John Torres v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 16 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHN CARLOS TORRES, No. 18-56267

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 5:17-cv-01527-DSF-JEM

v. MEMORANDUM* NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 7, 2020**

Before: TASHIMA, BYBEE, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.

John Carlos Torres appeals pro se from the district court’s summary

judgment in his action alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

(“FDCPA”) and state law arising out of foreclosure proceedings on his property.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Toguchi v.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Torres’s FDCPA

claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6) because Torres failed to raise a genuine dispute

of material fact as to whether defendants’ conduct was unfair or unconscionable.

See Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 805-06 (1999)

(“Summary judgment for a defendant is appropriate when the plaintiff fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to [his]

case, and on which [he] will bear the burden of proof at trial.” (citation omitted)).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Torres’s claims

under §§ 1692d(1), 1692e, 1692g(b), 1692i, 1692j of the FDCPA because Torres

failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants violated

any of these provisions. See Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 805-06.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Torres’s motion for

reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) because Torres failed

to set forth any basis for relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v.

ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of

review and factors for reconsideration under Rule 60(b)).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

2 18-56267 appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

3 18-56267