IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2025-KA-00058-COA
JOHNNY LEE THOMAS A/K/A JOHNNY APPELLANT THOMAS
v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/12/2024 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. CHARLES W. WRIGHT JR. COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: LAUDERDALE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: JUSTIN TAYLOR COOK
JOHNNY LEE THOMAS (PRO SE)
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: BARBARA WAKELAND BYRD DISTRICT ATTORNEY: KASSIE ANN COLEMAN NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 09/15/2026 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
BEFORE WILSON, P.J., EMFINGER AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ.
EMFINGER, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Johnny Lee Thomas was convicted of the first-degree murder of Garland Murray in the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County, Mississippi. He was sentenced to serve life in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections as a habitual offender pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-19-81 (Rev. 2000). After the trial court denied his post-trial motion, Thomas perfected this appeal.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. On August 7, 2021, outdoor surveillance cameras at the Old Marion Apartments in
Meridian, Mississippi, captured the events leading to Murray’s death. The video and audio recording of the incident was introduced into evidence at trial. Thomas testified that he drove Tommy Robinson and Matthew Chaney to the apartment complex that day so that Robinson could meet his wife there. Thomas testified that when the three men pulled into the apartment complex, he noticed an acquaintance named Marquis, also known as “Black,” in the parking lot on his right. According to Thomas, he kept driving past Black, took a left, and parked his car to the side of one of the apartment buildings. At the outset of the surveillance video, Thomas was standing in the parking lot talking with a group of men. Robinson was across the street from Thomas, near Thomas’ parked car, sitting at the top of some concrete steps leading up to an apartment building. Murray was standing at the foot of the steps where Robinson was sitting. In the video, Murray and Robinson were in the middle of a conversation that visibly escalated into an argument. Still engaged with Robinson, Murray proceeded to walk across the street toward the area where Thomas was congregated with several other men. At one point in the video, Murray walked back into the middle of the street facing Robinson, who had begun to walk toward Murray. Murray pointed at Robinson stating, “Man I’ll fight you.” Just a few seconds later, Murray pulled a gun from the waistband of his pants and fired a shot toward the ground in Robinson’s direction. The bullet hit the ground several feet in front of Robinson. After Murray fired the gun, Robinson ran in the opposite direction. Murray then turned away from Robinson and began to walk back toward Thomas and the other group of men. While Murray never pointed his gun at anyone else, the gun remained in his hand as he moved among the group. As Murray moved through
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the group, Thomas was standing behind Murray. While Murray faced away from Thomas, Thomas fired multiple shots at Murray. After Murray fell to the ground, Thomas fled across the street and got into his car with Robinson. The pair drove back over to where Murray had been shot to retrieve one of Thomas’ shoes that had come off as he was running towards his car. The last seconds of the video show Thomas and Robinson speeding out of the apartment complex lot while Murray remained lying on the ground. Murray was transported to the hospital where he died. Murray’s autopsy stated that his cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds. Murray sustained four total gunshot wounds. Two bullets entered Murray’s torso from the back, and two bullets entered Murray’s torso and right arm from the front.
¶3. After Thomas and Robinson left the apartment complex, Thomas drove to his friend Troy Reed’s home. Reed testified that Thomas’ wife, Taquaisha, called him and told him that the car that Thomas drove to his house needed some mechanical work.1 According to Reed, he assumed that the car was “broke down” and that they needed somewhere to store it until they got it fixed. In response to Taquaisha’s phone call, Reed told her that the car could remain parked behind his house until it was repaired. Before a warrant was secured for the vehicle, investigators received an anonymous tip identifying Thomas as the individual who shot Murray, and the individual identified the vehicle that he was driving. Investigators were able to corroborate the anonymous tip through additional eyewitness statements and by comparing Thomas’ social media pictures with the surveillance video. Detective Richard
1 The initial description of the vehicle that Thomas was driving was a white PT Cruiser. However, after review of the surveillance video, the vehicle was described as a white Kia Soul. Thomas’ wife, Taquaisha owned the Kia Soul, and the vehicle was registered in her name.
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Robinson testified that multiple investigations were going on at the same time as the shooting at the Old Marion apartment complex. According to Detective Robinson, one of those investigations involved a shooting into the home of Willie Ruffin. Detective Robinson testified that Ruffin was “a known associate of Mr. Thomas and Mr. Robinson.” According to Detective Robinson, the shooting into Ruffin’s home occurred “like five hours after the shooting at Old Marion Road in the early morning hours.” During the investigation into the shooting at Ruffin’s home, detectives found Thomas at the scene. Ruffin testified that on August 7, 2021, Thomas was living in Ruffin’s home in a studio in the back. According to Ruffin, on that day, Thomas left Ruffin’s home with Tommy Robinson and Matt Chaney. Investigators executed a search warrant at Ruffin’s home and found a pair of shorts that matched those worn by Thomas on the day that Murray was shot. Thomas turned himself in to law enforcement several days after the shooting, on August 16, 2021.
¶4. Thomas’ three-day trial began on December 9, 2024. During the trial, Thomas testified in his own defense and did not deny shooting Murray. Instead, Thomas claimed that he shot Murray in self-defense. Thomas’ version of events that occurred on August 7, 2021, conflicted with the surveillance video footage that was shown to the jury. After all the evidence was presented at trial and after closing arguments and jury instructions, the jury retired to deliberate, and the alternate jurors were dismissed.
¶5. During the jury’s deliberations, the court received a note from one of the jurors expressing fear and unease in rendering a verdict because witnesses and family members of the individuals associated with the trial had seen the juror’s vehicles. Ultimately, the jurors
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were brought back into the courtroom, and the judge assured the jurors that law enforcement would escort them to their vehicles and provide security at their homes if necessary. Later, during deliberation, the court received a second note, apparently from the same juror, stating that she was having high anxiety and heart palpitations and did not think she could continue. Although the court briefly considered replacing the anxious juror with one of the dismissed alternate jurors who had remained in the courthouse building, the judge did not do so. Instead, the judge called the jurors back into the courtroom and reiterated that all the jurors would have security to escort them to their vehicles and that security at their homes would be provided if needed. After further deliberations, Thomas was found guilty of first-degree murder. Thomas filed a motion for a new trial on December 20, 2024. His motion was denied on January 6, 2025. Thomas filed his notice of appeal on January 13, 2025.
ANALYSIS
¶6. Thomas had court-appointed counsel on appeal. Thomas’ counsel filed a timely appellant’s brief with three issues. Those issues are as follows: (1) The trial court erred by refusing instruction D-15-1 regarding defense of others; (2) the trial court erred by refusing instruction D-14 regarding “no duty to retreat;”2 and (3) the trial court violated Batson v. Kentucky3 by applying unequal scrutiny to the State’s and Thomas’ peremptory strikes.
2 Issue one and Issue two of the appellant’s brief filed by counsel will be consolidated within the analysis portion of this opinion as they both relate to jury instructions.
3 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992), and J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127(1994), prevent the parties, during the jury selection process, from exercising peremptory challenges to discriminate against potential jurors based upon their race or gender. This issue is typically raised as a “Batson” challenge.
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Thomas filed a document titled “Pro Se Supplemental Briefing in Support of Direct Appeal.” While Thomas’ pro se document is identified as a supplemental pleading, it was filed prior to his court-appointed counsel’s brief. Thomas’ pro se brief addresses an additional eleven issues. We first address the issues raised by Thomas’ appellate counsel.
I. Did the trial court err in refusing proposed jury instructions D-15-
1 and D-14?
¶7. Thomas contends that the trial court erred in refusing his proposed jury instruction D- 15-1 on self-defense or the defense of others. Thomas argues that he was denied an instruction that would have allowed the jury to acquit him if it found he acted in his own defense or to defend Robinson. Thomas also argues that the trial court erred by refusing his proposed jury instruction D-14 on “no duty to retreat.” He claims that the jury was never informed that he did not have a duty to retreat, and the instruction given failed to fairly announce the law of the case.
¶8. When reviewing a challenge to a trial court’s ruling on a jury instruction, the supreme court explained in Victory v. State, 83 So. 3d 370, 373 (¶12) (Miss. 2012):
[T]o grant or deny proposed jury instructions is within the sole discretion of the circuit court. Newell v. State, 49 So. 3d 66, 73 (¶20) (Miss. 2010). Thus, this Court reviews the grant or denial of jury instructions for an abuse of discretion. Id. No one instruction should be singled out. Id. Accordingly, the Court reviews the jury instructions as a whole to determine whether an error has occurred. Id. “A defendant is entitled to have jury instructions given which present his theory of the case; however, this entitlement is limited in that the court may refuse an instruction which incorrectly states the law, is covered fairly elsewhere in the instructions, or is without foundation in the evidence.”
Id. at 74 (¶20) (quoting Hearn v. State, 3 So. 3d 722, 738 (¶45) (Miss. 2008)).
“[I]f the instructions fairly announce the law of the case and create no injustice, no reversible error will be found.” Id. at 73 (¶20) (quoting Rubenstein v. State, 941 So. 2d 735, 785 (¶224) (Miss. 2006)).
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A. Jury Instruction D-15-1
¶9. Thomas’ proposed jury instruction D-15-1 stated:
The Court instructs the jury that self-defense and defense-of-others is a law of necessity. Every human being has a right to defend himself and others against death or serious bodily harm. But in order to justify the use of deadly force in defense, it must appear that the person attacked was so situated and endangered that the Defendant honestly believed, and that the Defendant had reasonable grounds for believing, that he or someone else was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm.
The circumstances under which he acted must have been such as to produce in the mind of a reasonably prudent person, similarly situated, the belief that the other person was then about to kill him or someone else, or to do him or someone else serious bodily harm.
The Court instructs you the jury that you are not to judge the actions of Johnny Thomas in the cool, calm light of after-developed facts but instead you are to put yourself in his place and judge his actions in the light of the circumstances confronting Johnny Thomas at the time, as you believe from the evidence that those circumstances reasonably appeared to him on the occasion; and,
(1) If you believe that under those circumstances it reasonably appeared to Johnny Thomas, at the instant that he took up a weapon, that Johnny Thomas then and there had reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of Garland Murray to kill Johnny Thomas or to do some great personal injury to Johnny Thomas, and there reasonably appeared to Johnny Thomas to be [in] imminent danger of such designs being accomplished; then Johnny Thomas was justified in anticipating an attack and using reasonable means to defend such attack;
then you must find Johnny Thomas not guilty of the murder of Garland Murray.
(2) If you believe that under those circumstances it reasonably appeared to Johnny Thomas, at the instant that he took up a weapon, that Johnny Thomas then and there had reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of Garland Murray to kill Tommy Robinson or to do some great personal injury to Tommy Robinson, and there reasonably appeared to Johnny Thomas to be [in] imminent danger of such designs being
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accomplished; then Johnny Thomas was justified in anticipating an attack and using reasonable means to defend such attack;
then you must find Johnny Thomas not guilty of the murder of Garland Murray.
The trial court instead gave jury instruction S-3, which ultimately became jury instruction C- 12. Jury instruction C-12 stated:
The court instructs the jury that to make a killing justifiable on the grounds of self-defense, the danger to the defendant or another must be either actual, present and urgent, or the defendant must have reasonable grounds to believe that the victim intended to kill the defendant or another or to do him or another some great bodily harm, and in addition to this, he must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is imminent danger of such act being accomplished. It is for the jury to determine the reasonableness of the grounds upon which the defendant acts. If you, the jury, unanimously find that the defendant acted in self-defense, then it is your sworn duty to return a verdict in favor of the defendant.
During the jury instruction conference when Thomas’ attorney requested the self-defense instruction, the judge asked, “[T]he self-defense instruction in D-15 is covered?” The State responded, “Yes, Your Honor.” In response the judge stated, “It’s refused. D-15-1 is covered. It’s refused. D-15-2, it’s refused; covered. Also, the court notes that under the rules[,] the [c]ourt’s not required to rule on this many multiple instructions that are basically the same.”
¶10. While the court did not give the instruction requested by Thomas, the court did give an instruction that covered both self-defense and the defense of others. Thomas’ claim that the jury was not instructed on his theory of self-defense or defense of another is without merit.
B. Jury Instruction D-14
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¶11. Thomas’ proposed jury instruction D-14 stated:
The Court instructs you the jury that if 1) Johnny Lee Thomas was not the initial aggressor, and 2) Johnny Lee Thomas was not engaged in unlawful activity, and 3) Johnny Lee Thomas was in a place where he had a right to be, and
4) Johnny Lee Thomas had reasonable ground to apprehend a design by Garland Murray to commit a felony or do some great personal injury, and
5) there was imminent danger of Garland Murray accomplishing such design,
Then Johnny Lee Thomas had no duty to retreat before using deadly force on Garland Murray, and you the jury cannot even consider the failure of Johnny Lee Thomas to retreat as evidence that Johnny Lee Thomas’ use of deadly force was unnecessary, excessive, or unreasonable.
The trial court refused this instruction, finding that this theory of Thomas’ defense was covered by other instructions. The trial court had previously approved jury instruction C-16, along with C-12 noted above. Jury instruction C-16 stated:
The Court instructs the Jury that while a Defendant may stand his ground and resist force by force, the resistance or force used by the Defendant may not be disproportionate to the attack or force used by the victim.
¶12. Thomas argued at trial, and on appeal, that instruction C-16 was not sufficient to properly instruct the jury on his rights in this regard. An almost identical instruction was, in fact, found to be insufficient in Haynes v. State, 412 So. 3d 1170, 1180 (¶¶33-34) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025). We find that Thomas’ right to stand his ground and the law regarding no duty to retreat was not covered by the other instructions, as stated by the trial court.
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¶13. However, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing instruction D-14 because there was no evidentiary basis to give such an instruction. In Shaheed v. State, 205 So. 3d 1105, 1112-13 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016), this Court explained:
The trial judge did not abuse her discretion by denying this “stand your ground” instruction. See Spires v. State, 10 So. 3d 477, 484 (¶ 30) (Miss.
2009). The Mississippi Supreme Court and this Court have held that it is within the trial judge’s discretion to refuse a “stand your ground” instruction when the defendant's own testimony is that he had no time or opportunity to retreat, and there is nothing in the evidence to suggest to a reasonable juror that the defendant could have retreated but did not do so. See id. at 485 (¶¶ 36-
37); Thomas v. State, 145 So. 3d 687, 694-95 (¶¶27-32) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).
That is the case here. Shaheed’s version was that he and Truss struggled; that Truss broke free and immediately reached for his pistol, which was in his waistband; and that he quickly shot Truss only to prevent Truss from shooting him. The State’s version was that Shaheed shot Truss in the head as Truss backed away with his hands raised. Neither version or any other evidence in the record pointed to an opportunity to retreat. Furthermore, other instructions adequately covered the general rules of law pertaining to self-defense.
We find the same to be true in the present case.
¶14. The video of this event was shown to the jury. The video shows that after Murray fired a shot toward Robinson, Robinson ran in the opposite direction. Murray then turned away from Robinson and walked toward Thomas and others on the opposite side of the street. Thomas testified that Murray walked toward him, still holding the firearm in his hand. Thomas stated that he was afraid Murray would shoot him; however, Murray walked past Thomas without acknowledging Thomas in any manner. After Murray had walked past Thomas, Thomas drew his weapon and shot Murray in the back. According to the video, Thomas fired at Murray less than five seconds after Murray had fired at Robinson. Just as in
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Shaheed, the video and other evidence clearly show that there was no opportunity for Thomas to retreat. This issue is without merit.
II. Did the trial court err in its Batson analysis?
¶15. Thomas argues that the trial court erred by applying “unequal scrutiny” to the State’s and Thomas’ peremptory strikes by accepting the State’s reasons for removing black jurors while rejecting Thomas’ legitimate race-neutral reasons. In the first twelve jurors tendered by the State, Thomas used eight peremptory challenges to strike jurors 6, 7, 8, 11, 15, 17, 20 and 22. The State made a Batson challenge stating that all eight of Thomas’ strikes were for white potential jurors. After considering Thomas’ race-neutral reasons, the court allowed four of Thomas’ peremptory challenges to stand, but four jurors were placed back on the jury. In the second group of jurors tendered to the State, the State used two peremptory challenges to strike jurors 24 and 28. Thomas made a Batson challenge stating that out of all the additional jurors who had been submitted, the State used its strikes against the only two black jurors in that group. The State first argued that Thomas had not made a prima facie showing that its peremptory challenges were based on race. Without ruling on the State’s contention, the court asked the State for race-neutral reasons for its challenges. The State then gave its reasons for each strike. As a result, this issue is moot.4 After hearing the State’s reasons for its strikes and the responses by Thomas, the trial court allowed the State’s peremptory challenges to jurors 24 and 28 to stand.
¶16. In Dewberry v. State, 407 So. 3d 269, 275 (¶¶21-22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025), this Court
4 See Jones v. State, 252 So. 3d 574, 581 (¶28) (Miss. 2018).
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stated:
The Batson decision established a three-part mechanism for determining whether a peremptory strike was discriminatory. “First, the party objecting to the use of a peremptory strike has the burden to make a prima facie case that race [or gender] was the criterion for the strike.” Miles v. State, 346 So. 3d 840, 842 (¶4) (Miss. 2022) (quoting H.A.S. Elec. Contractors Inc. v. Hemphill Constr. Co., 232 So. 3d 117, 123 (¶14) (Miss. 2016)). Under step two, “the burden shifts to the striking party to state a race-neutral reason for the strike.”
Id. Step three requires that if “the striking party offers a valid race-neutral reason, [then] the trial judge must allow the strike unless the other party demonstrates that the valid race-neutral reason was a pretext for discrimination.” H.A.S., 232 So. 3d at 124 (¶19). However, “[i]f . . . a trial judge properly finds the party has failed to provide a race-neutral reason [in step two], [then] the question of pretext never arises, and the juror is returned to the jury.” Hardison v. State, 94 So. 3d 1092, 1100 (¶28) (Miss. 2012).
“[We] appl[y] a highly deferential standard of review on appeal of a trial court’s Batson rulings.” Miles, 346 So. 3d at 842 (¶5). “In particular, a Batson ruling may not be overturned unless the record indicates that the ruling was clearly erroneous or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.”
Garlington v. State, 349 So. 3d 782, 803 (¶65) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
¶17. Thomas first argues on appeal that the trial court accepted the State’s reasons for the strikes to jurors 24 and 28 without scrutiny. Thomas argued that the State struck the only two black jurors on the panel. The State argued that juror 24 was the niece of a local judge. More specifically, the State argued, “That is Judge Harris’s niece, and with her relationship with Judge Harris, we didn’t know about her – even though she said she could be fair.” Thomas tries to compare this juror with a juror who was not stricken yet was employed at East Mississippi State Hospital (a State facility), but a juror with a family connection to the judicial system is not comparable to a juror employed with an irrelevant state agency. Thomas also argued that the trial court erred in overruling his Batson challenge against juror
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28. The State argued, “That was the lady that when questioned about self-defense said that she would rather kill than be killed. And based off that response, we’re going to strike her.” Thomas argues that white jurors who expressed strong views on self-defense or gun ownership were not challenged; however, Thomas does not refer to the record to identify any white juror to support this argument. In Clark v. State, 343 So. 3d 943, 962 (¶56) (Miss. 2022), the supreme court stated that “[t]here is no established requirement that a trial court must conduct a comparative juror analysis when one is not requested, and there is no requirement that a reviewing court must conduct one for the first time on appeal.”
¶18. Thomas next argues that when the State raised a reverse Batson challenge, the trial court “scrutinized the defense’s strikes with much greater skepticism.” The only specific example that Thomas discusses in his brief regards juror 6. The race-neutral reason that Thomas gave in response to juror 6 was “Juror 6 and Juror number 5 appeared to know one another. I observed them smile at one another when they were seated by one another, and I’d prefer not to have jurors who have prior friendships, prior relationships.” The supreme court held in Eubanks v. State, 291 So. 3d 309, 321 (¶40) (Miss. 2020), that the State offered a valid race-neutral reason for striking a juror who potentially had familiarity with another juror through their mutual employer. In that case, there was proof in the record that they shared a common employer. Id. In the case at hand, there is no proof of a relationship between juror 5 and juror 6 other than they smiled at one another when they were seated. Therefore, we cannot find that the trial court’s ruling in sustaining the objection as to juror 6 was erroneous.
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III. Does Thomas’ pro se supplemental brief present any reversible error?
¶19. Large portions of Thomas’ pro se brief fail to comply with Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 28, so at the outset of our consideration of his pro se brief, we note that this Court held the following in Hill v. State, 215 So. 3d 518, 523-24 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017):
The argument section of Hill’s pro se brief is a disorganized series of cursory and repetitive assertions of error with few citations to the record or relevant legal authorities. Hill thus fails to comply with the requirement that assignments of error must be supported by “the reasons for those contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.”
M.R.A.P. 28(a)(7). Arguments that do not comply with Rule 28(a)(7) are “procedurally barred.” Cowart v. State, 178 So. 3d 651, 666 (¶39) (Miss.
2015). “While pro se litigants are afforded some leniency, they must be held to substantially the same standards of litigation conduct as members of the bar.” Sumrell v. State, 972 So. 2d 572, 574 (¶6) (Miss. 2008) (quotation marks omitted); accord Thornton v. State, 141 So. 3d 5, 12 (¶28) (Miss. Ct. App.
2014).
We will likewise address only those portions of Thomas’ pro se brief that cite specifics in the record and make some meaningful argument as to why reversal is required.
A. Pro se Issue 1: The indictment was wholly void and erroneously amended to include habitual status without due process.
¶20. Thomas claims that the indictment against him was improperly amended to charge him as a habitual offender because the amendment was done “without notice, a formal hearing, or a motion to amend in open court—an egregious violation of procedural due process.” The record shows otherwise. The original indictment filed on January 12, 2023, did not include a habitual-offender enhancement. The State filed a motion to amend the indictment to charge Thomas as a habitual offender pursuant to section 99-19-81 on July 3, 2024. Thomas’
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counsel filed a response objecting to the motion on September 1, 2024. The State filed a reply to the response on September 2, 2024. The parties appeared before the court on September 5, 2024, for a hearing on the motion. At the request of the State, and without objection by the defense, the court took judicial notice of the two prior felony convictions from Lauderdale County, which the State had identified in its motion as the predicate offenses to be used by the State at any habitual sentencing hearing. Thomas testified at the hearing. After hearing the evidence and arguments presented by both the State and the defense, the trial court granted the motion to amend. This issue is without merit.
B. Pro Se Issue 2: Ineffective assistance of counsel violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
¶21. Thomas contends that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), for three reasons. First, he contends that his counsel failed to object to the improper amendment of the indictment to charge him as a habitual offender. For the reasons set forth above, we find Thomas’ claim in this regard is without merit. See supra ¶20. Second, he contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him at his guilty pleas for the prior convictions that those convictions could later be used to enhance his punishment in subsequent felony prosecutions. We find this claim to be without merit for two reasons. Counsel at the prior guilty plea proceedings had no duty to advise him that his convictions in those cases could later be used to charge Thomas as an habitual offender. See Griffin v. State, 607 So. 2d 1197, 1204 (Miss. 1992). Also, Thomas’ trial counsel in the present case could not collaterally attack the voluntariness of the prior convictions at the sentencing hearing. Thomas is required to challenge the
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voluntariness of his pleas in the prior cases by proceedings directly challenging the judgment in those cases. See Pulliam v. State, 328 So. 3d 93, 99 (¶22) (Miss. 2021). This claim is also without merit.
¶22. Thomas’ last argument under this issue is that his trial counsel “failed to move for a mistrial during critical prejudicial events.” Thomas sets out four specific instances where he contends counsel failed to move for a mistrial and one non-specific set of instances. Thomas contends that when a juror expressed concern for her safety, trial counsel should have moved for a mistrial. This contention is without merit because the record reflects trial counsel did move for a mistrial on this issue. Thomas also contends trial counsel should have moved for a mistrial when a “compromised” alternate juror was “nearly seated” after jury deliberations began. Because the alternate juror was not seated, this contention is without merit. Although trial counsel specifically stated that he had no objection to the court giving the instruction, Thomas maintains that trial counsel should have moved for a mistrial when the court gave the jury a Sharplin instruction.5 The trial court had the inherent authority and discretion to give such an instruction to manage jury deliberations. See Oats v. State, 425 So. 3d 540, 548
(¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025). This contention is without merit.
¶23. Thomas next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting a mistrial when the trial court refused to give a jury instruction to define “premeditated” after the jury had begun deliberations and requested a definition. The appellate record does not show that the jury made any such request, and this claim is without merit.
5 Sharplin v. State, 330 So. 2d 591, 596 (Miss. 1976).
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¶24. Finally, under this issue, Thomas maintains that his trial counsel should have moved for a mistrial due to an “overwhelming pattern of judicial bias and evidentiary rulings.” He does not, however, identify any evidence of judicial bias and points to no evidentiary ruling that would support his claim. Because Thomas fails to point to any example in the record to support his claim and makes no meaningful argument on this point, pursuant to Hill, this issue is barred from consideration on appeal.
C. Pro se Issue 3: Judicial and prosecutorial conflict violated due process.
¶25. Thomas contends that his convictions should be reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial because the same judge and same prosecutor who “handled Defendant’s prior conviction were assigned to this trial, raising serious concerns of impartiality and judicial bias.” Because Thomas did not file a motion for the trial judge to recuse prior to trial, we find that he has waived any objection to the judge presiding over his case. See Sanford v. State, 424 So. 3d 410, 413-14 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025). Thomas cites no case, and we find none, that prohibits the same prosecutor from prosecuting a defendant for multiple different crimes. This issue is without merit.
D. Pro se Issue 4: Trial court committed reversible error in the Batson analysis.
¶26. This issue was raised by Thomas’ appellate counsel and has been addressed above. See supra ¶¶15-18. Thomas cannot raise the same issue in his supplemental brief. M.R.A.P. 28(b).
E. Pro se Issue 5: The trial court erred in giving and refusing jury instructions, and the jury instructions failed to include elements
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of first-degree murder, all violating defendant’s right to a fair trial.
¶27. We first address Thomas’ claim that the jury instruction failed to include all the elements of first-degree murder that the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Thomas, however, fails to point out which element was missing from the instruction. Pursuant to Hill, this argument is also barred on appeal. See supra ¶19. In any event, to convict Thomas of first-degree murder, the State was required to prove that (1) Thomas killed Garland Murray; (2) without authority of law and not in necessary self-defense; (3) with deliberate design to cause his death by shooting him. See Willis v. State, 352 So. 3d 602, 617 (¶41) (Miss. 2022). The record shows that instruction C-10 included all these essential elements of the crime. This contention is without merit.
¶28. Thomas alleges that the trial court refused all his proposed instructions and gave all the State’s instructions. He contends that the defense’s requests for instructions as to “self- defense, defense of another, and lesser-included offenses (such as manslaughter or justifiable homicide)” were denied. However, the record shows that the court gave a self-defense instruction (which included a justifiable killing and defense of another) and two manslaughter instructions (heat of passion and imperfect self-defense). Thomas fails to identify a defense instruction that was wrongfully refused or a State’s instruction that was wrongfully given. He makes no specific arguments concerning any specific instruction. This issue, too, is procedurally barred pursuant to Hill. See supra ¶19. In any event, when reading the instructions in this case as a whole, we find that “the instructions fairly announce the law of the case and create no injustice.” See Hawthorne v. State, 835 So. 2d 14, 20 (¶26) (Miss.
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2003).
F. Pro se Issue 6: Jury taint, coerced verdict, and courtroom misconduct violated defendant’s constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial.
¶29. Thomas argues that the trial court erred in forcing a juror to remain on the jury after she requested her own removal due to anxiety and heart palpitations. According to the record, the jury retired to deliberate at 11:13 a.m., and box lunches were waiting for them in the jury room. After the court sent the jury out of the courtroom, the record reflects that the judge spoke with the alternate jurors and dismissed them. The court advised the alternates that the circuit court clerk had a box lunch for them and that they were free to go or stay to await the verdict. The trial judge then announced that the court would be in recess to await the jury’s verdict. The record reflects that a short break was taken, and then the court was advised that the jury had sent out a note at 1:38 p.m. The attorneys and the defendant were advised that the note read:
I feel uncomfortable making a decision due to not having much safety. We did not have a destination to park. Witnesses and family of the people in the trial seen my vehicle. Can we bring in an alternate juror.
This note was discussed on the record by the court and attorneys for the State and Thomas. The court indicated that it would call the jury back into open court and advise the jurors that deputies would be present to escort them safely to their cars and would assist the jurors in getting home if that was needed. After being given an opportunity to respond to the court’s intended course of action relative to the note, neither party voiced an objection to the process.
¶30. At 1:41 p.m. the jury was brought back into the courtroom. Apparently, before the
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court addressed the jury regarding the first note, a second note was given to the court. The trial court advised the jurors of the arrangements it had made concerning the jury’s exit from the courthouse. The trial court then addressed the second note, which had been signed by the juror stating that she was having a problem making a decision. Upon questioning by the court, the juror admitted that she had not answered the appropriate questions during voir dire, but she indicated that she did not know at that time what would be involved. The jury was then taken back into the jury room at 1:47 p.m.
¶31. During a discussion outside the presence of the jury, the court advised the parties that it was not convinced that the juror’s malaise was a sufficient reason to be excused by the court. The court then raised a question concerning whether either of the alternate jurors was still in the courthouse and whether one could be placed back on the jury. After bringing in one of the alternate jurors into the courtroom for questioning, the court determined that it would not be appropriate for him to serve. The decision was then made to have the juror continue her duties. The court advised that when the jury was brought back into the courtroom, the court intended to give the jury the Sharplin instruction. Counsel for Thomas indicated that he had no objection to the instruction. The jury was brought into the courtroom at 2:06 p.m., and the court gave the jury the Sharplin instruction. The jury again retired to continue their deliberations at 2:08 p.m. Immediately, outside the presence of the jury, counsel for Thomas moved for a mistrial because of the circumstances with the juror who asked to leave. The court overruled the motion. The record shows that the jury returned its verdict in open court at 3:35 p.m. As noted above, the trial court had the inherent authority
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to give the instruction to the jury in order to manage jury deliberations, especially in light of the interruptions caused by the notes. This issue is without merit.
G. Pro se Issue 7: Erroneous evidentiary rulings and jury instruction denial occurred.
¶32. Under this issue, Thomas fails to identify any evidentiary ruling by the court and fails to identify any specific jury instruction. This issue is barred from consideration on appeal pursuant to Hill. See supra ¶19.
H. Pro se Issue 8: Denial of access to trial transcripts and records violated due process.
¶33. Thomas claims that he was denied timely access to the complete record and trial transcripts. The record shows that Thomas’ trial counsel was allowed to withdraw, and the trial court appointed the State Public Defender’s Office of Indigent Appeals to represent Thomas on appeal. The notice of appeal and designation of the record was filed by appellate counsel on January 13, 2025. The Supreme Court Clerk filed the “Transcript Due Date Notification” on January 17, 2025, notifying the court reporter that the transcript was due on March 14, 2025. An order granting the reporter an extension of time to file the transcript set a new due date of thirty days after March 15, 2025. The reporter filed the transcript with the circuit court clerk on March 2, 2025. The circuit clerk was granted an extension of time to prepare the appellate record, with the due date set for thirty days after April 12, 2025. The appellate record was filed on May 12, 2025. The record does not show that any request was made by Thomas for records from the circuit clerk’s office. The Supreme Court Clerk sent notice of the availability of the appellate record to counsel of record on June 17, 2025. The
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due date for the Appellant’s brief was forty days after June 17, 2025. Thomas’ pro se “supplemental” brief was filed on August 5, 2025. The Appellant’s brief was timely filed by Thomas’ appellate counsel on September 26, 2025. Pursuant to Rule 28(b), Thomas was authorized to file a pro se supplemental brief; however, Thomas filed his pro se brief before his counsel filed his brief. We find no evidence of a denial of transcripts or records, and this issue is without merit.
I. Pro se Issue 9: The verdict of first-degree murder was contrary to law and evidence, in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights.
¶34. In this issue, Thomas contends that the trial court erred by not granting a directed verdict. He further argues that because the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, the court erred by failing to grant his post-trial motion for a new trial. His arguments are based upon the video evidence that shows that Murray was the initial aggressor and fired the first shot at Robinson before Thomas allegedly responded in defense of his friend Robinson. Thomas argues that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not act in self-defense or in defense of Robinson.
¶35. In Brisco v. State, 295 So. 3d 498, 510 (¶25) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019), this Court stated:
Motions for a directed verdict challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence.
Moss v. State, 190 So. 3d 9, 13 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015). All evidence introduced by the State, together with any reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom, is accepted as true. Davis v. State, 530 So. 2d 694, 703 (Miss. 1988). . . . The State bears the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the offense and did not act in self-defense.
Franklin v. State, 72 So. 3d 1129, 1136 (¶29) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (citing McIntosh v. State, 749 So. 2d 1235, 1240 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999)). “All credible evidence supporting the defendant’s guilt will be accepted as true.”
Brown v. State, 176 So. 3d 1, 12 (¶33) (Miss. 2015).
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¶36. The video evidence itself is sufficient to affirm the trial court’s refusal to acquit Thomas. The video clearly shows that Robinson and Murray were involved in a conversation away from the other group of men. Murray walked away from Robinson and joined the men across the street. The argument continued between Robinson and Murray, and when Robinson started walking toward Murray, Murray fired a shot into the ground between him and Robinson. At that point, Robinson turned and ran in the other direction. The video shows that Murray turned away from Robinson and walked through the group of men. When Thomas was in a position behind Murray, Thomas then pulled his weapon and shot Murray in the back. We find that fair-minded jurors could find from viewing the video that Thomas was not in immediate threat of harm from Murray. It does not appear from the video that Murray had even acknowledged Thomas’ presence.
¶37. Concerning our review of challenges to the weight of the evidence, this court stated in Flynt v. State, 183 So. 3d 1, 10 (¶30) (Miss. 2015):
The Court has summarized the standard of review for the denial of a motion for new trial as follows:
In reviewing a challenge to the weight of the evidence, this Court will overturn a verdict only “when it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice.” Bush, 895 So. 2d at 844. See also Amiker v. Drugs for Less, Inc., 796 So. 2d 942, 947 (Miss. 2000) (holding that a motion for a new trial is addressed to the discretion of the court and should be granted only “in exceptional cases in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict.”). As with challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court views all evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Id. Factual disputes are properly resolved by a jury and do not mandate a new trial.
Temple v. State, 498 So. 2d 379, 382 (Miss. 1986).
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Beasley [v. State], 136 So. 3d [3963,] 403 (¶35) [(Miss. 2014)].
(Emphasis added). It was a question for the jury to decide whether Thomas acted in necessary self-defense. In Tutwiler v. State, 197 So. 3d 418, 424 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015), we stated:
“A successful self-defense argument requires that the jury believe that it was objectively reasonable for the defendant to believe he was in danger of imminent death or serious bodily harm.” Wilder v. State, 118 So. 3d 628, 631
(¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Livingston v. State, 943 So. 2d 66, 71
(¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006)). “The question of whether the defendant acted in self-defense is a question for the jury to resolve.” Id. (citing Dubose v. State, 919 So. 2d 5, 7 (¶11) (Miss. 2005)).
The jury resolved this issue by finding that Thomas did not act in necessary self-defense or defense of another. This issue is without merit.
J. Pro se Issue 10: The trial court erred in allowing the State to argue that defendant’s post-incident flight created premeditation, misstating the law and misleading the jury.
¶38. Thomas claims the State argued that “the crime evolved into first-degree murder ‘after the fact’ based solely on the Defendant’s decision to flee the scene.” He argues that this argument by the State confused the jury because deliberate design must be present at the time of the killing. The State responds by arguing that there was no contemporaneous objection to the State’s argument at trial; therefore, this issue is barred from consideration on appeal. See Harris v. State, 384 So. 3d 493, 497 (¶11) (Miss. 2024). The State further contends that the claim is without merit because while the State did urge the jury to consider Thomas’ flight after the crime, the State did not ask the jury to consider flight to prove deliberate design. The State argued that Thomas’ flight was circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt, which is permissible pursuant to States v. State, 88 So. 3d 749, 757-58 (¶36) (Miss.
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2012). Our review of the State’s closing argument shows that the comment was that Thomas got rid of the weapon and went to his friend’s house and was hiding. The State argued that this shows a consciousness of guilt. This issue is without merit.
K. Pro se Issue 11: The trial court violated the defendant’s right to an impartial jury and due process when it nearly reseated an alternate juror who had been improperly contacted by the circuit clerk about the merits of the case.
¶39. As stated above, the trial court did not place the alternate juror back on the jury after deliberations had begun.6 The questioning of the alternate juror took place outside the presence of the jury and in no way impacted the jury deliberations or the defendant’s right to a fair trial. This issue is without merit.
CONCLUSION
¶40. Having found no reversible error, we affirm Thomas’ conviction and sentence.
¶41. AFFIRMED.
BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR.
6 Pursuant to MRCrP 47(d), an alternate juror can only replace a juror prior to the time the jury begins its deliberations.