John Shapiro v. Joy Campanelli

D. Oregon

John Shapiro v. Joy Campanelli

District Court, D. Oregon·Decided January 14, 2026·No. 6:25-cv-02340·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

EUGENE DIVISION

JOHN SHAPIRO, Civ. No. 6:25-cv-02340-AA

Plaintiff, OPINION & ORDER v.

JOY CAMPANELLI

Defendant. _______________________________________

AIKEN, District Judge.

Self-represented Plaintiff John Shapiro seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in this action. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s IFP Petition, ECF No. 1, is GRANTED. However, the Complaint, ECF No. 2, is DISMISSED without leave to amend. Additionally, Plaintiff is ordered to submit a complete and correct mailing address to the Court within 30 days of this Opinion. LEGAL STANDARD Generally, all parties instituting any civil action in United States District Court must pay a statutory filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). However, the federal IFP statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), provides indigent litigants an opportunity for meaningful access to federal courts despite their inability to pay the costs and fees associated with that access. To authorize a litigant to proceed IFP, a court must make two determinations. First, a court must determine whether the litigant is unable to pay the costs of commencing the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Second, it must assess whether the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune to such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). With regard to the second of these determinations, district courts have the power under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) to screen complaints even before service of the complaint on the defendants and must dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim. Courts apply the same standard under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). To survive a motion to dismiss under the federal

pleading standards, the complaint must include a short and plain statement of the claim and “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility

standard . . . asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. The court is not required to accept legal conclusions, unsupported by alleged facts, as true. Id. Pro se pleadings are held to less stringent standards than pleadings by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). That is, the court should construe pleadings by pro se plaintiffs liberally and afford the plaintiffs the benefit of any doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). Additionally, a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and the opportunity to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies cannot

be cured by amendment. Id. DISCUSSION When assessing an IFP petition, the Court first must determine whether the plaintiff has made a sufficient showing of indigency. Here, the Court is satisfied with Plaintiff’s showing of indigency, ECF No. 1, and the petition will be GRANTED. The Complaint in this case consists of two statements: “Upon information and belief, Defendant conspired with others, which violated Fourteenth Amendment

Rights” and “Plaintiff demands $1 Million against Defendant.” Compl. 1. The assertions that Defendant “conspired with others” and “violated [Plaintiff’s] Fourteenth Amendment Rights” are legal conclusions. The Complaint contains no factual content to support the legal conclusions he asserts. Said another way, the Court has been given no factual information about what happened to Plaintiff, where it happened, or when it happened. The Court cannot accept bare

legal conclusions unsupported by facts as an actionable claim, therefor Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed. Plaintiff submitted what appears to be an incomplete mailing address. In attempting to determine whether the address was complete, the Court discovered that Plaintiff has filed identical complaints with dozens of other federal district courts within the same month as this complaint. A court may take judicial notice of court filings from other state or federal court proceedings. See Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 741 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2006)

This Court is not the first to notice this slew of filings. Magistrate Judge Sheila K. Oberto of the Eastern District of California filed Findings and Recommendations in No. 1:25-cv-01859 on December 18, 2025, that helpfully compiled the cases filed by Plaintiff up through that date.1 Several more district court cases have been filed since. See Shapiro v. Campanelli, No. 2:25-cv-4980 (D. Ariz., Dec. 19, 2025); No. 2:25- cv-823 (E.D. Va., Dec 19, 2025); and No. 1:26-cv-20119 (S.D. Flor. Jan. 8, 2026). Additionally, since Judge Oberto filed her Findings and Recommendations,

Plaintiff has appealed dismissals in several of these duplicative actions to the applicable Circuit Court of Appeal—including dismissals without prejudice and with leave to amend. See Shapiro v. Campanelli, No. 25-14526-E (11th Cir. 2025); No. 25- 6209 (10th Cir. 2025); No. 26-1028 (1st Cir. 2026); No. 26-1011 (7th Cir. 2026).

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