205.411, F.S.A. (now F.S. 1967, 205.351, F.S.A.). It is patent that the local boards of county commissioners cannot graft local provisions onto the statute nor can they rely upon their discretion in refusing to issue all permits to practice palmistry, thereby effectively outlawing the occupation.2 The record reveals that the respondents did not deny the application for any failure of relator to meet the statutory requirements. Rather it appears they refused to issue the permit because they disapproved of the occupation of palmistry.

It is not disputed that relator met the statutory requirements for the issuance of a permit to practice palmistry. Respondents, however, contend that they may within their discretion deny the application on other considerations. This contention is without merit.3

Having demonstrated satisfaction of the statutory requisites relator thereby established a clear legal right to the permit. Mandamus was therefore a proper remedy.4 Accordingly the order appealed is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.

Reversed and remanded.

CROSS and REED, JJ., concur.

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Related

Morse v. Seminole County Board of County Commissioners
372 So. 2d 132 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1979)
City of Miami Beach v. Mr. Samuel's, Inc.
334 So. 2d 47 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1976)
Cellon v. Johnson
236 So. 2d 22 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1970)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
219 So. 2d 66, 1969 Fla. App. LEXIS 6137, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnson-v-alexander-fladistctapp-1969.