IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2021-KA-00082-SCT
JOHN HENRY WEBB a/k/a JOHN HENRY ZACHARIAH WEBB a/k/a JOHN WEBB a/k/a JOHN H. WEBB
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/18/2020 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. CELESTE EMBREY WILSON TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: ANGELA MARIE HUCK LUKE PATRICK WILLIAMSON MICHAEL HADEN LAWYER RAMON DAMAS COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: DESOTO COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: MICHAEL HADEN LAWYER ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: LAUREN GABRIELLE CANTRELL DISTRICT ATTORNEY: JOHN W. CHAMPION NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 05/26/2022 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE KITCHENS, P.J., MAXWELL AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ.
MAXWELL, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. A jury found John Henry Zachariah Webb guilty on one count of fondling and three
counts of sexual battery of two underage girls, one of whom was his live-in girlfriend’s
daughter. The evidence showed that Webb—who was in his mid to late 30s—had
intercourse with both girls numerous times, had the girls perform sexual acts on each other,
and engaged in group sex with them. The oldest girl was fourteen. ¶2. On appeal, Webb asserts multiple evidentiary challenges against his convictions. He
claims the judge erroneously admitted impermissible character evidence of his past, out-of-
state sexual assaults of one of the victims. And he attacks several other evidentiary rulings
as well as the weight of the evidence supporting his convictions. After review, we see no
merit to his assertions.
¶3. As to Webb’s character evidence claim, the trial judge instructed the jury it could not
consider the out-of-state sexual conduct as evidence of guilt on the charged crimes. Instead,
they could only consider these past sexual acts—which the judge deemed more probative
than prejudicial—as proof of Webb’s “motive, opportunity, and intent,” among other
purposes excepted by Mississippi Rule of Evidence 404(b). We see no error in that
discretionary call. Nor do we see any merit to Webb’s challenges to the judge’s admission
of screenshots of Snapchat messages with one of the minor victims, a photo of one of the
victim’s diary entries, and text messages between himself and his live-in girlfriend. The
record supports that the Snapchat photo was properly authenticated, and the diary entry and
text messages were relevant.
¶4. Webb’s final challenge is to the weight of the evidence supporting his convictions.
He challenges the credibility of both of the young victims, who detailed how he molested and
repeatedly sexually assaulted them. But the jury decides witness credibility, not this Court.
And in addition to the girls’ graphic testimony, the jury also saw letters urging one of the
girls to conceal the relationship, as well as a variety of other damning social media messages
2 between the girls and Webb. Thus, the evidence overwhelmingly favors the guilty verdicts.
We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶5. Anna was around nine years old when Zach Webb began dating her mother, Morgan.1
Webb soon moved in with Morgan and her two daughters in their Moscow, Tennessee home.
Eventually, Morgan began leaving her daughters at home with Webb while she worked night
shifts. Webb’s inappropriate behavior with Anna began when she started home-schooling
in the seventh grade. When Anna was just eleven years old, she fell asleep while lying on
the couch with Webb. Anna felt the then-thirty-five-year-old Webb “running his hands up
and down [her] thighs and biting [her] neck and [her] ear.” After that incident, Webb
continued to routinely fondle Anna, eventually having sexual intercourse with her. In a diary
entry from this time period, Anna wrote that she was “not even a virgin anymore” and that
it was “okay, because technically [she was] married to Zach.”
¶6. When Anna was twelve, she and her family—along with Webb—moved to Hernando,
Mississippi. Webb continued fondling and having sex with Anna after the move, with the
two engaging in various types of sexual acts “almost every day.” As Anna put it, the sex
occurred in almost every room in the house. Morgan testified that she noticed Anna being
“very flirty” and “hanging on . . . very close” to Webb. She also chided Anna for routinely
sleeping in bed with Webb.
1 For the victims’ protection, they will be referred to by fictitious names—Anna and Vanessa.
3 ¶7. Soon after the move, Anna began attending Hernando Middle School. There, she met
and became friends with Vanessa, a fourteen-year-old girl. The girls’ friendship quickly
evolved into a dating relationship. Anna also disclosed to Vanessa that she had been having
sex with her mother’s boyfriend (Webb) for a while.
¶8. Later that month, Anna introduced Vanessa to Webb. And Vanessa began going to
Anna’s house on the weekends to see both Anna and Webb. Webb eventually began sexually
abusing Vanessa too. Webb also prodded the two girls to perform sexual acts on each other
while he watched. And he engaged in group sex with the girls. The three viewed themselves
as being in a “three-way relationship.”
¶9. Webb began communicating with Vanessa every day via Snapchat and FaceTime.
After Webb told Vanessa that he loved her, Anna grew jealous and began writing notes to
Vanessa about the situation. In these notes, Anna referred to Webb as her boyfriend and
warned Vanessa to keep their “relationship” a secret.
¶10. Vanessa’s mother eventually discovered the Snapchat messages between Vanessa,
Anna, and Webb. She took screenshots of several of these messages. And she reported
Webb’s inappropriate behavior to law enforcement. Child Protective Services opened an
investigation into Webb but ultimately closed it when Anna denied the allegations. Soon
after, a school teacher confiscated a letter Anna had written Vanessa. In this letter, Anna
went on a tirade about Vanessa ending her “relationship” with Webb and threatened physical
violence if Vanessa told anyone about Webb. The school counselor questioned Vanessa
about the letter. Vanessa came clean, admitting she and Anna were involved in a relationship
4 with Webb. A detective with the DeSoto County Sheriff’s Department visited the school and
collected the letter along with screenshots from conversations between Vanessa and Webb.
Both girls were later interviewed by Healing Hearts Child Advocacy Center, where Vanessa
disclosed the sexual nature of her relationship with Webb.
¶11. A DeSoto County Grand Jury indicted Webb in the summer of 2020 for a variety of
sex crimes against Anna and Vanessa.2 In October 2020, a jury found Webb guilty on one
count of fondling and three counts of sexual battery. The trial court sentenced Webb to serve
a total of sixty years’ imprisonment.3
DISCUSSION
¶12. On appeal, Webb argues the judge made four reversible evidentiary errors. He also
asserts the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
2 Count One—fondling of Vanessa in violation of Mississippi Code Section 97-5-23 (Rev. 2020); Counts Two and Three—sexual battery of Vanessa in violation of Mississippi Code Section 97-3-95(1)(c) (Rev. 2020); Count Four—sexual battery of Anna in violation of Mississippi Code Section 97-3-95(1)(d) (Rev. 2020). A superseding indictment was returned on June 17, 2020, to broaden the range of dates in Count Four to include events that occurred in Moscow, Tennessee (August 25, 2014 to September 30, 2017). A second superseding indictment returned on July 8, 2020, corrected this by including only the date range in which Webb and AE were residing in DeSoto County (June 1 to October 10, 2017). 3 The judge sentenced Webb to thirty years in the Mississippi Department of Corrections on Count Two. On Count Three, the judge sentenced him to thirty years to be served consecutively with Count Two. On Count Four, he was sentenced to thirty years consecutive to Count Two and concurrent to Count Three. And on Count One, he was sentenced to fifteen years consecutive to Count Two, but concurrent to Counts Three and Four. So Webb must serve a total of sixty years.
5 I. Evidentiary Calls
¶13. Webb challenges a variety of the trial judge’s evidentiary decisions, which we review
for abuse of discretion. Bowman v. State, 283 So. 3d 154, 164 (Miss. 2019). “A trial judge
enjoys a great deal of discretion as to the relevancy and admissibility of evidence.” Id.
(quoting Hargett v. State, 62 So. 3d 950, 952 (Miss. 2011)). Even when evidence is
erroneously admitted, “this Court will affirm ‘unless the error adversely affects a substantial
right of a party.’” Id. (quoting Hargett, 62 So. 3d at 953). After review, this Court finds no
abuse of discretion in any of the disputed evidentiary rulings.
A. Webb’s Prior Sexual Abuse in Tennessee
¶14. Anna testified that Webb began sexually assaulting her while in Tennessee and that
Webb continued to do so when her family moved to Mississippi.
¶15. At trial, Webb argued the Tennessee allegations should be excluded as impermissible
character evidence. The State disagreed. It insisted that the previous sexual assaults showed
a pattern of “grooming”and was necessary to tell the complete story. The State also argued
the evidence qualified as Rule 404(b) evidence to show Webb’s “motive, opportunity, [and]
plan.” The trial judge had researched the issue and agreed that prior uncharged sexual
assaults are not necessarily banned character evidence. The judge pointed to Caldwell v.
State, in which this Court held prior sexual acts between the accused and victim are
“admissible to show the accused’s lustful lascivious disposition toward the particular victim,
especially in circumstances where the victim is under the age of consent.” Caldwell v. State,
6 So. 3d 1076, 1078 (Miss. 2009) (quoting Walker v. State, 878 So. 2d 913, 915 (Miss.
6 2004)). After considering the arguments, the judge found that evidence of the sexual assaults
in Tennessee were not only relevant but more probative than prejudicial. So she admitted
the evidence for the limited purposes described in Rule 404(b)(2). She also admonished the
State to clarify which conduct occurred outside Mississippi. And she gave a limiting
instruction, directing the jury not to consider the Tennessee conduct as evidence of Webb’s
guilt on the Mississippi charges.4 Webb argues the judge abused her discretion by admitting
evidence of the sexual assaults in Tennessee.
¶16. Under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1), “evidence of a crime, wrong, or other
act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular
occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” But such evidence may be
admissible for other purposes, “such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” MRE 404(b)(2). This list of
exceptions is not exclusive. MRE 404(b)(2) cmt.
¶17. The State has a “legitimate interest in telling a rational and coherent story of what
happened . . . .” Brown v. State, 483 So. 2d 328, 330 (Miss. 1986) (alteration in original)
(quoting Turner v. State, 478 So. 2d 300, 301 (Miss. 1985); Neal v. State, 451 So. 2d 743,
4 Jury Instruction No. 16, submitted by the State as S-9A, read as follows:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you have heard testimony concerning allegations of sexual abuse against the Defendant that are alleged to have taken place in Moscow, Tennessee. You cannot and must not simply infer that the Defendant acted in conformity with his previous actions and that he is therefore guilty of the charge for which he is presently on trial. Rather, this testimony should only be considered by you as evidence of the Defendant’s motive, opportunity, intent, plan, knowledge, or absence of mistake or accident.
7 759 (Miss. 1984)). And when the story involves sexual acts that bear “overwhelming
similarities” to the conduct at issue, they are “undeniably” admissible under Rule 404(b) as
both motive and as evidence of a “common plan, scheme, or system.” Green v. State, 89 So.
3d 543, 550 n.19 (Miss. 2012) (quoting People v. Sabin, 614 N.W.2d 888, 899 (Mich.
2000)). In McGrath v. State, we held the familial relationship of a sexually abusive
stepfather was “particularly relevant” for Rule 404(b) purposes. McGrath v. State, 271 So.
3d 437, 441 (Miss. 2019). And here, much like a stepfather, Webb was Anna’s mother’s
long-term, live-in boyfriend. So the same can be said for his familial-type relationship and
everyday abuse opportunities.
¶18. But even though he had unfettered, continuous access to Anna, a family or parent-type
relationship is not a prerequisite for admission of prior sexual acts as 404(b) evidence of
opportunity or motive. Indeed, we have “emphasi[zed] that any evidence that tends to show
a ‘seemingly uncontrollable desire to partake in pedophilic sexual activities with young and
developing female juveniles, is probative regarding motive.’” Id. at 442 (quoting Young v.
State, 106 So. 3d 775, 779 (Miss. 2012)). And a jury may hear evidence of a “defendant’s
means of accomplishing these activities” if they “bear substantial resemblance to each other
and with the present offense.” Id. (quoting Gore v. State, 37 So. 3d 1178, 1186 (Miss.
2010)). Webb’s desire to have sex with young and developing girls was overwhelmingly
proven. And evidence of his sexual abuse in Tennessee is unquestionably similar to his
continued pedophilic acts against both girls in Mississippi. So were Webb’s motives and
opportunities. His live-in status with Anna’s family helped cultivate his sexual relationship
8 with a preteen that continued and evolved into illegal sexual conduct with both Anna and
Vanessa in Mississippi.
¶19. After review of the evidence and the judge’s findings, we see no error in admitting
the Tennessee acts under Rule 404(b) and deeming them more probative than prejudicial.
B. Anna’s Diary Entry
¶20. The State also sought to admit a photograph of one of Anna’s diary entries taken from
Webb’s phone. Anna had written in her diary that she was “not even a virgin anymore” and
that it was “okay, because technically [she was] married to Zach.” The entry was written
while she was living in Moscow, Tennessee. A detective who had worked on the case served
as the sponsoring witness. Webb objected, arguing the entry was not relevant. The trial
judge withheld ruling on the photo until after the detective concluded his testimony.
¶21. Webb’s appellate challenges to the admission of the diary photo focus primarily on
relevancy. But he does throw in complaints that the copy of the photo provided to him was
illegible, the bench discussions were not recorded, and the photo lacks foundation. But he
did not raise these arguments during trial. “And ‘[t]his Court repeatedly has held that a
failure to object contemporaneously at trial forfeits an issue on appeal.’” Pulliam v. State,
328 So. 3d 93, 97 (Miss. 2021) (quoting Potts v. State, 233 So. 3d 782, 788 (Miss. 2017)).
While forfeited error is reviewed for plain error only, “the Court’s decision to utilize plain
error is discretionary, not obligatory.” Flynt v. State, 183 So. 3d 1, 14 (Miss. 2015). While
there is no obligation to consider these new claims, Webb made no mention of a pretrial
9 attempt to obtain a more legible copy of the diary entry. Nor did he request the bench
discussions be recorded.
¶22. Considering his preserved relevancy objection, our rules are clear. Evidence is
relevant if “it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without
the evidence” and “the fact is of consequence in determining the case.” MRE 401. “If the
evidence has any probative value at all, the rule favors its admission.” MRE 401 cmt. There
is little question about the diary entry’s relevancy. Anna testified she wrote this entry while
living in Tennessee. And it showed her written justification for not being a virgin—her
belief she was in a special relationship with Webb. From this, a reasonable juror could
conclude Webb had manipulated her into believing the unlawful sexual conduct was okay,
or at a minimum, that she was in a sexual relationship with Webb—either of which are
relevant to the charged offenses.
C. Screenshots of Snapchat Communications Between Webb and Vanessa
¶23. Webb next argues the trial judge wrongly admitted screenshots of Snapchat messages
purportedly between Webb and Vanessa. He insists the screenshots were not properly
authenticated. This Court disagrees.
¶24. Snapchat is a popular messaging app, often utilized on smartphones, that lets users
exchange photographs, videos, and text messages (called snaps). Thomas v. Cope, No.
7:20-CV-14 (HL), 2021 WL 4944802, at *2 n.3 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 22, 2021) (citing
https://phys.org/news/2018-06-snapchat.html). The primary distinction between Snapchat
and typical text messaging is that the images and messages contained in a Snapchat (snaps)
10 disappear after being viewed by the recipient. State v. M.P., 13 Wash. App. 2d 1007 n.2
(Wash. Ct. App. 2020) (citing Nelson v. Duvall, 387 P.3d 1158, 1161 n.1 (Wash. Ct. App.
2017)). Although Snapchat automatically deletes photos and messages, a recipient of the
snap can save one-on-one chats by taking a screenshot of the message or photograph. United
States v. Seme, No. 20-CR-10245-ADB, 2021 WL 5111865, at *1 (D. Mass. Nov. 3, 2021).
This can be accomplished using a smartphone’s screenshot function or by using a separate
device to photograph the message. Id.
¶25. Here, Vanessa testified that her mother—who accessed Vanessa’s Snapchat account
on her phone—took screenshots of photos and messages exchanged between Webb and
Vanessa before the images disappeared. At trial, Webb sought to exclude the screenshot
messages between Webb’s Snapchat account—which contained his photo and listed
“zwebb30” as the user—and Vanessa’s account. The challenged messages contained two
photographs, including one of Webb with his dog and another of Vanessa and Webb. There
were also screenshots of five pages of Snapchat messages, purportedly between Webb and
Vanessa.
¶26. In these messages, the then-fourteen-year-old Vanessa said she wanted Webb “to
come hold [her] and when my mom gets home shoot her.” Webb laughed off the idea of
shooting Vanessa’s mom. But he typed that he did “love the holding idea.” The messages
also discussed “marrying.” And in the snap exchange, Vanessa noted her confusion about
the “three of us dating.” Webb appeared unsure about the three-way relationship too,
claiming, “[t]his is kind of unprecedented territory for me[.]” As Webb put it, it was “funny
11 to watch all three of us go from being ok to territorial and back again really.” When Webb
told Vanessa, “I wanna wrap you up in my arms and hold you in the bed until you go to
sleep[,]” Vanessa replied, “I want u to.” Webb told Vanessa he “lov[ed]” her and “[s]he
needed to get ungrounded. So you’ll have a bit more freedom.” These exchanges and the
photos made up the gist of the screenshots the State sought to admit.
¶27. Webb primarily argues the screenshots were not properly authenticated because (1)
they were taken by Vanessa’s mother, a non-testifying witness, and (2) someone else (namely
Anna) could have accessed his phone to send the messages.
1. Authenticating Social Media Evidence
¶28. In Smith v. State, this Court noted the “unique issues” in play when authenticating
electronic social media information. Smith v. State, 136 So. 3d 424, 432 (Miss. 2014).
Though we recognized these challenges, we made clear that “[e]lectronic evidence may be
authenticated by the traditional means, and is adequately covered by the current rules of
evidence.” Id. Under Mississippi’s evidentiary rules, to properly authenticate evidence, “the
proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the
proponent claims it is.” MRE 901(a). This is typically met through witness testimony from
someone with knowledge that “an item is what it is claimed to be.” MRE 901(b)(1). Once
a party makes a prima facie showing of authenticity, the evidence goes to the jury, which
ultimately determines the evidence’s authenticity. Young v. Guild, 7 So. 3d 251, 262 (Miss.
2009). In other words, the judge functions as initial gatekeeper of the reliability of the
evidence, with the jury assessing the weight and credibility of admitted evidence.
12 ¶29. In evaluating what is required to establish a prima facie showing of authenticity of
social media evidence, in Smith, this Court leaned heavily on Texas law. Because social
media accounts can be fabricated, we agreed, “the fact that an electronic communication on
its face purports to originate from a certain person’s social networking account is generally
insufficient standing alone to authenticate that person as the author of the communications.”
Smith, 136 So. 3d at 433 (citing Campbell v. State, 382 S.W.3d 545, 550 (Tex. App. 2012)).
Like the Texas courts, we found “something more” is required.5 Id. And in Smith, because
“something more” was not proven, this Court found error—albeit harmless—in the trial
judge’s admission of Facebook communications based on “simply a name and small, blurry
photograph” of the defendant. Smith, 136 So. 3d at 433.6
For example, the purported sender admits authorship, the purported sender is seen composing the communication, business records of an internet service provider or cell phone company show that the communication originated from the purported sender’s personal computer or cell phone under circumstances in which it is reasonable to believe that only the purported sender would have access to the computer or cell phone, the communication contains information that only the purported sender could be expected to know, the purported sender responds to an exchange in such a way as to indicate circumstantially that he was in fact the author of the communication, or other circumstances peculiar to the particular case may suffice to establish a prima facie showing of authenticity.
Smith, 136 So. 3d at 433 (citing Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 639-41 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)). 6 See also Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 641-42 (“That an email on its face purports to come from a certain person’s email address, that the respondent in an internet chat room dialogue purports to identify himself, or that a text message emanates from a cell phone number assigned to the purported author—none of these circumstances, without more, has typically been regarded as sufficient to support a finding of authenticity.”).
13 2. Webb’s Authenticity Challenges
¶30. Here, unlike in Smith, Webb is not claiming the messages stemmed from a bogus
account opened in his name. Rather, Webb asserts two different authenticity challenges, one
attacking the sponsoring witness and the other suggesting Anna possibly accessed his
account to create the complained-of messages. He also briefly argues that the screenshots
were more prejudicial than probative.
a. Sponsoring Witness
¶31. Webb first insists the screenshot messages, purportedly between him and Vanessa,
were not properly authenticated because Vanessa’s mother, who physically took the
screenshots, did not testify as to their authenticity. The problem with Webb’s argument is
that a screenshot is just a photograph that has captured what is depicted on a smartphone’s
screen. And there is no requirement that a photograph be authenticated or sponsored by the
photographer. Instead, any person with the requisite knowledge of the facts represented in
the photograph may authenticate it. Jackson v. State, 483 So. 2d 1353, 1355 (Miss. 1986)
(no requirement that photographer testify when other competent testimony supports that
photograph represents what it purports to be). Here, Vanessa testified about participating in
the communications captured in the screenshots and that they were a true and accurate
depiction of her Snapchat conversations with Webb. So there is no merit to Webb’s
argument challenging the photo’s sponsoring witness.
14 b. Lack of Foundation
¶32. Webb centers his second authenticity challenge on the State’s failure to show it was
he—and not Anna—on the other side of these communications with Vanessa. But what
Webb misses is that the State need only prove a sufficient prima facie case of authentication,
which it did. At that point, the jury—not the trial judge—is tasked with deciding the ultimate
weight and worth of the evidence. So what Webb is really attacking is the weight of the
evidence of the screenshot messages, not their admissibility.7
¶33. The test for authenticating and admitting electronic evidence requires the proponent
offer a foundation from which the jury could reasonably find the evidence is what the
proponent says it is. MRE 901. But as noted in Smith and Tienda, because of varied
concerns with fabricating social networking applications and other like evidence, “something
more” than just a photo and account name is required to make a prima facie case of
authentication. Smith, 136 So. 3d at 433; Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 639-41.
¶34. This “something more” may be established in a variety of different ways, some of
which were listed in Smith, including “the purported sender respond[ing] to an exchange in
such a way as to indicate circumstantially that he was in fact the author of the
communication, or other circumstances peculiar to the particular case may suffice . . . .”
Smith, 136 So. 3d at 433.
7 The possibility that someone else may have been using a device goes to the weight of the evidence, not its authenticity. Garcia v. State, 300 So. 3d 945, 973 (Miss. 2020) (citing Holzheuser v. State, 828 S.E.2d 664 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019)).
15 ¶35. Here, Vanessa testified that she knew it was Webb communicating with her. Not only
was this his personal account—containing his username “zwebb30”—but it was the only
account he had ever used to communicate with her. He also crafted his written
communications in the same way he spoke to her. She explained the Snapchat messages
stemmed from conversations that the two had previously had in person. And on the
“rare[]”occasions Anna used Webb’s Snapchat account to communicate with Vanessa, Anna
identified herself.
¶36. Even though this was likely sufficient to prove a prima facie case of authenticity, at
this point in trial, the judge felt she still needed more foundation before admitting the
messages.
¶37. Vanessa gave additional testimony about the messages. And Anna’s mother, Morgan,
also testified. She recognized the account—which in addition to Webb’s username also
contained his photo—as the one Webb used to communicate with her. She also asked Webb
how Vanessa’s mom “got y’all’s conversation off Snapchat because as soon as I close it, not
even completely close the app, it deletes the conversation.” Webb told Morgan he thought
“her settings are set up different, that is saves all convos.” The judge admitted the photos
during Morgan’s testimony.
¶38. While Webb’s attorney repeatedly suggested someone else could have accessed
Webb’s phone, he misses that this possibility does not prevent authentication. That is because
the trial judge, as gatekeeper, need not find the evidence is necessarily what the proponent
claims—only that there is sufficient evidence that the jury ultimately might do so. The fact
16 the messages came from Webb’s account, when combined with the author’s messages and
responses, similar conversational tone, and post-screenshot discussions with Morgan, was
more than sufficient for the jury to make this determination.8
c. Unfair Prejudice
¶39. Webb also briefly argues the trial court erred by not ruling on his objection that the
messages were “presented out of context,” irrelevant, and more prejudicial than probative.
The relevancy of these communications to the charged crimes is obvious. And while a judge
“may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger
of . . . unfair prejudice,” the judge did not believe the messages were out of context. MRE
403 (emphasis added). We see nothing to suggest Webb was unfairly prejudiced. The
bottom line is that this Court will only reverse a trial judge’s evidentiary ruling if it
“adversely affects a substantial right of a party.” Bowman, 283 So. 3d at 164 (quoting
Hargett, 62 So. 3d at 953). And Webb’s substantial rights were by no means affected.
¶40. We find no error, much less reversible error, in admitting the Snapchat screenshots.
D. Text Messages between Webb and Morgan
¶41. The State also introduced text messages between Webb and Morgan, Anna’s mother.
The judge admitted the messages over Webb’s relevancy objection. He continues to
challenge the relevancy and “voluminous” nature of the messages, which he urges contain
mundane topics.
8 “On issues of witness credibility, the jury determines the weight and credibility of each witness’s testimony.” Thomas v. State, 48 So. 3d 460, 469 (Miss. 2010) (citing Nelson v. State, 10 So. 3d 898 (Miss. 2009)).
17 ¶42. The bulk of the messages referred to Webb’s inappropriate relationship with Anna.
In them, Morgan accused Webb of having sexual feelings towards her young daughter. And
Webb quipped that he did. That some of the text messages contained discussions of routine
errands, dinner options, and everyday life does not negate the probative value of the damning
ones. Nor has Webb shown how he was in any way prejudiced by admitting the remaining
messages. Thus, the judge did not abuse her discretion.
II. Weight of the Evidence
¶43. Finally, Webb argues the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence. When
reviewing challenges to the weight of the evidence, this Court views the evidence “in the
light most favorable to the verdict[.]” Little v. State, 233 So. 3d 288, 292 (Miss. 2017)
(citing Lindsey v. State, 212 So. 3d 44, 45 (Miss. 2017)). This Court will only disturb a
verdict “when it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it
to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice.” Id. (citing Lindsey, 212 So. 3d at 45).
¶44. Webb was convicted of four felony counts but does not delineate which of the counts
he is challenging. Instead, he pitches a general argument that Anna and Vanessa were not
credible and their stories were not corroborated. Generally, witness credibility issues are
decided by the jury, not appellate courts. Nelson, 10 So. 3d at 905. While Webb’s counsel
focused his strategy on attacking the young girls’ credibility, both underage girls gave
graphic details of Webb’s illegal sexual conduct—including fondling, having them perform
sexual acts on one another, and engaging in sexual intercourse with each girl and in a group
setting. And the jury obviously believed them. There were also various corroborating letters,
18 a written request to conceal the unlawful relationship, text messages, inappropriate photos
of the girls on his phone, and Snapchat messages between Vanessa and Webb.
¶45. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence
overwhelmingly supports the four guilty verdicts.
CONCLUSION
¶46. The trial judge did not abuse her discretion by admitting the challenged evidence.
And the jury’s verdict was supported by the weight of the evidence.
¶47. AFFIRMED.
RANDOLPH, C.J., KITCHENS AND KING, P.JJ., COLEMAN, BEAM, CHAMBERLIN, ISHEE AND GRIFFIS, JJ., CONCUR.