1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOHN WESLEY WILLIAMS, Case No. 2:25-cv-2168-JDP (P) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER; FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 MULE CREEK STATE PRISON, et al.,
15 Defendants. 16 17 18 Plaintiff, a state prisoner, brought this case alleging that defendants Sackett, Habedank,1 19 and Mule Creek State Prison (“MCSP”) violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against 20 him for filing administrative grievances. On August 20, 2025, I found that those claims could 21 proceed past screening. ECF No. 6. I also found, however, that plaintiff’s claims against an 22 unnamed inmate failed because he was not a state actor. Id. at 4-5. I offered plaintiff a choice of 23 filing another amended complaint or proceeding only with his cognizable claims, and he chose 24 the latter. ECF No. 9. Defendants were served and have moved to dismiss the complaint for 25 failure to state a cognizable claim. ECF No. 16. Plaintiff has filed an opposition, ECF No. 17, 26 1 Plaintiff lists this defendant’s name as Hededauh, but it appears to be Habedank. 27 Accordingly, I will use the spelling reflected in the motion to dismiss and order the Clerk of Court to change the docket to reflect the proper spelling. I will do the same for defendant 28 “Sacket,” who is properly identified as “Sackett.” 1 and defendants have filed a reply, ECF No. 18. For the reasons stated hereafter, I find that the 2 motion to dismiss should be granted. 3 I. Motion to Dismiss 4 A. Legal Standards 5 A complaint may be dismissed under that rule for “failure to state a claim upon which 6 relief may be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to 7 state a claim, a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 8 face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim has “facial plausibility 9 when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 10 that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 11 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability 12 requirement,” but it requires more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. 13 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 14 For purposes of dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the court generally considers only 15 allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly 16 subject to judicial notice, and construes all well-pleaded material factual allegations in the light 17 most favorable to the nonmoving party. Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 710 18 F.3d 946, 956 (9th Cir. 2013); Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012). 19 Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on either: (1) lack of a cognizable legal 20 theory, or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. Chubb Custom Ins. Co., 710 F.3d 21 at 956. Dismissal also is appropriate if the complaint alleges a fact that necessarily defeats the 22 claim. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228-1229 (9th Cir. 1984). 23 B. Analysis 24 i. Background 25 Plaintiff alleges that, on July 10, 2025, defendant Habedank forced him to relinquish a 26 television set because, contrary to prison policy, it had speakers. ECF No. 1 at 4. At some later 27 time, Habedank told plaintiff to provide a record of ownership to reclaim the television. Id. at 5. 28 He claims, however, that an unnamed inmate worker, “John Doe,” somehow influenced 1 Habedank, causing him not to reissue the television. Id. Plaintiff then submitted a grievance 2 regarding the officer’s decision not to return the television, which, as of the complaint’s filing, 3 remains pending. Id. 4 Then, on July 12, 2025, John Doe approached plaintiff and told him that, if he gave him 5 one-hundred dollars, he would get the television back. Id. Plaintiff alleges that he did not accept 6 that offer and, instead, filed another grievance reporting Doe’s actions. Id. 7 On July 31, 2025, Doe allegedly approached plaintiff, who uses a mobility walker, on the 8 exercise yard and angrily confronted him about the grievance that reported his offer to get the 9 television back for cash. Id. at 6. Plaintiff tried to deny that he had filed such a grievance, but 10 Doe stated that defendants Habedank and Sackett had told him that it was filed. Id. Then 11 plaintiff told Doe that he intended to report the confrontation, and that he could convey that 12 message to the two officers. Id. at 7. Doe told plaintiff that, if he did, the officers would give 13 him a knife to stab him and that he was not getting his television back. Id. He then began pulling 14 on plaintiff’s walker to attack him. Id. 15 ii. First Amendment Claims 16 Based on the foregoing, I found that, for screening purposes, plaintiff had brought 17 cognizable First Amendment retaliation claims against defendants Habedank, Sackett, and MCSP. 18 In their motion to dismiss, defendants argue that the foregoing allegations, taken as true, fail to 19 state a cognizable claim. I now agree. 20 First, with respect to MCSP itself, the prison is not a viable defendant in a section 1983 21 action because it is not a “person.” See Allison v. California Adult Authority, 419 F.2d 822, 823 22 (9th Cir. 1969) (Emphasizing that “state agencies which are but arms of the state government are 23 not ‘persons’ for purposes of the Civil Rights Act. Therefore plaintiff would not be entitled to 24 relief against the California Adult Authority or San Quentin State Prison.”). Additionally, as 25 defendants point out, the Eleventh Amendment bars claims for damages against the state, of 26 which the prison is part. See Krainski v. Nev. ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., 27 616 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against the State or its 28 agencies for all types of relief, absent unequivocal consent by the state.”). 1 Second, I find that plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state a First Amendment 2 retaliation claim against defendants Habedank and Sackett. “Within the prison context, a viable 3 claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state 4 actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected 5 conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and 6 (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 7 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, the only protected conduct referenced in the 8 complaint is the filing of two grievances. The first grievance was related to Habedank’s 9 confiscation of the television, and there does not appear to be any adverse action associated with 10 it. Indeed, after this grievance was filed, the correctional officer defendants do not appear to have 11 taken any action whatsoever; it was John Doe who approached plaintiff and offered to get the 12 television back in exchange for money.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOHN WESLEY WILLIAMS, Case No. 2:25-cv-2168-JDP (P) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER; FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 MULE CREEK STATE PRISON, et al.,
15 Defendants. 16 17 18 Plaintiff, a state prisoner, brought this case alleging that defendants Sackett, Habedank,1 19 and Mule Creek State Prison (“MCSP”) violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against 20 him for filing administrative grievances. On August 20, 2025, I found that those claims could 21 proceed past screening. ECF No. 6. I also found, however, that plaintiff’s claims against an 22 unnamed inmate failed because he was not a state actor. Id. at 4-5. I offered plaintiff a choice of 23 filing another amended complaint or proceeding only with his cognizable claims, and he chose 24 the latter. ECF No. 9. Defendants were served and have moved to dismiss the complaint for 25 failure to state a cognizable claim. ECF No. 16. Plaintiff has filed an opposition, ECF No. 17, 26 1 Plaintiff lists this defendant’s name as Hededauh, but it appears to be Habedank. 27 Accordingly, I will use the spelling reflected in the motion to dismiss and order the Clerk of Court to change the docket to reflect the proper spelling. I will do the same for defendant 28 “Sacket,” who is properly identified as “Sackett.” 1 and defendants have filed a reply, ECF No. 18. For the reasons stated hereafter, I find that the 2 motion to dismiss should be granted. 3 I. Motion to Dismiss 4 A. Legal Standards 5 A complaint may be dismissed under that rule for “failure to state a claim upon which 6 relief may be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to 7 state a claim, a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 8 face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim has “facial plausibility 9 when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 10 that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 11 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability 12 requirement,” but it requires more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. 13 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 14 For purposes of dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the court generally considers only 15 allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly 16 subject to judicial notice, and construes all well-pleaded material factual allegations in the light 17 most favorable to the nonmoving party. Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 710 18 F.3d 946, 956 (9th Cir. 2013); Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012). 19 Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on either: (1) lack of a cognizable legal 20 theory, or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. Chubb Custom Ins. Co., 710 F.3d 21 at 956. Dismissal also is appropriate if the complaint alleges a fact that necessarily defeats the 22 claim. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228-1229 (9th Cir. 1984). 23 B. Analysis 24 i. Background 25 Plaintiff alleges that, on July 10, 2025, defendant Habedank forced him to relinquish a 26 television set because, contrary to prison policy, it had speakers. ECF No. 1 at 4. At some later 27 time, Habedank told plaintiff to provide a record of ownership to reclaim the television. Id. at 5. 28 He claims, however, that an unnamed inmate worker, “John Doe,” somehow influenced 1 Habedank, causing him not to reissue the television. Id. Plaintiff then submitted a grievance 2 regarding the officer’s decision not to return the television, which, as of the complaint’s filing, 3 remains pending. Id. 4 Then, on July 12, 2025, John Doe approached plaintiff and told him that, if he gave him 5 one-hundred dollars, he would get the television back. Id. Plaintiff alleges that he did not accept 6 that offer and, instead, filed another grievance reporting Doe’s actions. Id. 7 On July 31, 2025, Doe allegedly approached plaintiff, who uses a mobility walker, on the 8 exercise yard and angrily confronted him about the grievance that reported his offer to get the 9 television back for cash. Id. at 6. Plaintiff tried to deny that he had filed such a grievance, but 10 Doe stated that defendants Habedank and Sackett had told him that it was filed. Id. Then 11 plaintiff told Doe that he intended to report the confrontation, and that he could convey that 12 message to the two officers. Id. at 7. Doe told plaintiff that, if he did, the officers would give 13 him a knife to stab him and that he was not getting his television back. Id. He then began pulling 14 on plaintiff’s walker to attack him. Id. 15 ii. First Amendment Claims 16 Based on the foregoing, I found that, for screening purposes, plaintiff had brought 17 cognizable First Amendment retaliation claims against defendants Habedank, Sackett, and MCSP. 18 In their motion to dismiss, defendants argue that the foregoing allegations, taken as true, fail to 19 state a cognizable claim. I now agree. 20 First, with respect to MCSP itself, the prison is not a viable defendant in a section 1983 21 action because it is not a “person.” See Allison v. California Adult Authority, 419 F.2d 822, 823 22 (9th Cir. 1969) (Emphasizing that “state agencies which are but arms of the state government are 23 not ‘persons’ for purposes of the Civil Rights Act. Therefore plaintiff would not be entitled to 24 relief against the California Adult Authority or San Quentin State Prison.”). Additionally, as 25 defendants point out, the Eleventh Amendment bars claims for damages against the state, of 26 which the prison is part. See Krainski v. Nev. ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., 27 616 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against the State or its 28 agencies for all types of relief, absent unequivocal consent by the state.”). 1 Second, I find that plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state a First Amendment 2 retaliation claim against defendants Habedank and Sackett. “Within the prison context, a viable 3 claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state 4 actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected 5 conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and 6 (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 7 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, the only protected conduct referenced in the 8 complaint is the filing of two grievances. The first grievance was related to Habedank’s 9 confiscation of the television, and there does not appear to be any adverse action associated with 10 it. Indeed, after this grievance was filed, the correctional officer defendants do not appear to have 11 taken any action whatsoever; it was John Doe who approached plaintiff and offered to get the 12 television back in exchange for money. Even if this offer could be considered “adverse,” I find 13 that it would be insufficient to chill an inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights. Plaintiff 14 himself alleges that he responded to the offer by filing another grievance. ECF No. 1 at 5. 15 Neither does it appear that defendants Habedank and Sackett have taken any action related 16 to the second grievance, which was filed not against either officer, but to report the offer made by 17 Doe. And, while Doe allegedly confronted and attacked plaintiff because of this grievance, there 18 is no allegation that he was acting on behalf of Habedank or Sackett. Rather, the allegations 19 indicate that Doe was upset because the grievance had reported his own improper conduct. 20 Plaintiff alleges that Doe yelled “you wrote a 602 about the hundred dollars and me, keep my 21 name out [of] your mouth or I’m gonna beat your ass.” Id. Plaintiff does allege that Doe learned 22 about the grievance from Habedank and Sackett, but he does not allege that they influenced Doe’s 23 response or knew that he would confront plaintiff. Plaintiff’s allegation that Doe threatened to 24 get a knife from Habedank and Sackett if he filed a third grievance is also insufficient to state a 25 claim against either officer. He does not allege that either officer had knowledge of this threat or 26 any intent to actually provide Doe with a knife. Thus, he has not sufficiently alleged that either 27 defendant took an adverse action against plaintiff for any protected conduct. 28 ] Finally, the initial confiscation of the television does not implicate a First Amendment 2 | retaliation claim. Plaintiff does not allege that Habedank confiscated his property in retaliation 3 | for any protected conduct. Rather, he alleges that the confiscation was undertaken because prison 4 | policy prohibits possessing a television with speakers. /d. at 4. 5 I will recommend that defendants’ motion be granted and that plaintiffs claims be 6 | dismissed with leave to amend. 7 Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall assign a district judge to this 8 | action. 9 Further, it is RECOMMENDED that defendants’ motion to dismiss, ECF No. 16, be 10 | GRANTED and plaintiff's complaint, ECF No. 1, be DISMISSED with leave to amend within 11 | thirty days of any order adopting these recommendations. 12 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 13 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days of 14 | service of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the 15 | court and serve a copy on all parties. Any such document should be captioned “Objections to 16 | Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations,” and any response shall be served and filed 17 | within fourteen days of service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file 18 | objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See 19 | Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 20 | 1991). 21 IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: _ March 17, 2026 QH——— 24 JEREMY D. PETERSON 95 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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