Johnny Moffett v. Columbia Manor et al.

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: October 22, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-05906
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 10 JOHNNY MOFFETT, CASE NO. 3:25-cv-05906-DGE 11 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING 12 v. COMPLAINT (DKT. NO. 5) 13 COLUMBIA MANOR et al., 14 Defendant. 15

16 This matter comes before the Court sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Plaintiff, 17 who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”), submitted a complaint on October 15, 18 2025, against Defendant Columbia Manor, also known as Smith Towers Apartment Buildings, 19 and three individual defendants: Greg Franks and Roy Franks, owners of Smith Towers, and 20 Michelle Arevalos, administrator of Smith Towers (collectively, “Defendants”). (Dkt. No. 5 at 21 2.) 22 Plaintiff states that the management at Smith Towers has “hindered [him] from working, 23 made [him] afraid for his safety, and has engaged in discrimination and racism.” (Id. at 5.) In 24 1 support of this contention, Plaintiff attached a “Stalking Log for Protection Order Case,” in 2 which he details various interactions with a “Mr. Pearl,” who lives at Smith Towers in the 3 apartment above Plaintiff, and whom Plaintiff claims is stalking him. (Dkt. No. 5-1 at 1–2.) 4 Plaintiff alleges various examples of Mr. Pearl “stalk[ing]” and “harassing” Plaintiff in his

5 apartment by “going from room to room” with Plaintiff; moving his furniture around to let 6 Plaintiff know “he is watching him”; and making noise such as flushing the toilet while Plaintiff 7 is in the bathroom, tapping on the ceiling, or “stomping” over Plaintiff’s living room. (Id. at 1– 8 2.) Plaintiff alleges that on February 2 and again on February 5, he told Arevalos about the 9 alleged stalking and asked her to move Mr. Pearl from “over [Plaintiff’s] apartment, and she had 10 no response.” (Id. at 1.) In addition to his stalking log, Plaintiff includes a photocopied page 11 from a book related to the Klu Klux Klan;1 a “witness list” of people who can apparently attest to 12 the stalking;2 a copy of Plaintiff’s membership card to the NAACP; and a supplemental “stalking 13 log” with daily notes about the activities of “Charles Allen” and “Dale Pearl James.” (Id. at 3–5; 14 Dkt. No. 9.)

15 Plaintiff asserts a cause of action for violation of the Fair Housing Act for “racism.” 16 (Dkt. No. 5 at 3.) 17 Any complaint filed by a person proceeding IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is 18 subject to a mandatory and sua sponte review and dismissal by the Court to the extent it is 19 frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary 20

21 1 According to the declaration of Johnny Florez Rodriguez, “Charles put a KKK booklet in front of [Plaintiff]’s front door.” (Dkt. No. 7 at 1.) 22 2 The witness declarations corroborate Plaintiff’s fears that Mr. Pearl is stalking him (see Dkt. Nos. 6–8) but provide no connection between the alleged stalking and any action or knowledge 23 on the part of Defendants. The witness declarations also list “Dale Pearl” as the defendant, rather than any of the defendants named in the complaint. (Id.) 24 1 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. 2 Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir.2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not 3 limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 4 “The standard for determining whether [a] Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief

5 can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 7 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that screening 8 pursuant to § 1915 “incorporates the familiar standard applied in the context of failure to state a 9 claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). As currently formulated, Plaintiff’s 10 complaint is subject to sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(20)(B)(ii) because it fails 11 to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 12 The Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) “bars discriminatory housing policies and practices” 13 based on “certain protected characteristics or traits.” Sw. Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. Maricopa 14 Domestic Water Improvement Dist., 17 F.4th 950, 955 (9th Cir. 2021). The FHA makes it

15 unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate 16 for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because 17 of race . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). A plaintiff can establish an FHA discrimination claim under 18 a theory of disparate treatment or disparate impact. Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th 19 Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). 20 Here, Plaintiff appears to be asserting a claim for disparate treatment under the FHA in 21 that he alleges Defendants have engaged in discrimination and racism. (See Dkt. No. 5 at 3.) 22 “Disparate treatment is synonymous with intentional discrimination.” Ohio House, LLC v. City 23 of Costa Mesa, 135 F.4th 645, 661 (9th Cir. 2025). To prevail on this claim a “plaintiff must

24 1 establish that the defendant had a discriminatory intent or motive.” Id. (internal citations 2 omitted). There are multiple ways to prove such intent. Id. 3 Plaintiff’s complaint contains several deficiencies that merit dismissal at this stage. 4 Plaintiff states his belief that Defendants have engaged in race-based discrimination against him

5 generally but does not plead any facts to support this assertion, nor does he allege facts to 6 support an inference that he was discriminated against in one of the ways specifically prohibited 7 by the FHA. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). Further, Plaintiff’s complaint does not plead any facts 8 that create a connection between Mr. Pearl’s or Mr. Allen’s alleged conduct, Plaintiff’s request 9 to Arevalos that Mr. Pearl be moved to a different apartment, and any alleged discrimination. 10 Leave to amend should be denied as futile when “no set of facts can be proved under the 11 amendment to the pleadings that would constitute a valid and sufficient claim or defense.” 12 Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Harris, 847 F.3d 646, 656 (9th Cir. 2017); see also Lockheed Martin 13 Corp. v. Network Sols., Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 986 (9th Cir. 1999) (if the “legal basis for a cause of 14 action is tenuous, futility supports the refusal to grant leave to amend”) (citation omitted).

15 Here, the Court can conceive of no facts that would remedy the deficiencies identified in 16 this order. Notwithstanding, because this is Plaintiff’s first complaint, the Court cannot 17 determine with certainty whether any potential amendment may be futile without first reviewing 18 the proposed amendment. 19 Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. 20 § 1915(e)(20)(B)(ii). Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his complaint to attempt to cure the 21 deficiencies identified in this order. Any amended complaint SHALL be filed no later than. 22 November 12, 2025. 23 The Clerk is directed to calendar this event.

24 1 2 Dated this 22nd day of October 2025. 3 a 4 David G. Estudillo 5 United States District Judge

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