John Stephan Willis Jones v. City of San Antonio

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: October 10, 2001
• Docket: 04-00-00560-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

No. 04-00-00560-CV John Stephan Willis JONES, Appellant v. The CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, Appellee From the 131st Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2000-CI-04182 Honorable David Berchelmann, Judge Presiding ⁽¹⁾

Opinion by: Karen Angelini, Justice

Sitting: Alma L. López, Justice

Paul W. Green, Justice

Karen Angelini, Justice

Delivered and Filed: October 10, 2001

AFFIRMED

John Stephan Willis Jones ("Jones") appeals the trial court's order granting the City of San Antonio's ("City") plea to the jurisdiction. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

Background

On December 15, 1989, City of San Antonio police officers encountered the stalled vehicle of Jonathan Paul Jones ("decedent") on a San Antonio highway. Decedent was not present when the officers arrived, because he had left to purchase gasoline for his vehicle. After decedent returned, the officers began to question him and determined that he had several outstanding warrants. Subsequently, decedent was struck by a passing car. He died as a result of trauma from the accident.

Decedent's son, Jones, filed a wrongful death action against the City pursuant to Chapter 71 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code. Jones claims that the failure of city police officers to arrest decedent, after they determined there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest, proximately caused decedent's death. The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction, contending that it enjoys sovereign immunity from tort claims, except to the extent that the Texas Tort Claims Act waives its immunity. The trial court granted the plea and dismissed Jones's suit with prejudice. Jones appeals, arguing the trial court erred in granting the plea to the jurisdiction.

Standard of Review

A plea to the jurisdiction contests the district court's authority to determine the subject matter of the cause of action. See Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). As subject-matter jurisdiction presents a question of law, we review a district court's order denying a plea to the jurisdiction de novo. See Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998). We examine a plaintiff's good faith factual allegations to determine whether the district court has jurisdiction. See Bland, 34 S.W.3d at 554-55. The plaintiff bears the burden of pleading facts that show the district court has subject-matter jurisdiction. See Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993). Unless the defendant pleads and proves that the plaintiff's allegations were fraudulently made to confer jurisdiction, they are accepted as true. Continental Coffee Prods. Co. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 449 (Tex. 1996). Absent the face of the petition affirmatively demonstrating a lack of jurisdiction, the district court must liberally construe the allegations in the petition in favor of the plaintiff and in favor of jurisdiction. Id.

Discussion

Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, a governmental unit is not liable for the torts of its officers or agents in the absence of a constitutional or statutory provision creating such liability. Medrano v. City of Pearsall, 989 S.W.2d 141, 143-144 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (citing State v. Terrell, 588 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Tex. 1979)). The City is a governmental unit as defined by the Texas Tort Claims Act, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.001(3)(B) (Vernon Supp. 2001), and thus, is protected from suit by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, unless waived by the Act. The doctrine of sovereign immunity consists of two basic principles of law: immunity from liability and immunity from suit. Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex. 1999). While immunity from liability does not affect a trial court's jurisdiction to hear the case, immunity from suit defeats a trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction and thus is properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction. Id. at 638-39.

The Texas Tort Claims Act ("TTCA") waives immunity from suit under certain circumstances. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.021 (Vernon 1997). In order for immunity to be waived, the claim must arise under one of the three specific areas of liability for which immunity is waived, and the claim must not fall under one of the exceptions from waiver. Medrano, 989 S.W.2d at 144. The three specific areas of liability for which immunity has been waived are: (1) injury caused by an employee's use of a motor-driven vehicle; (2) injury caused by a condition or use of tangible personal or real property; and (3) claims arising from premise defects. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.021 (Vernon 1997). Jones does not allege such a waiver under the Texas Tort Claims Act. Instead, Jones argues that the City is not immune from liability because arresting someone for outstanding warrants is a ministerial, rather than a discretionary, act. ⁽²⁾ The ministerial/discretionary distinction, however, relates to official immunity. Official immunity and sovereign immunity are to be distinguished. DeWitt v. Harris County, 904 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex. 1995). Official immunity is an affirmative defense that protects government employees from personal liability. Univ. of Houston v. Clark, 38 S.W.3d 578, 580 (Tex. 2000). Sovereign immunity, on the other hand, protects governmental entities from liability. DeWitt, 904 S.W.2d at 653.

Whether the Texas Tort Claims Act waives sovereign immunity in a given case does not affect whether the governmental employee may assert official immunity as a defense. On the other hand, whether the governmental employee is entitled to official immunity may affect whether the Texas Tort Claims Act's limited waiver of sovereign immunity is applicable.

Id. (citations omitted). For example, if sovereign immunity has been waived under section 101.021 of the Texas Tort Claims Act, the government can still rely on official immunity as a defense. See id. at 653-55. If it is found that the requirements of official immunity have been met, the government retains its sovereign immunity under section 101.021. See id. Jones has not met the first hurdle of showing that the City waived sovereign immunity. Thus, it is premature at this point to analyze whether official immunity applies.

Lastly, Jones relies on City of San Antonio v. Duncan, 936 S.W.2d 63 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1996, writ dism'd w.o.j.), in support of his argument that the trial court erred in granting the plea to the jurisdiction. The facts in Duncan are based on the same incident as the case at bar. Duncan, the passenger in decedent's car and the representative of decedent's estate, sued the City for negligence. Id. at 64. The City moved for summary judgment based on official immunity, and the trial court denied the motion. Id. We found that a fact issue existed as to "whether the officers had a ministerial, rather than a discretionary, duty to arrest" decedent. Id. at 66. The issue of whether the City had waived sovereign immunity under section 101.021 was not before us. Thus, Duncan is distinguishable from the instant case.

Conclusion

We overrule Jones's sole issue and affirm the decision of the trial court.

DO NOT PUBLISH

1. The Honorable David Berchelmann was assigned to hear the plea to the jurisdiction on behalf of the 131^st Judicial District Court.

2. In his original petition, Jones alleged waiver under subsections 101.021(1) and 101.021(2) of the Texas Tort Claims Act, which relate to the operation or use of a motor vehicle and the misuse and/or non-use of tangible personal property. After the City filed its plea to the jurisdiction, Jones filed an amended petition, deleting these theories of waiver and claiming only that arresting someone for outstanding warrants is not a discretionary act.