John Samuel Nix v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: January 25, 2005
• Docket: 06-04-00076-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

______________________________

No. 06-04-00076-CR

JOHN SAMUEL NIX, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

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On Appeal from the 188th Judicial District Court

Gregg County, Texas

Trial Court No. 31520-A

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Before Morriss, C.J., Ross and Carter, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss

MEMORANDUM OPINION

            The police knew John Samuel Nix too well. While police were responding to a disturbance call at a local Gregg County bar, they noticed Nix driving his pickup truck. One of the officers knew that Nix's driver's license was suspended at that time. Based on that fact, and Nix's noticeably erratic driving—he almost hit a police car—officers stopped his vehicle, determined he was intoxicated, and arrested him. A Gregg County jury convicted Nix for driving while intoxicated (DWI), subsequent offense, and assessed his punishment at five years' confinement. Nix contends on appeal that the trial court erred by failing to grant him a mistrial when the State introduced testimony on two occasions that Nix was driving with his license suspended when arrested for DWI, and erred in overruling Nix's objection during the punishment phase of the trial to the State's jury argument regarding application of parole law to any sentence the jury might impose.

            We affirm the judgment because we hold (1) mistrial was not required by the evidence that Nix's driver's license was suspended, and (2) the State's jury argument concerning parole was not improper.

1. Mistrial Was Not Required Due to Evidence of License Suspension

            We review a trial court's denial of a mistrial under an abuse of discretion standard. Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Trevino v. State, 991 S.W.2d 849, 851 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Mistrial is an extreme remedy for prejudicial events occurring during the trial process. See Bauder v. State, 921 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).

            Nix had obtained a pretrial order that, although the arresting officers could testify Nix did not possess a valid driver's license at the time, testimony that his driver's license was suspended would not be admissible. Officer Benjamin Kemper, apparently inadvertently, mentioned the license suspension in his testimony and immediately changed his wording:

[State]:Did you know Mr. Nix did not have a valid driver's license?

[Witness]:Yes, I did.

[State]:Okay. Did you mention that to the other officers?

[State]:Specifically, what did you advise them?

[Witness]:I advised them that Mr. Nix – that the truck belonged to Mr. Nix and I had dealt with him before and had recently checked the status of his driver's license because I knew it had been suspended – I'm sorry – was invalid prior to that, and I had checked within a couple of days of that and knew that it was still invalid at the timing [sic].

            Nix further complains that the same information was also improperly placed before the jury because the State did not quickly enough mute the volume on a videotape of the incident in which essentially the same comment was made. The record does not support this contention. The reporter's record shows that an agreement to mute existed, but then shows only that the videotape was played before the jury. The reporter did not transcribe the language heard by the jury, and this Court cannot determine whether the jury heard any reference to the license suspension or whether, if it did, such would have been harmful. Claims of error must be supported by and based on the record presented to this Court. Janecka v. State, 937 S.W.2d 456, 476 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).

            The issue raised here is whether the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant a mistrial. We find the uninvited and immediately self-corrected reference to the suspension of Nix's driver's license was not so inflammatory as to require a mistrial. See Kemp v. State, 846 S.W.2d 289, 308 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). The record reflects no other evidence before the jury that Nix's license was suspended. We therefore conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to grant a mistrial.

2. The State's Jury Argument Was Proper

            Nix further contends the trial court erred by overruling his objection to a statement made by the State during closing arguments at the punishment stage. Nix contends the State suggested that the jury should issue a harsher sentence because of the application of the parole laws to this case. In this situation, the State did not directly implore the jury to consider the applicability of parole or how it might shorten the time Nix actually spent in prison. Instead, while explaining the range of the sentence, counsel for the State made comments about which Nix complains:

Although I'm an Aggie, I'm not good at math, and I don't know if it's 700 or however many days, but in the charge you're going to get, we suggest to you, I think, if you give him two years, he's going to do two years.

Let me read this to you. It has instructions about parole in here, and that's important. It says in the Judge's instructions that it cannot accurately be predicted how the parole law and good-conduct time might be applied to this defendant because this application on these laws will depend on decisions made by the Parole Board.

Nix's counsel objected:

Judge, I'm going to object to him reading only that portion of it, and what he does not read that you are not to consider – that you are not to consider and they are instructed not to consider how this law may affect this defendant.

After the court overruled the objection, the State explained, "The bottom line is we don't get to tell juries because we don't know." The State did not, however, specifically point out that the jury is required to not consider either the existence of the parole law and good conduct time, or how the law of parole is to be applied to this particular defendant.

            The punishment charge given to the jury contains the parole instruction required by Article 37.07, Section 4(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 4(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004–2005). Further, the State's final statement was an accurate summary of the fact that no one knows how the parole law will ultimately apply to any given defendant. So far as it went, the State's comment concerning parole law is a reasonably accurate, albeit incomplete, summary of the court's charge on parole. See Whiting v. State, 797 S.W.2d 45, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (it is acceptable to paraphrase the court's charge to the jury); Jones v. State, 641 S.W.2d 545, 550 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982) (no error in explaining parole law as found in court's charge); Helleson v. State, 5 S.W.3d 393, 397 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref'd). It would be error, however, for the State to present a statement as the law, if it is contrary to that presented in the charge to the jury. Whiting, 797 S.W.2d at 48.

            This is not a situation where the State asked the jury to "do the math," which would necessarily ask the jury to do exactly what the charge tells it not to do, apply the parole law to this particular defendant. Such a comment by the State would be improper. See Helleson, 5 S.W.3d at 398.

            The argument made by the State in this case is not a complete summary of the parole charge, but correctly sets out the portion summarized. We also recognize that the trial court had, only a few minutes previously, read to the jury the entire punishment charge, containing the proper and complete parole instruction. We find that the State's argument was not an impermissible attempt to encourage the jury to violate its instructions, and thus that the argument was within the scope of permissible jury argument. We overrule this contention of error.

            We affirm the judgment.

                                                                                    Josh R. Morriss, III

                                                                                    Chief Justice

Date Submitted:          January 10, 2005

Date Decided:             January 25, 2005

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