1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Johnathan T., Case No.: 3:26-cv-00212-JO-JLB
12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING JOINT 13 v. MOTION FOR THE AWARD AND PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY FEES 14 FRANK BISIGNANO, AND EXPENSES PURSUANT TO Commissioner of Social Security 15 THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE Defendant. ACT 16
17 [ECF No. 19]
18 Before the Court is the parties’ Joint Motion for the Award and Payment of Attorney 19 Fees and Expenses Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). (ECF No. 19.) 20 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the parties’ Joint Motion. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 On January 14, 2026, Plaintiff Johnathan T. (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint pursuant 23 to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of the denial of his application for disability 24 insurance benefits and supplemental security income under the Social Security Act, Title 25 II and Title XVI, issued by the Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”). 26 (ECF No. 1.) On March 16, 2026, the Commissioner filed the administrative record. (ECF 27 Nos. 8, 9.) On May 27, 2026, the Court reversed the decision of the Commissioner and 28 1 remanded the matter for further administrative proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 2 U.S.C. § 405(g). (ECF No. 17.) The Clerk of Court promptly entered final judgment in 3 favor of Plaintiff. (ECF No. 18.) 4 On June 3, 2026, the parties filed the instant Joint Motion requesting the Court award 5 Plaintiff attorney’s fees and expenses in the amount of $9,200.00 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 6 § 2412(d) and no costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. (ECF. No 19 at 1.) The amount “represents 7 compensation for all legal services rendered on behalf of Plaintiff by counsel in connection 8 with this civil action.” (Id.) 9 II. THRESHOLD ISSUE OF TIMELINESS 10 The prevailing party is eligible to seek attorney’s fees within thirty (30) days of final 11 judgment in an action. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). “A sentence four remand becomes a 12 final judgment, for purposes of attorneys’ fees claims brought pursuant to the EAJA, upon 13 expiration of the time for appeal.” Akopyan v. Barnhart, 296 F.3d 852, 854 (9th Cir. 14 2002) (internal citation omitted) (citing Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 297 (1993)). 15 Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(B), if one of the parties to the action is 16 a United States officer sued in an official capacity, the time for appeal expires sixty (60) 17 days after entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). Therefore, a motion for 18 attorney’s fees filed after a sentence four remand is timely when filed within thirty (30) 19 days after Rule 4(a)’s appeal period has expired. Hoa Hong Van v. Barnhart, 483 F.3d 20 600, 607 (9th Cir. 2007). 21 Even when the appeals period has not yet run, an application for EAJA attorney fees 22 is timely, as long as “. . . (1) the applicant files no more than 30 days after final judgment, 23 and (2) the applicant is able to show that he or she ‘is a prevailing party and is eligible to 24 receive an award under this subsection.’” Auke Bay Concerned Citizen’s Advisory Council 25 v. Marsh, 779 F.2d 1391, 1393 (9th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 26 § 2412(d)(1)(B)). See also Schaefer, 509 U.S. at 302 (“An EAJA application may be filed 27 until 30 days after a judgment becomes ‘not appealable’ – i.e., 30 days after the time for 28 appeal has ended.”) (emphasis added). In Auke Bay, the Appellate Court clarified that an 1 application for EAJA fees filed before final judgment is nonetheless timely where “a court 2 order substantially grants the applicant’s remedy before final judgment is entered.” Auke 3 Bay, 779 F.2d at 1393. See also Sergio C. v. Kijkazi, No. 3:20-cv-02770-AHG, 2022 WL 4 1122847, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2022) (applying Auke Bay to conclude plaintiff’s EAJA 5 fee application in a Social Security case was not premature because the court remanded for 6 payment of benefits, notwithstanding the application being filed before the sixty (60) day 7 appeal period had run). 8 This Court entered judgment remanding the matter for additional administrative 9 proceedings on May 27, 2026. (ECF No. 17.) Judgement was entered on May 28, 2026. 10 (ECF No. 18.) On June 3, 2026, the parties filed the Joint Motion, five (5) days after 11 judgment was entered, and well before Rule 4(a)’s 60-day appeal timeline had expired. 12 (ECF No. 19). The judgment provided the substantial relief prayed for in Plaintiff’s 13 Complaint—remand to the Social Security Administration and Judgment for Plaintiff. 14 (ECF Nos. 1, 18.) Thus, before the judgment became final, the Court substantially granted 15 Plaintiff’s remedy. Accordingly, the Court finds the Joint Motion timely. 16 III. DISCUSSION 17 Under the EAJA, a litigant is entitled to attorney’s fees under the EAJA only if: 18 “(1) he is the prevailing party; (2) the government fails to show that its position was 19 substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust; and (3) the 20 requested fees and costs are reasonable.” Carbonell v. I.N.S., 429 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 21 2005) (citing Perez-Arellano v. Smith, 279 F.3d 791, 793 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also 28 22 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Additionally, the net worth of the prevailing party must “not 23 exceed $2,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed.” 26 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B); see 24 also United States v. 88.88 Acres of Land, 907 F.2d 106, 107 (9th Cir. 1990). 25 The Court will address each of the requirements in turn. 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 A. Prevailing Party 2 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), “[a] plaintiff who obtains a sentence four remand,” even 3 when further administrative review is ordered, “is considered a prevailing party for 4 purposes of attorneys’ fees.” Akopyan, 296 F.3d at 854 (citing Schaefer, 509 U.S. at 301- 5 02). Here, the Court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff, reversed the decision of the 6 Commissioner, and remanded the matter for further administrative proceedings. (ECF 7 Nos. 17, 18.) Therefore, Plaintiff is the prevailing party. 8 B. Substantial Justification 9 The Commissioner bears the burden to prove that his position, in both the underlying 10 administrative proceedings and in the subsequent litigation, was substantially justified 11 under 28 U.S.C. §
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Johnathan T., Case No.: 3:26-cv-00212-JO-JLB
12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING JOINT 13 v. MOTION FOR THE AWARD AND PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY FEES 14 FRANK BISIGNANO, AND EXPENSES PURSUANT TO Commissioner of Social Security 15 THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE Defendant. ACT 16
17 [ECF No. 19]
18 Before the Court is the parties’ Joint Motion for the Award and Payment of Attorney 19 Fees and Expenses Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). (ECF No. 19.) 20 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the parties’ Joint Motion. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 On January 14, 2026, Plaintiff Johnathan T. (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint pursuant 23 to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of the denial of his application for disability 24 insurance benefits and supplemental security income under the Social Security Act, Title 25 II and Title XVI, issued by the Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”). 26 (ECF No. 1.) On March 16, 2026, the Commissioner filed the administrative record. (ECF 27 Nos. 8, 9.) On May 27, 2026, the Court reversed the decision of the Commissioner and 28 1 remanded the matter for further administrative proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 2 U.S.C. § 405(g). (ECF No. 17.) The Clerk of Court promptly entered final judgment in 3 favor of Plaintiff. (ECF No. 18.) 4 On June 3, 2026, the parties filed the instant Joint Motion requesting the Court award 5 Plaintiff attorney’s fees and expenses in the amount of $9,200.00 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 6 § 2412(d) and no costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. (ECF. No 19 at 1.) The amount “represents 7 compensation for all legal services rendered on behalf of Plaintiff by counsel in connection 8 with this civil action.” (Id.) 9 II. THRESHOLD ISSUE OF TIMELINESS 10 The prevailing party is eligible to seek attorney’s fees within thirty (30) days of final 11 judgment in an action. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). “A sentence four remand becomes a 12 final judgment, for purposes of attorneys’ fees claims brought pursuant to the EAJA, upon 13 expiration of the time for appeal.” Akopyan v. Barnhart, 296 F.3d 852, 854 (9th Cir. 14 2002) (internal citation omitted) (citing Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 297 (1993)). 15 Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(B), if one of the parties to the action is 16 a United States officer sued in an official capacity, the time for appeal expires sixty (60) 17 days after entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). Therefore, a motion for 18 attorney’s fees filed after a sentence four remand is timely when filed within thirty (30) 19 days after Rule 4(a)’s appeal period has expired. Hoa Hong Van v. Barnhart, 483 F.3d 20 600, 607 (9th Cir. 2007). 21 Even when the appeals period has not yet run, an application for EAJA attorney fees 22 is timely, as long as “. . . (1) the applicant files no more than 30 days after final judgment, 23 and (2) the applicant is able to show that he or she ‘is a prevailing party and is eligible to 24 receive an award under this subsection.’” Auke Bay Concerned Citizen’s Advisory Council 25 v. Marsh, 779 F.2d 1391, 1393 (9th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 26 § 2412(d)(1)(B)). See also Schaefer, 509 U.S. at 302 (“An EAJA application may be filed 27 until 30 days after a judgment becomes ‘not appealable’ – i.e., 30 days after the time for 28 appeal has ended.”) (emphasis added). In Auke Bay, the Appellate Court clarified that an 1 application for EAJA fees filed before final judgment is nonetheless timely where “a court 2 order substantially grants the applicant’s remedy before final judgment is entered.” Auke 3 Bay, 779 F.2d at 1393. See also Sergio C. v. Kijkazi, No. 3:20-cv-02770-AHG, 2022 WL 4 1122847, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2022) (applying Auke Bay to conclude plaintiff’s EAJA 5 fee application in a Social Security case was not premature because the court remanded for 6 payment of benefits, notwithstanding the application being filed before the sixty (60) day 7 appeal period had run). 8 This Court entered judgment remanding the matter for additional administrative 9 proceedings on May 27, 2026. (ECF No. 17.) Judgement was entered on May 28, 2026. 10 (ECF No. 18.) On June 3, 2026, the parties filed the Joint Motion, five (5) days after 11 judgment was entered, and well before Rule 4(a)’s 60-day appeal timeline had expired. 12 (ECF No. 19). The judgment provided the substantial relief prayed for in Plaintiff’s 13 Complaint—remand to the Social Security Administration and Judgment for Plaintiff. 14 (ECF Nos. 1, 18.) Thus, before the judgment became final, the Court substantially granted 15 Plaintiff’s remedy. Accordingly, the Court finds the Joint Motion timely. 16 III. DISCUSSION 17 Under the EAJA, a litigant is entitled to attorney’s fees under the EAJA only if: 18 “(1) he is the prevailing party; (2) the government fails to show that its position was 19 substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust; and (3) the 20 requested fees and costs are reasonable.” Carbonell v. I.N.S., 429 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 21 2005) (citing Perez-Arellano v. Smith, 279 F.3d 791, 793 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also 28 22 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Additionally, the net worth of the prevailing party must “not 23 exceed $2,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed.” 26 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B); see 24 also United States v. 88.88 Acres of Land, 907 F.2d 106, 107 (9th Cir. 1990). 25 The Court will address each of the requirements in turn. 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 A. Prevailing Party 2 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), “[a] plaintiff who obtains a sentence four remand,” even 3 when further administrative review is ordered, “is considered a prevailing party for 4 purposes of attorneys’ fees.” Akopyan, 296 F.3d at 854 (citing Schaefer, 509 U.S. at 301- 5 02). Here, the Court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff, reversed the decision of the 6 Commissioner, and remanded the matter for further administrative proceedings. (ECF 7 Nos. 17, 18.) Therefore, Plaintiff is the prevailing party. 8 B. Substantial Justification 9 The Commissioner bears the burden to prove that his position, in both the underlying 10 administrative proceedings and in the subsequent litigation, was substantially justified 11 under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Meier v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 2013). 12 Here, the instant fee request comes to the Court by way of a joint motion; the Commissioner 13 makes no argument that his position was substantially justified. (ECF No. 19.) See Black 14 v. Berryhill, No. 18cv1673 JM (LL), 2019 WL 2436393, at *1 (S.D. Cal. June 11, 2029) 15 (finding the second element met “in light of the joint nature of the parties’ request and the 16 court’s prior order remanding this action, the government has not shown that its position 17 was substantially justified.”). Accordingly, the Commissioner has not met his burden of 18 showing his position was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an 19 award unjust. 20 In their Joint Motion, the parties agree that “[t]his stipulation constitutes a 21 compromise settlement of Plaintiff’s request for EAJA attorney fees and does not constitute 22 an admission of liability on the part of Defendant under the EAJA or otherwise.” (ECF. 23 No. 19 at 1-2.) However, such language does not change the nature or circumstances of 24 the instant request. Despite the disclaimer, “the compromise nature of the request is 25 sufficient to find the second element met, given that ‘Defendant has stipulated to the 26 attorney fees and does not argue that the prevailing party’s position was substantially 27 unjustified.’” Dana F. v. Kijakazi, No. 3:20-cv-01548-AHG, 2022 WL 542881, at *2 (S.D. 28 Cal. Feb. 23, 2022) (quoting Krebs v. Berryhill, No. 16-CV-3096 JLS (BGS), 2018 WL 1 3064346, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jun. 21, 2018)). Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff meets the 2 substantial justification requirement. 3 C. Net Worth of the Prevailing Party 4 The EAJA makes an individual ineligible for attorney fees if his “net worth 5 exceeds $2,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed.” 26 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B); see 6 also 88.88 Acres of Land, 907 F.2d at 107. Here, Plaintiff asserts that his net worth did not 7 exceed $2 million at the time of filing. (ECF No. 19-2 ¶ 4.) Accordingly, Plaintiff meets 8 the EAJA net worth requirement. 9 D. Reasonableness of Hours 10 The parties seek an award of 35.4 hours billed by Plaintiff’s counsel, Francesco 11 Benavides and Elizabeth Landgraf, and 3.5 hours billed by Plaintiff’s counsel’s paralegal. 12 (ECF No. 19-1 at 1-2.) The Court finds the number of hours billed by Plaintiff’s counsel 13 reasonable, but a small reduction in the number of hours billed by Plaintiff’s counsel’s 14 paralegal is warranted. See U.S.C.§ 2412(d); Costa v. Comm’r of SSA, 690 F.3d 1132, 15 1136 (9th Cir. 2012) (reiterating that “lawyers are not likely to spend unnecessary time on 16 contingency fee cases in the hope of inflating their fees because the payoff is too uncertain. 17 [] As a result, courts should generally defer to the winning lawyer’s professional judgment 18 as to how much time he was required to spend on the case.”) (internal quotation omitted). 19 Beginning with the attorney hours billed on this matter, Plaintiff’s counsel lists a 20 total of 35.4 hours of attorney work, at a rate of $258.46 per hour. (ECF No. 19-1 at 1.) 21 “Many district courts have noted that twenty to forty hours is the range most often 22 requested and granted in social security cases.” Costa, 690 F.3d at 1136; see also Hensley 23 v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983) (“Where a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, 24 his attorney should recover a fully compensatory fee.”). The Court finds the 35.4 total 25 hours billed by Plaintiff’s counsel to be reasonable, especially in light of Plaintiff’s results 26 in the case. See Darren Jeffrey C. v. Kijakazi, No. 3:21-cv-01012-AHG, 2022 WL 27 17826795, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2022) (finding 51.5 total hours requested reasonable 28 1 where the Court granted the plaintiff’s merits brief, reversed the decisions of the 2 Commissioner, and remanded the matter for further proceedings). 3 Next, the Court turns to the asserted 3.5 hours of paralegal work on this matter.1 4 (ECF. No. 19-1 at 2.) Under the EAJA, attorney’s fees “should not be awarded for work 5 on merely clerical tasks,” including when completed by paralegals. See Missouri v. 6 Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 288 fn. 10 (1989). Purely clerical tasks include “filing, transcript, 7 and document organization.” Nadarajah v. Holder, 569 F.3d 906, 921 (9th Cir. 2009); see 8 also Rosemary G. V. v. Saul, No. 3:19-cv-00715-RBM, 2020 WL 6703123, at *4 (S.D. 9 Cal. Nov. 12, 2020) (“Receipt of a court order or case filing is also clerical in nature.”) 10 (internal citations omitted). The Court finds that the time spent by Plaintiff’s counsel’s 11 paralegal on March 16, 2026, to “[d]ownload and compile eCAR,” and on March 24, 2026, 12 to “[r]eview scheduling order, create case calendar,” are clerical tasks, and are therefore 13 not compensable under the EAJA. See Nadarajah, 569 F.3d at 921 (holding that “filing, 14 transcript, and document organization time was clerical in nature” and therefore not 15 compensable under the EAJA); Doran v. Vicorp Rests., Inc., 407 F.Supp.2d 1120, 1125 16 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (noting “calendaring court dates” is clerical and reducing the fee award); 17 Soler v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 14cv2470-MMA (RBB), 2021 WL 2515236, at *10 (S.D. 18 Cal. June 18, 2021) (identifying “time spent scheduling ... [as] clerical tasks non- 19 compensable at any billing rate”). This determination requires the Court to reduce the 20 requested paralegal hours by 0.9 hours, to a total of 2.6 hours. 21 22 23 24 1 The following entries are entered as paralegal hours on this matter: (1) 1/7/2026, 25 prepare email and send to client with engagement agreement and fee waiver form, 0.5 hours; (2) 1/14/2026, draft and file complaint and associated documents with district court, 26 1.3 hours; (3) 3/16/2026, download and compile eCAR, 0.6 hours; (4) 3/24/2026, review 27 scheduling order, create case calendar, 0.3 hours; (5) 5/28/2026, prepare and send emails to client and administrative attorney with Court order and judgment, 0.5 hours; and (6) 28 1 After reducing the paralegal hours, 38 billed hours of attorney and paralegal time 2 remain. This is within the typical range, and the Court determines that the hours are 3 reasonable. See Darren Jeffrey C, 2022 WL 17826795, at *2. 4 E. Reasonableness of Hourly Rates 5 The EAJA provides that courts may award reasonable attorney fees “based upon 6 prevailing market rates for the kind and quality of the services furnished,” but that “attorney 7 fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour unless the court determines that an 8 increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified 9 attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). 10 The statutory maximum EAJA rate for attorney work performed in 2025 in the Ninth 11 Circuit, factoring in increases in the cost of living, was $258.46. See UNITED STATES 12 COURTS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, Statutory Maximum Rates Under the Equal Access to 13 Justice Act, https://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/criminal-justice-act/statutory-maximum-rates/ 14 (last visited June 25, 2026). Here, Plaintiff’s counsels’ hourly rate matches the Ninth 15 Circuit’s EAJA hourly rate exactly. (ECF No. 19-1 at 1.) Accordingly, the Court finds 16 that the hourly rate billed by counsel is reasonable. See Roland S. v. Saul, No. 3:20-cv- 17 01068-AHG, 2021 WL 4081567, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2021) (finding hourly rates 18 consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s EAJA rates to be reasonable.). 19 The Court finds that Plaintiff’s paralegal rate is reasonable. Plaintiff assigns an 20 hourly rate of $125.00 for paralegal work. (ECF No. 19-1 at 2.) Under the EAJA, paralegal 21 fees should be awarded at prevailing market rates. Nadarajah, 569 F.3d at 918. District 22 courts in the Southern District of California have found an hourly rate of $143.00 23 reasonable for paralegals. See Deshawntha J. v. O’Malley, No. 24-cv-00301-JLB, 2024 24 WL 3330602, at *2 (S.D. Cal. July 8, 2024) (imposing a rate of $143.00 per hour for work 25 performed by paralegal); Rudy T. v. O’Malley, No. 24-cv-00719-JLB, 2024 WL 4469105, 26 at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2024) (setting the paralegal rate to $143.00 per hour); Tammy G. v. 27 Dudek, No. 24-cv-01214-JLB, 2025 WL 1002476, at *3 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (allowing a 28 1 paralegal rate of $143.00 per hour). In accordance with the accepted local rate, the Court 2 accepts the requested paralegal rate of $125.00 per hour. 3 F. Assignment of Rights to Counsel 4 The parties jointly request that “fees shall be made payable to Plaintiff, but if the 5 Department of the Treasury determines that Plaintiff does not owe a federal debt, then the 6 government shall cause the payment of fees, expenses and costs to be made directly to 7 Plaintiff’s attorney.” (EFC No. 19 at 2.) “[A] § 2412(d) fees award is payable to the 8 litigant and is therefore subject to a [g]overnment offset to satisfy a pre-existing debt that 9 the litigant owes the United States.” Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 589 (2010). However, 10 this “does not prevent payment of a fee award directly to the attorney where there has been 11 a valid assignment and the plaintiff does not owe a debt to the government.” Ulugalu v. 12 Berryhill, No. 17-cv-01087-GPC-JLB, 2018 WL 2012330, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2018). 13 Here, Plaintiff assigned his EAJA fees to his attorney through the Law Offices of Francesco 14 Benavides. (ECF No. 19 at 2.) Therefore, if Plaintiff has no federal debt that is subject to 15 offset, the award of fees and costs may be paid directly to attorney Francesco Benavides, 16 pursuant to the assignment agreement and the parties’ Joint Motion. 17 IV. CONCLUSION 18 Considering the Court’s reductions as described above, the maximum amount 19 Plaintiff could recover under the EAJA is $9,474.48.2 In the parties’ Joint Motion, the 20 overall amount Plaintiff seeks to recover has been reduced to $9,200.00. As Plaintiff is 21 seeking an amount that is less than what he is entitled to recover, the Court GRANTS the 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25
26 27 2 The $9,474.48 is calculated as follows: 35.4 hours of attorney work at a rate of $258.46 per hour, for a total of $9,149.48; and 2.6 hours of paralegal work at a rate of 28 1 parties’ Joint Motion. The Court hereby AWARDS attorney fees in the amount of 2 $9,200.00. (ECF No. 19.) 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 ||Dated: July 2, 2026 -
n. Jill L. Burkhardt 6 ited States Magistrate Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28