NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 24-2816 __________
JOHN WAYNE, Appellant
v.
JOHN E. WETZEL; GEORGE LITTLE; TABB BICKELL; MICHAEL CLARK; LEE ESTOCK; DEREK F. OBERLANDER; JAIME SORBER; TAMMY FERGUSON; SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS ____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2:21-cv-04209) District Judge: Honorable Timothy J. Savage ____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) October 14, 2025
Before: KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 3, 2026) ___________
OPINION* ___________
PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. John Wayne, a Pennsylvania inmate, appeals pro se and in forma pauperis from
the District Court’s orders granting summary judgment and denying his motion to alter or
amend the judgment. We will affirm.
I.
Wayne has a lengthy disciplinary history. Between 2014 and 2017, Wayne was
placed in disciplinary custody for several finite terms and transferred between multiple
facilities because he was fighting other inmates. In late 2017, Department of Corrections
personnel approved Wayne’s placement on the Restricted Release List (RRL) based upon
his history of assaulting other inmates. This meant that Wayne would not be released
from restricted housing (a Security Level 5 Housing Unit) into the general population
without written approval of the Executive Deputy Secretary for Institutional Operations.
While on the RRL, Wayne continued to incur misconducts, including those for
assault and for striking others with feces, and he continued facing disciplinary custody for
his misconduct. In 2019, the Department approved Wayne for PORTAL, a step-down
program designed to help him re-enter the general population, but Wayne was removed
from the program around four months later after he threw brown liquid on an officer.
Wayne remained in restricted housing, where he eventually earned two phone calls
per week and access to the kiosk one time per week. In 2021, Wayne was approved for
the Intensive Management Unit (IMU), another step-down program designed to
reintegrate him into the general population. As Wayne progressed through the IMU’s
2 phases, he received more privileges, such as increased out-of-cell time and opportunities
for contact with other inmates, more phone calls and kiosk sessions, unrestricted
television and radio privileges, group treatment, and increased shower opportunities. He
re-entered the general population in 2024.
In 2021, Wayne filed in the District Court a pro se civil-rights complaint, which
was later amended by appointed counsel, against the current and former Secretaries of
Corrections, the current and former Executive Deputy Secretaries for Institutional
Operations, and prison facility superintendents. Wayne alleged that the defendants were
deliberately indifferent to the risk of harm he faced in prolonged restricted housing in
violation of the Eighth Amendment, and that they violated his Fourteenth Amendment
right to due process by denying him meaningful review of his placement on the RRL.
After the District Court dismissed some defendants for lack of personal
involvement, the remaining defendants moved for summary judgment, which the District
Court granted, determining that the undisputed facts established that they did not violate
the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment. Wayne, now proceeding pro se, filed a motion to
alter or amend the judgment, which the District Court denied. Wayne timely appealed.
II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the
District Court’s summary judgment ruling. See Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767
F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that
3 there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists if the
evidence is sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict for the nonmoving
party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
We review the denial of a motion to alter or amend the judgment for abuse of
discretion. See Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010). A judgment may
be altered or amended if the moving party shows: “(1) an intervening change in the
controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available when the court
granted the motion for summary judgment; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law
or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.” Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v.
Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999).
III.
As the Appellees accurately point out, Wayne challenges only the District Court’s
entry of judgment against him on his Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement
claim. See Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 145–46,
148 (3d Cir. 2017) (failure to raise issue in opening brief results in forfeiture). Courts
apply a two-pronged test to determine whether prison officials violated the Eighth
Amendment: “(1) the deprivation must be objectively, sufficiently serious; a prison
official’s act or omission must result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of
life’s necessities; and (2) the prison official must have been deliberate[ly] indifferen[t] to
4 inmate health or safety.” Porter v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 974 F.3d 431, 441 (3d Cir. 2020)
(citation modified). Placement in “[s]egregated detention is not cruel and unusual
punishment per se, as long as the conditions of confinement are not foul, inhuman or
totally without penological justification.” Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 364 (3d Cir.
1992), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in, Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65,
71 n.7 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Williams v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 117 F.4th 503,
517–18 (3d Cir. 2024); Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 709 (3d Cir. 1997). One such
justification is “the risk that [the prisoner] specifically poses.” See Porter, 974 F.3d at
446. But, as this Court has previously concluded, prolonged solitary confinement can
cause substantial psychological and physical harm. Id. at 441.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 24-2816 __________
JOHN WAYNE, Appellant
v.
JOHN E. WETZEL; GEORGE LITTLE; TABB BICKELL; MICHAEL CLARK; LEE ESTOCK; DEREK F. OBERLANDER; JAIME SORBER; TAMMY FERGUSON; SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS ____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2:21-cv-04209) District Judge: Honorable Timothy J. Savage ____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) October 14, 2025
Before: KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 3, 2026) ___________
OPINION* ___________
PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. John Wayne, a Pennsylvania inmate, appeals pro se and in forma pauperis from
the District Court’s orders granting summary judgment and denying his motion to alter or
amend the judgment. We will affirm.
I.
Wayne has a lengthy disciplinary history. Between 2014 and 2017, Wayne was
placed in disciplinary custody for several finite terms and transferred between multiple
facilities because he was fighting other inmates. In late 2017, Department of Corrections
personnel approved Wayne’s placement on the Restricted Release List (RRL) based upon
his history of assaulting other inmates. This meant that Wayne would not be released
from restricted housing (a Security Level 5 Housing Unit) into the general population
without written approval of the Executive Deputy Secretary for Institutional Operations.
While on the RRL, Wayne continued to incur misconducts, including those for
assault and for striking others with feces, and he continued facing disciplinary custody for
his misconduct. In 2019, the Department approved Wayne for PORTAL, a step-down
program designed to help him re-enter the general population, but Wayne was removed
from the program around four months later after he threw brown liquid on an officer.
Wayne remained in restricted housing, where he eventually earned two phone calls
per week and access to the kiosk one time per week. In 2021, Wayne was approved for
the Intensive Management Unit (IMU), another step-down program designed to
reintegrate him into the general population. As Wayne progressed through the IMU’s
2 phases, he received more privileges, such as increased out-of-cell time and opportunities
for contact with other inmates, more phone calls and kiosk sessions, unrestricted
television and radio privileges, group treatment, and increased shower opportunities. He
re-entered the general population in 2024.
In 2021, Wayne filed in the District Court a pro se civil-rights complaint, which
was later amended by appointed counsel, against the current and former Secretaries of
Corrections, the current and former Executive Deputy Secretaries for Institutional
Operations, and prison facility superintendents. Wayne alleged that the defendants were
deliberately indifferent to the risk of harm he faced in prolonged restricted housing in
violation of the Eighth Amendment, and that they violated his Fourteenth Amendment
right to due process by denying him meaningful review of his placement on the RRL.
After the District Court dismissed some defendants for lack of personal
involvement, the remaining defendants moved for summary judgment, which the District
Court granted, determining that the undisputed facts established that they did not violate
the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment. Wayne, now proceeding pro se, filed a motion to
alter or amend the judgment, which the District Court denied. Wayne timely appealed.
II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the
District Court’s summary judgment ruling. See Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767
F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that
3 there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists if the
evidence is sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict for the nonmoving
party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
We review the denial of a motion to alter or amend the judgment for abuse of
discretion. See Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010). A judgment may
be altered or amended if the moving party shows: “(1) an intervening change in the
controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available when the court
granted the motion for summary judgment; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law
or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.” Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v.
Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999).
III.
As the Appellees accurately point out, Wayne challenges only the District Court’s
entry of judgment against him on his Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement
claim. See Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 145–46,
148 (3d Cir. 2017) (failure to raise issue in opening brief results in forfeiture). Courts
apply a two-pronged test to determine whether prison officials violated the Eighth
Amendment: “(1) the deprivation must be objectively, sufficiently serious; a prison
official’s act or omission must result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of
life’s necessities; and (2) the prison official must have been deliberate[ly] indifferen[t] to
4 inmate health or safety.” Porter v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 974 F.3d 431, 441 (3d Cir. 2020)
(citation modified). Placement in “[s]egregated detention is not cruel and unusual
punishment per se, as long as the conditions of confinement are not foul, inhuman or
totally without penological justification.” Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 364 (3d Cir.
1992), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in, Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65,
71 n.7 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Williams v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 117 F.4th 503,
517–18 (3d Cir. 2024); Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 709 (3d Cir. 1997). One such
justification is “the risk that [the prisoner] specifically poses.” See Porter, 974 F.3d at
446. But, as this Court has previously concluded, prolonged solitary confinement can
cause substantial psychological and physical harm. Id. at 441.
Wayne’s sole argument on appeal is that the District Court applied the law
unfairly because other inmates in “identical circumstances” have been granted relief on
their Eighth Amendment claims. But the cases that Wayne points to are readily
distinguishable from the circumstances present here. Wayne cites to Johnston v. Wetzel,
431 F. Supp. 3d 666, 677 (W.D. Pa. 2019), in which the District Court determined that
the record supported the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim. Johnston was in restricted
housing for 17 years, confined for 22 or 23 hours per day, despite having not been cited
for any misconduct or discipline for the last 13 years. Id. at 673, 678–79. Wayne, on the
other hand, remained in restricted housing because he continued to be sanctioned
repeatedly for assaulting others, fighting with inmates, refusing to obey orders, and
5 possessing contraband. Prison officials thus had good reason to keep Wayne in restricted
housing. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833–34 (1994). And, as Wayne
progressed through the IMU by exhibiting good behavior and completing required
coursework, he earned more time out of his cell and more social opportunities.
Wayne’s cites to Shoatz v. Wetzel, No. 2:13-cv-0657, 2016 WL 595337 (W.D. Pa.
Feb. 12, 2016), and Mayo v. Wetzel, No. 1:18-CV-878, 2021 WL 11132203 (M.D. Pa.
Aug. 24, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 19835737 (M.D. Pa. Jan.
4, 2022), are also unavailing. In Shoatz, the District Court denied the defendants’ motion
for summary judgment where Shoatz had been held in solitary confinement for over 22
years. 2016 WL 595337 at *1. Shoatz submitted medical evidence that his long-term
isolation caused symptoms of depression and post-traumatic stress. Id. at *7. Inmate
Mayo was in solitary confinement for more than five years despite his known mental
illness, which included suicidal thoughts and self-harm expressions. Mayo, 2021 WL
11132203, at *1–2. Although Wayne reported that his placement in restricted housing
caused him sleep disturbances and anxiety, his psychological evaluations indicated that
he was in good health and did not require treatment. Wayne did not provide sufficient
evidence such that a reasonable factfinder could determine that his conditions posed a
substantial risk of serious harm. Cf. Porter, 974 F.3d at 442–43.
Finally, Wayne cites to cases decided in the contexts of a motion to dismiss and a
motion for preliminary injunction, not a motion for summary judgment. Cf. Tucker v.
6 Wetzel, No. 1:22-CV-631, 2023 WL 322442, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 2023) (determining
that allegations of solitary confinement for over three years were sufficient to state an
Eighth Amendment claim); Johnson v. Wetzel, 209 F. Supp. 3d 766, 771–72, 780–81
(M.D. Pa. 2016) (determining, on a preliminary injunction motion, that the plaintiff was
likely to succeed on his Eighth Amendment claim, where he was in solitary confinement
for 36 years, despite having “exemplary behavior” over the past decade). Regardless of
whether the allegations in Wayne’s amended complaint were sufficient to survive
dismissal at the pleading stage, the District Court correctly determined on summary
judgment that there was no genuine dispute of material fact warranting a trial on his
claims.
Thus, the District Court did not err by granting summary judgment. Nor did it
abuse its discretion by denying Wayne’s motion to alter or amend the judgment, as
Wayne did not set forth any new facts or law, and he did not show that the District
Court’s decision resulted in clear legal error or a manifest injustice. Max’s Seafood Café,
176 F.3d at 677. We will affirm the judgment.