Johns v. Ashmore

• Court: Superior Court of Maine
• Decided: February 24, 2023
• Docket: OXFcv-22-37
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT OXFORD, BS. CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. CV-22-37

TIMOTHY JOHNS, et al., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) V. ) ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS ) DAVID ASHMORE, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

Plaintiffs Timothy Johns and Ildiko Mizak bring this suit to determine their

rights to a private roadway. Defendants David and KaTin Ashmore have filed two

motions to dismiss. For the following reasons, the Motion to Dismiss Count VI of

Plaintiffs' Complaint is granted and the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Request fOl'

Punitive Damages is denied.

BACKGROUND

The court draws the following facts from the plaintiffs' Complaint and accepts

them as true for the purpose of considering the motions to dismiss. Moody v. State

Liquor & Lottery Comm'n, 2004 ME 20, ,i 8, 843 A.2d 43. The parties in this case

own abutting land on Rover Road in Dixfield, Maine. (Compl. iii! 9-24.) Although

previously a public way, Rover Road is currently considered a private ro'ad. (Compl.

,i,i 1, 3.) Disputes have arisen in recent years over the use of Rover Road, and some

of the defendants have attempted to physically restrict access to the road. (Compl.

ilil 36, 44-58.) The plaintiffs bring this action to seek a determination as to their

1 rights and the rights of the other abutting landowners to use Rover Road. (Compl. ii

8.)

The plaintiffs' Complaint was docketed on September 26, 2022, in the Oxford

County Superior Com't. Counts I, II, and III seek declaratory judgment. Count IV

alleges slander of title by the Ashmores. Count V seeks injunctive relief. Count VI

seeks punitive damages. The Ashmores' motions to dismiss were docketed on

November 14, 2022.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss under M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of

the claims in the complaint. Seacoast Hangar Condo. II Ass'n v. Martel, 2001 ME

112, ,r 16, 775 A.2d 1166. When the court reviews a motion to dismiss, "the

complaint is examined 'in the light most favorable to the plaintiff to determine

whether it sets forth elements of a cause of action or alleges facts that would entitle

the plaintiff to relief pursuant to some legal theory."' Lalonde v. Cent. Me. Med. Ctr.,

2017 ME 22, ,r 11, 155 A.3d 426 (quoting Moody, 2004 ME 20, ,r 7, 843 A.2d 43).

Allegations in the complaint are deemed true for the purposes of deciding a motion

to dismiss. Moody, 2004 ME 20, ii 8, 843 A.2d 43. "Dismissal is warranted when it

appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any set of

facts that he might prove in support of his claim." Johanson v. Dunnington, 2001

ME 169, ii 5, 785 A.2d 1244.

2 DISCUSSION

Motion to Dismiss Count VI

The Ashmores argue that Count VI of the Complaint must be dismissed

because a standalone request for punitive damages is not a cause of action. They a1·e

conect. See S. Port Marine, LLC v. Gulf Oil Ltd. P'ship, 234 F.3d 58, 64 (1st Cfr.

2000) (punitive damages "do not constitute a separate cause of action''). Rather,

punitive damages are a remedy that "must be based on underlying tortious conduct

by the defendant." Vicnire v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 401 A.2d 148, 155 (Me. 1979)

(setting aside a jury's punitive damages award where the plaintiff had failed to

establish liability for the underlying tort). Thus, Count VI must be dismissed.

However, that does not preclude the plaintiffs from pursuing punitive

damages against the Ashmores on thefr substantive claims if they can make the

proper showing at trial. See Franh v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 8, 13-14 (D.

Me. 2005). Nor are the plaintiffs precluded from relying on the factual allegations in

their Complaint regarding punitive damages. Id.

Motion to Dismiss Request for Punitive Damages

The Ashmores further argue that the plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient

facts to entitle them to punitive damages. The com't disagrees. "[T]o be entitled to

punitive damages, a plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that a

defendant acted with either actual malice (i.e., ill will) or legal malice (i.e., where

the defendant's conduct 'is so outrageous' that malice can be implied)." Corinth

Pellets, LLC v. Andritz, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-00082-NT, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169997,

3 at *12 (D. Me. Sep. 17, 2020) (citing to Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1361 (Me.

1985)).

Here, the plaintiffs have alleged that the Ashmores installed a locked cable

over Rover Road in a location that was difficult to access and have tlHeatened to

install a second gate or lock to obstruct the plaintiffs' access to the road. The

plaintiffs further allege that David Ashmore rnpeatedly confronted them over their

use of the contested road, tlll'eatened them, shouted obscenities at them, and threw

a set of keys at Timothy Johns' head. Johns has since obtained an Order for

Protection from Harassment against David Ashmore.l

Taken as true, the plaintiffs' allegations could be construed to establish ! malice. Anchors v. Manter, No. CV-94-214, 1997 Me. Super. LEXIS 55, at *21 (Feb. I' 19, 1997) (holding that malice was established by the defendant's "tlll'eats,

intimidation, brandishing of weapons, [and] placement of'no trespassing' signs and I i immoveable objects at the entrance to the right-of-way"). Dismissal is therefore

inappropriate at this early stage of the litigation. I i I I l The Order for Protection from Harassment is a court document referenced in the I! I Complaint and its authenticity has not been challenged (despite the misspelling of I Johns' surname as "Jones"). As such, it may be considered by the court. Moody v. State Liquor & Lottery Comm'n, 2004 ME 20, ,r 11, 843 A2d 43 (concluding that "official public documents, documents that are central to the plaintiffs claim, and documents referred to in the complaint may be properly considered on a motion to I I dismiss without converting the motion to one for a summary judgment when the authenticity of such documents is not challenged"). I 4

I The court accordingly orders as follows:

1. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count VI is granted.

2. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Request for Punitive Damages is

denied. Plaintiffs' request for punitive damages is preserved insofar as it is

applicable to the substantive counts in the Complaint, as are the factual

allegations made in support of the request.

The clerk is directed to incorporate this order on the docket by reference

pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 79(a).

l DATED: Julia I II J

I I I

II II