Johns v. City of Florissant

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Missouri
DecidedSeptember 14, 2020
Docket4:18-cv-01121
StatusUnknown

This text of Johns v. City of Florissant (Johns v. City of Florissant) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Johns v. City of Florissant, (E.D. Mo. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION

BRENT J. JOHNS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) Case No. 4:18-CV-1121 AGF ) CITY OF FLORISSANT, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on several motions filed by pro se Plaintiff Brent Johns. Plaintiff initiated this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights when they arrested him on March 1, 2017. Plaintiff is asserting claims against Defendants for excessive force, failing to intervene, failing to supervise, failing to provide adequate medical care, assault and battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. On March 30, 2020, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Plaintiff did not have a submissible case. (Doc. No. 50). Plaintiff did not file a timely response. On May 8, 2020, Defendants filed a “reply” where they noted that lack of response from Plaintiff and again requested the Court grant summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims. (Doc. No.56). By June 9, 2020, Plaintiff had still not filed any response to Defendants’ motion. As such, the Court issued an Order that Plaintiff show cause why Defendants’ motion for summary judgment should not be granted for the reasons set forth in their motion. (Doc. No. 57). Plaintiff did not file a timely response to that show cause order. On July 10, 2020, however, Plaintiff sent a letter to the Court in which he requested a status update on his case and appeared to be unaware that the Court had ordered him to show cause. (Doc. No. 58). Out of caution, the Court ordered that the Court’s June 9, 2020 Order be resent

to Plaintiff and gave him until July 27, 2020, to show cause why Defendants’ summary judgment motion should not be granted. (Doc. No. 59). A flurry of activity followed. Plaintiff filed a motion to appoint counsel (Doc. No. 63), along with a statement of material facts and a hundred pages and two CDs worth of accompanying exhibits. (Doc. No. 60-61). On Defendants’ motion, the Court granted

Defendants additional time to respond to Plaintiff’s filings. (Doc. No. 62, 64). Before Defendants filed their response, however, Plaintiff filed a motion to request extra time to file more documents (Doc. No. 66) and a motion to compel (Doc. No. 67). Defendants filed an opposition to these motions and filed their response to Plaintiff’s earlier filed statement of material facts. (Doc. Nos. 68-70). Plaintiff then filed a motion to

supplement summary judgment (which consisted of eighty-eight pages of deposition testimony—that Plaintiff had made handwritten notes on—from the criminal case that followed Plaintiff’s arrest) (Doc. No. 72), as well as two letters that appear to be a response to Defendants’ opposition to his motions for extra time and to compel (Doc. No. 74) and a request to receive a copy of Defendants’ summary judgment motion (Doc. No.

73). Notwithstanding the Court’s several prior orders referencing Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, this was the first time that Plaintiff specifically stated that he had not received a copy of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. On September 9, 2020, Defendants filed opposition to Plaintiff’s attempt to supplement the record with deposition testimony from his criminal case. (Doc. No. 75). For purposes of efficiency, the Court will address Plaintiff’s motion to request

time for documents (Doc. No. 66); motion to compel (Doc. No. 67); motion to supplement summary judgment (Doc. No. 72); and motion to appoint counsel (Doc. No. 63) in this Order. For the following reasons, all of Plaintiff’s motions will be denied. DISCUSSION I. Plaintiff’s motions to compel and to request time for documents.

In his motion to compel, Plaintiff alleges that he requested a list of relevant documents from Defendants which he never received. These documents include several Florissant Police Department manuals (including use of force and pursuit by vehicle policies); “background checks” (presumably, of the named Defendants); the Department’s hiring procedures; and dash camera and body camera footage from the

Defendants. Plaintiff requests the Court order that Defendants produce these materials, and further filed a motion requesting extra time to then file these documents with the Court alongside copies of depositions that were taken in his criminal case. In response, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s motions should be denied outright because they are untimely. Defendants assert that Plaintiff had eleven months to engage

in discovery, was provided several extensions to respond to Defendants’ summary judgment, and that, if the Court were to allow for additional supplement and untimely discovery requests, that Defendants would experience prejudice. Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s motion to compel should be denied because Plaintiff never submitted his initial disclosures to Defendants, meaning he is not authorized to engage in discovery. Moreover, Defendants argue that his motion to compel should be denied because the materials he requested are not relevant to his claims or do not exist. Specifically,

Defendants have stated that there is no dash camera or body camera video. The Second Amended Case Management Order, entered on January 23, 2020, states in relevant part: IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that following schedule shall apply in this case, and will be modified only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances:

. . . .

4. Following disclosure each party may engage in discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but all discovery in this case must be completed by February 21, 2020. Parties shall file motions to compel in a prompt manner and in no event after the discovery deadline.

(Doc. No. 45 at 1 (italics added)). Plaintiff mailed his motion to compel on August 11, 2020—nearly six months after the expiration of the discovery deadline set out in the scheduling order. Plaintiff, in essence, is requesting this Court to excuse the tardiness of his motion and to greatly modify this case’s scheduling deadlines to allow for discovery to occur after dispositive motion deadlines were due to be fully briefed. The schedule, however, “may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Petrone v. Werner Enters., Inc., 940 F.3d 425, 434 (8th Cir. Oct. 10, 2019) (quoting Marmo v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., 457 F.3d 748, 759 (8th Cir. 2006)). And, “[t]o establish good cause, a party must show its diligence in attempting to meet the progression order.” Id. (quoting Marmo, 457 F.3d at 759). Here, Plaintiff has not presented the Court with any reason for why his discovery request was so delayed or shown that he was diligent in attempting to meet the scheduling order’s deadlines. Plaintiff only asserts that he made requests for these

documents in October, but that Defendants never responded. If that was the case, Plaintiff should have diligently filed a motion with this Court explaining Defendants’ alleged discovery failures. In failing to raise those concerns until several months later, Plaintiff failed to attempt to abide by the scheduling order. As a result, Plaintiff cannot show good cause and the Court—in the exercise of its discretion—will deny his motion

to compel. See McMahon v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., No. 4:18-CV-583 CAS, 2019 WL 5213046, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 16, 2019) (“Because . . .

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Johns v. City of Florissant, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/johns-v-city-of-florissant-moed-2020.