John O. v. Superior Court

169 Cal. App. 3d 823, 215 Cal. Rptr. 592, 1985 Cal. App. LEXIS 2326
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedJune 7, 1985
DocketB010080
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 169 Cal. App. 3d 823 (John O. v. Superior Court) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
John O. v. Superior Court, 169 Cal. App. 3d 823, 215 Cal. Rptr. 592, 1985 Cal. App. LEXIS 2326 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).

Opinion

Opinion

LUCAS, J.

Introduction

Having previously denied the minor’s petition for writ of mandate to compel the juvenile court to vacate its order denying the minor’s motion for informal supervision and to make a new order granting said order, this court, pursuant to order of the California Supreme Court, issued an alternative writ of mandate.

*825 A petition was filed in juvenile court on August 2, 1984, in which it was alleged that John O. came within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, in that John allegedly committed a felony violation of section 10851 of the Vehicle Code (joyriding).

The facts from which the petition arose are these: John’s mother was employed as a housekeeper by Gloria Herrera (Herrera). While Herrera was on vacation, John’s sister stayed at Herrera’s house. John visited his sister at the house on June 26, 1984. During the visit, John noticed the keys to Herrera’s 1977 Porsche on top of the refrigerator, removed the car from the driveway, drove it for approximately one-half hour, and was involved in a traffic accident. Only Herrera’s vehicle was damaged. John admitted to the police and to Herrera that he took the car. His parents paid Herrera $200 to cover her insurance deductible, and Herrera told John’s mother that the insurance company would pay the remainder of the repair costs. The investigating police officer noted that John “admits crime and appears remorseful. Parents very cooperative.” John had never been arrested before the incident and has not been arrested since.

On August 2, 1984, an arraignment was held, and a deputy public defender was appointed to represent John. The court referred the matter to the probation department for an evaluation of John’s suitability for informal supervision under the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 654 1 and continued the case until the probation report could be prepared.

On September 25, 1984, a referee held a diversion hearing. Probation Officer Winston, who had investigated and evaluated the case, testified regarding his investigation into the case and the condition of the department’s informal supervision program. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1307(e).) Although he believed that John might be a candidate for informal supervision under the provisions of section 654, Winston said that the informal supervision option was not available, primarily because of county budget cuts. 2

*826 The referee denied John’s request for informal supervision. In reaching that decision, the referee stated that he was inclined to defer to the decisions of the probation officer* * 3 and district attorney’s office 4 to pursue formal juvenile court proceedings instead of informal probation. The referee stated that he was basing its decision to deny John’s request for informal supervision solely on the representation of the probation officer to the effect that budget limitations prevented the probation department from implementing the terms of section 654. The referee did not voice any doubts as to John’s suitability for informal supervision under section 654, but apparently believed that that option was not currently available, because of county budget cuts.

John filed a petition for writ of mandate and/or prohibition with the presiding judge of the juvenile court on November 28, 1984. That petition was denied by minute order of December 17, 1984. Thereafter, John filed a petition for writ of mandate with this court, which was denied; the Supreme Court ordered this court to issue an order granting an alternative writ of mandate, and this court complied with the Supreme Court’s order.

Discussion

The only issue before us is whether the juvenile court properly exercised its discretion in denying informal supervision to John. We find that the court based its decision on factors which were not proper considerations, and we therefore remand the matter for a redetermination in light of this opinion.

Section 654 and the California Rules of Court provide an option of informal supervision in lieu of formal juvenile court proceedings in cases where *827 the minor’s rehabilitative needs may be satisfied without resort to formal proceedings. (§ 654; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1307.) Section 654 states in pertinent part: “In any case in which a probation officer, after investigation of an application for a petition or any other investigation he or she is authorized to make concludes that a minor is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court or will probably soon be within that jurisdiction, the probation officer may, in lieu of filing a petition to declare a minor a dependent child of the court or a minor or a ward of the court under Section 601 or requesting that a petition be filed by the prosecuting attorney to declare a minor a ward of the court under Section 602 or subsequent to dismissal of a petition already filed, and with consent of the minor and the minor’s parent or guardian, delineate specific programs of supervision for the minor, for not to exceed six months, and attempt thereby to adjust the situation which brings the minor within the jurisdiction of the court or creates the probability that the minor will soon be within that jurisdiction. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the probation officer from filing a petition or requesting the prosecuting attorney to file a petition at any time within the six-month period. If the probation officer determines that the minor has not involved himself or herself in the specific programs within 60 days, the probation officer shall immediately file a petition or request that a petition be filed by the prosecuting attorney. However, when in the judgment of the probation officer the interest of the minor and the community can be protected, the probation officer shall make a diligent effort to proceed under this section. ” (§ 654; italics added.)

The factors to be considered in determining whether to grant informal supervision under section 654 are set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 1307(e). 5

*828 Once a petition for wardship has been filed under the provisions of section 602, the decision whether to institute informal probation in lieu of formal juvenile court proceedings is within the discretion of the court, not of the probation officer or any other person. (Charles S. v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 741, 747 [187 Cal.Rptr. 144, 653 P.2d 648]; Paul D. v. Superior Court (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 838, 843 [205 Cal.Rptr. 77]; Raymond B. v. Superior Court (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 372, 378-379 [162 Cal.Rptr.

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Bluebook (online)
169 Cal. App. 3d 823, 215 Cal. Rptr. 592, 1985 Cal. App. LEXIS 2326, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/john-o-v-superior-court-calctapp-1985.