John Michael Abner v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company

Opinion

RENDERED: AUGUST 28, 2026; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2025-CA-1375-MR

JOHN MICHAEL ABNER AND JOHN MICHAEL ABNER, AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF JOHN TYLER ABNER, AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF S.T., A MINOR APPELLANTS

APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE DIANE MINNIFIELD, JUDGE ACTION NOS. 22-CI-03119 & 23-CI-01118

STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY APPELLEE

OPINION

AFFIRMING

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BEFORE: COMBS, EASTON, AND L. JONES, JUDGES. COMBS, JUDGE: This case involves a wrongful death action and the issue of insurance coverage for the claim. John Michael Abner, individually; as Administrator of the Estate of John Tyler Abner, his late husband; and as next friend of S.T., a minor, appeals the decision of the Fayette Circuit Court granting

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summary judgment in favor of State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (State Farm). After our review, we affirm the summary judgment.

The following facts are undisputed. Benjamin William Call and John Tyler Abner (Ty), the decedent, became acquainted at a downtown Lexington restaurant on October 26, 2021. After spending the afternoon and evening eating and drinking together, Call and Ty walked amiably to a nearby parking garage where Ty’s car was parked.

Despite their display of camaraderie just minutes before, surveillance video from inside the parking garage shows Call pulling Ty out of a parked car to kick and punch him in the head, neck, face, and body. Once Call had beaten Ty unconscious, he dragged Ty’s body a few feet across the pavement and resumed the assault. When police responded to the scene, they observed a blood-soaked Call still beating the mangled body. Ty died at the scene as a result of blunt force trauma. Call was charged with murder.

In October 2022, John Michael Abner, the decedent’s husband, filed a wrongful death action against Call in Fayette Circuit Court. Subject to explicit terms and conditions, Call was insured by a manufactured homeowner’s insurance policy issued by State Farm to his wife. Pursuant to the policy, State Farm agreed to provide liability coverage to the Calls if a claim were made for damages because of bodily injury “caused by an occurrence.” “Occurrence” is defined by the policy

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as “an accident.” State Farm’s policy specifically excludes coverage for bodily injury that is either expected or intended by an insured. It also excludes coverage for bodily injury “which is the result of willful and malicious acts” of an insured.

In April 2023, State Farm filed a declaratory judgment action asking the court to define its obligations under the policy. It contended that its policy did not cover the claim for damages asserted against Call because the claim did not arise from an accident. Separately, it contended that the claim was specifically excluded from coverage because the decedent’s injuries were expected or intended by Call and were also the result of his willful and malicious acts. These separate civil actions were consolidated before the circuit court. The criminal proceedings continued.

In March 2024, Call was tried for Ty’s murder. The jury quickly rejected Call’s contention that he was too impaired by the consumption of alcohol to wantonly or intentionally kill Ty. He was convicted of murder and was sentenced to twenty-years’ imprisonment.1 On June 6, 2025, Abner filed a motion for summary judgment with respect to State Farm’s contractual obligation to defend and indemnify Call. State Farm filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The circuit court concluded that Ohio law governed the controversy and that State Farm had no duty to defend or

1 Abner’s direct appeal of his criminal conviction is still pending as case number 2024-SC-0374.

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indemnify Call against the claims asserted by Abner. It granted summary judgment to State Farm, and this appeal followed.

On appeal, Abner argues that the circuit court erred by applying Ohio law to resolve the controversy and by concluding -- as a matter of law -- that the policy did not provide coverage for the incident. We disagree with both contentions.

Summary judgment is granted “[o]nly when it appears impossible for [a party] to produce evidence at trial warranting a judgment in his favor . . . .” Huddleston v. Hughes, 843 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Ky. App. 1992) (citing Steelvest v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991)). The Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) specifically provide that summary judgment is appropriate where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56.03. Because summary judgment resolves only legal questions, we do not defer to the trial court’s decision; we “review the issue de novo.” Coomer v. CSX Transp., Inc., 319 S.W.3d 366, 370– 71 (Ky. 2010); LaCrosse v. Owners Insurance Company, 531 S.W.3d 25, 30 (Ky. App. 2016).

First, we must consider whether the trial court erred by concluding that Ohio law applied to the dispute. In order to resolve the approach of choice of law issues, Kentucky has adopted the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF

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LAWS § 188(1) (1971). Coomer, 319 S.W.3d at 30 (citing Lewis v. American Family Ins. Group, 555 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1977)). Pursuant to the Restatement’s provisions, contract disputes are resolved according to the laws of the state that has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties.

Abner acknowledges that the “most significant relationship” test governs the analysis. However, he argues that Kentucky rather than Ohio has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties because: the murder, the criminal adjudication, and the civil action occurred in Kentucky; the decedent was a Kentucky resident; and Kentucky public policy is implicated.

Although this case involves a claim arising from a tort, the central issues to be resolved concern the formation and performance of the insurance contract -- not the circumstances of the tort. See Grange Property & Cas. Co. v. Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 445 S.W.3d 51, 56 (Ky. App. 2014). Additionally, in most cases, the law of the residence of the named insured will apply to determine the scope of insurance coverage. Poore v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 208 S.W.3d 269, 271 (Ky. App. 2006) (citing Lewis v. American Family Ins. Group, 555 S.W.2d 579, 582 (Ky. 1977); Bonnlander v. Leader Nat’l Ins. Co., 949 S.W.2d 618, 620 (Ky. App. 1996); Snodgrass v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 992 S.W.2d 855, 856–57 (Ky. App. 1998)).

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Ohio has the most significant relationship to the formation and performance of the insurance contract to be interpreted in this case: the named insured was an Ohio resident; the insured who caused the loss was an Ohio resident; the insurance policy is an Ohio policy; and the principal location of the insured risk during the term of the policy was Ohio. While Call’s victim was a Kentucky resident and the horrific murder was committed here, construction of the terms and conditions of the insurance contract is the sole purpose of these proceedings. Although the site of the crime and the residence of the victim are enmeshed in the tragic circumstances underlying the civil action, they do not outweigh Ohio’s relevant connections to the terms and conditions of the insurance contract itself.

Kentucky’s general choice-of-law rule is disregarded only where our public policy clearly and overwhelmingly disfavors application of the law of a foreign state. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hodgkiss-Warrick, 413 S.W.3d 875, 879-80 (Ky. 2013). Abner argues that we should construe Kentucky public policy so as to prevent out-of-state residents from relying on a narrow construction of their homeowner policies by their home state when they come to Kentucky and harm Kentucky residents.

However, we are not persuaded that Ohio law requires a narrower construction of the State Farm policy than Kentucky law. In fact, under the

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circumstances summarized in this case, we believe that Ohio and Kentucky law are wholly harmonious.

Like Ohio, Kentucky’s jurisprudence holds: (1) that a clearly worded exclusion in an insurance policy may -- without violating public policy -- exclude coverage for an injury to a third party that is expected or intentionally caused by an insured and (2) that intent to injure can be inferred from the circumstances as a matter of law. See Thompson v. West American Ins. Co., 839 S.W.2d 579, 581 (Ky. App. 1992) (“sexual molestation is so inherently injurious, or substantially certain to result in some injury, that the intent to injure, or the expectation that injury will result, can be inferred as a matter of law”); Parsley v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 32 S.W.3d 103, 106 (Ky. App. 2000) (inferring intent to injure as a matter of law where victim was beaten with fists, kicked, and assaulted with various objects); Stone v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 34 S.W.3d 809, 812-14 (Ky. App. 2000) (inferring intent to injure as a matter of law where an assailant pointed a rifle directly at the victim and shot him at close range); Walker v. Economy Preferred Ins. Co., 909 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Ky. App. 1995) (inferring intent to injure as a matter of law where assailant punched victim in the face); Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Coyle, 285 S.W.3d 299, 306 (Ky. App. 2008) (inferring intent as a matter of law where tortfeasor pointed a firearm at the victim and meant to shoot him by pulling the trigger); Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins.

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Co. v. Pelgen, 241 S.W.3d 814, 818 (Ky. App. 2007) (inferring intent as a matter of law where a husband pointed a shotgun at his wife’s face and pulled the trigger).

Consequently, Abner cannot show that Kentucky has a public policy that overwhelmingly disfavors the application of Ohio law in this case. The circuit court did not err by concluding that Ohio law governs the rights and liabilities of the parties under the State Farm policy.

Next, we consider the court’s application of the specific provisions of Ohio law. Like Kentucky, Ohio’s jurisprudence holds that interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law. Garlock v. Jordan, 260 N.E.3d 42, 46–47 (Ohio App. 2025). Where provisions of a policy are reasonably clear and unambiguous, the courts assume that the parties’ intent is reflected in the language used. Id. And, like any other contract, an insurance policy is enforced according to the plain and ordinary meaning of its terms. Id.

Ohio courts hold that inherent in a policy’s definition of “occurrence”

is the concept of an accidental incident as opposed to an intentional one. See Travelers Property Casualty Corporation v. Chiquita Brands International, Inc., 243 N.E.3d 797, 804 (Ohio App. 2024). Furthermore, they apply the doctrine of inferred intent when interpreting a policy’s exclusion for intentional injury. The doctrine is relevant where an intentional act is substantially certain to cause injury. Napier v. Ickes, 140 N.E.3d 137, 148–49 (Ohio App. 2019) (citing Allstate Ins. Co.

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v. Campbell, 942 N.E.2d 1090, (Ohio 2010)) (the doctrine of inferred intent applies where the insured’s intentional act and the harm caused were so intrinsically enmeshed that the act necessarily resulted in the harm). Thus, where intent can be inferred from the circumstances, the intentional injury exclusion will be enforced as a matter of law.

Call’s act was plainly intentional: the unrelenting and merciless beating of Abner. And it was substantially certain to cause injury so that the intent to injure, or the expectation that injury would result, would be inferred, as a matter of law, in an Ohio court. Injury, and in this case death, necessarily resulted from Call’s barbaric assault. Our comments with respect to the sexual molestation discussed in West American Ins. Co., 839 S.W.2d at 581, are called to mind. Citing Horace Mann Insurance Company v. Leeber, 376 S.E.2d 581 (W.Va. 1988), we observed in West American that the harm caused by sexual molestation “is so well recognized, and so repugnant to public policy and to our sense of decency, that to give merit to a claim that no harm was intended to result from the act would be utterly absurd.” Id.

It is equally absurd to give merit to a claim that a deadly beating was not intended to harm the victim. The trial court did not err by concluding as a matter of law that coverage was excluded under the clear provisions of the insurance contract.

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We affirm the summary judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Masten Childers, III W. Jonathan Sweeten Daniel Short Cincinnati, Ohio Lexington, Kentucky

Justin S. Peterson Kellie M. Collins Lexington, Kentucky