1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOHN ZHONG, et al., Case No. 2:25-cv-09491-FLA (DSR)
12 Plaintiffs, ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS, 13 v. CONCLUSIONS, AND 14 RECOMMENDATIONS OF UNITED CITY OF DIAMOND BAR, et al., STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE ON 15 DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO Defendants. DISMISS [DKTS. 30, 37] 16
17 18 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the court has reviewed Defendants’ Motions to 19 Dismiss (Dkt. 30 and 37), Plaintiffs’ Oppositions thereto, Defendants’ combined 20 Reply, all relevant portions of the docket, and the Report and Recommendation of the 21 United States Magistrate Judge (“Report,” Dkt. 51). The court has considered 22 Plaintiffs’ April 28, 2026, Objections to the Report (Dkt. 52) and conducted a de novo 23 review of those portions of the Report to which Plaintiffs objected. 24 The Report recommends the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Complaint with leave to 25 amend some of their claims. Dkt. 51. Plaintiffs’ objections to the Report do not merit 26 a different result. 27 First, Plaintiffs object to the Report’s analysis of their Fourth Amendment claim 28 based on an allegedly unlawful search of their property. Dkt. 52 at 3–4. The Report 1 found that the claim is untimely because the search occurred in May 2023, more than 2 two years before Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on October 6, 2025. Dkt. 51 at 13. The 3 Report also found that Plaintiffs were aware of the identities of the responsible actors 4 in August 2023, also more than two years before they filed this lawsuit on October 6, 5 2025. Id. at 14–15. Plaintiffs object that Defendants “used false identities and false 6 pretenses to gain entry” to their property. Dkt. 52 at 3. As the Report found, 7 however, Plaintiffs were aware of the identity of the responsible actor in August 2023, 8 when they filed their answer to a state court lawsuit identifying Defendant Gubman as 9 the person who had searched Plaintiffs’ property. Dkt. 51 at 15; see also Dkt. 32-4 at 10 5; Dkt. 32-5. Plaintiffs’ objection to the Report’s untimeliness analysis, therefore, is 11 unpersuasive. 12 Second, Plaintiffs object that the accrual of their Fourth Amendment claim was 13 delayed by “judicial deception.” Dkt. 52 at 4–5. “[A] plaintiff bringing a judicial 14 deception claim ‘argues that [an officer] misled the magistrate judge when applying 15 for the warrant, and had the magistrate considered all of the facts that the magistrate 16 would not have found probable cause.’” Chism v. Washington, 661 F.3d 380, 386 n. 9 17 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Smith v. Almada, 640 F.3d 931, 937 (9th Cir. 2011)). 18 A judicial-deception claim begins “accruing when the underlying affidavit 19 became reasonably available.” Klein v. City of Beverly Hills, 865 F.3d 1276, 1279 20 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). Plaintiffs’ reliance on this theory is misplaced because 21 they allege the search of their property was “made without a judicial warrant” and was 22 a “warrantless entry into a private residence[.]” Dkt. 1 at 11, 12. As the Report 23 found, the alleged warrantless search occurred, and Plaintiffs were aware of the 24 identity of the responsible actor, more than two years before Plaintiffs filed this 25 lawsuit. Dkt. 51 at 13–15. 26 Third, Plaintiffs object to the Report’s analysis of their civil rights claims based 27 on the allegedly improper recording of a lis pendens against their property. Dkt. 52 at 28 5–6. The Report found that the claims were untimely because Plaintiffs were aware of 1 the recording of the lis pendens at the latest by September 6, 2023, when they filed a 2 motion in state court to remove the lis pendens, more than two years before they filed 3 this lawsuit on October 6, 2025. Dkt. 51 at 9; see also Dkt. 32-6 at 1. Plaintiffs 4 further object that the “ongoing maintenance of the lis pendens,” after it had been 5 recorded, renders their claims timely. Dkt. 52 at 5–6. 6 The court agrees with the Report that Plaintiffs’ individualized claims are “not 7 saved by the continuing violations doctrine.” Dkt. 51 at 14 (discussing Bird v. Dep’t 8 of Hum. Servs., 935 F.3d 738, 748 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam)). Even if it is assumed 9 Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries from the lis pendens “continue to the present day, 10 continuing effect is insufficient to constitute a continuing violation.” See Bird, 935 11 F.3d at 748 (citing Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 665 F.2d 918, 924 (9th Cir. 1982) 12 (“continuing impact from past violations is not actionable”)). 13 Fourth, Plaintiffs object to the dismissal of five Defendants, the 14 Councilmembers for the City of Diamond Bar, as premature. Dkt. 52 at 6–7. The 15 Report found the Councilmembers, who were sued in their official capacities, should 16 be dismissed as redundant Defendants because Plaintiffs also named the City of 17 Diamond Bar as a Defendant. Dkt. 51 at 6. Plaintiffs object they should be allowed 18 to amend their claims against the Councilmembers in their individual capacities. Dkt. 19 52 at 7. 20 The crux of Plaintiffs’ proposed claims against the Councilmembers is their 21 allegedly unlawful policymaking and alleged failure to train and supervise officers. 22 Dkt. 52 at 7. The Councilmembers in their individual capacities would be entitled to 23 absolute legislative immunity for their policymaking decisions. See Bogan v. Scott- 24 Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 54 (1998) (“Local legislators are entitled to absolute immunity 25 from § 1983 liability for their legislative activities.”). Plaintiffs’ other allegations 26 about the Councilmembers are entirely conclusory and, therefore, suggest no basis for 27 amendment. See Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 911 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming 28 denial of request for leave to amend that litigants made in objections to a Magistrate 1 | Judge’s Report where the litigants “did not explain how they would cure the 2 | deficiencies” in their pleading). Accordingly, the Councilmembers are dismissed as 3 | Defendants. 4 Fifth, Plaintiffs object that dismissal of their claims as untimely without leave to 5 || amend is improper. Dkt. 52 at 7. Plaintiffs seek to amend their allegations as to the 6 | dates when their claims accrued. /d. The court agrees with the Report that “such 7 | dismissal should be without leave to amend.” Dkt. 51 at 9. Plaintiffs “[do] not 8 | propose any new facts or legal theories for an amended complaint and therefore [give] 9 | the [cJourt no basis to allow an amendment.” See Gardner, 563 F.3d at 991. 10 Having conducted a de novo review, Plaintiffs’ Objections do not cause this 11 | court to alter or modify the Report. Accordingly, the court ACCEPTS and ADOPTS 12 | the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOHN ZHONG, et al., Case No. 2:25-cv-09491-FLA (DSR)
12 Plaintiffs, ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS, 13 v. CONCLUSIONS, AND 14 RECOMMENDATIONS OF UNITED CITY OF DIAMOND BAR, et al., STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE ON 15 DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO Defendants. DISMISS [DKTS. 30, 37] 16
17 18 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the court has reviewed Defendants’ Motions to 19 Dismiss (Dkt. 30 and 37), Plaintiffs’ Oppositions thereto, Defendants’ combined 20 Reply, all relevant portions of the docket, and the Report and Recommendation of the 21 United States Magistrate Judge (“Report,” Dkt. 51). The court has considered 22 Plaintiffs’ April 28, 2026, Objections to the Report (Dkt. 52) and conducted a de novo 23 review of those portions of the Report to which Plaintiffs objected. 24 The Report recommends the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Complaint with leave to 25 amend some of their claims. Dkt. 51. Plaintiffs’ objections to the Report do not merit 26 a different result. 27 First, Plaintiffs object to the Report’s analysis of their Fourth Amendment claim 28 based on an allegedly unlawful search of their property. Dkt. 52 at 3–4. The Report 1 found that the claim is untimely because the search occurred in May 2023, more than 2 two years before Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on October 6, 2025. Dkt. 51 at 13. The 3 Report also found that Plaintiffs were aware of the identities of the responsible actors 4 in August 2023, also more than two years before they filed this lawsuit on October 6, 5 2025. Id. at 14–15. Plaintiffs object that Defendants “used false identities and false 6 pretenses to gain entry” to their property. Dkt. 52 at 3. As the Report found, 7 however, Plaintiffs were aware of the identity of the responsible actor in August 2023, 8 when they filed their answer to a state court lawsuit identifying Defendant Gubman as 9 the person who had searched Plaintiffs’ property. Dkt. 51 at 15; see also Dkt. 32-4 at 10 5; Dkt. 32-5. Plaintiffs’ objection to the Report’s untimeliness analysis, therefore, is 11 unpersuasive. 12 Second, Plaintiffs object that the accrual of their Fourth Amendment claim was 13 delayed by “judicial deception.” Dkt. 52 at 4–5. “[A] plaintiff bringing a judicial 14 deception claim ‘argues that [an officer] misled the magistrate judge when applying 15 for the warrant, and had the magistrate considered all of the facts that the magistrate 16 would not have found probable cause.’” Chism v. Washington, 661 F.3d 380, 386 n. 9 17 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Smith v. Almada, 640 F.3d 931, 937 (9th Cir. 2011)). 18 A judicial-deception claim begins “accruing when the underlying affidavit 19 became reasonably available.” Klein v. City of Beverly Hills, 865 F.3d 1276, 1279 20 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). Plaintiffs’ reliance on this theory is misplaced because 21 they allege the search of their property was “made without a judicial warrant” and was 22 a “warrantless entry into a private residence[.]” Dkt. 1 at 11, 12. As the Report 23 found, the alleged warrantless search occurred, and Plaintiffs were aware of the 24 identity of the responsible actor, more than two years before Plaintiffs filed this 25 lawsuit. Dkt. 51 at 13–15. 26 Third, Plaintiffs object to the Report’s analysis of their civil rights claims based 27 on the allegedly improper recording of a lis pendens against their property. Dkt. 52 at 28 5–6. The Report found that the claims were untimely because Plaintiffs were aware of 1 the recording of the lis pendens at the latest by September 6, 2023, when they filed a 2 motion in state court to remove the lis pendens, more than two years before they filed 3 this lawsuit on October 6, 2025. Dkt. 51 at 9; see also Dkt. 32-6 at 1. Plaintiffs 4 further object that the “ongoing maintenance of the lis pendens,” after it had been 5 recorded, renders their claims timely. Dkt. 52 at 5–6. 6 The court agrees with the Report that Plaintiffs’ individualized claims are “not 7 saved by the continuing violations doctrine.” Dkt. 51 at 14 (discussing Bird v. Dep’t 8 of Hum. Servs., 935 F.3d 738, 748 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam)). Even if it is assumed 9 Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries from the lis pendens “continue to the present day, 10 continuing effect is insufficient to constitute a continuing violation.” See Bird, 935 11 F.3d at 748 (citing Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 665 F.2d 918, 924 (9th Cir. 1982) 12 (“continuing impact from past violations is not actionable”)). 13 Fourth, Plaintiffs object to the dismissal of five Defendants, the 14 Councilmembers for the City of Diamond Bar, as premature. Dkt. 52 at 6–7. The 15 Report found the Councilmembers, who were sued in their official capacities, should 16 be dismissed as redundant Defendants because Plaintiffs also named the City of 17 Diamond Bar as a Defendant. Dkt. 51 at 6. Plaintiffs object they should be allowed 18 to amend their claims against the Councilmembers in their individual capacities. Dkt. 19 52 at 7. 20 The crux of Plaintiffs’ proposed claims against the Councilmembers is their 21 allegedly unlawful policymaking and alleged failure to train and supervise officers. 22 Dkt. 52 at 7. The Councilmembers in their individual capacities would be entitled to 23 absolute legislative immunity for their policymaking decisions. See Bogan v. Scott- 24 Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 54 (1998) (“Local legislators are entitled to absolute immunity 25 from § 1983 liability for their legislative activities.”). Plaintiffs’ other allegations 26 about the Councilmembers are entirely conclusory and, therefore, suggest no basis for 27 amendment. See Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 911 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming 28 denial of request for leave to amend that litigants made in objections to a Magistrate 1 | Judge’s Report where the litigants “did not explain how they would cure the 2 | deficiencies” in their pleading). Accordingly, the Councilmembers are dismissed as 3 | Defendants. 4 Fifth, Plaintiffs object that dismissal of their claims as untimely without leave to 5 || amend is improper. Dkt. 52 at 7. Plaintiffs seek to amend their allegations as to the 6 | dates when their claims accrued. /d. The court agrees with the Report that “such 7 | dismissal should be without leave to amend.” Dkt. 51 at 9. Plaintiffs “[do] not 8 | propose any new facts or legal theories for an amended complaint and therefore [give] 9 | the [cJourt no basis to allow an amendment.” See Gardner, 563 F.3d at 991. 10 Having conducted a de novo review, Plaintiffs’ Objections do not cause this 11 | court to alter or modify the Report. Accordingly, the court ACCEPTS and ADOPTS 12 | the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge. 13 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that: (1) the Report and Recommendation of 14 | the Magistrate Judge is ACCEPTED and ADOPTED; (2) Defendants’ Motions to 15 | Dismiss are GRANTED as to Plaintiffs’ claims for deprivation of equal protection and 16 | due process based on selective enforcement of the short-term rental ordinance and 17 | recordation of the /is pendens, for violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause, and for 18 || unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment without leave 19 | to amend; (3) Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED as to all other claims 20 | with 30 days’ leave to amend from the docketing of this Order; and (4) Defendants’ 21 | deadline to file a response to a First Amended Complaint shall be 30 days after the 22 | filing date of the First Amended Complaint. 23 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 26 | Dated: July 6, 2026 27 FERNANDO L. AENLLE-ROCHA United States District Judge 28