John W. Williams v. Beer, et al.

E.D. California

John W. Williams v. Beer, et al.

DecidedJanuary 7, 2026

Docket1:21-cv-00155

StatusUnknown

This text of John W. Williams v. Beer, et al. (John W. Williams v. Beer, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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John W. Williams v. Beer, et al., (E.D. Cal. 2026).

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5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 JOHN W. WILLIAMS, Case No. 1:21-cv-00155-KES-EPG (PC) 10 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ 11 MOTION TO STAY v.

12 BEER, et al., (ECF No. 152) 13 Defendants. 14

15 Plaintiff John Williams is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil action filed 16 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 17 Now before the Court is Defendants’ motion for a protective order to stay discovery and 18 the scheduling order deadlines pending a ruling on their motion for summary judgment based on 19 Plaintiff’s alleged failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. (ECF No. 152). For the reasons 20 explained below, the Court will deny Defendants’ motion to stay. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 Plaintiff filed his complaint on February 8, 2021. (ECF No. 1). Defendants Oaks, Pascoe, 23 and Riddle, Beer, and Garcia are correctional officers, and Defendant Cubos is a registered nurse 24 who recorded Plaintiff’s injuries. (ECF Nos. 1, 10, 13). This action stems from Plaintiff’s 25 allegations that, on August 5, 2019, Defendant Oaks stabbed him in the buttocks with a metal 26 pencil-like handcuff key, repeatedly kicked him, and pepper sprayed him, while Defendant Pascoe stood outside the van’s side door and watched. (ECF Nos. 1, 10, 13, 25). Plaintiff also 27 alleges that, after he was subjected to the excessive use of force, he suffered from bleeding 28 1 buttocks, pain to groin, pain to lower torso, pain to face, pain to legs, burning of skin, burning of 2 eyes, and burning lungs, and that while Defendants Oaks, Pascoe, Riddle, Beer, Garcia, and 3 Cubos were aware of some, if not all, of his injuries, none of them provided or summoned 4 medical care for those injuries. (Id.) 5 After screening, Plaintiff elected to proceed on his Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant Oaks; his Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim against Defendant 6 Pascoe; his Eighth Amendment sexual assault claim against defendant Oaks; and his Eighth 7 Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs against defendants 8 Oaks, Pascoe, Riddle, Beer, Garcia, and Cubos. (Id.) 9 On December 9, 2025, Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff 10 failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing his complaint. (ECF No. 148). Among 11 other things, Defendants argue that one of Plaintiff’s grievances “was not exhausted through the 12 third and final level of review until December 2, 2021— nearly a year after Plaintiff filed the 13 operative complaint in this case.” (ECF No. 148-1, p. 12). Plaintiff opposed Defendants’ motion 14 for summary judgment on December 29, 2025, arguing, among other things, that Defendants 15 failed to properly process his grievance, and thus his claims should be deemed exhausted. (ECF 16 No. 155, pp. 2, 6-7). Defendants have yet to file a reply in support of their motion for summary 17 judgment.1 18 On December 17, 2025, Defendants filed their instant motion to stay, stating as follows: 19 [A] protective order staying the Scheduling Order deadlines and staying discovery—including but not limited to Defendants’ responses to Interrogatories, 20 Sets Two, to Defendant Oaks, Pascoe, Riddle, and Garcia; Plaintiff’s additional interrogatories to Defendant Beer; and Plaintiff’s Request for Production of 21 Documents, Set Two, to Defendant Pascoe, recently served by Plaintiff—is 22 necessary to protect Defendants from annoyance, oppression, and undue burden and expense pending resolution of Defendants’ exhaustion-based motion for 23 summary judgment, which may resolve this case entirely and without the need for reaching the merits in this case. 24 (ECF No. 152, p. 2) (footnote omitted). 25 \\\ 26 \\\ 27 1 The Court recognizes that Defendants have a pending motion for extension of time to file their reply. 28 (ECF No. 158). 1 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 2 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(1)—which Rule Defendants rely on—“A 3 party or any person from whom discovery is sought may move for a protective order in the court 4 where the action is pending. . . . The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party 5 or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). 6 Further, the court has the inherent power to stay proceedings. Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 7 U.S. 248, 254–55 (1936) (“[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in 8 every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort 9 for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.”). In considering whether to grant a stay, a court must 10 weigh competing interests, including “the possible damage which may result from the granting of 11 a stay, the hardship or inequity which a party may suffer in being required to go forward, and the 12 orderly course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, 13 and questions of law which could be expected to result from a stay.” CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 14 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962) (citing Landis, 299 U.S. at 254-55). 15 The decision to stay is within a court’s discretion, although the standard of review “is 16 ‘somewhat less deferential’ than the abuse of discretion standard used in other contexts.” 17 Dependable Highway Exp., Inc. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 498 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 2007) 18 (citation omitted). Similarly, courts exercise “wide discretion in controlling discovery.” Little v. 19 City of Seattle, 863 F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 1988). In the context of staying discovery pending the 20 resolution of an exhaustion motion, the Ninth Circuit has noted that “the district court may in its 21 discretion limit discovery to evidence concerning exhaustion, leaving until later—if it becomes 22 necessary—discovery directed to the merits of the suit.” Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1170 (9th 23 Cir. 2014) (emphasis added). III. ANALYSIS 24 Upon consideration, the Court deny Defendant’s motion to stay. 25 First, as to the damage that may result if this case were stayed, the Court’s notes that this 26 case was already stayed from April 2022 to June 2025 pending the resolution of related state 27 criminal proceedings. (ECF Nos. 53, 94). As this case has been pending since 2021, with an over 28 1 || three-year stay already granted, further delays would result in hardship to Plaintiff and interfere 2 || with the orderly course of justice. 3 Second, the Court previously denied Defendants’ informal request to stay discovery in its 4 || scheduling order because, among other reasons, “resolution of Defendants’ affirmative defense of 5 || non-exhaustion is likely to take a substantial amount of time and such that a stay pending 6 resolution of that defense would substantially delay resolution of the case.” (ECF No. 107, p. 1 7 n.1). This reasoning still holds true. Notably, Plaintiff has presented at least one colorable 8 argument opposing their motion for summary judgment—Defendants failed to follow their own

9 procedures in responding to his administrative grievance. (ECF No. 155); see Andres v. Marshall, 867 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir.

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5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 JOHN W. WILLIAMS, Case No. 1:21-cv-00155-KES-EPG (PC) 10 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ 11 MOTION TO STAY v.

12 BEER, et al., (ECF No. 152) 13 Defendants. 14

15 Plaintiff John Williams is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil action filed 16 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 17 Now before the Court is Defendants’ motion for a protective order to stay discovery and 18 the scheduling order deadlines pending a ruling on their motion for summary judgment based on 19 Plaintiff’s alleged failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. (ECF No. 152). For the reasons 20 explained below, the Court will deny Defendants’ motion to stay. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 Plaintiff filed his complaint on February 8, 2021. (ECF No. 1). Defendants Oaks, Pascoe, 23 and Riddle, Beer, and Garcia are correctional officers, and Defendant Cubos is a registered nurse 24 who recorded Plaintiff’s injuries. (ECF Nos. 1, 10, 13). This action stems from Plaintiff’s 25 allegations that, on August 5, 2019, Defendant Oaks stabbed him in the buttocks with a metal 26 pencil-like handcuff key, repeatedly kicked him, and pepper sprayed him, while Defendant Pascoe stood outside the van’s side door and watched. (ECF Nos. 1, 10, 13, 25). Plaintiff also 27 alleges that, after he was subjected to the excessive use of force, he suffered from bleeding 28 1 buttocks, pain to groin, pain to lower torso, pain to face, pain to legs, burning of skin, burning of 2 eyes, and burning lungs, and that while Defendants Oaks, Pascoe, Riddle, Beer, Garcia, and 3 Cubos were aware of some, if not all, of his injuries, none of them provided or summoned 4 medical care for those injuries. (Id.) 5 After screening, Plaintiff elected to proceed on his Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant Oaks; his Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim against Defendant 6 Pascoe; his Eighth Amendment sexual assault claim against defendant Oaks; and his Eighth 7 Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs against defendants 8 Oaks, Pascoe, Riddle, Beer, Garcia, and Cubos. (Id.) 9 On December 9, 2025, Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff 10 failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing his complaint. (ECF No. 148). Among 11 other things, Defendants argue that one of Plaintiff’s grievances “was not exhausted through the 12 third and final level of review until December 2, 2021— nearly a year after Plaintiff filed the 13 operative complaint in this case.” (ECF No. 148-1, p. 12). Plaintiff opposed Defendants’ motion 14 for summary judgment on December 29, 2025, arguing, among other things, that Defendants 15 failed to properly process his grievance, and thus his claims should be deemed exhausted. (ECF 16 No. 155, pp. 2, 6-7). Defendants have yet to file a reply in support of their motion for summary 17 judgment.1 18 On December 17, 2025, Defendants filed their instant motion to stay, stating as follows: 19 [A] protective order staying the Scheduling Order deadlines and staying discovery—including but not limited to Defendants’ responses to Interrogatories, 20 Sets Two, to Defendant Oaks, Pascoe, Riddle, and Garcia; Plaintiff’s additional interrogatories to Defendant Beer; and Plaintiff’s Request for Production of 21 Documents, Set Two, to Defendant Pascoe, recently served by Plaintiff—is 22 necessary to protect Defendants from annoyance, oppression, and undue burden and expense pending resolution of Defendants’ exhaustion-based motion for 23 summary judgment, which may resolve this case entirely and without the need for reaching the merits in this case. 24 (ECF No. 152, p. 2) (footnote omitted). 25 \\\ 26 \\\ 27 1 The Court recognizes that Defendants have a pending motion for extension of time to file their reply. 28 (ECF No. 158). 1 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 2 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(1)—which Rule Defendants rely on—“A 3 party or any person from whom discovery is sought may move for a protective order in the court 4 where the action is pending. . . . The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party 5 or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). 6 Further, the court has the inherent power to stay proceedings. Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 7 U.S. 248, 254–55 (1936) (“[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in 8 every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort 9 for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.”). In considering whether to grant a stay, a court must 10 weigh competing interests, including “the possible damage which may result from the granting of 11 a stay, the hardship or inequity which a party may suffer in being required to go forward, and the 12 orderly course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, 13 and questions of law which could be expected to result from a stay.” CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 14 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962) (citing Landis, 299 U.S. at 254-55). 15 The decision to stay is within a court’s discretion, although the standard of review “is 16 ‘somewhat less deferential’ than the abuse of discretion standard used in other contexts.” 17 Dependable Highway Exp., Inc. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 498 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 2007) 18 (citation omitted). Similarly, courts exercise “wide discretion in controlling discovery.” Little v. 19 City of Seattle, 863 F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 1988). In the context of staying discovery pending the 20 resolution of an exhaustion motion, the Ninth Circuit has noted that “the district court may in its 21 discretion limit discovery to evidence concerning exhaustion, leaving until later—if it becomes 22 necessary—discovery directed to the merits of the suit.” Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1170 (9th 23 Cir. 2014) (emphasis added). III. ANALYSIS 24 Upon consideration, the Court deny Defendant’s motion to stay. 25 First, as to the damage that may result if this case were stayed, the Court’s notes that this 26 case was already stayed from April 2022 to June 2025 pending the resolution of related state 27 criminal proceedings. (ECF Nos. 53, 94). As this case has been pending since 2021, with an over 28 1 || three-year stay already granted, further delays would result in hardship to Plaintiff and interfere 2 || with the orderly course of justice. 3 Second, the Court previously denied Defendants’ informal request to stay discovery in its 4 || scheduling order because, among other reasons, “resolution of Defendants’ affirmative defense of 5 || non-exhaustion is likely to take a substantial amount of time and such that a stay pending 6 resolution of that defense would substantially delay resolution of the case.” (ECF No. 107, p. 1 7 n.1). This reasoning still holds true. Notably, Plaintiff has presented at least one colorable 8 argument opposing their motion for summary judgment—Defendants failed to follow their own

9 procedures in responding to his administrative grievance. (ECF No. 155); see Andres v. Marshall, 867 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2017) (“When prison officials improperly fail to process a prisoner’s grievance, the prisoner is deemed to have exhausted available administrative remedies.”). Thus, resolution of this motion will not necessarily dispose of the case. 2 IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 13 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to stay (ECF No. 152) is denied. 14 15 | ORDERED. '° | Dated: _ January 7, 2026 [spe hey □□ 17 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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