STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT
2023 CA 0145
JOHNNIE STOCKTON, III A VERSUS
SANDRA STOCKTON
JUDGMENT RENDERED: OCT 1. 8 2M
Appealed from The Twenty -First Judicial District Court Parish of Livingston • State of Louisiana Docket Number 165, 238 • Division K
The Honorable Jeffery T. Oglesbee, Presiding Judge
Jenel Guidry Secrease COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT Ponchatoula, Louisiana PLAINTnor— Johnnie Stockton, III
Sherman Q. Mack COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE C. Glenn Westmoreland DEFENDANT— Sandra Stockton
Kimberly L. Resetar Albany, Louisiana
BEFORE: WELCH, HOLDRIDGE, AND WOLFE, JJ. WELCH, J.
Johnnie Stockton, III appeals a judgment partitioning the community of
acquets and gains previously existing between him and Sandra Stockton and
awarding Sandra Stockton final spousal support for a period of five years. Finding
neither manifest error in the trial court' s underlying factual findings nor an abuse of
the trial court' s vast discretion with regard to such matters, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Stockton and Ms. Stockton were married on December 7, 1985, and
during their marriage, they had three children, all of whom are now majors. The
parties physically separated around September 17, 2020, and on October 19, 2020,
Mr. Stockton filed a petition for divorce. On October 27, 2020, Ms. Stockton filed
an answer and reconventional demand, likewise seeking a divorce as well as other
incidental relief.
On December 2, 2020, the parties entered into a stipulated judgment. Among
other things, this stipulated judgment terminated the parties' community property
regime, and it awarded Ms. Stockton exclusive use of the former matrimonial
domicile, subject to the reservation of Mr. Stockton' s right to seek rental
reimbursement for Ms. Stockton' s exclusive use of the home. The stipulated
judgment also provided that beginning December 15, 2020, Mr. Stockton would
pay the mortgage, property tax, and [ homeowner' s] insurance on the former
matrimonial domicile[,]" that he would pay "[ Ms.] Stockton' s vehicle note and auto
insurance as interim spousal support[,]" and that he would " pay $ 500. 00 to [ Ms.]
Stockton as interim spousal [ support]," with no retroactive support being owed.
Mr. Stockton subsequently filed a petition to partition community property,
together with a detailed descriptive list of community assets, community liabilities,
and reimbursement claims. Thereafter, on November 16, 2021, a judgment of
divorce was rendered and signed. Ms. Stockton subsequently filed a rule for
2 contempt, claiming that Mr. Stockton had violated the terms of the December 2,
2020 stipulated judgment and was in contempt of court because he stopped paying
the mortgage, deeming it interim spousal support that was no longer owed, and a
rule seeking permanent spousal support.
A trial to partition the community and on Ms. Stockton' s rule for contempt
and permanent spousal support was held on September 22, 2022, A joint detailed
descriptive list setting forth both parties lists of community assets, community
liabilities, and reimbursement claims, as well as their concurrences and traversals
was offered into evidence. As evidenced by the joint detailed descriptive list, the
partition portion of the trial involved numerous claims between the parties.
However, of particular importance to this appeal were the following issues: ( 1) the
value and allocation of the community enterprise, Stockton Paint Company; ( 2) the
value and allocation of community movables that were located in the matrimonial
domicile until it was sold and that were thereafter disposed of by Ms. Stockton; ( 3)
Ms. Stockton' s reimbursement claim for community funds used to purchase and
improve a camp that was Mr. Stockton' s separate property, which was destroyed by
Hurricane Ida ( but was insured); and ( 4) Mr. Stockton' s reimbursement claim for
one- half of the fair market rental value of the matrimonial domicile due to Ms.
Stockton' s exclusive use and occupancy of that home.
At the conclusion of trial, the trial court took the matter under advisement,
and thereafter, on October 17, 2022, issued written reasons for judgment partitioning
the community, adjudicating the reimbursement claims of the parties, and awarding
Ms. Stockton permanent spousal support. With regard to the community property
partition issues pertinent to this appeal, the trial court valued Stockton Paint
Company at $ 202, 000.00, which was based on the testimony of Michelle Avery, an
expert witness, and it allocated that asset to Mr. Stockton. Further, the trial court,
noting the " inherent lack of evidence" regarding the value of the community
3 movables that were previously located in the matrimonial domicile, determined that
those community movables had no inherent value, as those items were donated or
disposed of by Ms. Stockton following the sale of the matrimonial domicile and
neither Mr. Stockton nor Ms. Stockton made arrangements to preserve those items.
Therefore, the trial court did not place a value or allocate any of those movables.
The trial court granted Ms. Stockton' s reimbursement claim for one- half of the
community funds that were used to acquire and improve the camp that was Mr.
Stockton' s separate property in the amount of $45, 000. 00. The trial court also
granted Mr. Stockton' s claim for reimbursement for one- half the fair market rental
value of the matrimonial domicile due to Ms. Stockton' s exclusive use, set the fair
market rental value at $ 722.00, which was the amount of the monthly mortgage note
on the home, and awarded him reimbursement in the total amount of $7, 581. 00.
With regard to permanent spousal support, the trial court found that Ms. Stockton
was free from fault in the termination of the marriage, that Ms. Stockton was in need
of support, and that Mr. Stockton had the ability to pay support. Therefore, based
on the evidence, the trial court awarded Ms. Stockton permanent spousal support in
the amount of $300. 00 per month for a period of five years from the termination of
her interim spousal support on May 15, 2022.
A judgment in accordance with the trial court' s written reasons for judgment
was signed on November 15, 2022. Mr. Stockton now appeals, challenging the trial
court' s ruling with regard to the value and allocation of Stockton Paint Company;
the value of and failure to allocate to Ms. Stockton the community movables that
were in the matrimonial domicile until it was sold; Ms. Stockton' s reimbursement
claim for community funds that were used to purchase and improve the camp that
was Mr. Stockton' s separate property; the fair market rental value placed on the
former matrimonial domicile by the trial court in adjudicating his reimbursement
claim in that regard; and its award of permanent spousal support to Ms. Stockton.
4 COMMUNITY PROPERTY PARTITION
When the spouses are unable to agree on a partition of community property
or on the settlement of the claims between the spouses arising either from the
matrimonial regime, or from the co -ownership of former community property
following termination of the matrimonial regime, either spouse, as an incident of the
action that would result in a termination of the matrimonial regime or upon
termination of the matrimonial regime or thereafter, may institute a community
property partition. La. R. S. 9: 2801( A).
The court shall partition the community by valuing the assets as of the time of
trial on the merits, determining the liabilities, and adjudicating the claims of the
parties. La. R.S. 9: 2801( A)(4)( a). The court shall divide the community assets and
liabilities so that each spouse receives property of an equal net value. La. R.S.
9: 2801( A)(4)( b). The court shall allocate or assign to the respective spouses all of
the community assets and liabilities. La. R. S. 9: 280 1 ( A)(4)( c). In deciding to whom
an asset or liability shall be allocated, the court shall consider the nature and source
of the asset or liability, the economic condition of each spouse, and any other
circumstances the court deems relevant. La. R. S. 9: 2801( A)(4)( c).
A trial court' s factual findings and credibility determinations made in the
course of valuing and allocating assets and liabilities in the partition of community
property may not be set aside absent manifest error or unless clearly wrong.
Berthelot v. Berthelot, 2017- 1055 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 7118118), 254 So. 3d 800, 806.
In valuing assets, the trial court is not required to accept, at face value, the valuation
placed on assets by either spouse. If the trial court' s valuations are reasonably
supported by the record and do not constitute an abuse of discretion, its
determinations should be affirmed. Berthelot, 254 So. 3d at 816; Rao v. Rao, 2005-
0059 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 11/ 4105), 927 So. 2d 356, 360- 361, writ denied, 2005- 2453
La. 3/ 24/ 06), 925 So. 2d 1232. Furthermore, the trial court' s allocation or assigning
5 of assets and liabilities in the partition of community property is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Berthelot, 254 So. 3d at 808. Likewise,
reimbursements are factual determinations and absent manifest error or an abuse of
discretion, the trial court' s decision should not be disturbed on appeal. Pierce v.
Pierce, 2019- 0689 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 2/ 21/ 2020), 298 So -3d 902, 911
On appeal, Mr. Stockton contends that the trial court erred in valuing Stockton
Paint Company at $ 202, 000. 00 and in allocating it to him. According to the record,
during the parties' marriage, Mr. Stockton re -started Stockton Paint Company,
which was a company that Mr. Stockton and his father had started. Mr. Stockton
testified that the business does approximately 90% commercial painting, that it
employs himself and the parties' major son, and that it consists of four ladders, two
spray rigs, and Mr. Stockton' s personal cell phone number. According to Mr.
Stockton, Stockton Paint Company had a value of $53, 000.00 and he was willing to
have it valued at $ 50, 000. 00 and allocated to Ms. Stockton in the partition.
On the other hand, Ms. Stockton offered the testimony of Michelle Avery, a
Certified Public Accountant who is also certified in business evaluations. Ms. Avery
was retained by Ms. Stockton for the purpose of valuing Stockton Paint Company.
In connection with Ms. Avery' s testimony, a report by Ms. Avery was also
introduced, which explained Ms. Avery' s methodology in determining the value of
Stockton Paint Company. According to Ms. Avery' s testimony and report, she
considered two approaches to valuing Stockton Paint Company: the income -based
approach, which yielded a value of $390, 000. 00 and the market- based approach,
which yielded a value of $182, 000. 00. Ms. Avery explained that the income -based
approach is the value of the company with goodwill, whereas the market-based
approach excludes goodwill. According to Ms. Avery' s report, as of December 21,
2021, Stockton Paint Company had a value of approximately $ 202, 000. 00. Ms.
Avery explained that this number was based on the value from the market-based
rn of $ 182, 000. 00 ( approach the value of the company without Mr. Stockton' s
goodwill) plus the sum of $20,000.00, which was the amount of excess working
capital that was in the company' s bank account.
In its written reasons for judgment, the trial court found that Ms. Avery " had
completed a comprehensive review of the company[,] which included her review of
similar situated companies, the bank statements and tax information for the
company, including the revenue history for the last five years." The trial court also
found Ms. Avery' s testimony " very [ informative] and enlightening regarding the
methodology and analysis regarding her valuation" of Stockton Paint Company. The
trial court further found that, despite Mr. Stockton' s testimony that the " company
was a one-man show with only his son as a consistent employee, the evidence
suggest[ ed] otherwise." Therefore, based on the testimony of Ms. Avery and the
other evidence, the trial court found that Stockton Paint Company had a fair market
value of $202, 000. 00, and it allocated that asset to Mr. Stockton.
Based on our review of the record and the evidence at trial, we find the trial
court' s factual finding that Stockton Paint Company had a value of $202, 000. 00 to
be reasonably supported by the record, particularly the testimony of Ms. Avery and,
as such, it is not manifestly erroneous. While Mr. Stockton obviously disagreed with
Ms. Avery' s opinion and the method that she used to place a value on the business,
the trial court' s decision to credit the testimony of Ms. Avery over that of Mr.
Stockton was not manifestly erroneous. Indeed, the trier of fact is free to accept or
reject the testimony of any witness, and further, its reasonable evaluations of
credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed on review.
Berthelot, 254 So.3d at 806- 507 and 509. Likewise, considering all of the evidence
regarding the nature of Stockton Paint Company, how it was run during the marriage
by Mr. Stockton, and the circumstances of the parties, we cannot say that the trial
7 court' s decision to allocate that asset to Mr. Stockton was an abuse of its vast
discretion.
Next, with respect to the valuation and/ or allocation of community movables
that were in the matrimonial domicile prior to it being sold, Mr. Stockton contends
that the trial court should have assessed Ms. Stockton with the value of those
movables since she unilaterally disposed of them. The community movables that
Mr. Stockton claims that the trial court should have included were approximately
fifty items, which were essentially household and personal items such as workout
equipment, dishes, pots and pans, used television sets and other appliances. The trial
court noted, in its reasons for judgment, that the parties disagreed about the value of
the household items, furniture and movables, and that the majority of the values that
the parties placed on their detailed descriptive list were " their own guess as to the
value of the respective items." The trial court noted that "[ i] n addition to the inherent
lack of evidence regarding the valu[ e] of these items," the evidence revealed that
following the sale of the matrimonial domicile, Ms. Stockton knew that they had
approximately thirty days in which to vacate the home and to allocate the household
items acquired during the parties' marriage. The trial court further noted that Ms.
Stockton testified that she sent Mr. Stockton a proposal regarding the division of the
movables and she also provided him with several dates and times wherein he could
retrieve any items from the home. Mr. Stockton testified that he did not agree with
Ms. Stockton' s allocation of the community movables or her demands as to when he
could access the former matrimonial domicile. Therefore, he never went to the
matrimonial domicile to retrieve any items. According to Ms. Stockton, because she
had to vacate the matrimonial domicile and had nowhere to store items remaining in
the home, she had to donate the items. The trial court, noting that Mr. Stockton
failed to make arrangements to remove any of the community movables, but was
claiming, at trial, that those movables had significant value, declined to value those
EVu items, finding that had Mr. Stockton or Ms. Stockton believed those items had any inherent value, they would have made arrangements to preserve those items prior to
the sale of the matrimonial domicile.
Based on our review of the record, including the lack of evidence establishing
any value of those community movables, household items, or personal items, we
find no error in the trial court' s factual finding that those movable had no value nor
in its decision not to allocate those items.
Next, with respect to reimbursement claims, Mr. Stockton challenges the trial
court' s decision to award Ms. Stockton reimbursement for community funds that
were used to acquire and improve a camp that was Mr. Stockton' s separate property,
which, although destroyed by Hurricane Ida, was insured. Mr. Stockton' s testimony
revealed that he used $ 70,000. 00 in community funds to acquire this camp and that
he spent an additional " 15, 20 thousand" in community funds to improve that camp.
Based on this testimony, the trial court awarded Ms. Stockton reimbursement in the
amount of $45, 000. 00 or one- half of $90, 000. 00 ($ 70, 000. 00 + $ 20, 000. 00).
On appeal, Mr. Stockton, noting that the court is required to value the assets
as of the time of trial on the merits, argues that since the camp was destroyed by
Hurricane Ida, it had no value. Therefore, Mr. Stockton contends that it was
inequitable for Mr. Stockton to owe reimbursement in the amount of $45, 000. 00 for
something that he no longer has. However, we find no merit to this argument.
First, and foremost, we note that La. R. S. 9: 2801( A)(4)( a) provides that the
court shall partition the community by valuing the assets as of the time of trial on
the merits, determining the liabilities, and adjudicating the claims of the parties.
Notably, the camp was not a community asset to be valued at trial and partitioned in
the community— it was Mr. Stockton' s separate property. Further, Mrs. Stockton
made a reimbursement claim, which was a claim to be adjudicated by the trial court.
Ms. Stockton' s reimbursement claim was based on La. C. C. art. 2366, which
9 provides that " Ji] f community property has been used during the existence of the
community property regime ... for the acquisition, use, improvement, or benefit of
the separate property of a spouse, the other spouse is entitled to reimbursement for
one-half of the amount or value that the community property had at the time it
was used." ( Emphasis added).
Therefore, based on the clear and unambiguous language of this article, Ms.
Stockton' s reimbursement claim is based on the value the community property had
at the time it was used. Further, she is entitled to reimbursement for the value of the
community property at the time it was used, regardless of the value of the separate
property at the time of trial. Therefore, based on the applicable law and the
testimony of Mr. Stockton that he utilized $70, 000.00 in community funds to acquire
the camp and that he used an additional $ 15, 000. 00-$ 20,000.00 in community funds
on improvements ( for a total sum of approximately $$ 5, 000. 00-$ 90, 000. 00 in
community funds on his separate property), we find no manifest error or abuse of
discretion in the trial court' s award of reimbursement to Ms. Stockton in the amount
of $45, 000. 00, which sum represents one-half of the value of community funds used.
Mr. Stockton also challenges the amount of reimbursement he was granted for
one- half the fair market rental value of the family home due to Ms. Stockton' s
exclusive use of that home. Mr. Stockton' s right to reimbursement in this regard is
governed by La. R.S. 9: 374, and it provides, in relevant part:
B. When the family residence is community property ..., after or in conjunction with the filing of a petition for divorce, either spouse may petition for, and a court may award to one of the spouses, after a
contradictory hearing, the use and occupancy of the family residence
C. A spouse who, in accordance with the provisions of Subsection A or B of this Section, uses and occupies or is awarded by the court the use and occupancy of the family residence, ... shall not be liable to the other spouse for rental for the use and occupancy, except as hereafter provided.
10 D. In a proceeding for divorce or thereafter, a spouse may move for an award of rent at any time. After a contradictory hearing, the court may award rent to be paid by a spouse exercising exclusive use and occupancy of a residence whether by judgment or in fact. The award shall be retroactive to the date of filing of the motion, but rent shall be awarded only for the period of exclusive occupancy. The adjudication of the issue of rent and the amount thereof may be deferred to a later date by the court or by agreement of the parties.....
As previously set forth, pursuant the December 2, 2020 stipulated judgment,
Ms. Stockton was awarded exclusive use of the former matrimonial domicile,
subject to the reservation of Mr. Stockton' s right to seek rental reimbursement for
Ms. Stockton' s exclusive use of the home. There is no dispute that Ms. Stockton
had the exclusive use and occupancy of the former matrimonial domicile for
approximately 21 months.
At trial, in support of Mr. Stockton' s reimbursement claim, he offered into
evidence an email from a realtor, which set forth that the home ( the former
matrimonial domicile) should "rent for a [ m] inimum of $2, 000 a month." Therefore,
he sought reimbursement in the amount of $21, 000. 00.' However, Mr. Stockton' s
testimony also revealed that the mortgage on the former matrimonial domicile was
approximately $ 721. 00 per month. Ms. Stockton posited that the fair market rental
value of the former matrimonial domicile should be set at $ 722. 00 ( the approximate
amount of the monthly mortgage note), such that Mr. Stockton' s right to
reimbursement for one- half the fair market value should be set at $ 7, 581. 00.2
The trial court, in its reasons for judgment, stated that "[ b] ased upon the
testimony and evidence presented, the court accepts the value of [Ms. Stockton] and
awards [ Mr. Stockton' s] rental reimbursement claim in the amount of $7, 581 [. 00]."
On appeal, Mr. Stockton contends that the fair market rental value should have been
assessed at the rate of $2, 000. 00 per month rather than $ 722. 00 per month. However,
1 1/ 2 of (21 months x $ 2, 000.00/ month) _ $ 21, 000.00. 2 1h of (21 months x $ 722. 00/ month) = $ 7, 581. 00. 00.
11 given the great discretion afforded to a trial court in community property partitions,
the trial court is not required to accept at face value a spouse' s valuation of a claim
against the community. Berthelot, 254 So. 3d at 816. Based on our review of the
record and the evidence, we cannot say that the trial court manifestly erred or abused
its discretion in setting the fair market rental value of the former matrimonial
domicile at $ 722.00 per month instead of $2, 000. 00 per month or in its total award
of reimbursement to Mr. Stockton in the amount of $7, 581. 00.
FINAL PERIODIC SPOUSAL SUPPORT
Louisiana Civil Code article 112( A) provides that when a spouse has not been
at fault prior to the filing of a petition for divorce and is in need of support, based on
the needs of that party and the ability of the other party to pay, that spouse may be
awarded final periodic spousal support. The party alleging a right to permanent
spousal support carries the burden of proving that he or she is free from fault.
Cauthron v. Cauthron, 2012- 0913 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 2115113), 113 So. 3d 232, 233.
A spouse who petitions for permanent spousal support need not be totally blameless.
Ennis v. Ennis, 2016- 0423 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 5/ 8/ 17) ( unpublished), 2017 WL
1900328 * 2; see also Schmitt v. Schmitt, 2009- 0415 ( La. App. 4' Cir. 12/ 16/ 09),
28 So. 3d 537, 540. To constitute fault sufficient to deprive a spouse of final periodic
spousal support, the spouse' s misconduct must not only be of a serious nature, but it
must also be an independent, contributory, or proximate cause of the separation.
Ennis, 2017 WL 1900328 at * 4; Schmitt, 28 So. 3d at 540. Fault consists of those
same actions that would have previously resulted in a for -cause divorce or marital
separation: adultery, conviction of a felony, habitual intemperance or excesses, cruel
treatment or outrages, public defamation, abandonment, an attempt on the other' s
life, status as a fugitive, and intentional non- support. Ennis, 2017 WL 1900328 at
4; Cauthron, 113 So. 3d at 233- 234. The trial court' s determination of fault is
entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed except in the case of manifest error.
12 Ennis, 2017 WL 1900328 at * 5; Almon v. Almon, 97- 2004 ( La. App. 1" Cir.
9/ 25198), 718 So. 2d 1073, 1077.
Once freedom from fault is established, the basic tests for the amount of
spousal support are the needs of that spouse and the ability of the other spouse to
pay. Politz v, Politz, 2005- 2568 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 8/ 1/ 07) ( unpublished), 2007 WL
2193547 * 3, writ denied, 2007- 2137 ( La. 1/ 7{ 0$), 973 So. 2d 728; Noto v. Nota,
2009- 1100 ( La. App. 5 Cir. 5111 / 10), 41 So. 3d 1175, 1180. The award for final
periodic spousal support is governed by La. C. C. art. 112( B), which requires the
court to consider all relevant factors including: ( 1) the income and means of the
parties; ( 2) the financial obligations of the parties; ( 3) the earning capacity of the
parties; ( 4) the effect of custody of children upon a party' s earning capacity; ( 5) the
time necessary for the claimant to acquire appropriate education, training, or
employment; ( 6) the health and age of the parties; ( 7) the duration of the marriage;
8) the tax consequences to the parties; and ( 9) the existence, effect, and duration of
any act of domestic abuse committed by the other spouse upon the claimant or a
child of one of the spouses. Further, under La. C. C. art. 112( D), the amount of final
periodic spousal support shall not exceed one- third of the paying spouse' s net
income.
The goal of a final periodic spousal support award is limited to the amount
sufficient for maintenance as opposed to continuing an accustomed style of living.
Ennis, 2017 WL1900329 at * 3; see also La. C. C. art. 111. in an action for final
periodic spousal support, the claimant spouse has the burden of proving insufficient
means of support. Ennis, 2017 WL 1900328 at * 3. Support means a sum sufficient
for the claimant spouse' s maintenance, which includes the allowable expenses for
food, shelter, clothing, transportation expenses, medical and drug expenses, utilities,
household maintenance, and the income tax liability generated" by such support
payments. Id. Generally, expenditures for newspapers, gifts, recreation, vacation,
13 and church tithes are not to be considered in awarding final spousal support;
similarly, expenses attributable to entertainment are not necessary for a spouse' s
maintenance and should not be considered in fixing final spousal support. Id.
As with the determination of fault, the trial court' s award of final periodic
spousal support is given great weight, and an appellate court should only disturb a
trial court' s award of final periodic spousal support when there has been a clear
abuse of that discretion or when the amount exceeds the statutory limit of one- third
of the net income of the payor' s income. Ennis, 2017 WL 190032$ at * 3; see also
La. C. C. art. 112( D).
On appeal, Mr. Stockton contends that the trial court erred in awarding Ms.
Stockton permanent spousal support because she failed to prove that she was free
from fault and that she had insufficient means for supporta According to Mr.
Stockton' s testimony at trial, the reason for the dissolution of the parties' marriage
was a lack of affection and intimacy. He explained that Ms. Stockton " stopped
wanting to do anything with [him,]" she "[ w] ould' t go to the camp anymore," and
she " didn' t sleep with [ him]" but rather "[ s] he slept on [ an] afghan, not even [ under]
the same covers as [ he] did, for the last six months." She also continued to go to the
gym on Friday evenings, despite his request that she not do so. After Mr. Stockton
told her that he wanted to talk to her, she responded that they had " nothing else to
talk about," so he left.
According to Ms. Stockton, she slept under a little blanket because she was
going through menopause and she not want to sleep under the comforter. Ms.
Stockton also explained that she had gone to the gym on Fridays for many years, and
that she would go to the camp on Fridays after the gym, which Mr. Stockton did not
like, because " it was just not on his time frame." Ms. Stockton also explained that
3 Mr. Stockton does not argue on appeal that he was unable to pay the amount awarded by the trial court ($ 340. 00) or that the award exceeded one- third of his net income.
14 they were planning a wedding for her daughter that was at the home, and so for
several months before Mr. Stockton left, she did not go to the camp because she was
preparing her house and yard for the wedding. Ms. Stockton believed that the cause
of the break up of their marriage was attributable to Mr. Stockton' s drinking, and
she agreed that they both played a part in the lack of intimacy. Ms. Stockton also
testified that she did not file for divorce from Mr. Stockton, that he left her, and that
she was trying to make their marriage work.
Ms. Stockton, in support of her claim for permanent spousal support, testified
as to her specific monthly expenses, and she also offered her monthly income and
expense affidavit. According to this evidence, her net monthly income was
1, 739.00 per month, her expenses totaled approximately $ 2, 194. 00 per month, and
that she was in need of approximately $ 455. 00 per month to meet her needs of basic
support. According to Mr. Stockton' s testimony, his net income was approximately 4, 600. 00 per month. Mr. Stockton also testified as to his specific monthly
expenses, which totaled approximately $ 4,300. 00 per month, and that his ability to
pay spousal support was approximately $ 300. 00 per month.
Based on the testimony of the parties, the trial court found that Ms. Stockton
was free from fault in the dissolution of the marriage, and we find no manifest error
in this determination. With respect to need, the trial court specifically considered
the income and expenses of the parties, and it further noted that the parties had been
married for more than thirty-five years and that during this time, Mr. Stockton had
been " the primary ` breadwinner' for the family." Therefore, after a careful
consideration of the factors set forth in La. C. C. art. 112( B), the trial court awarded
Ms. Stockton the sum of $300. 00 per month for a period of five years, Considering
the testimony of the parties and the evidence in the record, we find that the trial
court' s award was reasonable and supported by the record, and thus, we cannot say
that the trial court abused its vast discretion.
15 CONCLUSION
For all of the above and foregoing reasons, the November 15, 2022 judgment
of the trial court is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed to the appellant,
Johnnie Stockton, III.
AFFIRMED.
16 STATE OF LOUISIANA
DOCKET NUMBER
JOHNNIE STOCKTON, III
VERSUS
HOLDRIDGE, J., dissenting in part.
I dissent in part for not giving any value to Ms. Stockton' s movables, which
total approximately $ 2, 150. 00. Ms. Stockton filed a joint detailed descriptive list,
wherein she judicially admitted to having certain movables which had a value of
approximately $ 2, 150. 00. I further dissent and find that the trial court was
manifestly erroneous in finding the rental value for the former matrimonial domicile
was $ 722. 00 a month. The rental value, at minimum, should have been set at
1, 500. 00 a month.