Johnessee v. Schnepf

2025 IL App (4th) 250038-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: September 12, 2025
• Docket: 4-25-0038
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2025 IL App (4th) 250038-U

NO. 4-25-0038 NOTICE This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is IN THE APPELLATE COURT September 12, 2025 not precedent except in the Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed OF ILLINOIS 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL FOURTH DISTRICT

CONNIE JOHNESSEE, DOROTHEA SMITH, ) Appeal from the BRENDA JOHNSON, and JOE SCHNEPF, ) Circuit Court of Plaintiffs, ) Pike County v. ) No. 09MR47 LYNDLE SCHNEPF, JOHN SCHNEPF, CAROLYN ) SHAFFER, and RAYMOND SCHNEPF, Individually ) and as Successor Trustee of the Maleta Maxine Schnepf ) February 2001 Trust, ) Defendants, ) ) (John Schnepf and Raymond Schnepf, Defendants- ) Appellants; Connie Johnessee, Dorothea Smith, and ) Brenda Johnson, Plaintiffs-Appellees; Ben Shaffer, Eric ) Honorable Shaffer, Tracy Brown, Jared Schnepf, and Riley Joe ) Talmadge “Tad” Brenner, Howser, Appellees). ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Harris and Justice Zenoff concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding the circuit court’s division and distribution determinations were consistent with the settlor’s intent.

¶2 Defendants, John and Raymond Schnepf, appeal the circuit court’s order

determining (1) the proceeds from the Maleta Maxine Schnepf February 2001 Trust (Trust) should

be divided into seven equal shares for the seven children of Maleta Schnepf who were living when

the Trust was created and not awarded a life estate thereunder and (2) five shares of the Trust proceeds should be distributed amongst the five surviving children and two shares should be

distributed per stirpes to the descendants of the two deceased children. On appeal, John and

Raymond argue the court misconstrued the language of the Trust in reaching its division and

distribution determinations. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 The Trust has been the subject of contentious litigation since 2009, which has made

the circuit court intimately involved in its administration. This court addressed the Trust in two

prior appeals. See Johnessee v. Schnepf, 2012 IL App (4th) 110767; Johnessee v. Schnepf, 2016

IL App (4th) 150162-U. Additionally, in several other appeals, this court addressed matters related

to Maleta’s property and estate, as well as orders of protection involving some of the parties to this

appeal. See Schnepf v. Schnepf, No. 4-05-0817 (2006) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme

Court Rule 23); Johnessee v. Schnepf, No. 4-10-0285 (2011) (unpublished order under Illinois

Supreme Court Rule 23); Schnepf v. Schnepf, 2013 IL App (4th) 120342-U; Schnepf v. Schnepf,

2013 IL App (4th) 121142. We note Justice McCullough aptly observed the following in a special

concurrence and dissent in the appeal of the orders of protection: “This case is a good example of

what many families do when property is involved and death ([Maleta’s]) occurs: spend time and

money fighting over property in which they were lucky to have any interest.” Johnessee, No. 4-

10-0285 (McCullough, J., specially concurring and dissenting). For this appeal, we limit the

following background to the facts necessary for our decision.

¶5 In February 2001, Maleta created the Trust. At that time, she had eight living

children, several of whom had children of their own. Maleta’s children included John, Raymond,

Connie Johnessee, Dorothea Smith, Brenda Johnson, Lyndle Schnepf, Carolyn Shaffer, and Joe

-2- Schnepf. Maleta had another child, who died prior to the creation of the Trust, leaving no children.

¶6 The Trust included certain real estate and awarded life estates to Maleta and Lyndle.

The Trust provided specific instructions concerning its termination:

“XVI. This trust shall terminate upon the death of the latter

beneficiary as set forth in Article [III] hereof. At that time the trustee

shall convert to cash that real estate relevant hereto and shall

distribute the proceeds therefrom to my remaining children, in equal

shares per stirpes.”

¶7 Maleta enjoyed the benefits of the Trust until her death in July 2008. Lyndle then

did the same until his death in February 2022. Lyndle died without leaving any children. Prior to

Lyndle’s death, but after Maleta’s death, Carolyn and Joe died. Carolyn left two children, Ben and

Eric Shaffer. Joe also left two children, Tracy Brown and Jared Schnepf, as well as a grandchild,

Riley Joe Howser, who was the son of Joe’s deceased child, Tamara Schnepf.

¶8 Following the death of Lyndle, the then court-appointed special trustee of the Trust

sold the real estate from the Trust. The special trustee then sought judicial determinations

concerning the division and distribution of the Trust proceeds. John and Raymond argued the

proceeds should be divided into five equal shares for the five surviving children of Maleta and

then one share should be distributed to each of those children. Conversely, Connie, Dorothea,

Brenda, Tracy, Jared, Riley, Ben, and Eric argued the proceeds should be divided into seven equal

shares for the seven children of Maleta who were living when the Trust was created and not

awarded a life estate thereunder and then five shares of the proceeds should be distributed amongst

the five surviving children and two shares should be distributed per stirpes to the descendants of

-3- the two deceased children. After considering the language of the Trust and the circumstances under

which it was drafted, the circuit court agreed with the latter position and entered a written order

setting forth its division and distribution determinations.

¶9 This appeal followed.

¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 11 On appeal, John and Raymond argue the circuit court misconstrued the language of

the Trust in reaching its division and distribution determinations. Connie, Dorothea, Brenda,

Tracy, Jared, and Riley disagree. Ben and Eric take no position in this appeal.

¶ 12 The parties do not dispute the circuit court’s interpretation or construction of the

Trust is subject to de novo review. See In re Estate of Lee, 2017 IL App (3d) 150651, ¶ 31 (“To

the extent that we are called upon to review the trial court’s interpretation of the terms of the trust,

we will apply a de novo standard of review.”); Schroeder v. Sullivan, 2018 IL App (1st) 163210,

¶ 25 (“[T]his case concerns the construction of a trust, which is a question of law we also review

de novo.”). De novo review means we perform the same analysis a circuit court would perform

and give no deference to the court’s conclusions or specific rationale. See Blagden v. McMillin,

2023 IL App (4th) 220238, ¶ 40.

¶ 13 In construing a trust, “the goal is to determine the settlor’s intent, which the court

will effectuate if it is not contrary to law or public policy.” Citizens National Bank of Paris v. Kids

Hope United, Inc., 235 Ill. 2d 565, 574 (2009). “Courts search for intent by analyzing both the

words used in the instrument and the circumstances under which they were drafted, including: the

state of the [settlor’s] property, his family, and the like.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Harris

Trust & Savings Bank v. Beach, 118 Ill. 2d 1, 3-4 (1987). “In determining this intent, courts

-4- consider the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used, taking into consideration the entire

document.” Citizens National Bank of Paris, 235 Ill. 2d at 574. Additionally, “courts should give

effect to each word and phrase and should decline to adopt a construction which would render any

portion of the language meaningless or nonsensical.” Stein v. Scott, 252 Ill. App. 3d 611, 615-16

(1993) (citing Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Donovan, 145 Ill. 2d 166, 172-73 (1991)).

¶ 14 The Trust provision at issue in this case is as follows:

“XVI. This trust shall terminate upon the death of the latter

beneficiary as set forth in Article [III] hereof. At that time the trustee

shall convert to cash that real estate relevant hereto and shall

distribute the proceeds therefrom to my remaining children, in equal

In dispute from this provision is the meaning of the word “remaining.” The word is not defined in

the Trust, nor is it a commonly defined term in Illinois law.

¶ 15 John and Raymond maintain construing “remaining” to mean “surviving” is the

only reasonable construction of the Trust provision. They assert such a construction (1) is

consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the word “remaining” as it has been defined by

various dictionaries; (2) is reinforced by the “[a]t that time” language of the provision; (3) is

supported by persuasive case law, namely, In re Berg’s Estate, 96 Pa. Super. 125 (1929); and

(4) does not render any word of the provision meaningless.

¶ 16 Like the circuit court, we find construing “remaining” to mean “surviving” would

be an unreasonable construction of the Trust provision, as it would render the “per stirpes”

language found therein meaningless. “Per Stirpes,” a well-established term in Illinois law, is a

-5- term “used to specify the method of distribution of property.” Goodwine State Bank v. Mullins,

253 Ill. App. 3d 980, 1006 (1993). That is, it is a term “used to designate the method of determining

the shares to which the remaindermen are entitled.” Id. The term specifically denotes “a taking by

right of representation of that which an ancestor would take if living.” Id.

¶ 17 John and Raymond assert the “per stirpes” language would not be rendered

meaningless under their construction because it would provide that, if any of Maleta’s children

survived Lyndle but then died before the sale of the real estate and the distribution of the proceeds

therefrom, their descendants would take per stirpes. However, even under their construction, the

interest of the remainderman—the surviving children—would automatically vest at a particular

moment, regardless of whether that moment be the death of Lyndle or the division and distribution

of the proceeds by the trustee. Therefore, the per stirpes language would be meaningless.

¶ 18 Berg’s Estate, relied upon by John and Raymond, is distinguishable in this regard.

The instrument in that case, unlike the trust in this case, did not contain per stirpes language. See

Berg’s Estate, 96 Pa. Super. at 127. Likewise, Goodwine State Bank, cited by John and Raymond

in their reply brief, is distinguishable. While the instrument in that case included per stirpes

language, it identified the remaindermen as the “ ‘then[-]living descendants,’ ” not a particular

generation of descendants like the trust in this case—the “children” of Maleta. See Goodwine State

Bank, 253 Ill. App. 3d at 1003. Accordingly, neither of these cases supports the position of John

and Raymond.

¶ 19 Therefore, we reject the construction proposed by John and Raymond as it would

improperly render the “per stirpes” language meaningless.

¶ 20 John and Raymond further maintain construing “remaining” to mean the seven

-6- children of Maleta who were living when the Trust was created and not awarded a life estate

thereunder, the construction advocated by their fellow kin and adopted by the circuit court, is not

a reasonable construction of the Trust provision at issue. They assert such a construction is

(1) unsupported by the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “remaining” as it has been defined

by various dictionaries and (2) makes the term “remaining” surplusage.

¶ 21 We find construing “remaining” to mean the seven children of Maleta who were

living when the Trust was created and not awarded a life estate thereunder is a reasonable

construction of the Trust provision based upon the language of the Trust and the circumstances

under which it was drafted. At the time of the Trust’s creation, Maleta had eight living children,

several of whom had children of their own. In the Trust, Maleta awarded one of her children,

Lyndle, a life estate. Maleta further directed, following the expiration of the life estates, the real

estate in the Trust be sold and the proceeds therefrom be distributed to her remaining children, in

equal shares per stirpes. Maleta’s designation that the proceeds be distributed per stirpes, that is,

“a taking by right of representation of that which an ancestor would take if living,” indicates Maleta

contemplated the possibility of a child dying before the termination of the Trust and desired for

that child’s descendants to take the child’s share. See id. at 1006.

¶ 22 Contrary to the assertion of John and Raymond, construing “remaining” to mean

the other children of Maleta who were living when the Trust was created and not awarded a life

estate thereunder is not inconsistent with the definition of “remaining” provided in the

Merriam-Webster online dictionary, which reads: “left over after a part has been destroyed, taken,

used, or lost.” Merriam-Webster Dictionary, http://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/remaining (last visited August 11, 2025). Such a construction refers to the

-7- living children of Maleta who had not yet been addressed in the Trust. Similarly, construing the

Trust provision in such a fashion does not make the term “remaining” surplusage, as it

distinguishes between Lyndle, who received a life estate under the Trust, and the other living

children who did not receive the same.

¶ 23 From the language of the Trust and the circumstances under which it was drafted,

we find Maleta intended to leave the proceeds from the Trust equally to her seven children who

were living when the Trust was created and not awarded a life estate thereunder and, in the event

any of those children died before the termination of the Trust, the proceeds were to be distributed

per stirpes to the descendants of the deceased children. We need not, therefore, resort to other rules

of construction. See Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 118 Ill. 2d at 4 (“When, however, the instrument

fails to make the settlor’s *** intention clear, courts often resort to rules of construction to

determine the meaning of the terms used in the document.”).

¶ 24 We conclude the circuit court’s division and distribution determinations were

consistent with Maleta’s intent.

¶ 25 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 26 For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 27 Affirmed.

-8-