Johnny Reedy v. Cameron N. Bratcher

• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky
• Decided: July 11, 2025
• Docket: 2024-CA-0768
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RENDERED: JULY 11, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-0768-MR

JOHNNY REEDY AND LANORA KAY REEDY APPELLANTS

APPEAL FROM GRAYSON CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE BRUCE T. BUTLER, JUDGE ACTION NO. 22-CI-00260

CAMERON N. BRATCHER AND EDDIE SWIFT APPELLEES

OPINION AFFIRMING

** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: COMBS, L. JONES, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

COMBS, JUDGE: This case arises from a complicated and vitriolic property

dispute. Johnny Reedy and Lanora Kay Reedy (the Reedys) appeal an order of the

Grayson Circuit Court dismissing their complaint against Cameron N. Bratcher and

Eddie Swift. A dispute arose among the parties in 2016 with respect to the use of

Tanyard Spring Lick Road, which adjoins the Reedys’ property. After resolution of several related civil and criminal actions, the Reedys filed the action underlying

this appeal in November 2022. In their complaint, the Reedys alleged that

Bratcher and Swift (and others) engaged in a conspiracy to deprive them of an

interest in their property by having the disputed road to be declared a public

passageway. They alleged that Bratcher and Swift caused Johnny Reedy to be

cited for obstructing a highway and filed “meritless criminal charges against

[Lanora Reedy]” in an effort to “force the Reedys to relinquish or diminish their

property rights in Tanyard Spring Lick Road.”

The Reedys contend that the trial court erred by dismissing the

complaint as time-barred. After our review, we affirm.

The following summary is derived from the Reedys’ complaint, the

trial court record, and the unpublished opinion rendered in the parties’ first appeal

to this Court, Reedy v. Bratcher, No. 2023-CA-0673-MR, 2024 WL 1221268 (Ky.

App. Mar. 22, 2024).

The Reedys’ neighbors and others had used Tanyard Spring Lick Road

for many years before Johnny Reedy blocked the roadway with a tractor and other

obstacles in 2016. Bratcher and Swift contacted the county attorney’s office for

help. Swift also attended a fiscal court meeting on July 15, 2016, to discuss the

county’s interest in the road. By letter dated July 15, 2016, the county attorney

advised Johnny Reedy to remove the obstacles blocking the road. When he

-2- refused, Johnny was charged by the sheriff with obstructing a public passage in

violation of the provisions of KRS1 525.140. Nonetheless, Reedy kept the road

blocked. Some weeks later, the county attorney received a letter from the Reedys’

neighbor, Charlene Wilkins, urging that action be taken by means of criminal

proceedings to require that the obstructions be removed. Ultimately, in their

complaint against Bratcher and Swift, the Reedys alleged upon information and

belief that Bratcher “caused the Wilkins Letter to be composed and sent to [the

county attorney] as part of the Bratcher/Swift Conspiracy.” They alleged that

Bratcher also “put together a Criminal Complaint setting forth bogus charges

against [Lanora Kay Reedy] of Disorderly Conduct, Menacing, and Terroristic

Threatening.” (Citations omitted.) Eventually, both Johnny and Lanora were

arrested and charged with criminal offenses.

In 2017, the Reedys filed a civil action against their neighbors seeking

to resolve the status of the disputed road. Although, neither Swift nor Bratcher

was named as a defendant in that action, they were called to testify. The trial court

determined that the county had abandoned the passageway and that it was no

longer a public road. However, the court determined that the defendants had

proven an easement by prescription entitling them to use the roadway. The circuit

court ordered the Reedys to remove all gates and obstacles and to refrain from

1 Kentucky Revised Statutes.

-3- interfering with the reasonable use of the road by the other property owners. Reedy

v. Bratcher, 2024 WL 1221268, at *1.

In October 2022, the Reedys filed a federal civil rights action claiming

that the Grayson County Fiscal Court, Swift, Bratcher, and two county attorneys

had engaged in a “conspiracy” to deprive them of their constitutional rights. The

Reedys’ complaint also included state law claims for abuse of process. Swift and

Bratcher filed counterclaims based on state law jurisprudence. The claims asserted

against the county attorneys and the fiscal court were dismissed.

In August 2022, the federal district court concluded that Swift and

Bratcher were entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to the federal

civil rights claims, and those claims were dismissed. Once the federal claims were

dismissed, the federal court declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over

the state law claims pending among the parties. By the federal court’s Order, those

claims were dismissed without prejudice.

In November 2022, the Reedys filed the complaint underlying this

appeal, reasserting their claims for abuse of process against Bratcher and Swift.

Specifically, the Reedys alleged, upon information and belief, that throughout their

criminal prosecutions, the county attorney “constantly consulted with Bratcher,

Swift, and/or members of the [conspiracy], and, effectively, let those private

citizens control the criminal prosecutions against [them.]” They alleged that

-4- Bratcher and Swift instigated the criminal prosecutions and urged the county

attorney “to continue to pursue” them with an “ulterior motive” -- “to advance

and/or protect the private civil interests of themselves and/or persons associated

with Bratcher and/or Swift in obtaining unlimited access to the Tanyard Spring

Lick Road.” The Reedys alleged that they suffered damages as a result of the

wrongful conduct -- including but not limited to attorney’s fees incurred in

defending the criminal actions. They sought an award of compensatory and

punitive damages.

Bratcher and Swift answered the complaint and contended that the

action had been filed out of time. They also asserted counterclaims. In February

2023, Bratcher and Swift filed a motion to dismiss. They argued that the Reedys’

action had been filed many years outside the one-year period of limitations

prescribed by the provisions of KRS 413.140(1).

In response, the Reedys argued that their claim for abuse of process is

not governed by a one-year statute of limitations. They contended that the action is

governed instead by the five-year period of limitations set out in KRS 413.120

because the action is premised on an injury to property (i.e., the money used to pay

for their defense to the criminal actions) -- not an injury to their persons.

The Reedys contended that the five-year-period of limitations had

been effectively tolled by the federal civil rights action that they had filed against

-5- Bratcher, Swift, and others in 2020. Citing the savings provisions of KRS

413.270(1), they argued that the 2022 state court action filed in Grayson Circuit

Court was timely because it had been filed within the ninety-day period following

the dismissal of the federal civil rights action. The Reedys argued that where the

federal court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims, they were

entitled to renew their state law claims in Grayson Circuit Court.

Ultimately, the circuit court concluded that the Reedys’ abuse-of-

process claims were subject to the one-year period of limitation established by the

provisions of KRS 413.140. Consequently, the trial court ordered that the abuse-

of-process claims asserted against Bratcher and Swift be dismissed. The Reedys

then filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the summary judgment and Order of

dismissal. They argued that the trial court improperly relied upon two unpublished

opinions of this Court to support its holding. By its Order entered on May 4, 2023,

the trial court denied the motion to vacate but amended its prior Order to

incorporate its further analysis. The Reedys filed a notice of appeal.

After briefing, the matter was assigned to a merits panel of this Court

for resolution. However, we observed, sua sponte, that the trial court’s Orders did

not address the counterclaims asserted by Bratcher and Swift and that both of its

Orders lacked finality language. We recognized that while the trial court could

have made the challenged Order final and appealable, it did not so -- choosing

-6- instead to omit language that would have made its interlocutory Order subject to

our immediate review. Reedy v. Bratcher, 2024 WL 1221268, at *2.

Consequently, we were required to dismiss the appeal as having been taken from a

non-final Order.

In April 2024, the Reedys filed a motion requesting the Grayson

Circuit Court to make the challenged Order final and appealable under the

provisions of CR2 54.02(1). Although their counterclaims remained pending,

neither Bratcher nor Swift objected. The circuit court’s Order was made final, and

this appeal followed.

The single issue to be resolved on appeal is whether the trial court

erred by concluding that the Reedys’ abuse-of-process claims are time-barred. The

parties agree that our review of the trial court’s decision to grant the motion to

dismiss is conducted de novo. James v. Wilson, 95 S.W.3d 875, 883-84 (Ky. App.

2002). Consequently, we must liberally construe the pleadings, accepting as true

all of the Reedys’ allegations. Mims v. Western-Southern Agency, Inc., 226

S.W.3d 833 (Ky. App. 2007). If the Reedys are “entitled to relief under any set of

facts” they could prove, we must conclude that the trial court erred by dismissing

the action. Pari-Mutuel Clerks’ Union of Kentucky, Local 541, SEIU, AFL-CIO v.

Kentucky Jockey Club, 551 S.W.2d 801, 803 (Ky. 1977).

2 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

-7- The principles underlying the tort of abuse of process bear some

discussion at the juncture.

Generally, “one who uses a legal process, whether criminal or civil,

against another primarily to accomplish a purpose for which that process is not

designed, is subject to liability to the other for harm caused by the abuse of

process.” Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. Leggett, 307 S.W.3d 109, 113 (Ky. 2010).

“The improper purpose usually takes the form of coercion to obtain a collateral

advantage, not properly involved in the proceeding itself, such as the surrender of

property or the payment of money, by the use of the process as a threat or a club.”

Flynn v. Songer, 399 S.W.2d 491, 494 (Ky. 1966); see also Bonnie Braes Farms,

Inc. v. Robinson, 598 S.W.2d 765, 765 (Ky. App. 1980). “There is, in other words,

a form of extortion, and it is what is done in the course of negotiation, rather than

the issuance or any formal use of the process itself, which constitutes the tort.”

Simpson v. Laytart, 962 S.W.2d 392, 395 (Ky. 1998) (quoting W. Prosser,

Handbook of the Law of Torts, § 121 (4th ed. 1971)).

The provisions of KRS 413.120(6) establish a five-year statute of

limitations for actions concerning contracts, trespass, fraud, and “for an injury to

the rights of the plaintiff, not arising on contract and not otherwise enumerated.”

The provisions of KRS 413.140 set forth a one-year statute of limitations for

actions based on various injuries (inter alia) to the plaintiff’s person, conspiracy,

-8- libel, or slander. While claims for malicious prosecution are governed by the one-

year statute of limitations under the provisions of KRS 413.140(1), there is no

specific statute of limitations for abuse of process. Accordingly, the Reedys argue

that the “catch-all” five-year statute of limitations provided in KRS 413.120 for an

injury to the rights of the plaintiff not otherwise enumerated should apply.

In its analysis of issues as to the statute of limitations, the trial court

relied upon on our decision in DeMoisey v. Ostermiller, Nos. 2014-CA-001827-

MR, 2014-CA-001864-MR, 2016 WL 2609321 (Ky. App. May 6, 2016). In

DeMoisey, we held that a claim for abuse of process is governed by a one-year

statute of limitations as the tort requires an injury to the person or his property.

Having concluded that the abuse-of-process claim had been filed beyond the one-

year statute of limitations in that case, we remanded the matter and ordered the trial

court to dismiss the claim with prejudice. Id. at *14. The Supreme Court of

Kentucky denied discretionary review in 2018, but it ordered our opinion not to be

published. (Although Bratcher and Swift provide a citation to DeMoisey at 659

S.W.3d 757 (Ky. App. 2018), Westlaw duly notes that the opinion was published

in error and was subsequently ordered depublished by the Kentucky Supreme

Court in October 2020.) In light of this procedural history, we agree with the

Reedys that DeMoisey cannot be afforded binding precedential value.

-9- The trial court also relied upon Bardstown Capital Corporation v.

Seiller Waterman, LLC, No. 2018-CA-001886-MR, 2020 WL 3108238 (Ky. App.

Jun. 12, 2020), wherein we held that the circuit court did not err where it applied

the one-year statute of limitations to the plaintiff’s abuse-of-process claim.

Although the Supreme Court of Kentucky granted discretionary review in that

case, it noted specifically that the parties “do not raise any issues regarding the

abuse of process claim in this appeal.” Seiller Waterman, LLC v. Bardstown

Capital Corporation, 643 S.W.3d 68, 74 n.7 (Ky. 2022), abrogated by Bluegrass

Tr. for Historic Preservation v. Lexington Fayette Urban Cnty. Government

Planning Commission, 701 S.W.3d 196 (Ky. 2024). Nevertheless, once the

Kentucky Supreme Court issued its opinion on appeal, our decision was rendered

devoid of precedential value. See Laboratory Corp of America v. Smith, 701

S.W.3d 228, 234 (Ky. 2024).

While Kentucky courts are not bound by the holdings of federal courts

that construe state law in the course of their decisions, we believe that their sound

reasoning is helpful here -- especially since our Supreme Court has not given us

firm precedent on this issue. See Embs v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of

Lexington, Kentucky, Inc., 528 S.W.2d 703, 705 (Ky. 1975). The federal district

courts in Kentucky have consistently held that abuse-of-process claims are subject

to a one-year statute of limitations under KRS 413.140(1)(a). See Conley v. Frye,

-10- No. 17-CV-44-HRW, 2018 WL 771523, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 7, 2018) (citing

Dickerson v. City of Hickman, 2010 WL 816684 at *5 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 4, 2010),

and Bates v. Stapleton, 2008 WL 1735170, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 11, 2008));

Sawyer v. Boone Cnty., KY., No. 2:22-CV-00071-GFVT, 2024 WL 4860828, at

*12 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 21, 2024); Hall v. City of Williamsburg, Kentucky, No. 6:16-

304-DCR, 2017 WL 2274327, at *8 (E.D. Ky. May 24, 2017), aff’d sub nom. Hall

v. City of Williamsburg, 768 Fed. Appx. 366 (6th Cir. 2019); Maqablh v. Heinz,

No. 3:16-CV-289-JHM, 2016 WL 7192124, at *8 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 12, 2016); and

Jackson v. Jernigan, No. 3:16-CV-00750-JHM, 2017 WL 1962713, at *9-10

(W.D. Ky. May 11, 2017).

Based on the clear guidance indicated by the federal courts

interpreting this issue as well as the tenor of unpublished Kentucky state court

cases, we are persuaded that the abuse-of-process claims are subject to a one-year

period of limitations. In this case, the Reedys do not contend that their abuse-of-

process claims were filed in the federal court action before one year had elapsed

from the date of accrual. Therefore, their claims for abuse of process were

untimely as they were filed outside the one-year limitations period. Consequently,

the trial court did not err by granting the motion to dismiss.

The order of the Grayson Circuit Court is affirmed.

ALL CONCUR.

-11- BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Harry B. O’Donnell IV Joseph M. Harris, Jr. Louisville, Kentucky Leitchfield, Kentucky

-12-