John Larson v. Chad Holmes

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: November 13, 2025
• Docket: 24-1912
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1912 Filed November 13, 2025

JOHN LARSON, Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

CHAD HOLMES, Defendant-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jasper County, Michael Jacobsen,

Judge.

An injured state employee appeals, alleging the district court erred in

dismissing his petition for failure to plead with particularity and plausibility.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Matthew M. Sahag (argued) of Dickey, Campbell, & Sahag Law Firm, PLC,

Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, Patrick C. Valencia (argued), Deputy

Solicitor General, Eric Wessan, Solicitor General, and Ian M. Jongewaard (until

withdrawal), Assistant Solicitor General, for appellee.

Heard at oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ. 2

SCHUMACHER, Judge.

John Larson appeals the district court order granting Chad Holmes’s motion

to dismiss for failure to meet the heightened pleading requirements of Iowa Code

section 669.14A(3) (2024). The district court found that Larson’s petition failed to

plead with particularity the elements required for his gross negligence claim and

did not state a plausible violation of the law. But the district court also determined

that if Larson had met the heightened pleading standard, his claim would not be

precluded by either the Iowa Workers’ Compensation statute or the Iowa Tort

Claims Act (ITCA). Upon our review, we conclude the dismissal of the petition was

in error based on existing precedent. And we find no error in the district court’s

rejection of the alternative grounds urged by Holmes for affirmance of the

dismissal. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Larson was an inmate at the Newton Correctional Facility, and he also

worked as an employee for the State of Iowa. Holmes was also a State of Iowa

employee, who worked as a Correctional Trades Leader within the facility. The

Newton Correctional Facility is a State of Iowa correctional institution.

On the day of the triggering event, the skid loader owned by the State and

used at the facility was not working. Holmes borrowed a skid loader from a local

business. Holmes instructed Larson to assist him in moving a snowplow blade

with the skid loader. Holmes used the forks of the skid loader to lift the snowplow

blade off the ground but did not secure the blade to the skid loader. While Holmes

lifted the blade, Larson was standing close to the skid loader. The blade slipped

off the forks and landed on Larson’s foot, causing permanent injuries. 3

Larson filed a petition in the district court, alleging Holmes was responsible

for supervising, managing, training, and delegating work duties to Larson, and that

Holmes was directing Larson in his employment on the day of the injury. The

petition stated Holmes told Larson to “stand in the immediate vicinity of where

Holmes was moving the snowplow using the skid loader.” Also, the petition alleged

that Holmes knew the danger of moving the blade in this manner without securing

it to the skid loader because he knew of the skid loader’s manufacturer’s warning.

Larson claimed Holmes knew it was dangerous to move the blade with the

skid loader because there were seven other employees standing near the skid

loader and Holmes knew that if the blade fell, it would cause severe injury to

Larson. The petition also alleged Holmes knew the “manner and method” of

moving the snowplow blade and Larson standing near the skid loader made the

injury “probable as opposed to merely possible.” Larson alleged Holmes was

grossly negligent as he “consciously failed to avoid the peril of probable injury,”

and that conduct demonstrated a “willful and wanton disregard of the rights,

welfare and safety of Larson.”

Holmes moved to dismiss Larson’s petition for failure “to meet the

heightened pleading standards under Iowa Code section 669.14A(3),” that

workers’ compensation was the only remedy available to Larson as a public

employee under Iowa Code section 85.2, and that coemployee gross negligence

claims are not covered “under the State’s limited waiver of its sovereign immunity”

under the ITCA.

The district court found, as to the first claim, that Larson’s petition alleged

facts showing ordinary negligence and failed to plead with particularity the 4

plausibility of coemployee gross negligence. In its explanation, the district court

focused on the fact that seven people and Larson were near the equipment as the

blade was moved. The court found this indicated that no one had “knowledge of

the peril to be apprehended.” See Thompson v. Bohlken, 312 N.W.2d 501, 505

(Iowa 1981). The court also found Larson failed to specifically allege facts showing

that Holmes was aware of the manufacturer’s warning, as the skid loader was

borrowed. See id. The court also found that even if Holmes knew of the

manufacturer’s warning that Larson alleged informed users that moving items

could cause injury, it was warning of a possibility of injury, not a probability. See

id. Accordingly, the district court determined that Larson failed to meet the

heightened pleading standard as mandated by section 669.14A(3). The district

court dismissed the petition with prejudice.

In the district court’s written ruling, although dismissing the petition based

on the pleadings, the court rejected Holmes’s other arguments contained in the

motion to dismiss. It found that if the petition had met the heightened pleading

requirement, the claim would not have been precluded by the ITCA or workers’

compensation exclusivity. Larson now appeals the dismissal of his petition.

II. Discussion

We review challenges to a district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for

correction of errors at law. Koester v. Eyerly-Ball Cmty. Mental Health Servs., 14

N.W.3d 723, 727 (Iowa 2024). “In our review, ‘we accept as true the petition’s well-

pleaded factual allegations, but not its legal conclusions.’” Id. at 727–28 (citation

omitted). 5

Larson asserts that his petition alleging gross negligence is not subject to

the heightened pleading requirements of section 669.14A(3), which concern

qualified immunity. Larson argues his claim is one of common law, as it does not

include a deprivation of an immunity, right, or privilege, nor a violation of the law.

See Doe v. W. Dubuque Cmty. Sch. Dist., 20 N.W.3d 798, 804 (Iowa 2025).

Section 669.14A(3) states:

A plaintiff who brings a claim under this chapter alleging a violation of the law must state with particularity the circumstances constituting the violation and that the law was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Failure to plead a plausible violation or failure to plead that the law was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation shall result in dismissal with prejudice.

Holmes relies on Nahas v. Polk County to assert that section 670.4A(3),1

which employs the same language as section 669.14A(3),2 requires pleading with

particularity and plausibility like Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and 9(b).

991 N.W.2d 770, 781 (Iowa 2023). According to sections 670.4A(3) and

669.14A(3), if a plaintiff fails to meet the heightened pleading standard by not

showing the source of information regarding an allegation “and the reasons for the

belief,” then the petition must be dismissed with prejudice. Id.

But our supreme court has clarified subsequently to Nahas that “the

application of the heightened pleading standard to claims not subject to the

1 Iowa Code section 670.4A(3) is contained in the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act,

while section 669.14A(3) is in the ITCA. 2 The analysis of the application of section 670.4A also applies to

section 669.14A(3) as the provisions “were enacted at the same time,” “are identical,” and “our holding in Doe that substantive qualified immunity applies only to statutory or constitutional claims and not to common law claims applies equally to section 669.14A.” Est. of Kahn v. City of Clermont, 22 N.W.2d 252, 258 (Iowa 2025). 6

qualified immunity defense was erroneous.” Doe, 20 N.W.3d at 805–06. “The

substantive defense[s] [of qualified immunity] and heightened pleading are

contained in one provision and are inextricably intertwined.” Id. at 806. The court,

consistent with federal law, held “that section 670.4A applies only where the

plaintiff has asserted a state constitutional tort claim or statutory claim and not

where the plaintiff has asserted only a state common law claim.” Id. at 806. Also,

“[u]nder federal law, qualified immunity is not a defense to common law claims.”

Id. Doe explicitly used negligence hypotheticals as examples of claims which lack

a “right, privilege, or immunity secured by law” that “was clearly established at the

time of the alleged violation.” Id. at 807; Iowa Code § 670.4A(1)(a).

So if a claim is one of common law, such as negligence, qualified immunity

does not apply, and “neither does the heightened pleading standard.” Kahn, 22

N.W.3d at 258; see Iowa Code § 669.14A. It follows that if heightened pleading

requirements do not apply then “a plaintiff’s petition survives a motion to dismiss if

it simply contains factual allegations that give the defendant ‘fair notice’ of the claim

so the defendant can adequately respond to the petition.” Kahn, 22 N.W.3d at 258

(citation omitted).

Here, Larson’s petition contained requisite factual allegations which

provided Holmes with fair notice and an opportunity to respond to the claim of

gross negligence. See id. The district court applied the law in force when granting

the motion to dismiss, but the law has been modified in the interim pending this

appeal. We acknowledge that the district court did not have the benefit of this

guidance when issuing the ruling. We reverse the district court’s dismissal of 7

Larson’s petition for failure to meet the heightened pleading standard of

section 669.14A.

We next turn to the alternate grounds relied on by the State to affirm the

district court ruling. We detect no error in the district court’s rulings regarding

Larson’s potential statutory remedies. “We review rulings on statutory construction

for correction of errors at law.” Goche v. WMG, L.C., 970 N.W.2d 860, 863 (Iowa

2022). The court found that Larson was classified as a state employee working

within the scope of his employment when he sustained injury, which is not disputed

by the parties. When the State is the employer of a state employee, and the

employee is injured within the scope of employment, Iowa Code section 85.2

applies. Section 85.2 states the exclusive remedy for an injured state employee

in these circumstances is workers’ compensation.3 But the district court found an

exception to section 85.2 workers’ compensation exclusivity when the claim is one

of gross negligence, based on section 85.20(2).4 See McGill v. Fish, 790

N.W.2d 113, 119 (Iowa 2010). And the district court found claims of gross

negligence are not excluded by the ITCA under supreme court precedent. See id.

at 120 (finding an exception for gross negligence claims under Iowa Code

section 669.14(5)).5

3 Iowa Code section 85.2, included in the workers’ compensation statute, makes

workers’ compensation compulsory for employees who are employed by the State, subject to exceptions outlined in section 85.1. Section 85.1 contains no relevant exceptions here. 4 Iowa Code section 85.20 requires that an employee’s remedy for coemployee-

based injuries be limited to workers’ compensation unless the injury is caused by a coemployee’s gross negligence. 5 Iowa Code section 669.14 lists exceptions to the State’s sovereign immunity,

including “[a]ny claim by an employee of the state which is covered by the Iowa workers’ compensation law.” 8

The State argues that section 85.2 pertains exclusively to state employees

while section 85.20 concerns nonpublic employees, and that section 85.20(2)’s

gross negligence carve-out likewise only applies to nonpublic employees, making

workers’ compensation Larson’s only potential remedy. The State also asserts

that the supreme court has not weighed the effect of section 85.2’s specific

language on section 85.20’s broader language within the workers’ compensation

statute and that the more specific section 85.2 applies. See MidWestOne Bank v.

Heartland Co-op, 941 N.W.2d 876, 883 (Iowa 2020).

But in McGill, the court cited section 85.2 in its statutory interpretation of

sections 85.20 and 669.14(5). See 790 N.W.2d at 120. As for the ITCA, the court

determined “[i]t is clear the legislature intended to exclude claims by state workers

for workers’ compensation against the State from the ITCA.” Id. (noting

section 85.2 excludes “state workers and the state, as an employer, within the

workers’ compensation scheme”). Id. Accordingly, because state workers fall

within the workers’ compensation statute and section 85.20 eliminates from

exclusivity claims of gross negligence, the court in McGill determined

“[c]oemployee gross negligence claims brought by a state worker are not excluded

from the provisions of the ITCA.” Id. at 119–20. Because gross negligence claims

are not subject to the workers’ compensation statute, these claims can be pursued

under the ITCA. See id. Smith, in confirming McGill, explained gross negligence

claims in relation to the ITCA:

[T]here is no indication whatsoever our legislature sought to bar coemployee gross negligence claims by state workers when it amended the procedures in the ITCA to require the state to be substituted as a defendant in the lawsuit once it is determined the coemployee acted in the course of employment. 9

Smith v. Iowa State Univ. of Sci. & Tech., 851 N.W.2d 1, 20 (2014) (quoting McGill,

790 N.W.2d at 120) (alteration in original). There was no error in the determination

by the district court that Larson’s claim would not be precluded by the ITCA.

The district court was also correct in applying McGill to find “[t]he workers’

compensation laws abolish all other claims against employers and coemployees

except negligence claims against coemployees based on . . . gross negligence.”

790 N.W.2d at 119; see Iowa Code § 85.20(1)–(2). Although the State asserts the

district court failed to consider section 85.2’s effect on section 85.20, the court’s

analysis was based on the context of the entire workers’ compensation statute.

See Beverage v. Alcoa, Inc., 975 N.W.2d 670, 681 (Iowa 2022). “A statutory

subsection may not be considered in a vacuum, but must be considered in

reference to the statute as a whole . . . .” Id. (quoting 2A Sutherland Statutory

Construction § 46:5 (7th ed. rev. 2014). “[C]ontext is critical, and context comes

from ‘the language’s relationship to other provisions of the same statute and other

provisions of related statutes.’” Id. (quoting Com. Bank v. McGowen, 956

N.W.2d 128, 133 (Iowa 2021).

Because sections 85.2 and 85.20 are both included within the workers’

compensation statute, and section 85.1 provides no exception for state employees,

these employees’ remedies are exclusive to workers’ compensation unless the

claim is gross negligence, which eliminates exclusivity. See id.; McGill, 790

N.W.2d at 119. So, as the district court stated, Larson’s claim “would not be

subject to the exclusivity of workers’ compensation . . . [and] would not have been

barred by the [ITCA]” as it is based on gross negligence. See McGill, 790 N.W.2d 10

at 119–20; see also Smith, 851 N.W.2d at 20. If we were to determine

section 85.20 requires that workers’ compensation is the exclusive remedy for

state coemployee gross negligence, the decision would be inconsistent with

governing precedent. See McGill, 790 N.W.2d at 119–20; see also Smith, 851

N.W.2d at 20.

As we are unable to overturn supreme court precedent, we find the district

court made no error in its determinations regarding Larson’s potential statutory

remedies. See Willock v. State, No. 24-0014, 2025 WL 1704327, at *1 (Iowa Ct.

App. June 18, 2025).

III. Conclusion

We conclude the dismissal of Larson’s petition based on the pleadings was

in error. And because we find no error in the district court’s rejection of the

alternative grounds supporting the dismissal as argued by Holmes, we reverse and

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In doing so, we make

no determination on the merits of the gross negligence claim.