John Little v. Department of the Navy

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedOctober 19, 2022
DocketSF-0752-16-0607-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of John Little v. Department of the Navy (John Little v. Department of the Navy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
John Little v. Department of the Navy, (Miss. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

JOHN W. LITTLE, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, SF-0752-16-0607-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, DATE: October 19, 2022 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

John W. Little, Bremerton, Washington, pro se.

Eric M. Pederson and Alan Mygatt-Tauber, Silverdale, Washington, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which sustained his indefinite suspension. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error aff ected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). ¶2 As further detailed in the initial decision, the appellant holds the noncritical sensitive position of Mechanical Engineer for the agency’s Naval Facilities Command, Northwest. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 21, Initial Decision (ID) at 3. In 2014, his security clearance expired, 10 years after issuance. Id. While reinvestigation of his security clearance commenced, the agency permitted him to continue accessing controlled areas. Id. However, in May 2016, while the reinvestigation was still pending, the agency proposed suspending his access t o classified information and areas, and assignment to sensitive duties, based on the results of a psychological/psychiatric evaluation and the appellant’s conduct. ID at 3-4; IAF, Tab 7 at 25-33, Tab 12 at 6. After the appellant responded, the agency issued a decision suspending his access. ID at 4. The agency then proposed the appellant’s indefinite suspension for failure to meet a condition of his employment, specifically, access to classified information and assignment to a sensitive position. Id. After the appellant responded both orally and in writing to the proposal, the agency issued a decision upholding the indefinite suspension, effective June 23, 2016, pending a final clearance determination from the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudication Facility. ID at 4-5, 12; IAF, Tab 7 at 13-16. The instant appeal followed. IAF, Tab 1. 3

¶3 The administrative judge informed the appellant of the Board’s limited authority to review matters relating to security clearance determinations. E.g., IAF, Tab 9 at 2. She limited the issues for hearing accordingly. IAF, Tab 12 at 2-3; ID at 5. The administrative judge then issued a decision affirming the appellant’s indefinite suspension. ID at 5-13. The appellant has filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. 2 The agency has filed a response. PFR File, Tab 3. ¶4 An indefinite suspension lasting more than 14 days is an adverse action appealable to the Board under 5 U.S.C. § 7513(d). 5 U.S.C. § 7512(2); Palafox v. Department of the Navy, 124 M.S.P.R. 54, ¶ 8 (2016). It is well settled that an agency may indefinitely suspend an appellant when his access to classified information has been suspended and he needs such access to perform his job. Palafox, 124 M.S.P.R. 54, ¶ 8. In such a case, the Board lacks the authority to review the merits of the decision to suspend access. Id. However, the Board retains the authority to review whether: (1) the appellant’s position required access to classified information; (2) his access to classified information was suspended; and (3) he was provided with the procedural protections specified in 5 U.S.C. § 7513. Id. In addition, the Board has the authority under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(A) to review whether the agency provided the procedural protections required under its own regulations. Id. Finally, because a tenured Federal employee has a property interest in continued employment, the Board also may consider whether the agency provided minimum due process in taking the indefinite suspension action. Id.

2 With his petition for review, the appellant attached a number of documents. PFR File, Tab 1 at 10-28. These documents are duplicates of ones provided below. Compare id., with IAF, Tab 3 at 26, Tab 7 at 25, Tab 11 at 13-14, 20-22, 35-39, Tab 16 at 42, Tab 17 at 15-30. Evidence submitted on review that is already a part of the record below is not considered new. Meier v. Department of the Interior, 3 M.S.P.R. 247, 256 (1980); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115. 4

¶5 On review, the appellant first argues that the agency ordered him to undergo a mental health evaluation, and that amounted to a prohibited personnel practice under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(2). PFR File, Tab 1 at 4; see IAF, Tab 6 at 7, Tab 11 at 2, 4; see generally Mattison v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 492, ¶ 11 (2016) (recognizing that section 2302(b)(2) “relates to statements or recommendations by outsiders, like senators or congressmen; the legislative objective was to forestall political or partisan interference in personnel actions” (quoting Depte v. United States, 715 F.2d 1481, 1484 (Fed. Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds by Stone v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 179 F.3d 1368, 1376 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). This allegation falls outside the Board’s limited authority in the context of this appeal, as described above . Supra ¶ 4; see Doe v. Department of Justice, 121 M.S.P.R.

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John Little v. Department of the Navy, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/john-little-v-department-of-the-navy-mspb-2022.