USCA11 Case: 24-10192 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 05/28/2025 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-10192 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________
JOHN ANDREW KISTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus MARIA WYNN, CRNP, TAHIR SIDDIQ, Dr., WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., HUGH HOOD, Regional Medical Director,
Defendants-Appellees. USCA11 Case: 24-10192 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 05/28/2025 Page: 2 of 7
2 Opinion of the Court 24-10192
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama D.C. Docket No. 2:21-cv-00222-MHT-CSC ____________________
Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and BLACK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: John Kister appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Maria Wynn, Tahir Siddiq, Wexford Health Sources, Inc., and Hugh Hood (collectively, Appellees), in Kister’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging Appellees were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Kister as- serts we should remand his case for further proceedings because the district court used the incorrect deliberate indifference standard in granting summary judgment to the Appellees. Kister also con- tends the district court improperly construed the Appellees’ special report as a motion for summary judgment. After review, we vacate and remand the district court’s judgment. I. DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE STANDARD Kister contends the district court applied the wrong deliber- ate indifference standard in deciding his case. He requests that we remand in light of our recent decision in Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251 (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc), which we issued after the district’s decision in this case. USCA11 Case: 24-10192 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 05/28/2025 Page: 3 of 7
24-10192 Opinion of the Court 3
In Wade, we clarified the standard governing deliberate indif- ference claims under the Eighth Amendment. We held a plaintiff must show “he suffered a deprivation that was, objectively, suffi- ciently serious.” Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). If a plaintiff meets that threshold, the plaintiff then must establish “the defend- ant acted with ‘subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law’” meaning “the defendant was actually, subjectively aware that his own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm to the plain- tiff.” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839). We also added a “caveat” that “even if the defendant ‘actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety,’ he ‘cannot be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause’ if he ‘responded reasonably to the risk.’” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844-45). The district court issued its final judgment before we de- cided Wade. We therefore vacate the district court’s judgment made in the Appellees’ favor on Kister’s deliberate indifference claims and remand for the court to analyze those claims in light of Wade. II. SPECIAL REPORT Kister also challenges the district court construal of the Ap- pellees’ special report as a motion for summary judgment. We have affirmed special reports being turned into summary judgment motions if pro se litigants are informed the court is considering summary judgment and they are allowed time to marshal evidence in support of their allegations. See Horton v. Gilchrist, 128 F.4th USCA11 Case: 24-10192 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 05/28/2025 Page: 4 of 7
4 Opinion of the Court 24-10192
1221, 1225-26 (11th Cir. 2025). And as a general matter, courts must “giv[e] notice and a reasonable time to respond” before it “con- sider[s] summary judgment on its own.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f ). The district court entered an order directing Appellees to file a special report addressing Kister’s claims on April 13, 2021. On April 23, 2021, Appellees filed a joint special report, in which they moved for summary judgment and provided supporting eviden- tiary materials. Upon receipt of the Appellees’ special report, the magistrate judge notified Kister in an Order dated April 26, 2021, that “[a]s indicated herein, at some time in the future the court may treat the defendants’ reports and the plaintiff’s response as a dispos- itive motion and response.” The Order further notified the parties that following 15 days from the date of the order, “the court may at any time thereafter and without further notice to the parties (1) treat the special report, as supplemented, and any supporting evi- dentiary materials as a motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment whichever is proper, and (2) after considering any re- sponse as allowed by this order, rule on the dispositive motion in accordance with the law.” After Appellees filed their initial special report on April 23, 2021, the magistrate judge ordered Appellees to produce several supplements to their special report. And in August 2021, the mag- istrate judge ordered Appellees to file two supplemental special re- ports. Throughout this time, Kister was responding to Appellees’ special reports and supplements thereto. Kister filed his last re- sponses on September 20, 2021. USCA11 Case: 24-10192 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 05/28/2025 Page: 5 of 7
24-10192 Opinion of the Court 5
The case was then dormant for around one year, until Kister filed a change of address with the court. On October 3, 2022, Kister also filed a “notice of non-response” requesting a response from or a default judgment against certain defendants, which the district court denied. The case was again dormant for over another year, apart from a reassignment to another district judge and Kister filing changes of address. On December 6, 2023, over two and a half years since the magistrate judge’s April 26, 2021, order notifying Kister that the special report could be construed as a motion for summary judgment, the magistrate judge entered a report and rec- ommendation (R&R) recommending summary judgment in favor of the Appellees. Kister was given 14 days to object to the R&R, and he filed an objection dated December 18, 2023, and postmarked on Decem- ber 21, 2023. On December 26, 2023, Kister’s objection was filed in the district court. Kister wrote one short paragraph stating there were issues of fact remaining in the case, making summary judg- ment improper. The district judge issued an order granting sum- mary judgment and adopting the R&R the next day, on December 27, 2023. Over two and a half years elapsed between the magistrate judge’s April 2021 order and the issuance of the R&R in December 2023, and Kister’s case was nearly inactive for two of those years. Kister did not receive any additional communication from the court on the possibility of converting the special report to a sum- mary judgment motion beyond the April 2021 order stating the USCA11 Case: 24-10192 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 05/28/2025 Page: 6 of 7
6 Opinion of the Court 24-10192
court “may” consider the special reports as a dispositive motion and response at some time in the future, and the court “may at any time” treat the special report, as supplemented, and any supporting evidentiary materials as a motion to dismiss or motion for sum- mary judgment. For over two years, the case was almost dormant. Then suddenly, the magistrate judge issued an R&R recommend- ing summary judgment after which Kister was given only 14 days to object. In Chapman v. Dunn, we held the district court did not give a pro se inmate enough time to respond to the magistrate judge’s R&R before entering summary judgment against him.
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USCA11 Case: 24-10192 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 05/28/2025 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-10192 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________
JOHN ANDREW KISTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus MARIA WYNN, CRNP, TAHIR SIDDIQ, Dr., WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., HUGH HOOD, Regional Medical Director,
Defendants-Appellees. USCA11 Case: 24-10192 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 05/28/2025 Page: 2 of 7
2 Opinion of the Court 24-10192
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama D.C. Docket No. 2:21-cv-00222-MHT-CSC ____________________
Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and BLACK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: John Kister appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Maria Wynn, Tahir Siddiq, Wexford Health Sources, Inc., and Hugh Hood (collectively, Appellees), in Kister’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging Appellees were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Kister as- serts we should remand his case for further proceedings because the district court used the incorrect deliberate indifference standard in granting summary judgment to the Appellees. Kister also con- tends the district court improperly construed the Appellees’ special report as a motion for summary judgment. After review, we vacate and remand the district court’s judgment. I. DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE STANDARD Kister contends the district court applied the wrong deliber- ate indifference standard in deciding his case. He requests that we remand in light of our recent decision in Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251 (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc), which we issued after the district’s decision in this case. USCA11 Case: 24-10192 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 05/28/2025 Page: 3 of 7
24-10192 Opinion of the Court 3
In Wade, we clarified the standard governing deliberate indif- ference claims under the Eighth Amendment. We held a plaintiff must show “he suffered a deprivation that was, objectively, suffi- ciently serious.” Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). If a plaintiff meets that threshold, the plaintiff then must establish “the defend- ant acted with ‘subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law’” meaning “the defendant was actually, subjectively aware that his own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm to the plain- tiff.” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839). We also added a “caveat” that “even if the defendant ‘actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety,’ he ‘cannot be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause’ if he ‘responded reasonably to the risk.’” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844-45). The district court issued its final judgment before we de- cided Wade. We therefore vacate the district court’s judgment made in the Appellees’ favor on Kister’s deliberate indifference claims and remand for the court to analyze those claims in light of Wade. II. SPECIAL REPORT Kister also challenges the district court construal of the Ap- pellees’ special report as a motion for summary judgment. We have affirmed special reports being turned into summary judgment motions if pro se litigants are informed the court is considering summary judgment and they are allowed time to marshal evidence in support of their allegations. See Horton v. Gilchrist, 128 F.4th USCA11 Case: 24-10192 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 05/28/2025 Page: 4 of 7
4 Opinion of the Court 24-10192
1221, 1225-26 (11th Cir. 2025). And as a general matter, courts must “giv[e] notice and a reasonable time to respond” before it “con- sider[s] summary judgment on its own.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f ). The district court entered an order directing Appellees to file a special report addressing Kister’s claims on April 13, 2021. On April 23, 2021, Appellees filed a joint special report, in which they moved for summary judgment and provided supporting eviden- tiary materials. Upon receipt of the Appellees’ special report, the magistrate judge notified Kister in an Order dated April 26, 2021, that “[a]s indicated herein, at some time in the future the court may treat the defendants’ reports and the plaintiff’s response as a dispos- itive motion and response.” The Order further notified the parties that following 15 days from the date of the order, “the court may at any time thereafter and without further notice to the parties (1) treat the special report, as supplemented, and any supporting evi- dentiary materials as a motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment whichever is proper, and (2) after considering any re- sponse as allowed by this order, rule on the dispositive motion in accordance with the law.” After Appellees filed their initial special report on April 23, 2021, the magistrate judge ordered Appellees to produce several supplements to their special report. And in August 2021, the mag- istrate judge ordered Appellees to file two supplemental special re- ports. Throughout this time, Kister was responding to Appellees’ special reports and supplements thereto. Kister filed his last re- sponses on September 20, 2021. USCA11 Case: 24-10192 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 05/28/2025 Page: 5 of 7
24-10192 Opinion of the Court 5
The case was then dormant for around one year, until Kister filed a change of address with the court. On October 3, 2022, Kister also filed a “notice of non-response” requesting a response from or a default judgment against certain defendants, which the district court denied. The case was again dormant for over another year, apart from a reassignment to another district judge and Kister filing changes of address. On December 6, 2023, over two and a half years since the magistrate judge’s April 26, 2021, order notifying Kister that the special report could be construed as a motion for summary judgment, the magistrate judge entered a report and rec- ommendation (R&R) recommending summary judgment in favor of the Appellees. Kister was given 14 days to object to the R&R, and he filed an objection dated December 18, 2023, and postmarked on Decem- ber 21, 2023. On December 26, 2023, Kister’s objection was filed in the district court. Kister wrote one short paragraph stating there were issues of fact remaining in the case, making summary judg- ment improper. The district judge issued an order granting sum- mary judgment and adopting the R&R the next day, on December 27, 2023. Over two and a half years elapsed between the magistrate judge’s April 2021 order and the issuance of the R&R in December 2023, and Kister’s case was nearly inactive for two of those years. Kister did not receive any additional communication from the court on the possibility of converting the special report to a sum- mary judgment motion beyond the April 2021 order stating the USCA11 Case: 24-10192 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 05/28/2025 Page: 6 of 7
6 Opinion of the Court 24-10192
court “may” consider the special reports as a dispositive motion and response at some time in the future, and the court “may at any time” treat the special report, as supplemented, and any supporting evidentiary materials as a motion to dismiss or motion for sum- mary judgment. For over two years, the case was almost dormant. Then suddenly, the magistrate judge issued an R&R recommend- ing summary judgment after which Kister was given only 14 days to object. In Chapman v. Dunn, we held the district court did not give a pro se inmate enough time to respond to the magistrate judge’s R&R before entering summary judgment against him. 129 F.4th 1307, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2025). In that case, [t]he parties had been going back and forth in discov- ery for more than two years between the time when the magistrate judge said he would consider sum- mary judgment “at some time in the future” and when he issued the report and recommendation. The magistrate judge submitted the report and recom- mendation without providing Chapman any further notice—and before Chapman’s response to the de- fendants’ medical declaration made it onto the docket. Id. at 1319. We held that in the particular circumstances, 14 days was not a reasonable time for Chapman to object to the R&R, and accordingly Chapman did not receive “an adequate opportunity to develop the record.” Id. USCA11 Case: 24-10192 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 05/28/2025 Page: 7 of 7
24-10192 Opinion of the Court 7
While Kister was able to file a single paragraph objection within the time period allowed by the R&R, like in Chapman, we hold that in the particular circumstances here, 14 days was not a reasonable time to file an objection. Kister’s case had been nearly inactive for two years, and the R&R was issued two and a half years after Kister’s notice that the special report could be turned into a dispositive motion for summary judgment. Under these circum- stances, the district court abused its discretion in failing to provide Kister with sufficient notice prior to construing the Appellees’ spe- cial reports as motions for summary judgment, and in allowing Kister, a pro se inmate, only 14 days to respond to the R&R after his case had been nearly inactive for over two years. See Horton, 128 F.4th at 1226 (recognizing “a court should be particularly careful to ensure proper notice to a pro se litigant” (quotation marks omit- ted)). III. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated, we VACATE the district court’s judg- ment in favor of the Appellees and REMAND for the court to pro- vide Kister a sufficient opportunity to object to the R&R and for reconsideration of Kister’s claims in light of Wade.