IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED John William Gertchen, Nov 12 2025, 8:58 am
CLERK Appellant-Defendant Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
v.
State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
November 12, 2025 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-CR-919 Appeal from the Johnson Superior Court The Honorable Brandi Foster Kirkendall, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 41D01-1904-F2-5 41D01-1906-F4-49
Opinion by Judge DeBoer Judges Bradford and Weissmann concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-919 | November 12, 2025 Page 1 of 7 DeBoer, Judge.
Case Summary [1] John Gertchen was charged with multiple felonies in Johnson County in 2019.
He posted bond, failed to appear for a hearing, and warrants were issued for his
arrest. When he was arrested in Oregon in 2022, local authorities in Indiana
chose not to extradite him. In 2025, after being arrested and returned to
Indiana to face his 2019 charges, he filed a motion for discharge pursuant to
Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C). He now appeals the trial court’s order denying
that motion. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [2] In April 2019, the State charged Gertchen with five felonies for dealing
methamphetamine and suboxone in Johnson County. In June, he was charged
with an additional felony for possession of methamphetamine under a separate
cause number. He was arrested on June 22.
[3] Gertchen’s trial was initially set for September 17, but on its own motion, the
trial court rescheduled it for October 1. Later, the court granted Gertchen’s
unopposed motion to continue and reset the trial for December 3. On October
1, he was released on bond. The court granted Gertchen’s additional requests
to continue the trial dates, and ultimately, the trial was set for March 17, 2020.
Then, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the court reset the trial for July 14. On
June 18, Gertchen failed to appear for a pretrial conference, and warrants were
issued for his arrest.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-919 | November 12, 2025 Page 2 of 7 [4] In June 2022, Gertchen was arrested on those warrants in Lane County,
Oregon, and charged with being a fugitive from justice. He waived his right to
formal extradition proceedings, indicating he “consent[ed] to return to the State
of Indiana with any authorized agent of that state.” Appellant’s Appendix Vol.
2 at 45. Lane County authorities contacted the Johnson County Sheriff’s Office
about arranging Gertchen’s transport, and a sergeant responded by asking for
an extension of time due to resource constraints. The record is silent on what
transpired until January 31, 2023, when a Lane County deputy prosecutor filed
a motion to dismiss the fugitive charge against Gertchen, stating “[t]he
demanding state does not wish to extradite at this time.” Id. at 44. The Oregon
court granted that motion and Gertchen was released from jail.
[5] On January 13, 2025, the trial court received notice that Gertchen had been
arrested and returned to Indiana. At a pretrial conference, the court set trial for
March 24; however, on February 19, Gertchen filed a motion for discharge
arguing that he was entitled to dismissal of the charges against him under
Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C). After the court denied his motion, Gertchen
requested permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal. The trial court granted
his request, and this Court accepted jurisdiction.
Discussion and Decision [6] Gertchen argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for discharge
because more than one year passed since “the State refused to extradite him
from Oregon[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 5. In other words, he believes the span of
time after the State declined to extradite him should count toward the one-year Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-919 | November 12, 2025 Page 3 of 7 period it had to bring him to trial under Criminal Rule 4(C). “When, as here,
the relevant facts [of a Rule 4(C) issue] are undisputed and the issue presents a
question of law, our review is de novo.” Ferman v. State, 232 N.E.3d 133, 137
(Ind. Ct. App. 2024).
[7] On January 1, 2024, a new version of Rule 4(C) came into effect and Rule 4.2
was adopted. In his appeal, Gertchen cites the current version of Rule 4(C) but
asks us not to apply Rule 4.2 because it was not in effect when he was arrested
in Oregon in 2022. See Appellant’s Br. at 5-7. We apply the rules that were in
effect at the time Gertchen invoked them by filing his motion for discharge. See
Mitchell v. 10th & The Bypass, LLC, 3 N.E.3d 967, 974 (Ind. 2014) (applying the
amended version of Trial Rule 60 because it was effective when the motion was
filed); see also Woodcock v. State, 163 N.E.3d 863, 872 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)
(quoting Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679, 687 (Ind. 2005), cert. denied) (“[I]t is
firmly established that, a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to
be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or
not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a
clear break with the past.”), trans. denied. 1
[8] Rule 4(C) provides that “[n]o person can be held on recognizance or otherwise
to answer a criminal charge for a period in aggregate exceeding one year from
the date the criminal charge against such defendant is filed, or from the date of
1 See also Carson v. State, 266 N.E.3d 272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (mem.) (applying the version of Rule 4 in effect at the time the motion for discharge was filed), trans. denied.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-919 | November 12, 2025 Page 4 of 7 the arrest on such charge, whichever is later.” “The rule places an affirmative
duty on the State to bring a defendant to trial within one year of being charged
or arrested[.]” Cook v. State, 810 N.E.2d 1064, 1065 (Ind. 2004). However,
“[d]elays caused by a defendant, congestion of the court calendar, or an
emergency are excluded from the time period.” Ind. Crim. Rule 4(C). Rule
4.2(A) provides that “[i]f a defendant is charged in Indiana but apprehended
outside the state . . . , the Rule 4 time periods commence when the defendant is
returned to Indiana[.]” 2
[9] While Gertchen argues his circumstances are similar to those presented in
Greengrass v. State, 542 N.E.2d 995 (Ind. 1989), the Supreme Court’s adoption of
Rule 4.2(A), in its effect, tracks the reasoning Justice DeBruler expressed in his
dissent in Greengrass. There, the defendant was charged with robbery in Indiana
in October 1980 and arrested in New York the next month. Id. at 995. “[T]he
State of Indiana refused to complete extradition proceedings at that time[,]” but
ultimately extradited him after he was rearrested in New Jersey in 1986. Id. A
majority of our Supreme Court agreed with the defendant that the trial court
had erred in denying his motion for discharge under Rule 4(C). Id. at 996. The
majority reasoned that because the State “chose not to extradite” the defendant
after his out-of-state arrest, it had “effected a delay in his trial with which [the
defendant could not] be charged.” Id.
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IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED John William Gertchen, Nov 12 2025, 8:58 am
CLERK Appellant-Defendant Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
v.
State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
November 12, 2025 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-CR-919 Appeal from the Johnson Superior Court The Honorable Brandi Foster Kirkendall, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 41D01-1904-F2-5 41D01-1906-F4-49
Opinion by Judge DeBoer Judges Bradford and Weissmann concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-919 | November 12, 2025 Page 1 of 7 DeBoer, Judge.
Case Summary [1] John Gertchen was charged with multiple felonies in Johnson County in 2019.
He posted bond, failed to appear for a hearing, and warrants were issued for his
arrest. When he was arrested in Oregon in 2022, local authorities in Indiana
chose not to extradite him. In 2025, after being arrested and returned to
Indiana to face his 2019 charges, he filed a motion for discharge pursuant to
Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C). He now appeals the trial court’s order denying
that motion. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [2] In April 2019, the State charged Gertchen with five felonies for dealing
methamphetamine and suboxone in Johnson County. In June, he was charged
with an additional felony for possession of methamphetamine under a separate
cause number. He was arrested on June 22.
[3] Gertchen’s trial was initially set for September 17, but on its own motion, the
trial court rescheduled it for October 1. Later, the court granted Gertchen’s
unopposed motion to continue and reset the trial for December 3. On October
1, he was released on bond. The court granted Gertchen’s additional requests
to continue the trial dates, and ultimately, the trial was set for March 17, 2020.
Then, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the court reset the trial for July 14. On
June 18, Gertchen failed to appear for a pretrial conference, and warrants were
issued for his arrest.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-919 | November 12, 2025 Page 2 of 7 [4] In June 2022, Gertchen was arrested on those warrants in Lane County,
Oregon, and charged with being a fugitive from justice. He waived his right to
formal extradition proceedings, indicating he “consent[ed] to return to the State
of Indiana with any authorized agent of that state.” Appellant’s Appendix Vol.
2 at 45. Lane County authorities contacted the Johnson County Sheriff’s Office
about arranging Gertchen’s transport, and a sergeant responded by asking for
an extension of time due to resource constraints. The record is silent on what
transpired until January 31, 2023, when a Lane County deputy prosecutor filed
a motion to dismiss the fugitive charge against Gertchen, stating “[t]he
demanding state does not wish to extradite at this time.” Id. at 44. The Oregon
court granted that motion and Gertchen was released from jail.
[5] On January 13, 2025, the trial court received notice that Gertchen had been
arrested and returned to Indiana. At a pretrial conference, the court set trial for
March 24; however, on February 19, Gertchen filed a motion for discharge
arguing that he was entitled to dismissal of the charges against him under
Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C). After the court denied his motion, Gertchen
requested permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal. The trial court granted
his request, and this Court accepted jurisdiction.
Discussion and Decision [6] Gertchen argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for discharge
because more than one year passed since “the State refused to extradite him
from Oregon[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 5. In other words, he believes the span of
time after the State declined to extradite him should count toward the one-year Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-919 | November 12, 2025 Page 3 of 7 period it had to bring him to trial under Criminal Rule 4(C). “When, as here,
the relevant facts [of a Rule 4(C) issue] are undisputed and the issue presents a
question of law, our review is de novo.” Ferman v. State, 232 N.E.3d 133, 137
(Ind. Ct. App. 2024).
[7] On January 1, 2024, a new version of Rule 4(C) came into effect and Rule 4.2
was adopted. In his appeal, Gertchen cites the current version of Rule 4(C) but
asks us not to apply Rule 4.2 because it was not in effect when he was arrested
in Oregon in 2022. See Appellant’s Br. at 5-7. We apply the rules that were in
effect at the time Gertchen invoked them by filing his motion for discharge. See
Mitchell v. 10th & The Bypass, LLC, 3 N.E.3d 967, 974 (Ind. 2014) (applying the
amended version of Trial Rule 60 because it was effective when the motion was
filed); see also Woodcock v. State, 163 N.E.3d 863, 872 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)
(quoting Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679, 687 (Ind. 2005), cert. denied) (“[I]t is
firmly established that, a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to
be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or
not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a
clear break with the past.”), trans. denied. 1
[8] Rule 4(C) provides that “[n]o person can be held on recognizance or otherwise
to answer a criminal charge for a period in aggregate exceeding one year from
the date the criminal charge against such defendant is filed, or from the date of
1 See also Carson v. State, 266 N.E.3d 272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (mem.) (applying the version of Rule 4 in effect at the time the motion for discharge was filed), trans. denied.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-919 | November 12, 2025 Page 4 of 7 the arrest on such charge, whichever is later.” “The rule places an affirmative
duty on the State to bring a defendant to trial within one year of being charged
or arrested[.]” Cook v. State, 810 N.E.2d 1064, 1065 (Ind. 2004). However,
“[d]elays caused by a defendant, congestion of the court calendar, or an
emergency are excluded from the time period.” Ind. Crim. Rule 4(C). Rule
4.2(A) provides that “[i]f a defendant is charged in Indiana but apprehended
outside the state . . . , the Rule 4 time periods commence when the defendant is
returned to Indiana[.]” 2
[9] While Gertchen argues his circumstances are similar to those presented in
Greengrass v. State, 542 N.E.2d 995 (Ind. 1989), the Supreme Court’s adoption of
Rule 4.2(A), in its effect, tracks the reasoning Justice DeBruler expressed in his
dissent in Greengrass. There, the defendant was charged with robbery in Indiana
in October 1980 and arrested in New York the next month. Id. at 995. “[T]he
State of Indiana refused to complete extradition proceedings at that time[,]” but
ultimately extradited him after he was rearrested in New Jersey in 1986. Id. A
majority of our Supreme Court agreed with the defendant that the trial court
had erred in denying his motion for discharge under Rule 4(C). Id. at 996. The
majority reasoned that because the State “chose not to extradite” the defendant
after his out-of-state arrest, it had “effected a delay in his trial with which [the
defendant could not] be charged.” Id. In his dissent, Justice DeBruler reasoned
2 Criminal Rule 4.2 was amended on January 1, 2025 before Gertchen filed his motion for discharge, but the language of Rule 4.2(A) remains the same.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-919 | November 12, 2025 Page 5 of 7 that the defendant’s New York arrest pursuant to an extradition warrant did not
constitute an arrest on his Indiana charges for purposes of Rule 4(C). Id.
(DeBruler, J., dissenting). Because he did not believe it was the Supreme
Court’s intent in promulgating Rule 4 “to include that time used in the
extradition process or that expiring prior to an actual arrest on Indiana
charges[,]” he would have found that the one-year period began in “1986 when
[the defendant] was extradited and arrested on the Indiana charge.” Id.
(DeBruler, J., dissenting).
[10] Gertchen’s mid-proceedings flight from Indiana falls squarely within the
purview of Rule 4.2(A). The rule prescribes that when a defendant is charged
in Indiana and apprehended out of state, the Rule 4(C) period does not
commence until he is returned to Indiana. Nothing in the plain language of the
rule limits its application to an initial arrest. Thus, when a defendant such as
Gertchen is charged and arrested in Indiana, fails to appear, flees the state, and
is apprehended out of state, the resulting delay is excluded from the Rule 4(C)
period and the clock does not begin to run again until he is returned to the state.
See Sweeney v. State, 704 N.E.2d 86, 100 n.27 (Ind. 1998) (A “defendant’s speedy
trial rights in Indiana do not commence until he is within the jurisdiction and
exclusive control of Indiana authorities.”).
[11] For these reasons, the trial court did not err in denying Gertchen’s motion for
discharge. Over the course of the proceedings, the Rule 4(C) clock ran for two
periods—from Gertchen’s arrest to his first trial date, and from his return to
Indiana until he filed his motion for discharge. By our calculation, the Rule
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-919 | November 12, 2025 Page 6 of 7 4(C) clock has run for 126 days and the State has 239 days remaining to bring
him to trial.
Conclusion [12] We conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Gertchen’s motion for
discharge pursuant to Rule 4(C).
[13] Affirmed.
Bradford, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Michael J. Kyle Franklin, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Justin F. Roebel Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-919 | November 12, 2025 Page 7 of 7