John Louis Corrigan, Sr. v. State of Minnesota

• Court: Court of Appeals of Minnesota
• Decided: May 28, 2024
• Docket: a231555
• Status: Published

Opinion

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A23-1555

John Louis Corrigan, Sr., Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota, Respondent.

Filed May 28, 2024 Affirmed Ede, Judge

Scott County District Court File No. 70-CV-22-14765

John L. Corrigan, Sr., Belfair, Washington (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Ronald Hocevar, Scott County Attorney, Todd P. Zettler, Assistant County Attorney, Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Larson, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

EDE, Judge

In this appeal from dismissal of appellant’s declaratory-judgment action challenging

a Minnesota statute criminalizing stalking as unconstitutionally overbroad, appellant

argues that the district court (1) abused its discretion by denying his motions to change venue and to strike portions of respondent’s motion to dismiss and (2) erred by granting

respondent’s dismissal motion. We affirm.

FACTS

Appellant John Louis Corrigan Sr. is a Washington resident and the father of John

Louis Corrigan Jr. In 2016, Corrigan Jr. was convicted of stalking a woman in Scott

County, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.749, subdivision 2(2) (2016).

Corrigan Jr. appealed, and this court affirmed. State v. Corrigan, No. A17-1145, 2018 WL

3214271 (Minn. App. July 2, 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 16, 2018). In a civil action

filed in federal district court, Corrigan Jr. sued the district court judge who presided over

his trial, the prosecutor, the police officers involved in his case, the victim, the Scott County

Sheriff, the City of Savage, and Scott County, arguing that the defendants had violated his

constitutional rights. The federal lawsuit was later dismissed. Corrigan Jr. next challenged

his conviction several times through postconviction petitions. The district court heard and

denied each petition, and this court affirmed. Corrigan v. State, No. A22-0004, 2022 WL

2659357 (Minn. App. July 11, 2022), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 2022); Corrigan v. State,

No. A20-1323, 2021 WL 2408443 (Minn. App. June 14, 2021); Corrigan v. State, No.

A19-0019, 2019 WL 4010308 (Minn. App. Aug. 26, 2019).

In November 2022, Corrigan Sr. filed the complaint underlying this appeal in Scott

County. The complaint requested declaratory relief against respondent State of Minnesota

and challenged the constitutionality of Minnesota Statutes section 609.749,

subdivisions 2(2) and 2(c)(2) (2022). Corrigan Sr. alleged that section 609.749 is facially

overbroad because it “prohibit[s] a substantial amount of protected speech in violation of

2 the First Amendment,” and he claimed that the law is not “susceptible to a judicial

remedy[,]” such as a narrowing construction or severance of the unconstitutional

provisions. In particular, Corrigan Sr. maintained that, insofar as section 609.749

criminalizes a single incident of stalking instead of repeated incidents of following or

monitoring, the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad. Corrigan Sr. also asserted that he

is Corrigan Jr.’s father and that venue is proper in Scott County because that is where his

son was convicted.

In December 2022, the state moved to dismiss Corrigan Sr.’s complaint for failure

to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The state argued that the complaint did

not present a justiciable controversy and that Corrigan Sr. did not have standing.

Before the district court ruled on the state’s motion, Corrigan Sr. moved for a change

of venue to Dakota County because he believed that “an impartial trial [could not] be had

in the county wherein the action [was] pending and that the ends of justice would be

promoted by the change.” In support of his motion, Corrigan Sr. alleged bias and prejudice

against his son by the trial judge and the prosecutors who handled his son’s case.

The district court filed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order denying

Corrigan Sr.’s motion to change venue, reasoning that Corrigan Sr. failed to meet his

burden of proof. The district court determined that “[the trial judge]’s previous rulings

against Corrigan Jr. [did] not amount to bias, prejudice, or ill-will in the instant case that

would demand a change of venue.” The district court also observed that “[t]here [were] no

allegations that jurors in Scott County, or that other Scott County Judges, [were]

disqualified from rendering a fair and impartial decision,” such that Corrigan Sr.’s concerns

3 could be addressed by a notice to remove, instead of changing venue. And the district court

explained that “Dakota County [was] not a more convenient venue for witnesses and

[would] not promote the ends of justice.”

Corrigan Sr. subsequently filed a response to the state’s motion to dismiss, claiming

that the state’s motion was “frivolous” and “a deliberate attempt to harass and intimidate”

him. But rather than requesting that the district court deny the state’s motion, Corrigan Sr.

asked that the district court strike “elements of [the state’s] motion” as “immaterial and/or

impertinent matter.”

The district court filed an order denying Corrigan Sr.’s request to strike the state’s

motion and granting the state’s motion to dismiss. In analyzing the motion to strike, the

district court reasoned that irrelevant or incorrect information may not be stricken absent

unusual circumstances, which the district court did not find in this case. As to the motion

to dismiss, the district court looked to whether a justiciable controversy was present and

determined whether the controversy was ripe. Quoting Minnesota Democratic-Farmer-

Labor Party by Martin v. Simon, the district court explained that a First Amendment claim

is ripe “when a plaintiff shows an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably

affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by [the] statute, and there exists a

credible threat of prosecution.” 970 N.W.2d 689, 696 (Minn App. 2022) (quotation

omitted). Because Corrigan Sr. did not allege “that he ha[d] an intent to engage in a course

of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by” section

609.749, the district court concluded that the controversy was not ripe and dismissed the

complaint.

4 Corrigan Sr. appeals.

DECISION

Corrigan Sr. challenges the district court’s denial of his motions to change venue

and to strike, as well as the district court’s dismissal of his complaint. Below, we address

each issue sequentially.

I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Corrigan Sr.’s motions to change venue and to strike.

A. Motion to Change Venue

Venue is generally reviewed by writ of mandamus. Peterson v. Holiday

Recreational Indus., Inc., 726 N.W.2d 499, 504 (Minn. App. 2007), rev. denied (Minn.

Feb. 28, 2007). And we have refused to review a posttrial challenge to venue when the

challenge is not brought by a writ of mandamus. See id. (stating that the issue of venue was

not properly before this court because appellants did not petition for mandamus following

the district court’s venue ruling). But even assuming without deciding that Corrigan Sr.’s

pretrial venue challenge is reviewable outside of a writ of mandamus, we conclude that the

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion because Corrigan Sr. failed

to carry his burden of establishing that venue change was required under Minnesota

Statutes section 542.11 (2022).

“A party seeking a change of venue has the burden of establishing that such a change

is required.” VanHercke v. Eastvold, 405 N.W.2d 902, 904 (Minn. 1987). In a civil action,

venue may be changed by order of the court:

5 (1) upon written consent of the parties; (2) when it is made to appear on motion that any party has been made a defendant for the purpose of preventing a change of venue under section 542.10; (3) when an impartial trial cannot be had in the county wherein the action is pending; or (4) when the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change.

Minn. Stat. § 542.11. But an erroneous decision does not provide a basis for a change in

venue. See Burke v. Mayall, 10 Minn. 287, 288, 290, 10 Gil. 226, 227-28 (1865).

The decision whether to grant or deny a motion to change venue rests within the

sound discretion of the district court, and we will not disturb that decision unless there is a

clear abuse of discretion. Vanden Broucke v. Lyon Cnty., 222 N.W.2d 792, 795 (Minn.

1974). “Whether a sound discretion is exercised in granting or denying a change of venue

depends on the particular facts of each case.” Thon v. Erickson, 45 N.W.2d 560, 561 (Minn.

1950).

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Corrigan Sr.

failed to meet his burden of establishing that venue change was required. First, although

Corrigan Sr. points to the trial judge’s alleged bias toward his son as support for his venue

argument, the record does not establish that the trial judge was ever assigned to preside

over Corrigan Sr.’s civil complaint or motions. And even if the trial judge was assigned to

Corrigan Sr.’s case, Corrigan Sr. could have filed a notice to remove the trial judge.

Moreover, despite Corrigan Sr.’s stated belief that the trial judge’s decisions related to his

son’s case were erroneous, such decisions are not grounds for a change of venue. See Burke,

10 Minn. at 288, 290, 10 Gil. at 227-28. Second, Corrigan Sr. did not allege that other

6 judges and jurors in Scott County could not render a fair and impartial decision in his case.

And third, Corrigan Sr. has no other matters in Scott County that suggest he would not

receive a fair trial there, unlike cases in which the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that

a change in venue was warranted. See, e.g., Castle v. Village of Baudette, 125 N.W.2d 416,

418-19 (Minn. 1963) (holding that the district court abused its discretion by denying a

change of venue motion when plaintiff’s recent sexual assault conviction was highly

publicized in the county).

We therefore discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of Corrigan

Sr.’s motion to change venue.

B. Motion to Strike

Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 12.06 states that “the [district] court may order

any pleading not in compliance with Rule 11 stricken as sham and false, or may order

stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial,

impertinent or scandalous matter.” “To be irrelevant the pleading must have no material

relation to the case.” Pederson v. Eppard, 231 N.W. 393, 393 (Minn. 1930). Although

nonprecedential, we are persuaded by and adopt the reasoning of Huerd v. Huerd, in which

we reviewed the district court’s denial of a rule 12.06 motion to strike by applying the

abuse-of-discretion standard of review because the rule “identifies what the district court

‘may’ do[.]” No. A19-1579, 2020 WL 4434583, at *6 (Minn. App. Aug. 3, 2020).

Although Corrigan Sr. contends that the district court erred by denying his motion

to strike portions of the state’s motion to dismiss, he fails to cite any authority to support

his assertion. “Appellate courts cannot presume error by the district court.” Butler v. Jakes,

7 977 N.W.2d 867, 873 (Minn. App. 2022). Mere assertions of error without supporting

authority or argument are inadequately briefed and are forfeited unless prejudicial error is

obvious on mere inspection. See State v. Andersen, 871 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Minn. 2015);

see also Stone v. Invitation Homes, Inc., 4 N.W.3d 489, 494 n.6 (Minn. 2024) (explaining

that, despite the Minnesota Supreme Court’s use of the term “waived” in previous

decisions, “waiver is when a known right is voluntarily relinquished, whereas forfeiture

occurs when a party fails to timely assert a right”). Here, prejudicial error is not obvious

on our mere inspection of the record. But even assuming without deciding that Corrigan

Sr. has not forfeited any argument regarding his motion to strike, we remain unconvinced

that the district court abused its discretion.

Because he maintained that the following portions of the state’s motion to dismiss

were “immaterial and/or impertinent,” Corrigan Sr. asked the district court to strike them:

the statement of facts and the state’s appellate brief from Corrigan Jr.’s last appeal, which

the state attached to its motion to dismiss; the first, second, and third paragraphs of the

state’s argument section; and the state’s assertions as to Corrigan Sr.’s lack of standing.

Essentially, Corrigan Sr.’s motion requested that the district court strike the state’s entire

pleading. But the state’s motion was clearly pertinent because it challenged Corrigan Sr.’s

standing. And the state’s appellate brief from Corrigan Jr.’s last appeal was relevant by

virtue of the allegations in Corrigan Sr.’s complaint that he was Corrigan Jr.’s father and

that Corrigan Jr. had been convicted under the same statute that Corrigan Sr. sought to

challenge in this lawsuit. The state’s appellate brief also supported the state’s position that

8 Corrigan Jr. was utilizing his father to challenge his conviction. Furthermore, Corrigan Sr.

did not contend that the state’s motion was false or about a scandalous matter.

Thus, because the state’s motion to dismiss was not a sham or false, nor was it

redundant, immaterial, impertinent or about a scandalous matter, the district court did not

abuse its discretion by denying Corrigan Sr.’s motion to strike under Minnesota Rule of

Civil Procedure 12.06.

II. The district court did not err by granting the state’s motion to dismiss.

Corrigan Sr. challenges the district court’s dismissal of his complaint for lack of

standing, arguing that he has standing because the stalking statute could potentially

implicate conduct protected by the First Amendment. We disagree.

“[A] declaratory judgment action must present an actual, justiciable controversy.”

McCaughtry v. City of Red Wing, 808 N.W.2d 331, 337 (Minn. 2011). And the person

bringing such an action must have standing, which is “a sufficient stake in a justiciable

controversy to seek relief from a court.” Id. at 338 (quotation omitted). To establish that a

challenge is “ripe” for review and presents a justiciable controversy in a declaratory-

judgment action challenging the constitutionality of a law, a person must establish that “the

law ‘is, or is about to be, applied to [their] disadvantage.’” Minn. Democratic-Farmer-Lab.

Party by Martin, 970 N.W.2d at 692 (quoting Baertsch v. Minn. Dep’t of Revenue, 518

N.W.2d 21, 25 (Minn. 1994)). If First Amendment rights are at stake, however, a person

must establish that they have “an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably

affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by [the] statute, and [that] there exists

a credible threat of prosecution.” Id. at 696 (alteration in original) (quotation omitted).

9 Whether a justiciable controversy exists and whether a party has standing are

questions of law, which this court reviews de novo. See Cruz-Guzman v. State, 916 N.W.2d

1, 7 (Minn. 2018).

As a Washington resident, Corrigan Sr. has failed to allege that he intends to engage

in conduct that would arguably be proscribed by the Minnesota stalking statute he claims

is unconstitutionally overbroad. Nor does the record establish that the state has threatened

Corrigan Sr. with prosecution. See Minn. Democratic-Farmer-Lab. Party by Martin, 970

N.W.2d at 697 (noting that appellate courts assess whether prosecution has been threatened

when determining if an appellant faced a credible threat of prosecution). Corrigan Sr. has

also failed to allege that he has been forced to modify his conduct or his speech. See id.

(stating that “a plaintiff who chooses to self-censor based on a statute . . . must demonstrate

that their choice was objectively reasonable” and that, “[t]o do so, they need to establish a

credible threat of prosecution”).

We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in granting the state’s motion

to dismiss based on Corrigan Sr.’s lack of standing.

Affirmed.