Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc. v. Ciba Vision Corp.

712 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50599, 2010 WL 1730819
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedApril 27, 2010
Docket8:05-mj-00135
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 712 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc. v. Ciba Vision Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc. v. Ciba Vision Corp., 712 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50599, 2010 WL 1730819 (M.D. Fla. 2010).

Opinion

ORDER

TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN, District Judge.

Before the Court is CIBA Vision Corporation’s (“CIBA”) Motion for Permanent Injunction (Doc. 319) which seeks to enjoin Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc. (“J & J”) from future sales of the contact lens product which the Court has found to be infringing, J & J’s ACUVUE®OASYS. See Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc. v. CIBA Vision Corp., 648 F.Supp.2d 1294 (M.D.Fla.2009) 1 After receiving the parties’ papers both in support of and opposition to the Motion for Permanent Injunction (Docs. 319, 320, 347, 364, S-75, S-80), and allowing discovery, the Court conducted a two day evidentiary hearing on March 22-23, 2010, at which nine witnesses testified and the Court received one hundred fifteen exhibits in evidence. The entire record of the evidentiary hearing (Docs. 375, 376, 378, 379) and the parties’ briefs are incorporated by reference.

In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 126 S.Ct. 1837, 164 L.Ed.2d 641 (2006), the Supreme Court held that in patent cases, a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy the same four-factor test applicable to other requests for permanent injunctive relief:

A [patent] plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.

Id. at 391, 126 S.Ct. 1837. The patent plaintiff bears the burden of proving its entitlement to a permanent injunction. See Voda v. Cordis Corp., 536 F.3d 1311, 1329 (Fed.Cir.2008).

*1287 In many cases, and in this one, the issues of irreparable injury and the adequacy of monetary damages necessarily overlap. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F.Supp.2d 556, 569 n. 11 (E.D.Va. 2007). While a number of irreparable harm arguments were made at the hearing, the Court focuses on the issue of licensing. J & J argues that CIBA’s previous licensing of the Nicolson patents is evidence that it will suffer no irreparable harm if future sales of ACUVUE®OASYS are not enjoined, and that money damages are adequate to redress future harm. In analyzing this contention, the Court accepts CIBA’s position that the mere fact that a patent holder has previously licensed the patent to one party does not create a bar to the patent holder seeking permanent injunctive relief against a different, infringing competitor. The Court also accepts CIBA’s premise that some of CIBA’s licensing of the Nicolson patents occurred in the context of settling litigation and that this diminishes the significance of these licenses in the irreparable harm analysis. However, even granting both of these propositions, the Court still looks to the entire licensing history as relevant to whether CIBA will suffer future irreparable harm if an injunction does not issue.

In an instructive decision, Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 551 F.3d 1323 (Fed.Cir. 2008), the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of a permanent injunction following a jury finding of infringement. In so doing the Federal Circuit found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding irreparable injury notwithstanding that the plaintiff Acumed had previously licensed the subject patent. The Federal Circuit first found that:

While the fact that a patentee has previously chosen to license the patent may indicate that a reasonable royalty does compensate for an infringement, that is but one factor for the district court to consider. The fact of the grant of previous licenses, the identity of the past licensees, the experience in the market since the licenses were granted, and the identity of the new infringer all may affect the district court’s discretionary decision concerning whether a reasonable royalty from an infringer constitutes damages adequate to compensate for the infringement.

Id. at 1328. The Federal Circuit determined that, contrary to Stryker’s argument that the district court had assigned no weight to the two licenses granted by Acumed, the district court had in fact considered the licenses, but simply did not find them to be persuasive to establish lack of irreparable injury. The Federal Circuit noted that:

Absent clear error of judgment, which is not evident here, the weight accorded to the prior licenses falls squarely within the discretion of the court. A plaintiffs past willingness to license its patent is not sufficient per se to establish lack of irreparable harm if a new infringer were licensed. [Citations omitted.] Adding a new competitor to the market may create an irreparable harm that the prior licenses did not.

Id. at 1328-29. Notably, the Federal Circuit concluded in a footnote:

We decline to consider whether it would be appropriate under other circumstances to deny injunctive relief because the patentee had licensed the patented technology to other competitors. We simply note that the district court did not abuse its discretion here when it considered the licenses granted by Acumed along with all the other relevant factors and ultimately concluded that Acumed would suffer irreparable harm *1288 from Stryker’s continued infringement with no adequate remedy at law.

Id. at 1329 n. *.

Turning to this case, the facts adduced at the evidentiary hearing establish that CIBA has entered into four licenses of the Nicolson patents (which are due to expire in 2014), and previously offered a fifth license to J & J. (Tr. I at 140-41, 150 (Saia); JDEMO 90.) 2

In 2002, before this litigation commenced, J & J and CIBA discussed the possibility of CIBA licensing the Nicolson patents to J & J. While initial license discussions mentioned a royalty rate of 8% (Tr. I at 131-33 (Saia); JX 301, 302), CIBA, in a December 20, 2002 e-mail, offered to give J & J a license to the Nicolson patents in return for a 15% royalty. (Tr. I at 132 (Saia); JX 60 (“[w]e are willing to grant you a license to the Nicolson patents at a 15% flat royalty rate.... In exchange, you will give us a license to your [J & J’s] EW [extended wear] developments”). J & J declined CIBA’s 15% royalty rate offer. (Tr. I at 132, 175 (Saia); JX 302).) According to Andrea Saia, CIBA president and chief executive officer, CIBA made the offer in 2002 for several reasons: CIBA “was in a capacity constraint situation for silicone hydrogel [contact lenses];” “we weren’t quite certain what was going to happen with the overall silicone hydrogel segment;” and CIBA was interested “in helping accelerate the overall segment in our business.” (Tr.

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712 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50599, 2010 WL 1730819, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johnson-johnson-vision-care-inc-v-ciba-vision-corp-flmd-2010.