John Webb v. Department of the Air Force

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedMay 16, 2024
DocketAT-0752-16-0540-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of John Webb v. Department of the Air Force (John Webb v. Department of the Air Force) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
John Webb v. Department of the Air Force, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

0UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

JOHN K. WEBB, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, AT-0752-16-0540-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, DATE: May 16, 2024 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

John K. Webb , Pensacola, Florida, pro se.

William Vincent Cochrane and Holly L. Buchanan , Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which sustained his removal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND The appellant was removed from his position of Computer Scientist, GS-12, at the 96th Range Control Squadron, at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6 at 14. The agency based the action on the appellant’s failure to meet a condition of his employment—the requirement to maintain his security clearance. Id. at 26. The record reflects that on November 20, 2014, the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications Facility (DODCAF) rendered a preliminary decision to revoke the appellant’s eligibility for access to classified information or employment in sensitive duties. Id. at 74-75. The appellant was provided with instructions on how to submit a response, which he did on January 30, 2015. IAF, Tab 15, at 17-64. On June 21, 2015, the DODCAF revoked the appellant’s “eligibility for access to classified information and/or assignment to duties that have been designated national security sensitive.” IAF, Tab 6 at 71-72. Although the appellant appealed the decision to the Personnel Security Appeal Board (PSAB), the PSAB upheld the revocation on October 16, 2015. Id. at 69-70. The agency proposed the appellant’s removal on February 25, 2016, and he submitted both a written and an oral response to the proposal. Id. at 20-28. The deciding official issued a 3

decision removing the appellant effective April 30, 2016. Id. at 15-19. The appellant then filed this Board appeal. IAF, Tab 1. Because the appellant withdrew his request for a hearing, the administrative judge decided this appeal based on the written record. IAF, Tab 27, Initial Decision (ID) at 2; IAF, Tab 21 n.1. In her initial decision, the administrative judge found that the agency demonstrated by preponderant evidence that the appellant’s Computer Scientist position required him to maintain a Secret level security clearance. ID at 4; IAF, Tab 6 at 22, 65, Tab 22 at 10, 12. The administrative judge also found that the record established that the DODCAF revoked the appellant’s access to classified information and that the PSAB upheld the revocation. ID at 4; IAF Tab 6 at 69-75; Tab 15 at 66-69. The administrative judge found further that the agency complied with the procedures required by 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b) when removing the appellant from his position, and that the agency established the required nexus between its adverse action and the efficiency of the service. ID at 4. In addition, the administrative judge found no evidence of a formal agency policy that gives the appellant the right to transfer to a nonsensitive position, and absent a statute or regulation requiring the agency to seek out alternative employment, the Board lacks the authority to review whether an employee’s reassignment to a position not requiring a security clearance would have been reasonable. ID at 3-4. To the extent the appellant alleged that the agency discriminated against him on the basis of his age by showing favoritism to younger employees by helping them keep their security clearances, the administrative judge found that the Board lacks authority to review this claim because it would involve an inquiry into the validity of the agency’s reasons for deciding to revoke the appellant’s access. ID at 4-5. Finally, regarding the appellant’s claim that the agency failed to follow its own procedural protections when it did not consider certain documents he provided, the administrative judge found that because the appellant failed to prove by preponderant evidence that the agency committed any procedural error that would have resulted in him not being 4

removed for failure to maintain a requirement of his position, he failed to establish harmful error. ID at 5-6. Thus, the administrative judge affirmed the agency’s removal action. ID at 6. The appellant has filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency has filed a response, and the appellant has filed a reply to the agency’s response. PFR File, Tabs 3-4.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW In Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530-31 (1988), the U.S. Supreme Court held that, in an appeal under 5 U.S.C. § 7513 based on the denial or revocation of a security clearance, the Board lacks authority to review the substance of the underlying security clearance determination, but may review, inter alia, whether the employee’s position required a security clearance, whether the security clearance was revoked, and whether the procedures set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b) were followed. Here, it is undisputed that the appellant’s position required a security clearance, that it was revoked, and that the agency complied with the requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b) in taking the removal action. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit also has held that, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7701

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Department of the Navy v. Egan
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John Webb v. Department of the Air Force, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/john-webb-v-department-of-the-air-force-mspb-2024.