John Lloyd v. Department of the Army

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedAugust 2, 2022
DocketDE-0752-16-0247-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of John Lloyd v. Department of the Army (John Lloyd v. Department of the Army) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
John Lloyd v. Department of the Army, (Miss. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

JOHN T. LLOYD, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DE-0752-16-0247-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DATE: August 2, 2022 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

John T. Lloyd, Colorado Springs, Colorado, pro se.

Daniel Dougherty, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for the agency.

James D. Bush, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which sustained his indefinite suspension. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is avai lable that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the appellant has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED by this Final Order to clarify the administrative judge’s analysis of the appellant’s due process claim, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW ¶2 The appellant served as the Program Director of the Special Mission Office at the agency’s Peterson Air Force Base. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5 at 42. The position required that he maintain a top secret security clearance. Id. at 329. On August 20, 2015, the agency suspended the appellant’s access to classified information and placed him on administrative leave. Id. at 40. Based on that suspension, the agency proposed the appellant’s indefinite suspension from duty without pay on January 4, 2016. Id. at 38. The appellant responded both orally and in writing to the proposal notice, and the deciding official sustained the action, effective March 1, 2016. Id. at 21-26. This appeal followed. IAF, Tab 1. ¶3 After determining that the requested hearing was unnecessary, the administrative judge issued an initial decision affirming the indefinite suspension. IAF, Tab 15, Initial Decision (ID) at 1-2. He found that: the appellant’s position required him to hold a valid security clearance; the agency afforded him minimum due process in the imposition of the indefinite suspension and the 3

suspension of his access to classified information; the agency identified the conditions subsequent for the termination of the appellant’s indefinite suspension; and the appellant failed to prove his harmful procedural error claim. ID at 3-7. ¶4 The appellant has filed a petition for review challenging the administrative judge’s finding that the agency afforded him minimum due process in the suspension of his access to classified information. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 3. The agency has responded in opposition, and the appellant has replied to the agency’s response. PFR File, Tabs 5-6. ¶5 In the initial decision, the administrative judge stated that the minimal due process to be afforded the appellant here included sufficient notice of the reasons for the suspension of his access to classified information an d the opportunity to make an informed reply. ID at 2-3. Our reviewing court, however, has clarified the Board’s line of cases on which the administrative judge relied, finding that, because an employee has no property interest in a security clearance , an agency is not obliged as a matter of constitutional due process to notify the employee of the specific reasons for the suspension of his clearance. Gargiulo v. Department of Homeland Security, 727 F.3d 1181, 1185-86 (Fed. Cir. 2013); see Buelna v. Department of Homeland Security, 121 M.S.P.R. 262, ¶ 25 (2014). Rather, for purposes of due process, it is sufficient for an agency to inform the employee that his position required a security clearance and that he can no longer hold his position once he lost his clearance. Buelna, 121 M.S.P.R. 262, ¶ 25. Here, the agency provided the appellant with this information, and we find no due process violation. IAF, Tab 5 at 38-40. ¶6 Separate from constitutional due process, the Board will reverse an indefinite suspension based on the suspension of a security clearance if an appellant is able to prove harmful procedural error. Buelna, 121 M.S.P.R. 262, ¶ 33; 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(c)(1). To do so, an appellant must prove that the agency committed an error in the application of its procedures that is likely to have caused the agency to reach a conclusion different from the one it would have 4

reached in the absence or cure of the error. Buelna, 121 M.S.P.R. 262, ¶ 33; 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(r). The appellant argued below that the agency committed harmful procedural error when it failed to follow Department of Defense Regulation 5200.2-R and Department of the Army Regulation 380-67. IAF, Tab 13 at 4-8. The administrative judge found that the appellant failed to prove this claim, ID at 4-6, the appellant does not challenge this finding on review, and we discern no basis to disturb it. ¶7 In addition, pursuant to the statutory requirement of 5 U.S.C. § 7513(e), an employee facing an adverse action must be notified of the specific reasons for a proposed adverse action. Buelna, 121 M.S.P.R. 262, ¶ 25. In the context of an indefinite suspension based on the suspension of a security clearance, section 7513 requires that the appellant be provided sufficient information to make an informed reply, including a statement of the reasons for the clearance suspension. Id., ¶ 34. ¶8 In this case, the agency’s proposal to indefinitely suspend the appellant informed him that his access to classified information was suspended “due to the circumstances from the on-going [sic] G32 investigation into the allegations of the improper storage and control of classified material.” IAF, Tab 5 at 38. Despite the appellant’s claims to the contrary, we find that the agency provided him with sufficient information to make an informed reply to the proposed indefinite suspension, including the reasons for the clearance suspension , and that the requirements of section 7513 were satisfied. See King v.

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John Lloyd v. Department of the Army, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/john-lloyd-v-department-of-the-army-mspb-2022.