John Young v. City of St. Charles

Eighth Circuit

John Young v. City of St. Charles

34 F. App'x 245

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

DecidedMay 9, 2002

Docket02-1372

StatusUnpublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 34 F. App'x 245 (John Young v. City of St. Charles) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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John Young v. City of St. Charles, 34 F. App'x 245 (8th Cir. 2002).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

John Young was terminated from his position as a police officer with the St. Charles, Missouri police department. Young brought two lawsuits contending the city’s termination of his employment deprived him of his federal constitutional rights. The first lawsuit was dismissed, and the district court concluded the second lawsuit was barred by res judicata (claim preclusion). Young appeals pro se.

Because Young alleges federal constitutional violations, we apply the federal law of claim preclusion. Canady v. Allstate Ins. Co., 282 F.3d 1005, 1014 (8th Cir. 2002). Claim preclusion bars a later lawsuit if “(1) a court of competent jurisdiction rendered the prior judgment, (2) the prior judgment was a final judgment on the merits, and (3) both cases involved the same cause of action and the same parties.” Id. Young does not dispute the district court’s jurisdiction or that the district court’s dismissal was a final judgment on the merits.

Young asserts his second cause of action is different from the first. As this court explained in Canady, however, “[t]he same cause of action framed in terms of a new legal theory is still the same cause of action.” Id. at 1015 (quoting NAACP v. Metropolitan Council, 125 F.3d 1171, 1174 (8th Cir.1997)). Whether Young frames his due process claim as a Fourteenth Amendment property deprivation (as in the first lawsuit) or a Fifth Amendment liberty deprivation (as in the second lawsuit), he seeks to remedy the same wrong-his allegedly unconstitutional dismissal from the St. Charles police force. Thus, Young’s cause of action is the same in his first and second suits.

Further, the two new defendants in the second lawsuit-both employees of the police department-are in privity with parties to the first lawsuit. See Harmon Ind., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 903 (8th Cir.1999). In their official capacities, the two new defendants have the same legal interests as the city. In their individual capacities, the two new defendants are in privity with an individual defendant who was employed in a similar position of authority in the police department.

For the reasons explained above, Young’s claim is properly barred because of claim preclusion. We affirm the decision of the district court.

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PER CURIAM.

John Young was terminated from his position as a police officer with the St. Charles, Missouri police department. Young brought two lawsuits contending the city’s termination of his employment deprived him of his federal constitutional rights. The first lawsuit was dismissed, and the district court concluded the second lawsuit was barred by res judicata (claim preclusion). Young appeals pro se.

Because Young alleges federal constitutional violations, we apply the federal law of claim preclusion. Canady v. Allstate Ins. Co., 282 F.3d 1005, 1014 (8th Cir. 2002). Claim preclusion bars a later lawsuit if “(1) a court of competent jurisdiction rendered the prior judgment, (2) the prior judgment was a final judgment on the merits, and (3) both cases involved the same cause of action and the same parties.” Id. Young does not dispute the district court’s jurisdiction or that the district court’s dismissal was a final judgment on the merits.

Young asserts his second cause of action is different from the first. As this court explained in Canady, however, “[t]he same cause of action framed in terms of a new legal theory is still the same cause of action.” Id. at 1015 (quoting NAACP v. Metropolitan Council, 125 F.3d 1171, 1174 (8th Cir.1997)). Whether Young frames his due process claim as a Fourteenth Amendment property deprivation (as in the first lawsuit) or a Fifth Amendment liberty deprivation (as in the second lawsuit), he seeks to remedy the same wrong-his allegedly unconstitutional dismissal from the St. Charles police force. Thus, Young’s cause of action is the same in his first and second suits.

Further, the two new defendants in the second lawsuit-both employees of the police department-are in privity with parties to the first lawsuit. See Harmon Ind., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 903 (8th Cir.1999). In their official capacities, the two new defendants have the same legal interests as the city. In their individual capacities, the two new defendants are in privity with an individual defendant who was employed in a similar position of authority in the police department.

For the reasons explained above, Young’s claim is properly barred because of claim preclusion. We affirm the decision of the district court.

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