RENDERED: DECEMBER 5, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2025-CA-0763-ME
JOHN MICHAEL TIGGELAAR, II APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE FAMILY COURT v. HONORABLE LIBBY G. MESSER, JUDGE ACTION NO. 20-D-00534-002
BRITTNEY MARIE HERTOG AND E.C.T., A MINOR CHILD APPELLEES
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CETRULO, A. JONES, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
CETRULO, JUDGE: John Michael Tiggelaar, II, (“Tiggelaar”) appeals from a
Domestic Violence Order (“DVO”) entered against him by the Fayette Family
Court in favor of appellees. On appeal, Tiggelaar argues that the case largely turns
upon this Court’s prior opinion in Walker v. Walker, 520 S.W.3d 390 (Ky. App.
2017), and that the Walker decision incorrectly rejected the doctrine of res judicata in domestic violence actions. We disagree with his interpretation of Walker and
conclude that our precedent supports the family court’s decision herein. We
affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Tiggelaar and Brittney Hertog (“Hertog”) were previously married
and had one child together. In August 2019, Hertog filed for divorce in Florida
where the parties then resided. She left Florida for Kentucky in 2019 and filed a
domestic violence petition in Fayette Family Court in May 2020. Tiggelaar also
relocated to Kentucky. In July 2020, the parties jointly agreed to the entry of a
one-year protection order of no contact except through the Talking Parents
application and in compliance with the Florida divorce court orders.
When that order was near expiration, Hertog sought to extend it, but
the parties then entered into a civil restraining order which allowed the prior DVO
to expire. However, that agreed order continued to require only written contact
between the parties, specifically prohibited harassing language and threats, and still
required Tiggelaar to remain 500 feet away from Hertog. The record indicates that
the parties’ divorce was finalized in Florida in 2024. That divorce action
continued to require supervised timesharing by Tiggelaar with his child with
regular Zoom calls.
-2- In March 2025, Hertog filed a new domestic violence petition which
contained allegations of a recent text message by Tiggelaar. She alleged that he
appeared intoxicated on a Zoom call with their child and that the child ended the
call after becoming upset. He continued calling and texting Hertog, contending
that he was not drunk and that she was in violation of the court order for
monitoring his calls with the child. He threatened to contact his attorney and file
legal action, ultimately texting, “So stop, or I will make you. Yes, that last bit is a
threat. Bring it.”
Hertog’s petition did include that text threat, but also recounted in
some detail the prior allegations from 2019 through 2020. Tiggelaar moved to
limit the testimony and evidence to acts committed after the Florida litigation. The
family court denied that motion, and the matter proceeded to a hearing on May 16,
2025. In so ruling, the family court stated that the evidence of the prior threats and
proven acts of violence was relevant to determine if the statutory elements had
been met for this newly filed petition and to allow the full context of the current
text messages to be understood.
In her testimony before the family court regarding the recent event,
Hertog stated that she texted Tiggelaar she would not be responding to further
messages after the child had hung up from the Zoom call. She testified he was
upset and stated that Dad did “not seem right.” After Tiggelaar called her
-3- “approximately 25 times in succession,” she messaged him to stop calling. Several
hours later, he made the threat that she perceived as more than a “legal threat.”
Hertog also testified to several acts that led to the previous filing in
2020, including Tiggelaar causing personal injuries to her, sexually assaulting her,
and making numerous threats to harm and even kill her. Some of those threats had
been recorded and were played for the family court. Tiggelaar did not deny that
these prior incidents had occurred. Rather, as he does here, he argued they were
not relevant and were “stale” having occurred prior to 2021. He testified he had
not seen Hertog outside of a courtroom in at least two years. He admitted he
violated the previous restraining order by texting the March 2025 threat, but
maintained it was his intention to simply threaten legal action. No other witnesses
testified. At the conclusion of the evidence, the family court did enter the three-
year DVO requested by Hertog. In so ruling, the court specifically found that
Tiggelaar’s threat would place a person in reasonable fear for her own safety and
that other less restrictive options had been tried and failed. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Our review of the family court’s decision regarding an entry of an
order of protection is limited to “whether the [factual] findings of the trial judge
were clearly erroneous” or whether the court abused its discretion. Caudill v.
Caudill, 318 S.W.3d 112, 115 (Ky. App. 2010) (citation omitted). A family
-4- court’s findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if supported by substantial
evidence. Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003) (citation omitted).
Further, an abuse of discretion occurs only when a court’s decision is
unreasonable, unfair, arbitrary, or capricious. Dunn v. Thacker, 546 S.W.3d 576,
578 (Ky. App. 2018) (citation omitted).
ANALYSIS
Tiggelaar claims the family court erred in its issuance of a DVO as
there was insufficient evidence for the court to find that domestic violence had
occurred and may again occur. He further argues that the family court abused its
discretion in admitting and relying on evidence of acts that had occurred over five
years earlier, had been pled in a prior action, and had led to the prior DVO being
entered. He argues that the doctrines of res judicata or issue preclusion bar a
subsequent suit between the same parties on matters that were or could have been
brought in support of that prior action.
We address the latter argument first. As mentioned, this argument
focuses on this Court’s prior opinion in Walker v. Walker, supra. In that case,
Nancy Walker obtained a DVO against her former husband in 2012 for a two-year
period. 521 S.W.3d at 391. In 2014, as the expiration date loomed, she moved the
court to extend its duration for three more years, which the trial court denied. Id.
When that prior order expired, Jeremy Walker obtained an order directing Nancy
-5- to return his weapons to him. Id. In response, she filed a second petition seeking a
protective order relying in part upon a new psychological evaluation. Id. The
court then granted a new DVO stating that it was based in part on the prior DVO
and concluded that the preponderance of evidence established that an act of
violence had occurred in the past and may occur again. Id. at 392. Jeremy Walker
argued that the sole act of domestic violence occurred in 2012 and could not be
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 5, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2025-CA-0763-ME
JOHN MICHAEL TIGGELAAR, II APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE FAMILY COURT v. HONORABLE LIBBY G. MESSER, JUDGE ACTION NO. 20-D-00534-002
BRITTNEY MARIE HERTOG AND E.C.T., A MINOR CHILD APPELLEES
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CETRULO, A. JONES, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
CETRULO, JUDGE: John Michael Tiggelaar, II, (“Tiggelaar”) appeals from a
Domestic Violence Order (“DVO”) entered against him by the Fayette Family
Court in favor of appellees. On appeal, Tiggelaar argues that the case largely turns
upon this Court’s prior opinion in Walker v. Walker, 520 S.W.3d 390 (Ky. App.
2017), and that the Walker decision incorrectly rejected the doctrine of res judicata in domestic violence actions. We disagree with his interpretation of Walker and
conclude that our precedent supports the family court’s decision herein. We
affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Tiggelaar and Brittney Hertog (“Hertog”) were previously married
and had one child together. In August 2019, Hertog filed for divorce in Florida
where the parties then resided. She left Florida for Kentucky in 2019 and filed a
domestic violence petition in Fayette Family Court in May 2020. Tiggelaar also
relocated to Kentucky. In July 2020, the parties jointly agreed to the entry of a
one-year protection order of no contact except through the Talking Parents
application and in compliance with the Florida divorce court orders.
When that order was near expiration, Hertog sought to extend it, but
the parties then entered into a civil restraining order which allowed the prior DVO
to expire. However, that agreed order continued to require only written contact
between the parties, specifically prohibited harassing language and threats, and still
required Tiggelaar to remain 500 feet away from Hertog. The record indicates that
the parties’ divorce was finalized in Florida in 2024. That divorce action
continued to require supervised timesharing by Tiggelaar with his child with
regular Zoom calls.
-2- In March 2025, Hertog filed a new domestic violence petition which
contained allegations of a recent text message by Tiggelaar. She alleged that he
appeared intoxicated on a Zoom call with their child and that the child ended the
call after becoming upset. He continued calling and texting Hertog, contending
that he was not drunk and that she was in violation of the court order for
monitoring his calls with the child. He threatened to contact his attorney and file
legal action, ultimately texting, “So stop, or I will make you. Yes, that last bit is a
threat. Bring it.”
Hertog’s petition did include that text threat, but also recounted in
some detail the prior allegations from 2019 through 2020. Tiggelaar moved to
limit the testimony and evidence to acts committed after the Florida litigation. The
family court denied that motion, and the matter proceeded to a hearing on May 16,
2025. In so ruling, the family court stated that the evidence of the prior threats and
proven acts of violence was relevant to determine if the statutory elements had
been met for this newly filed petition and to allow the full context of the current
text messages to be understood.
In her testimony before the family court regarding the recent event,
Hertog stated that she texted Tiggelaar she would not be responding to further
messages after the child had hung up from the Zoom call. She testified he was
upset and stated that Dad did “not seem right.” After Tiggelaar called her
-3- “approximately 25 times in succession,” she messaged him to stop calling. Several
hours later, he made the threat that she perceived as more than a “legal threat.”
Hertog also testified to several acts that led to the previous filing in
2020, including Tiggelaar causing personal injuries to her, sexually assaulting her,
and making numerous threats to harm and even kill her. Some of those threats had
been recorded and were played for the family court. Tiggelaar did not deny that
these prior incidents had occurred. Rather, as he does here, he argued they were
not relevant and were “stale” having occurred prior to 2021. He testified he had
not seen Hertog outside of a courtroom in at least two years. He admitted he
violated the previous restraining order by texting the March 2025 threat, but
maintained it was his intention to simply threaten legal action. No other witnesses
testified. At the conclusion of the evidence, the family court did enter the three-
year DVO requested by Hertog. In so ruling, the court specifically found that
Tiggelaar’s threat would place a person in reasonable fear for her own safety and
that other less restrictive options had been tried and failed. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Our review of the family court’s decision regarding an entry of an
order of protection is limited to “whether the [factual] findings of the trial judge
were clearly erroneous” or whether the court abused its discretion. Caudill v.
Caudill, 318 S.W.3d 112, 115 (Ky. App. 2010) (citation omitted). A family
-4- court’s findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if supported by substantial
evidence. Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003) (citation omitted).
Further, an abuse of discretion occurs only when a court’s decision is
unreasonable, unfair, arbitrary, or capricious. Dunn v. Thacker, 546 S.W.3d 576,
578 (Ky. App. 2018) (citation omitted).
ANALYSIS
Tiggelaar claims the family court erred in its issuance of a DVO as
there was insufficient evidence for the court to find that domestic violence had
occurred and may again occur. He further argues that the family court abused its
discretion in admitting and relying on evidence of acts that had occurred over five
years earlier, had been pled in a prior action, and had led to the prior DVO being
entered. He argues that the doctrines of res judicata or issue preclusion bar a
subsequent suit between the same parties on matters that were or could have been
brought in support of that prior action.
We address the latter argument first. As mentioned, this argument
focuses on this Court’s prior opinion in Walker v. Walker, supra. In that case,
Nancy Walker obtained a DVO against her former husband in 2012 for a two-year
period. 521 S.W.3d at 391. In 2014, as the expiration date loomed, she moved the
court to extend its duration for three more years, which the trial court denied. Id.
When that prior order expired, Jeremy Walker obtained an order directing Nancy
-5- to return his weapons to him. Id. In response, she filed a second petition seeking a
protective order relying in part upon a new psychological evaluation. Id. The
court then granted a new DVO stating that it was based in part on the prior DVO
and concluded that the preponderance of evidence established that an act of
violence had occurred in the past and may occur again. Id. at 392. Jeremy Walker
argued that the sole act of domestic violence occurred in 2012 and could not be
considered in determining whether to issue the second DVO. Id.
This Court specifically addressed and rejected Jeremy Walker’s claim
of res judicata in that case, holding that Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”)
403.735 expressly allows courts to look back and consider prior protective orders.
Id. at 392. It authorizes courts to “obtain the respondent’s Kentucky criminal and
protective order history and utilize that information to assess what relief and which
sanctions may protect against danger to the petitioner . . . .” KRS 403.735(1)(a).
Id. Finally, the Walker Court held that while KRS 403.735 concerns what relief is
appropriate, rather than the entitlement to relief itself, it is “all the more persuasive
when examining KRS 403.740 which does not exclude prior orders from
consideration.” 520 S.W.3d at 392.
Res judicata has no application here. Even if the prior DVO was
based upon the same incidents of Tiggelaar’s domestic violence against Hertog
presented in this matter, res judicata does not prohibit the family court from
-6- considering those prior incidents in the context of his more recent conduct to
determine if there was a basis for issuing a new DVO. In Walker, the Court
considered “whether the proof sufficient for the issuance of one DVO can be
considered as proof for a subsequent DVO[,]” and we answered that question in
the affirmative. Id. at 392; see also Lazar v. Lazar, 678 S.W.3d 472, 476-77 (Ky.
App. 2023) (reiterating Walker’s finding that “proof sufficient for the issuance of
one DVO can be considered as proof for a subsequent DVO”).
Tiggelaar also asserts on appeal that the Walker court misinterpreted
the legislative intent of KRS 403.715, and that the Walker decision was erroneous
in dismissing the applicability of res judicata and allowing family courts to
consider previously adjudicated domestic violence as evidence of subsequent acts
under KRS 403.740(1). We do not depart from the Walker holding, nor do we
agree that the rejection of his res judicata argument will lead to “disastrous”
results. We agree with Walker that a family court may consider prior acts or orders
regarding domestic violence should a new threat occur and lead to the filing of a
new petition. In the case herein, the evidence was undisputed that Tiggelaar had
again threatened Hertog. The family court acted within its discretion in
considering the prior acts and orders in assessing whether this new threat
constituted domestic violence. The court also specifically noted that the parties’
-7- prior agreed restraining order – a less restrictive option than a DVO – had been
tried and failed. We find no abuse of discretion.
Next, Tiggelaar argues that there was insufficient evidence of
domestic violence when the only new contact was a text message. He argues that
her stated fear of injury or domestic violence was unreasonable. We disagree as
“[t]he definition of domestic violence and abuse, found in KRS 403.720(1),
includes ‘physical injury, serious physical injury, sexual abuse, assault, or the
infliction of fear of imminent physical injury, serious physical injury, sexual abuse,
or assault between family members.’” Abdur-Rahman v. Peterson, 338 S.W.3d
823, 825 (Ky. App. 2011) (emphasis added).
Here, Hertog presented evidence of prior physical assaults which
followed or coincided with previous threats and were similar to the threat she
received by text in March 2025. While those previous events were a few years in
the past and there was no evidence of any violation or contact for a couple of years,
the testimony from Hertog was that she felt fear of physical injury. Tiggelaar’s
response to this was not to deny the threat, but to simply assert that it was not his
intention to threaten physical violence, only legal action. It is not his state of mind
or intent that is in issue in a domestic violence petition. For purposes of KRS
403.720, a victim’s “belief that danger is imminent can be inferred from a past
-8- pattern of repeated serious abuse.” Fraley v. Rice-Fraley, 313 S.W.3d 635, 640
(Ky. App. 2010) (citing KRS 503.010(3)).
In Williford v. Williford, this Court explained that “the family court is
in the best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and weigh the evidence
presented.” 583 S.W.3d 424, 429 (Ky. App. 2019) (citing Hohman v. Dery, 371
S.W.3d 780, 783 (Ky. App. 2012)). We are also mindful that the domestic
violence statutes are to be interpreted by the courts to allow victims to obtain
protection against further violence and abuse. Kingrey v. Whitlow, 150 S.W.3d 67,
70 (Ky. App. 2004) (citing KRS 403.715(1)). The family court herein summarized
her view of the evidence of the most recent events as follows:
In March of this year Respondent admittedly texted the Petitioner aggressively and threatening litigation over her not providing him a hard copy of the child’s report card. Later that day during the child’s [virtual] visit the mother observed signs that [Mr. Tiggelaar] was intoxicated. The child appeared concerned and ended the call himself. Mother then texted him telling him that the call was ended due to his being drunk. When Respondent continued to try to call back she texted to stop calling and that the child was not going to answer another call. He then responded with threats of both further legal action as well as made the statement “stop or I will make you. Yes, that last bit is a threat.” This last statement she felt was different than the prior threats of legal action but was a personal threat to her safety or the safety of the child.
While a text message in and of itself may not generally create a fear of
imminent physical injury, the circumstances and history between the parties
-9- become relevant to that perception. See, e.g., Hogle v. Hogle, 710 S.W.3d 482
(Ky. App. 2025); Gibson v. Campbell-Marletta, 503 S.W.3d 186 (Ky. App. 2016).
CONCLUSION
The family court had the opportunity to judge the credibility of the
witnesses and testimony presented during the hearing. Based on the totality of the
evidence, the family court found that an act of domestic violence had occurred and
was likely to occur again in the future. We have reviewed the entirety of the
evidence and conclude the family court did not err in its decision. As such,
issuance of the DVO was proper. The judgment is AFFIRMED.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Ephraim W. Helton Jason Rapp Danville, Kentucky Lexington, Kentucky
-10-