JOHN VAJAS * NO. 2025-C-0675
VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL KEVIN MORRIS * FOURTH CIRCUIT * STATE OF LOUISIANA *******
APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH NO. 2025-01741, DIVISION “L” Honorable Kern A. Reese ****** Judge Nakisha Ervin-Knott ****** (Court composed of Chief Judge Roland L. Belsome, Judge Nakisha Ervin-Knott, Judge Monique G. Morial)
Ryan E. Gaudet G. Adam Savoie DUDLEY DEBOSIER INJURY LAWYERS 1100 Poydras Street, Suite 3900 New Orleans, LA 70163 COUNSEL FOR RELATOR
Valerie Theng Matherne Troy N. Bell James M. Matherne Trey M. Williams Chloe L. Krake COURINGTON, KIEFER & SOMMERS, MATHERNE & BELL, L.L.C. 616 Girod Street New Orleans, LA 70130
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT
REVERSED November 12, 2025 NEK RLB
MGM
Relator, John Vajas (“Vajas”), seeks supervisory review of the district
court’s September 29, 2025 judgment granting Respondent’s exception of no right
of action and motion to strike. For the following reasons, we reverse the district
court’s judgment.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arises from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on April 19,
2024. On February 21, 2025, Vajas filed suit against Kevin Morris (“Morris”), the
other driver involved in the accident. In his petition for damages, Vajas mentions
that the Respondent, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State
Farm”), had issued a policy of insurance to Morris that provided coverage for the
accident. Despite not being named as a party in the original petition, State Farm
filed a motion to strike all references to it from the case. In the interim, Vajas
attempted service on Morris three times with no success. As a result, Vajas filed an
amended petition on August 12, 2025, and formally added State Farm as a party to
the case. In response, State Farm filed an exception of no right of action, arguing
that, pursuant to the amendments to La. R.S. 22:1269, Vajas could not bring a
direct action against it. The district court heard arguments on State Farm’s motion
1 to strike and exception of no right of action on September 19, 20251, and it granted
both in State Farm’s favor. Following the hearing, the district court issued its
formal, written judgment dismissing State Farm without prejudice and striking any
reference to it or insurance coverage from the case. This timely writ application
followed.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Vajas assigns two errors in his application:
1. The district court erred as a matter of law by misinterpreting La. R.S.
22:1269(B)(1)(c) and finding that Vajas cannot maintain a direct action
when service was attempted without success.
2. The district court erred as a matter of law by granting the motion to strike
when Vajas’ actions were in full compliance with the direct action statute.
DISCUSSION
Whether the district court erred by granting State Farm’s exception of no right of action
Vajas first contends that the district court erred in granting State Farm’s
exception of no right of action. Appellate courts typically review a ruling on an
exception of no right of action under the de novo standard because the exception
presents a question of law. Bombace v. Starr Indemn. & Liab. Co., 2025-0037, p. 8
(La. App. 4 Cir. 6/24/25), 416 So. 3d 8, 14 (citation omitted). The exception
questions whether the plaintiff has standing to bring suit against a particular
defendant, and sustaining the exception declares the plaintiff’s action legally
nonexistent or barred. Id. at p. 9, 416 So. 3d at 15 (quoting La. C.C.P. art. 923 and
citing Pri-Tal v. Progressive Prop. Ins. Co., 2024-0531, p. 10 (La. App. 4 Cir.
1 Prior to the hearing on State Farm’s motions, Vajas was finally able to serve
Morris, and Morris filed an answer to the suit.
2 5/14/25), 414 So. 3d 1064, 1073). Thus, the appellate court’s role is to determine
whether the lower court was legally correct in its ruling. Id. at p. 8, 416 So. 3d at
14 (citation omitted).
In this case, the district court granted State Farm’s exception of no right of
action based on its interpretation of the amended Louisiana Direct Action Statute.
The proper interpretation of a statute raises a question of law that likewise must be
reviewed de novo. See 225 Baronne Complex, LLC v. Roy Anderson Corp., 2024-
0401, p. 10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/31/25), 408 So. 3d 291, 299 (citation omitted).
“The starting point for the interpretation of any statute is the language of the
statute itself.” Auricchio v. Harriston, 2020-01167, p. 4 (La. 10/10/21), 332 So. 3d
660, 662 (quoting Dejoie v. Medley, 2008-2223 (La. 5/5/09), 9 So. 3d 826, 829).
When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous and does not lead to
absurd consequences, it shall be applied as written. Id. at p. 4, 332 So. 3d at 662-63
(citing La. C.C. art. 9 and then citing La. R.S. 1:4). Courts are to presume “that
every word, sentence or provision in the statute was intended to serve some useful
purpose, that some effect is to be given to each such provision, and that no
unnecessary words or provisions were used.” ABL Mgmt., Inc. v. Bd. of
Supervisors of Southern Univ., 2000-0798, p. 6 (La. 11/28/00), 773 So. 2d 131,
135 (citation omitted). Courts cannot presume that “the Legislature inserted idle,
meaningless or superfluous language in the statute or that it intended for any part
or provision of the statute to be meaningless, redundant or useless.” Id. (citation
omitted).
The Louisiana Direct Action Statute, codified under La. R.S. 22:1269, used
to allow plaintiffs to bring suit directly against the insurer of a tortfeasor. However,
the statute was amended in 2024 and now precludes direct action against an insurer
3 unless certain criteria are met. See La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1)(a)-(g). As amended, the
statute now provides, in pertinent part, that a plaintiff shall not have a right of
direct action against an insurer unless “[s]ervice of citation or other process has
been attempted [upon the insured defendant] without success or the insured
defendant refuses to answer or otherwise defend the action within one hundred
eighty days of service.” La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1)(c). We find the language of the
amended Direct Action Statute is clear and unambiguous—if a plaintiff has
attempted to serve the insured defendant without success, then that plaintiff has a
right of direct action against the insurer. Here, Vajas attempted to serve Morris
three times without success. Therefore, per the plain wording of the statute, Vajas
has the right to add State Farm to this suit.
To support its opposition, State Farm argues that because Morris was
eventually served and has since filed an answer, Vajas no longer has a right against
it. This argument is unpersuasive. Vajas did not move to add State Farm until after
three unsuccessful attempts on Morris, which complied with the language of the
statute.2 The statute does not say the plaintiff loses his right to direct action if the
insured is served after the insurer has been added to the suit. If the Legislature had
intended for that to be the case, it would have included language to that effect. As
courts are to presume that the Legislature is deliberate with its language, we find
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JOHN VAJAS * NO. 2025-C-0675
VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL KEVIN MORRIS * FOURTH CIRCUIT * STATE OF LOUISIANA *******
APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH NO. 2025-01741, DIVISION “L” Honorable Kern A. Reese ****** Judge Nakisha Ervin-Knott ****** (Court composed of Chief Judge Roland L. Belsome, Judge Nakisha Ervin-Knott, Judge Monique G. Morial)
Ryan E. Gaudet G. Adam Savoie DUDLEY DEBOSIER INJURY LAWYERS 1100 Poydras Street, Suite 3900 New Orleans, LA 70163 COUNSEL FOR RELATOR
Valerie Theng Matherne Troy N. Bell James M. Matherne Trey M. Williams Chloe L. Krake COURINGTON, KIEFER & SOMMERS, MATHERNE & BELL, L.L.C. 616 Girod Street New Orleans, LA 70130
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT
REVERSED November 12, 2025 NEK RLB
MGM
Relator, John Vajas (“Vajas”), seeks supervisory review of the district
court’s September 29, 2025 judgment granting Respondent’s exception of no right
of action and motion to strike. For the following reasons, we reverse the district
court’s judgment.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arises from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on April 19,
2024. On February 21, 2025, Vajas filed suit against Kevin Morris (“Morris”), the
other driver involved in the accident. In his petition for damages, Vajas mentions
that the Respondent, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State
Farm”), had issued a policy of insurance to Morris that provided coverage for the
accident. Despite not being named as a party in the original petition, State Farm
filed a motion to strike all references to it from the case. In the interim, Vajas
attempted service on Morris three times with no success. As a result, Vajas filed an
amended petition on August 12, 2025, and formally added State Farm as a party to
the case. In response, State Farm filed an exception of no right of action, arguing
that, pursuant to the amendments to La. R.S. 22:1269, Vajas could not bring a
direct action against it. The district court heard arguments on State Farm’s motion
1 to strike and exception of no right of action on September 19, 20251, and it granted
both in State Farm’s favor. Following the hearing, the district court issued its
formal, written judgment dismissing State Farm without prejudice and striking any
reference to it or insurance coverage from the case. This timely writ application
followed.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Vajas assigns two errors in his application:
1. The district court erred as a matter of law by misinterpreting La. R.S.
22:1269(B)(1)(c) and finding that Vajas cannot maintain a direct action
when service was attempted without success.
2. The district court erred as a matter of law by granting the motion to strike
when Vajas’ actions were in full compliance with the direct action statute.
DISCUSSION
Whether the district court erred by granting State Farm’s exception of no right of action
Vajas first contends that the district court erred in granting State Farm’s
exception of no right of action. Appellate courts typically review a ruling on an
exception of no right of action under the de novo standard because the exception
presents a question of law. Bombace v. Starr Indemn. & Liab. Co., 2025-0037, p. 8
(La. App. 4 Cir. 6/24/25), 416 So. 3d 8, 14 (citation omitted). The exception
questions whether the plaintiff has standing to bring suit against a particular
defendant, and sustaining the exception declares the plaintiff’s action legally
nonexistent or barred. Id. at p. 9, 416 So. 3d at 15 (quoting La. C.C.P. art. 923 and
citing Pri-Tal v. Progressive Prop. Ins. Co., 2024-0531, p. 10 (La. App. 4 Cir.
1 Prior to the hearing on State Farm’s motions, Vajas was finally able to serve
Morris, and Morris filed an answer to the suit.
2 5/14/25), 414 So. 3d 1064, 1073). Thus, the appellate court’s role is to determine
whether the lower court was legally correct in its ruling. Id. at p. 8, 416 So. 3d at
14 (citation omitted).
In this case, the district court granted State Farm’s exception of no right of
action based on its interpretation of the amended Louisiana Direct Action Statute.
The proper interpretation of a statute raises a question of law that likewise must be
reviewed de novo. See 225 Baronne Complex, LLC v. Roy Anderson Corp., 2024-
0401, p. 10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/31/25), 408 So. 3d 291, 299 (citation omitted).
“The starting point for the interpretation of any statute is the language of the
statute itself.” Auricchio v. Harriston, 2020-01167, p. 4 (La. 10/10/21), 332 So. 3d
660, 662 (quoting Dejoie v. Medley, 2008-2223 (La. 5/5/09), 9 So. 3d 826, 829).
When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous and does not lead to
absurd consequences, it shall be applied as written. Id. at p. 4, 332 So. 3d at 662-63
(citing La. C.C. art. 9 and then citing La. R.S. 1:4). Courts are to presume “that
every word, sentence or provision in the statute was intended to serve some useful
purpose, that some effect is to be given to each such provision, and that no
unnecessary words or provisions were used.” ABL Mgmt., Inc. v. Bd. of
Supervisors of Southern Univ., 2000-0798, p. 6 (La. 11/28/00), 773 So. 2d 131,
135 (citation omitted). Courts cannot presume that “the Legislature inserted idle,
meaningless or superfluous language in the statute or that it intended for any part
or provision of the statute to be meaningless, redundant or useless.” Id. (citation
omitted).
The Louisiana Direct Action Statute, codified under La. R.S. 22:1269, used
to allow plaintiffs to bring suit directly against the insurer of a tortfeasor. However,
the statute was amended in 2024 and now precludes direct action against an insurer
3 unless certain criteria are met. See La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1)(a)-(g). As amended, the
statute now provides, in pertinent part, that a plaintiff shall not have a right of
direct action against an insurer unless “[s]ervice of citation or other process has
been attempted [upon the insured defendant] without success or the insured
defendant refuses to answer or otherwise defend the action within one hundred
eighty days of service.” La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1)(c). We find the language of the
amended Direct Action Statute is clear and unambiguous—if a plaintiff has
attempted to serve the insured defendant without success, then that plaintiff has a
right of direct action against the insurer. Here, Vajas attempted to serve Morris
three times without success. Therefore, per the plain wording of the statute, Vajas
has the right to add State Farm to this suit.
To support its opposition, State Farm argues that because Morris was
eventually served and has since filed an answer, Vajas no longer has a right against
it. This argument is unpersuasive. Vajas did not move to add State Farm until after
three unsuccessful attempts on Morris, which complied with the language of the
statute.2 The statute does not say the plaintiff loses his right to direct action if the
insured is served after the insurer has been added to the suit. If the Legislature had
intended for that to be the case, it would have included language to that effect. As
courts are to presume that the Legislature is deliberate with its language, we find
that to declare Vajas does not have a right of direct action against State Farm to be
contrary to the Legislature’s intent.
In making its ruling, the district court focused on the language of La. R.S.
22:1269(D)(1)(a) and (c). These provisions provide that an insurer may be brought
2 The statute does not specify the number of service attempts needed before a
plaintiff may take direct action against an insurer. It only requires that some attempt be made to serve the insured before bringing a direct action.
4 into a case at the end for purposes of a final judgment or settlement. The district
court reasoned that since Morris had been served and had filed an answer, there
was no reason to include State Farm in the case prior to the rendition of a final
judgment. The district court further reasoned that there appeared to be a conflict
between sections (B)(1)(c) and (D)(1)(a) of the statute. This is not so. The plain
language of La. R.S. 22:1269(D)(1)(a) states, “In those instances where direct
action is not otherwise authorized by law, . . . a liability insurer may be joined
on motion of any party as a party defendant for the purposes of entering final
judgment or enforcing the settlement.” (Emphasis added). La. R.S.
22:1269(B)(1)(c) authorizes Vajas to bring a direct action against State Farm under
these circumstances. Therefore, a conflict does not exist, and La. R.S.
22:1269(D)(1)(a) does not apply to this case.
In summary, the Direct Action Statute, as amended, is clear and
unambiguous that Vajas has a right of direct action against State Farm under the
exception outlined in La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1)(c). There is nothing in the statute
indicating that State Farm must be removed from the suit after it is joined through
one of the authorized exceptions. Therefore, the law must be applied as written.
We find that the district court erred in granting State Farm’s exception and
dismissing it from this suit.
Whether the district court erred by granting State Farm’s motion to strike
In light of the above, we find that the district court likewise erred in granting
State Farm’s motion to strike. Although an appellate court typically reviews a
ruling on a motion to strike for an abuse of discretion, when the ruling involves an
interpretation of a statute, the de novo standard applies. Hurel v. Nat’l Fire &
5 Marine Ins. Co., 2025-0049, p. 15 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/11/25), 414 So. 3d 778, 788
(citing 225 Baronne Complex, LLC, 2024-0401, p. 10, 408 So. 3d at 291).
In its motion to strike, State Farm requested that all references to it be
stricken from the pleadings and that the existence of insurance coverage be
precluded from the jury in accordance with La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(4). That provision
holds that an insurer shall not be included in the caption of an action and that the
existence of insurance coverage shall not be disclosed to the jury unless so required
by article 411 of the Louisiana Code of Evidence. La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(4)(a) and
(b).
First, La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(4)(a) only prohibits the inclusion of an insurer in
a case’s caption. As Vajas has not listed State Farm in the caption of this case, that
section of the statute is inapplicable here. Next, La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(4)(b) provides
that the existence of insurance coverage shall not be disclosed to the jury unless the
disclosure is required under La. C.E. art. 411. Article 411 of the Code of Evidence
allows for the existence of insurance coverage to be communicated to a jury under
certain circumstances, including cases where a direct action has been brought
against an insurer pursuant to an exception in La. R.S. 22:2169(B)(1)(a)-(g). As
Vajas has a right of direct action pursuant to one of those exceptions, we find that
striking all references to State Farm and the existence of insurance coverage to be
premature at this juncture.
State Farm relies on the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Hurel to support its
argument that the district court correctly granted its motion to strike. 2025-0049, p.
1, 414 So. 3d at 778. However, Hurel is distinguishable from this current case in
that the Court found that the plaintiff did not have a right of action against the
insurer. Id. at p. 13, 414 So. 3d at 787. Therefore, the granting of the motion to
6 strike was proper in that case. Conversely, because we find that Vajas has a right of
action against State Farm, the district court erred in striking any reference to State
Farm from the pleadings and in prematurely precluding any reference to insurance
coverage from trial.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the district court erred in granting
State Farm’s exception of no right of action and motion to strike. Accordingly, we
reverse the district court’s September 29, 2025 judgment dismissing State Farm
from this case and striking any reference to it or insurance coverage for the subject
accident.
REVERSED