IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2022-CC-00948-COA
JOHN HOFFMAN APPELLANT
v.
MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF APPELLEE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/31/2022 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. RANDI PERESICH MUELLER COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HANCOCK COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JOHN HOFFMAN (PRO SE) ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: ALBERT B. WHITE NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - STATE BOARDS AND AGENCIES DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 10/10/2023 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., McCARTY AND SMITH, JJ.
McCARTY, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. A man applied for unemployment benefits, claiming he was unemployed as a result
of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Mississippi Department of Employment Security denied
his application, finding he failed to provide adequate evidence of his employment. Finding
that the decision of the MDES was supported by substantial evidence, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2. John Hoffman is a self-described freelance paralegal operating in Bay St. Louis,
Mississippi. He filed a claim for Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA) under the
CARES Act,1 stating he was self-employed but unable to work as a result of the COVID-19
1 15 U.S.C. § 9021. pandemic. The Department notified him it would allow several forms of “acceptable proof”
to show unemployment status.
¶3. In July 2021, MDES notified Hoffman that he “did not timely provide proof or the
documentation did not meet the requirements for proof.” The Department ultimately
“disallowed” Hoffman’s eligibility for PUA benefits, effective December 27, 2020. MDES
found he was not entitled to the $9,744 he received in benefits and was required to repay the
balance.
¶4. Hoffman appealed MDES’ order. At his hearing, Hoffman stated he submitted proof
of his unemployment in a timely manner in the form of a bank statement. The Administrative
Law Judge affirmed the decision. In its decision, the ALJ determined:
Bank statements are acceptable proof of self-employment; however, the bank statements must be clear that deposits made were from work performed in employment or self-employment. The claimant’s evidence is not clear regarding the deposits. The claimant did not provide proof of employment, self-employment, or documentation that the claimant was offered work and unable to begin due to the COVID-19 Pandemic.
¶5. Hoffman then appealed to the Hancock County Circuit Court. Attached to his filing
was a document declaring he was self-employed, made on a form provided by MDES. The
document declared Hoffman was a “self-employed paralegal” working an “average of 20
hours per week” conducting work such as research, filings, and paperwork generation.
Hoffman also provided a judgment against an electric company.
¶6. In affirming, the circuit court held “Bank statements reflecting various deposits do not
establish that the monies were from self-employment, only that deposits were made.” The
court further found it was not the date that the material was submitted but the “inadequacy
2 of the documentation that led to this conclusion.”
¶7. Aggrieved by the circuit court’s decision, Hoffman appealed, and this case was
assigned to us for review. We have reorganized his issues for clarity.
DISCUSSION
I. Hoffman failed to prove he was self-employed.
¶8. Hoffman contends he “complied with all of the requests of . . . MDES” by submitting
three documents: a bank statement, an affidavit form that he was self-employed, and a
judgment against an electric company.
¶9. The standard of review in cases where this Court examines the circuit court’s
judgment affirming the Board’s decision is abuse of discretion. Cannon v. Miss. Dep’t of
Emp. Sec., 88 So. 3d 809, 811 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012). Further, an agency’s findings
should not be disturbed unless its order is (1) not supported by substantial evidence, (2)
arbitrary or capricious, (3) beyond the scope or power granted to the agency, or (4) violates
the claimant’s constitutional rights. Id.
¶10. MDES provided clear guidelines for a claimant to support a claim for self-
employment: “Evidence of self-employment may consist of the following documents: 1099
form, Income Tax Return, Business License, Federal ID Number, Business Receipts, Bank
Statement(s), Cancelled Check(s), Affidavit.” Hoffman did not provide these required
documents.
¶11. Hoffman argues the bank statement reflecting he generated over $35,000 in income
is sufficient proof of his self-employment. However, as the ALJ stated in the well-detailed
3 order, “the deposits did not establish that the monies were from self-employment.” Instead,
the entries are listed in the account summary as “Deposit by Check,” “Deposit,” and
“Withdrawal.” Standing alone, these transactions do not provide any indication that they
were used for anything related to self-employment. Without more information, there was no
proof the funds were from employment of any kind, let alone self-employment. As the ALJ
concluded, “[p]rinted bank statements without cancelled checks, written statements from
employers, or copies of invoices, are not acceptable proof that deposits were made as a result
of work performed while self-employed.”
¶12. Hoffman also offered a form declaring he was unemployed and a judgment as
additional proof of his self-employment. But, “it is the role of the agency, in its expertise,
to determine the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.” Jackson Cnty.
Bd. Sup’rs v. Miss. Emp. Sec. Comm’n, 129 So. 3d 178, 183 (¶15) (Miss. 2013). The agency
determined this was not acceptable proof, and Hoffman has failed to show why this was in
error.
¶13. Because the circuit court’s ruling was supported by substantial evidence, we will not
disturb its decision on appeal.
II. Hoffman’s right to a fair hearing was not violated.
¶14. Hoffman also argues MDES did not give him a fair hearing and claims he was denied
his right to confront his accusers as guaranteed by the 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments.
¶15. As this Court has recognized, the Confrontation Clause of the 6th Amendment
guarantees a criminal defendant the right to “be confronted with the witnesses against him.”
4 Bufford v. State, 191 So. 3d 755, 759 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015). However, this right is
primarily available to defendants in a criminal context, and Hoffman is the petitioner in a
civil matter. Because this was not a criminal matter, the claim does not require reversal. See
Amerson v. Epps, 63 So. 3d 1246, 1251 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (concluding there was
no right to confront the commissioner of the Department of Corrections in a civil matter);
Humphrey v. Holts, No. 2021-CA-00046-COA, 2023 WL 2130809, at *5 (¶18) (Miss. Ct.
App. Feb. 21, 2023) (finding the right to confrontation was not violated in a public-records
proceeding as it was civil in nature); but see Miss. Code Ann.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2022-CC-00948-COA
JOHN HOFFMAN APPELLANT
v.
MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF APPELLEE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/31/2022 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. RANDI PERESICH MUELLER COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HANCOCK COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JOHN HOFFMAN (PRO SE) ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: ALBERT B. WHITE NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - STATE BOARDS AND AGENCIES DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 10/10/2023 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., McCARTY AND SMITH, JJ.
McCARTY, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. A man applied for unemployment benefits, claiming he was unemployed as a result
of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Mississippi Department of Employment Security denied
his application, finding he failed to provide adequate evidence of his employment. Finding
that the decision of the MDES was supported by substantial evidence, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2. John Hoffman is a self-described freelance paralegal operating in Bay St. Louis,
Mississippi. He filed a claim for Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA) under the
CARES Act,1 stating he was self-employed but unable to work as a result of the COVID-19
1 15 U.S.C. § 9021. pandemic. The Department notified him it would allow several forms of “acceptable proof”
to show unemployment status.
¶3. In July 2021, MDES notified Hoffman that he “did not timely provide proof or the
documentation did not meet the requirements for proof.” The Department ultimately
“disallowed” Hoffman’s eligibility for PUA benefits, effective December 27, 2020. MDES
found he was not entitled to the $9,744 he received in benefits and was required to repay the
balance.
¶4. Hoffman appealed MDES’ order. At his hearing, Hoffman stated he submitted proof
of his unemployment in a timely manner in the form of a bank statement. The Administrative
Law Judge affirmed the decision. In its decision, the ALJ determined:
Bank statements are acceptable proof of self-employment; however, the bank statements must be clear that deposits made were from work performed in employment or self-employment. The claimant’s evidence is not clear regarding the deposits. The claimant did not provide proof of employment, self-employment, or documentation that the claimant was offered work and unable to begin due to the COVID-19 Pandemic.
¶5. Hoffman then appealed to the Hancock County Circuit Court. Attached to his filing
was a document declaring he was self-employed, made on a form provided by MDES. The
document declared Hoffman was a “self-employed paralegal” working an “average of 20
hours per week” conducting work such as research, filings, and paperwork generation.
Hoffman also provided a judgment against an electric company.
¶6. In affirming, the circuit court held “Bank statements reflecting various deposits do not
establish that the monies were from self-employment, only that deposits were made.” The
court further found it was not the date that the material was submitted but the “inadequacy
2 of the documentation that led to this conclusion.”
¶7. Aggrieved by the circuit court’s decision, Hoffman appealed, and this case was
assigned to us for review. We have reorganized his issues for clarity.
DISCUSSION
I. Hoffman failed to prove he was self-employed.
¶8. Hoffman contends he “complied with all of the requests of . . . MDES” by submitting
three documents: a bank statement, an affidavit form that he was self-employed, and a
judgment against an electric company.
¶9. The standard of review in cases where this Court examines the circuit court’s
judgment affirming the Board’s decision is abuse of discretion. Cannon v. Miss. Dep’t of
Emp. Sec., 88 So. 3d 809, 811 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012). Further, an agency’s findings
should not be disturbed unless its order is (1) not supported by substantial evidence, (2)
arbitrary or capricious, (3) beyond the scope or power granted to the agency, or (4) violates
the claimant’s constitutional rights. Id.
¶10. MDES provided clear guidelines for a claimant to support a claim for self-
employment: “Evidence of self-employment may consist of the following documents: 1099
form, Income Tax Return, Business License, Federal ID Number, Business Receipts, Bank
Statement(s), Cancelled Check(s), Affidavit.” Hoffman did not provide these required
documents.
¶11. Hoffman argues the bank statement reflecting he generated over $35,000 in income
is sufficient proof of his self-employment. However, as the ALJ stated in the well-detailed
3 order, “the deposits did not establish that the monies were from self-employment.” Instead,
the entries are listed in the account summary as “Deposit by Check,” “Deposit,” and
“Withdrawal.” Standing alone, these transactions do not provide any indication that they
were used for anything related to self-employment. Without more information, there was no
proof the funds were from employment of any kind, let alone self-employment. As the ALJ
concluded, “[p]rinted bank statements without cancelled checks, written statements from
employers, or copies of invoices, are not acceptable proof that deposits were made as a result
of work performed while self-employed.”
¶12. Hoffman also offered a form declaring he was unemployed and a judgment as
additional proof of his self-employment. But, “it is the role of the agency, in its expertise,
to determine the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.” Jackson Cnty.
Bd. Sup’rs v. Miss. Emp. Sec. Comm’n, 129 So. 3d 178, 183 (¶15) (Miss. 2013). The agency
determined this was not acceptable proof, and Hoffman has failed to show why this was in
error.
¶13. Because the circuit court’s ruling was supported by substantial evidence, we will not
disturb its decision on appeal.
II. Hoffman’s right to a fair hearing was not violated.
¶14. Hoffman also argues MDES did not give him a fair hearing and claims he was denied
his right to confront his accusers as guaranteed by the 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments.
¶15. As this Court has recognized, the Confrontation Clause of the 6th Amendment
guarantees a criminal defendant the right to “be confronted with the witnesses against him.”
4 Bufford v. State, 191 So. 3d 755, 759 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015). However, this right is
primarily available to defendants in a criminal context, and Hoffman is the petitioner in a
civil matter. Because this was not a criminal matter, the claim does not require reversal. See
Amerson v. Epps, 63 So. 3d 1246, 1251 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (concluding there was
no right to confront the commissioner of the Department of Corrections in a civil matter);
Humphrey v. Holts, No. 2021-CA-00046-COA, 2023 WL 2130809, at *5 (¶18) (Miss. Ct.
App. Feb. 21, 2023) (finding the right to confrontation was not violated in a public-records
proceeding as it was civil in nature); but see Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-557(1)(e)(iv) (Rev.
2023) (granting the right to confront witnesses in certain youth court proceedings).
¶16. Hoffman also contends that his constitutional rights were violated because the ALJ
was “not only acting as a judge presiding over the hearing but the ALJ was also representing
the plaintiff at the hearing.” Hoffman states the ALJ told him that “if Mr. Hoffman had any
questions for an agent of the MDES that Mr. Hoffman would have to ask the ALJ.” We
affirm that the hearing was properly conducted.
¶17. Because of the inadequacy of the evidence provided by Hoffman that he was not given
a fair hearing, we affirm on this issue.
III. Hoffman is required to repay the overpayment amount.
¶18. In its “Notice of Nonmonetary Decision and Overpayment” decision, the MDES
provides that “a claimant will be liable to repay Unemployment Insurance benefits received
when the claimant was disqualified from receiving Unemployment Insurance benefits.”
¶19. As defined in Mississippi Code Annotated section 71-5-19(4)(a)(iii) (Supp. 2019), an
5 “overpayment of benefits occurs when a person receives benefits . . . and is later found to be
disqualified or ineligible for any reason, including, but not limited to, a determination or
reversal by the department or the courts of a previous decision to award such person
benefits.” Further, under section 71-5-19(4)(b), “[a]ny person receiving an overpayment . . .
shall be liable to repay to the department for the Unemployment Compensation Fund a sum
equal to the overpayment amount so received by him[.]”
¶20. Because the statute requires repayment in this situation, “[o]ur hands are largely tied
here because discretion whether to require repayment belongs to MDES, not this [C]ourt.”
Owens v. Miss. Dep’t of Emp. Sec., 135 So. 3d 943, 945 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014). We
affirm the ruling that Hoffman must repay the overpayment pursuant to state law.
CONCLUSION
¶21. We find Hoffman failed to adequately prove he was self-employed. We also find
Hoffman’s hearing did not violate his constitutional rights. Lastly, the ALJ correctly found
Hoffman is required to repay the overpayment amount.
¶22. AFFIRMED.
BARNES, C.J., CARLTON, P.J., GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, SMITH AND EMFINGER, JJ., CONCUR. WILSON, P.J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.