John Roe CS 88 v. DOE 1, a corporation

District Court, C.D. California·Decided March 4, 2025·No. 2:24-cv-11154·Unknown

Opinion

Lisa Dearden Trépanier (SBN 156302) LisaT@trepaniertajima.com Lisa M. Dale (SBN 194688) lisa.dale@trepaniertajima.com Patrick Y. Yoo (SBN 302282) Patrick@trepaniertajima.com TRÉPANIER TAJIMA LLP 4605 Lankershim Blvd., Suite 540 North Hollywood, California 91602 Telephone: (323) 487-1101

Attorneys for Defendants DOE 1 and DOE 2

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

John Roe CS 88, Case No. 2:24-cv-11154 JFW (SSCx) District Judge John F. Walter Plaintiff, Magistrate Judge Stephanie S.

Christensen v.

DOE 1, a corporation; DOE 2, a

corporation; DOE 3, an entity of [PROPOSED] ORDER RE unknown form; and DOES 4 to 100, ORDER1 Inclusive,

Defendants.

1 This Stipulated Protective Order is substantially based on the model protective order provided under Magistrate Judge Stephanie S. Christensen’s Procedures as of 24 July 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 Purposes and Limitations. Discovery in this action is likely to involve production of confidential, proprietary, or private information for which special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation may be warranted. Accordingly, Plaintiff John Roe CS 88 and Defendants Doe 1 and Doe 2 (“Church Defendants”) (collectively the “parties”) hereby stipulate to and petition the court to enter the following Stipulated Protective Order. The parties acknowledge that this Order does not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to discovery and that the protection it affords from public disclosure and use extends only to the limited information or items that are entitled to confidential treatment under the applicable legal principles. 1.2 Good Cause Statement. This Action concerns Plaintiff’s claims for damages arising out of alleged sexual abuse. Church Defendants are alleged to be liable for the abuse. This Action is thus likely to involve confidential medical, religious, and third-party information for which special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecution of this action is warranted. Such confidential materials and information consist of, among other things, confidential medical records, religious organization records implicating privacy rights of third parties, privileged communications with clergy, and other information otherwise generally unavailable to the public or which may be privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure under state or federal statutes and the First Amendment of both state and federal constitutions, court rules, case decisions, or common law. Accordingly, to expedite the flow of information, to facilitate the prompt resolution of disputes over confidentiality of discovery materials, to adequately protect information the parties are entitled to keep confidential, to ensure that the parties are permitted reasonable necessary uses of such material in preparation for and in the conduct of trial, to address their handling at the end of the litigation, and serve the ends of justice, a protective order for such information is justified in this matter. It is the intent of the parties that information will not be designated as confidential for tactical reasons and that nothing be so designated without a good faith belief that it has been maintained in a confidential, non-public manner, and there is good cause why it should not be part of the public record of this case. 1.3 Acknowledgment of Procedure for Filing Under Seal. The parties further acknowledge, as set forth in Section 12.3, below, that this Stipulated Protective Order does not entitle them to file confidential information under seal; Local Rule 79-5 sets forth the procedures that must be followed and the standards that will be applied when a party seeks permission from the court to file material under seal. There is a strong presumption that the public has a right of access to judicial proceedings and records in civil cases. In connection with non-dispositive motions, good cause must be shown to support a filing under seal. See Kamakana v. City and Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2006), Phillips ex rel. Ests. of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210–11 (9th Cir. 2002), Makar-Welbon v. Sony Elecs., Inc., 187 F.R.D. 576, 577 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (even stipulated protective orders require good cause showing), and a specific showing of good cause or compelling reasons with proper evidentiary support and legal justification, must be made with respect to Protected Material that a party seeks to file under seal. The parties’ mere designation of Disclosure or Discovery Material as CONFIDENTIAL does not—without the submission of competent evidence by declaration, establishing that the material sought to be filed under seal qualifies as confidential, privileged, or otherwise protectable—constitute good cause. Further, if a party requests sealing related to a dispositive motion or trial, then compelling reasons, not only good cause, for the sealing must be shown, and the relief sought shall be narrowly tailored to serve the specific interest to be protected. See Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 677–79 (9th Cir. 2010). For each item or type of information, document, or thing sought to be filed or introduced under seal in connection with a dispositive motion or trial, the party seeking protection must articulate compelling reasons, supported by specific facts and legal justification, for the requested sealing order. Again, competent evidence supporting the application to file documents under seal must be provided by declaration. Any document that is not confidential, privileged, or otherwise protectable in its entirety will not be filed under seal if the confidential portions can be redacted. If documents can be redacted, then a redacted version for public viewing, omitting only the confidential, privileged, or otherwise protectable portions of the document, shall be filed. Any application that seeks to file documents under seal in their entirety should include an explanation of why redaction is not feasible. 2. DEFINITIONS 2.1 Action: John Roe CS 88 v. Doe 1, et al., Case No. 2:24-cv-11154 JFW (SSCx) (i.e., this pending federal action). 2.2 Challenging Party: a Party or Non-Party that challenges the designation of information or items under this Order. 2.3 “CONFIDENTIAL” Information or Items: information (regardless of how it is generated, stored or maintained) or tangible things that qualify for protection under Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and as specified above in the Good Cause Statement. 2.4 Counsel: The term “counsel” will mean outside counsel of record, and other attorneys, paralegals, secretaries, and other support staff employed in the law firms identified below: Trépanier Tajima LLP (for Church Defendants) and Slater Slater Schulman LLP (for Plaintiff). “Counsel” also includes attorneys, paralegals, secretaries, and other support staff employed in the law firm of Kirton McConkie in Salt Lake City, Utah (for Church Defendants). 2.5 Designating Party: a Party or Non-Party that designates information or items that it produces in disclosures or in responses to discovery as “CONFIDENTIAL.” 2.6 Disclosure or Discovery Material: all items or information, regardless of the medium or manner in which it is generated, stored, or maintained (including, among other things, testimony, transcripts, and tangible things), that are produced or generated in disclosures or responses to discovery in this matter. 2.7 Expert: a person with specialized knowledge or experience in a matter pertinent to the litigation who has been retained by a Party or its counsel to serve as an exper

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John Roe CS 88 v. DOE 1, a corporation, (C.D. Cal. 2025).

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