John P. Broadaway Teena G. Broadaway v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, John M. Cameron Caroline D. Cameron v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

111 F.3d 593, 79 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2072, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 7145, 1997 WL 182266
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedApril 16, 1997
Docket96-2154, 96-2155
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 111 F.3d 593 (John P. Broadaway Teena G. Broadaway v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, John M. Cameron Caroline D. Cameron v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
John P. Broadaway Teena G. Broadaway v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, John M. Cameron Caroline D. Cameron v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 111 F.3d 593, 79 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2072, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 7145, 1997 WL 182266 (8th Cir. 1997).

Opinion

BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.

John P. and Teena G. Broadaway and John M. and Caroline D. Cameron appeal from a final decision of the Tax Court 2 upholding the Commissioner’s assessment of tax deficiencies based on dividend distributions from Cameron Construction Company made to the Broadaways and the Camerons during the 1989 tax year. We affirm.

I.

This case was submitted to the Tax Court on the basis of a fully stipulated record that provides the following salient facts. The Broadaways and the Camerons are shareholders in Cameron Construction Company (the Company) which operated and paid taxes as a Subchapter C corporation, see I.R.C. §§ 301-385 (1988), 3 until October 31, 1988. The Company has at all times been engaged in the road and highway construction business and has at all times calculated its taxable income from long-term construction contracts using the completed contract method of accounting. 4 While operating as a C corporation, the Company was required to maintain an earnings and profits account from which distributions to Company shareholders — including the Broadaways and the Cam-erons — would be taxed as dividends. See I.R.C. § 316(a). For purposes of determining earnings and profits, the parties agree that the Company, even though it calculated its taxable income under the completed contract method of accounting, was required under I.R.C. § 312(n)(6) to account for its long-term construction contracts under the percentage of completion method of accounting. 5

The dispute in this case flows from the Company’s election pursuant to I.R.C. § 1362(a) to switch from Subchapter C status and to be taxed as a Subchapter S corporation, see I.R.C. §§ 1361-1379, effective upon the close of the Company’s taxable year ended October 31, 1988. Under Subchapter S, the Company does not pay corporate-level income taxes. Instead, the Company’s income is taxed directly to its shareholders based on their ownership of corporate *595 stock — whether or not the funds are actually distributed to the shareholders. 6 Instead of maintaining an earnings and profits account, an S corporation monitors its undistributed corporate earnings,' those that have been taxed to the shareholders but not yet distributed, using an accumulated adjustments account from which distributions to shareholders are generally tax-free. 7 See I.R.C. § 1368(c)(1). The parties agreed in their jointly filed stipulation of facts that the Company remained obligated to account for its earnings and profits in 1989 under the percentage of completion method of accounting, despite the Company’s election to switch to Subchapter S status. A number of long-term construction contracts begun while the Company was a C corporation were completed after it became an S corporation.

From November 1, 1988 through December 31, 1989, the Company incurred costs on long-term contracts begun while it was a C corporation that exceeded the reasonable estimates the Company had used under the percentage of completion method of accounting to calculate earnings and profits for its last taxable year as a C corporation. 8 As a result of the disparity between the Company’s reasonable cost estimates and its actual costs to complete these long-term contracts, the taxpayers argue that the accumulated earnings and profits account carried over from the Company’s existence as a C corporation 9 reflects an artificially high balance. This artificially high earnings and profits balance, they contend, ultimately resulted in the Commissioner’s improper characterization of a $300,000 distribution to the taxpayers as a taxable dividend to the extent of the balance in the Company’s carried-over earnings and profits account. The parties stipulate that the balance in the Company’s earnings and profits account as of October 31, 1988 — the end of the Company’s last year as a C corporation — was $251,650.13. The taxpayers argue that the Company should be allowed to adjust this amount by retroactively revising the reasonable cost estimates that it used to calculate earnings and profits on long-term contracts in progress on October 31, 1988 to reflect the actual, higher costs eventually incurred during its 1989 tax year.

The Tax Court rejected the taxpayers’ arguments and concluded that for purposes of calculating the taxable amount of the dividend distribution, the Company’s earnings and profits for its last year as a C corporation must be computed on the basis of estimates of the total costs of its long-term contracts made on October 31, 1988 without retroactive adjustment to reflect actual, higher costs incurred during the 1989 tax year. Accordingly, the court upheld the tax deficiencies assessed by the Commissioner. The taxpayers appeal the Tax Court’s decision.

II.

We have jurisdiction over appeals from final decisions of the Tax Court, see I.R.C. § 7482(a) (1994), and we review the legal conclusions of the Tax Court de novo. See Chakales v. Commissioner, 79 F.3d 726, 728 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, *596 117 S.Ct. 85, 136 L.Ed.2d 42 (1996). The taxpayers make several arguments to support their claim that the Tax Court erroneously concluded that the Company could not adjust its carried-over earnings and profits account to reflect events occurring after the Company became an S corporation. We agree with the Tax Court that the Internal Revenue Code does not permit such adjustments to be made.

Under I.R.C. § 1371(e)(1), with limited exceptions, “no adjustment shall be made to the earnings and profits of an S corporation.” This provision effectively suspends activity related to the earnings and profits account, and the account balance carried over to an S corporation from its previous existence as a C corporation remains unchanged from year to year unless one of a limited number of specific events occur that warrant adjustment to the account. The carried-over earnings and profits account can be decreased under the Code only to reflect (1) dividend distributions to shareholders to the extent made out of accumulated earnings and profits, see I.R.C. §§ 1371(e)(3), 1368(e)(2); (2) distributions resulting from redemptions, liquidations, reorganizations, or divisives, 10 see I.R.C. § 1371(e)(2); and (3) tax paid by an S corporation as a result of recapture of investment credit taken when the corporation was a C corporation, see I.R.C. § 1371(d)(3). In addition, the earnings and profits account can be increased if the S corporation acquires another corporation with an earnings and profits account balance. See I.R.C. § 381(c)(2) (1988 & Supp. 1 1989).

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111 F.3d 593, 79 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2072, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 7145, 1997 WL 182266, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/john-p-broadaway-teena-g-broadaway-v-commissioner-of-internal-revenue-ca8-1997.