John Wiles Nagle IV v. City of San Jose, et al.

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: May 15, 2026
• Docket: 5:25-cv-05523
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JOHN WILES NAGLE IV, Case No. 25-cv-05523-SVK

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 9 v. PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED 10 CITY OF SAN JOSE, et al., COMPLAINT 11 Defendants. Re: Dkt. No. 38

12 This case arises out of Plaintiff John Wiles Nagle IV’s allegations of misconduct by certain 13 members of the San Jose Police Officers during a traffic stop. See, generally, Dkt. 1. The Parties 14 have exchanged initial disclosures and Defendants have stipulated to several amendments. Dkts. 15 12, 23, 30, 33. At issue is Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). Dkt. 35. The SAC 16 seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful seizure, excessive use of force and denial of 17 medical care by four defendant-officers, Jose Alvarez, Peter Ryu, David Freudenstein, and 18 Michael Jaycox (the “Named Officers”) as well as against 25 Doe Officers. Dkt. 35 at 7-9. It also 19 alleges attendant California statutory and common law causes of action against the same officers. 20 Id. at 10-12. The SAC also names the City of San Jose (the “City”) as a defendant for negligent 21 training and supervision. See id. at 1, 6 ¶ 29, 11-12. 22 Before the Court is Defendants’ partial motion to dismiss the SAC. Dkt. 38 (“Motion”) 23 Specifically, Defendants seek dismissal of: (1) the Section 1983 claims against Officers Ryu, 24 Freudenstein and Jaycox only; (2) the California state tort claims against all Named Officers; and 25 (3) dismissal of the Doe Officers as defendants. Dkt. 38 at 2. All necessary Parties have 26 consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. Dkts. 15, 22, 46.1 The Court determines that this 27 1 matter may be resolved without oral argument. Civil L.R. 7-1(b). Having considered the Parties’ 2 submissions, the relevant law and the record in this matter, the Court GRANTS IN PART and 3 DENIES IN PART the Motion. 4 I. BACKGROUND 5 The facts herein are drawn from Plaintiff’s SAC.2 On January 10, 2025, Plaintiff was 6 driving his son and other young family members to get propane for a barbecue. Dkt. 35, ¶ 16. He 7 was pulled over by officers of the San Jose Police Department (“SJPD”), and alleges that the 8 “officers exited the[ir] vehicle and immediately drew their weapons.” Id., ¶ 17. After some 9 conversation, the “officers ordered Plaintiff out of the car and physically grabbed him to arrest 10 him.” Id., ¶ 18. Plaintiff verbally complained about the officers “being too rough,” and “one of 11 the officers took Plaintiff to the ground and was straddling him.” Id., ¶ 19. A second unnamed 12 officer soon joined in. Id. Then, “while Plaintiff was pinned to the ground and defenseless, 13 Defendant Alvarez sprinted towards Plaintiff and struck him with a blow from his knee, before 14 repeatedly striking him with a closed fist no fewer than five times all over his body.” Id., ¶ 23. At 15 that point, “the officer originally straddling Plaintiff joined in the attack, and delivered a knee 16 strike to Plaintiff’s back before striking him with a closed fist to the face,” breaking his nose. Id. 17 An unnamed number of officers “subsequently pinned Plaintiff to the ground with knees to his 18 back and neck, injuring and choking him.” Id. Officers Ryu, Freudenstein and Jaycox were at the 19 scene and were either involved with “or failed to stop the assault.”3 Id. 20 An ambulance arrived at the scene sometime thereafter. Id., ¶ 27. Plaintiff was to be 21 transported to a hospital but alleges, on information and belief, that the “officers demanded that 22 Plaintiff be removed from the ambulance, despite his obvious need for medical care, and placed 23

24 jurisdiction. See Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 502-05 (9th Cir. 2017) (magistrate judge jurisdiction vests after all named parties, whether served or unserved, consent). 25 2 For the purposes of resolving the Motion, the Court takes the factual allegations of the Complaint 26 as true. See Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008) (courts generally “accept factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in 27 the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”). 1 into an SJPD cruiser.” Id. Plaintiff was subsequently hospitalized, but then “taken to jail[] and 2 given significant medical treatment while incarcerated for his injuries.” Id., ¶ 28. Plaintiff alleges 3 that the assault took place because “Officers escalated a non-violent encounter into a violent 4 assault on compliant individuals,” and that the City is responsible for its “failure to properly train, 5 supervise and discipline its personnel.” Id., ¶ 29. Plaintiff also alleges that each of the Officers 6 present failed to intervene in the assault and “worked together as a group to back each other up 7 provide tacit approval for the incident, and support, assist, and encourage one another’s actions.” 8 Id., ¶¶ 30-32. 9 Plaintiff filed his original complaint on July 1, 2025 and a first amended complaint on 10 September 22, 2025. Dkts. 1, 12. Defendants City of San Jose and Officer Alvarez answered the 11 first amended complaint on November 12, 2025. Dkt. 23. Thereafter, the Court held an initial 12 case management conference and, among other dates, set the Parties’ deadline for initial 13 disclosures as January 19, 2026. Dkt. 30. The Parties exchanged initial disclosures, and the City 14 and Officer Alvarez stipulated to permit Plaintiff to amend the complaint “to substitute newly 15 identified officers in place of previously named DOE defendants.” Dkt. 33, ¶¶ 4-5, 10. The SAC 16 was filed on January 30, 2026, and the Motion was filed on March 3, 2026. Dkts. 35, 38. The 17 matter was fully briefed on March 20, 2026. Dkts. 39-40. 18 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 19 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court must dismiss a complaint if it 20 “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a 21 Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 22 plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This facial- 23 plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to allege facts resulting in “more than a sheer possibility 24 that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In ruling on 25 a motion to dismiss, a court may consider only “the complaint, materials incorporated into the 26 complaint by reference, and matters [subject to] judicial notice.” UFCW Loc. 1500 Pension Fund 27 v. Mayer, 895 F.3d 695, 698 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). A court must also presume the 1 Courtney, 32 F.4th 764, 772 (9th Cir. 2022). However, a court need not accept as true “allegations 2 that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” See 3 Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 1008 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).

4 III. DISCUSSION 5 A. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claims Against Officers Ryu, Freudenstein and Jaycox are Sufficiently Pleaded 6 7 The Court begins with Defendants’ challenge to Plaintiff’s Section 1983 allegations 8 against Officers Ryu, Freudenstein and Jaycox. Defendants do not challenge the allegations 9 against Officer Alvarez, but argue that the other Named Officers’ “liability is purportedly 10 premised on either their personal participation in the conduct or acting in concert with others, or 11 ‘authorizing, acquiescing, condoning, acting, omitting or failing to take action to prevent unlawful 12 conduct.’” Dkt. 38 at 6 (citing Dkt. 35, ¶¶ 14, 31). They argue that, therefore, “Plaintiff has done 13 no more than plead the legal theories as far as the remaining named officers” without pleading 14 “any facts.” Id. 15 The Court is persuaded by Defendants’ first argument. Plaintiff pleads specific and direct 16 involvement in the alleged assault by three officers: one unnamed officer who “took Plaintiff to 17 the ground and was straddling him, a second officer [who] joined to hold Plaintiff on the ground” 18 and Officer Alvarez who “sprinted toward Plaintiff and struck him with a blow from his knee” 19 while he was “pinned on the ground.” Dkt. 35, ¶¶ 19, 23. Accordingly, construing the pleadings 20 in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, it possible that the two unnamed officers are two of 21 Officers Ryu, Freudenstein and Jaycox. The fact that it is possible, however, does not make it 22 plausible. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (2007) (there is a “need at the pleading 23 stage for allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)” liability). In the absence 24 of allegations naming the officers, for example, the Court has no way of knowing which two of 25 Officers Ryu, Freudenstein and Jaycox are implicated.4 26 4 Although consistent with the pleadings, the Court cannot rely on the facts proffered in Plaintiffs’ 27 opposition that Officer Jaycox “delivered closed-fist strikes before helping secure Plaintiff in 1 However, the Court must also consider Plaintiff’s alternative theory of liability: that 2 Officers Ryu, Freudenstein and Jaycox are liable for “authorizing, acquiescing, condoning” or 3 “failing to take action to prevent [the] unlawful conduct.” See Dkt. 38 at 6. Defendants argue that 4 such allegations are insufficient to subject Officers Ryu, Freudenstein and Jaycox to liability as a 5 matter of law. Dkt. 38 at 6. Defendants cite no legal authority, however, for this proposition. 6 Indeed, the converse is true: “[O]fficers can be held liable for failing to intercede” so long as 7 “they had an opportunity to intercede.” Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289 (9th Cir. 8 2000). Accordingly, even if Named Officers Ryu, Freudenstein and Jaycox did not directly 9 participate in the alleged assault, because Plaintiff alleges that they were “at the scene” and “failed 10 to stop the assault” and alleges a course of events that appears to have occurred over a sufficiently 11 long time so as to give the Named Officers an opportunity to intercede, (see Dkt. 35, ¶¶ 19-23), 12 Plaintiff’s claims are sufficiently pleaded under a failure to intervene theory. 13 Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Section 1983 claims against Officers 14 Ryu, Freudenstein and Jaycox is DENIED. However, for clarity of the record and to streamline 15 the proceedings, the Court also grants leave to amend for Plaintiff to add his proffered 16 allegations as to the direct involvement of Officers Jaycox and Freudenstein. See Dkt. 39 at 11. 17 B. Among the State Tort Claims, Defendants Challenge Only the Bane Act Claim and Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. Plaintiff Has 18 Adequately Pleaded These Claims. 19 Next, although Defendants appear to take issue with all of Plaintiff’s “state tort claims” 20 against Officers Alvarez, Ryu, Freudenstein, and Jaycox, (Dkt. 38 at 2), the proper scope of this 21 challenge is significantly narrower. First, Defendants’ arguments are in substance directed only to 22 the “Bane Act” claim under California Civil Code Section 52.1 (Count IV) and Plaintiff’s claim 23 for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”) (Count VI). See Dkt. 38 at 6-8. Thus, the 24 Court DENIES the Motion insofar as it seeks to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for common-law 25 2026) (“A court may not look beyond the complaint to a plaintiff’s moving papers, such as a 26 memorandum in opposition to a defendant’s motion to dismiss’ in determining whether to grant the Motion.”). However, the Court may “look to proffered facts in an opposition in determining 27 whether to grant leave to amend.” See, e.g., Flickinger v. Castillo, No. [CONTINUED] 1 battery and negligence because Defendants’ Motion does not meet their burden. 2 Additionally, Officer Alvarez previously answered the first amended complaint, which, as 3 Plaintiff points out, included the same allegations as the second amended complaint as to Officer 4 Alvarez. See Dkt. 39 at 4; Dkt. 33, ¶ 7; compare also Dkt. 12 at 9-12 with Dkt. 35 at 9-12. 5 Accordingly, the Court finds he has waived his Rule 12(b)(6) challenge. E.g., Brinson v. 6 California, No. 25-cv-02381-DMR, 2025 WL 2967812, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2025) 7 (“Amending a complaint does not automatically revive defenses and objections the defendant has 8 previously waived. ... Thus, a defendant may bring a Rule 12(b) motion objecting to an amended 9 complaint only to the extent the challenges asserted in that motion are based on the new matter in 10 the amended complaint.” (cleaned up) (citations omitted)). Thus, the Court DENIES the Motion 11 insofar as it seeks dismissal of the Counts IV and VI against Officer Alvarez. 12 Thus, the only challenges properly before the Court are Officers’ Ryu, Freudenstein and 13 Jaycox’s challenges to the Bane Act claim and claim for IIED. 14 The Bane Act “was enacted in 1987 to address hate crimes.” Reese v. Cnty. of 15 Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th Cir. 2018). It “provides a cause of action for violations of 16 a plaintiff’s state or federal civil rights committed by threats, intimidation, or coercion.” Id. 17 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). After analyzing California state intermediate 18 appellate court authorities, which federal courts “must follow” unless they find “convincing 19 evidence that the state’s supreme court likely would not follow” such authority, the Ninth Circuit 20 clarified:

21 [W]e draw two conclusions as to the necessary showing for an excessive force claim under the Bane Act. First, the Bane Act does 22 not require the “threat, intimidation or coercion” element of the claim to be transactionally independent from the constitutional violation 23 alleged. Second, the Bane Act requires a “a specific intent to violate the arrestee’s right to freedom from unreasonable seizure.” 24 25 Id. at 1043. So, the elements of a Bane Act claim for use of excessive force are the same as under 26 Section 1983 but with the additional intent element: “[T]he jury must find that the defendants 27 intended not only the force, but its unreasonableness.” Id. at 1045. Here, the Court agrees with 1 reckless, deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s rights, negligent, and objectively unreasonable,” but 2 not intentionally unreasonable or violative. See Dkt. 35, ¶ 33. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim for 3 violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 against Officers Ryu, Freudenstein and Jaycox is DISMISSED 4 with leave to amend. 5 As to for IIED, the elements of such a claim require “extreme and outrageous conduct” 6 performed “with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, 7 emotional distress.” Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 571 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Davidson v. 8 City of Westminster, 32 Cal. 3d 197, 209 (1982)). Defendants’ argument, based on a lack of 9 specific intent, is the same. See Dkt. 38 at 7-8. Here, however, the Court is not persuaded. 10 Plaintiff pleads “reckless” conduct as his legal theory supported by the specific facts set forth in 11 paragraphs 17-32. Dkt. 35, ¶¶ 17-33. The Court finds that, based on the facts set forth in 12 Plaintiff’s SAC, it is plausible to infer that the Named Officers acted with “reckless disregard of 13 the probability of causing[] emotional distress,” as required by Corales. 567 F.3d at 571. 14 Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to dismiss count VI is DENIED. 15 C. Plaintiffs’ Allegations Against Doe Defendants Remain Pending Discovery 16 Finally, Defendants move to dismiss Doe defendants, arguing that “Doe pleadings are 17 generally not permissible in federal court.” Dkt. 38 at 8. Defendants’ argument is overly broad. 18 True, “general allegations that [Doe Defendants] committed wrongdoing” are improper and “the 19 use of ‘John Doe’ to identify a defendant is not favored.” Villarreal v. Cnty. of Monterey, 254 F. 20 Supp. 3d 1168, 1194-95 (N.D. Cal. 2017). “Nonetheless, while cases lacking specific allegations 21 against Doe Defendants are improper, where a plaintiff has specific allegations against officers 22 and/or supervisors but is unaware of any particular officer’s name, the plaintiff may name ‘Doe 23 Officers’ and amend the pleading … to add their names once she has discovered their identities.” 24 Verdugo v. City of San Jose, No. 25-cv-08776-SVK, 2026 WL 825707, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 25 2026) (contrasting id. with Acasio v. San Mateo Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., No. 14-cv-04689-JSC, 2015 26 WL 333011, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2015)). Here, all of the Doe Defendants are “Doe Officers,” 27 named “individually and in their official capacity as police officers for the San Jose Police ] Dkt. 35 at 1; see also id., §§ 17-33. Plaintiff is merely unaware of the specific “who did what” 2 and the names of some officers. See id. On the other hand, initial disclosures have been 3 exchanged and at least some of the Officers involved in the alleged incident have been identified 4 || by Defendants. See Dkt. 33, 44. At some point, the universe of involved officers is narrow 5 enough that remaining Doe Defendants must be removed. 6 Balancing these considerations and administering the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “to 7 || secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination” of this action, (Fed. R. Civ. P. 1), the 8 Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to dismiss Doe Defendants but ORDERS that, no later than 9 30 days prior to the close of fact discovery in this case, Plaintiff shall amend the operative 10 || complaint to remove any remaining Doe Defendants. Il |) Iv. CONCLUSION 12 For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the SAC is GRANTED IN 13 PART and DENIED IN PART. The Bane Act claim (Count IV) against Defendants Ryu, 14 || Freudenstein and Jaycox is DISMISSED with leave to amend, while the remaining claims are 3 15 || not dismissed against any defendants. a 16 If Plaintiff amends his SAC, he shall also amend to clarify the identities of the two other 2 17 || directly involved officers, (see Dkt. 35, 9] 18-19), when they are known. Moreover, Plaintiff shall Z 18 amend the operative complaint to remove any remaining Doe Defendants and substitute any other 19 || known officer-defendants no later than 30 days prior to the close of fact discovery. 20 Plaintiff's amended complaint with regard to the Bane Act claim, if any, shall be due no 21 later than May 29, 2026. If no amended complaint is filed at that time, Defendants shall answer 22 || the second amended complaint no later than June 5, 2026. 23 24 SO ORDERED. 25 || Dated: May 15, 2026 26 27 Summ veYl SUSAN VAN KEULEN 28 United States Magistrate Judge