John Hatton v. Daniel D. Grigar

Opinion

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed November 21, 2006

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed November 21, 2006.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

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NO. 14-05-01053-CV

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JOHN HATTON, Appellant

V.

DANIEL D. GRIGAR, Appellee

On Appeal from the 268th District Court

Fort Bend County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 97-CV-98376

M E M O R A N D U M   O P I N I O N

In ten issues, appellant John Hatton appeals from the trial court=s grant of no-evidence summary judgment in favor of appellee Daniel D. Grigar dismissing Hatton=s bill of review and the trial court=s order of sanctions.  We affirm.

I.  Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a longstanding dispute over the ownership of a road.  In 1997, Daniel D. Grigar sought a declaratory judgment that the gravel road abutting John Hatton=s property, which provided access to Grigar=s landlocked property, constituted a public easement.  On June 23, 2000, after a bench trial, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of Grigar (the A2000 judgment@), finding that:  (1) Grigar=s land was in fact landlocked, (2) the road constituted a public road, and (3) an easement of ingress and egress existed by necessity, prescription, and implication in favor of Grigar.  Hatton appealed the judgment to this court, and we affirmed.  See Hatton v. Grigar, 66 S.W.3d 545, 557 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).  Although not detailed by the parties in this appeal, the same facts underlying the 2000 judgment and our decision in Hatton have apparently given rise to several proceedings in other state and federal courts.

Hatton thereafter timely petitioned the trial court for a bill of review, seeking again to set aside the 2000 judgment.  In the petition, Hatton claimed the trial court did not give him notice of the date it entered the judgment; therefore, he asserted, through no fault of his own, he failed to appear on the date the court signed and entered the judgment and did not receive notice of the judgment Auntil a later date.@  Hatton contended that the court=s alleged failure to provide notice denied him due process by precluding him both from appearing on the date of entry and requesting the trial court to reconsider its ruling and from timely requesting the court to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law.  See Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 86B87 (1988); Lopez v. Lopez, 757 S.W.2d 721, 722 (Tex. 1988).  Hatton further asserted that Grigar had no standing to seek a declaratory judgment, and this constituted a meritorious defense the trial court never considered. 

Grigar moved for no-evidence summary judgment on Hatton=s bill of review and for sanctions and attorney=s fees against Hatton and his attorney, Robert T. Wallace, under both Rule 13 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and section 10 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.  In his motion, Grigar requested that the trial court take notice of all prior proceedings therein relating to the 2000 judgment and of our decision in Hatton.  Grigar also challenged Hatton=s contention that he had no notice the trial court signed the 2000 judgment, noting that Hatton timely appealed the judgment.  At the summary judgment hearing, the court took notice of the prior proceedings and acknowledged that the record from the 2000 lawsuit indicated the district clerk sent Hatton notice of the judgment the day the trial judge signed it.  Although the record does not indicate the date Hatton received actual notice of the 2000 judgment, Wallace conceded Hatton received notice in time to file a notice of appeal.  In response to Grigar=s no-evidence motion, Hatton contended the motion violated Rule 166a(i) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure by failing to specifically state which elements of Hatton=s bill of review claim lacked evidence.  See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i).  Hatton also responded with evidence showing he owned the property adjacent to the road and purportedly demonstrating he had acquired title to the road through adverse possession and deeds from other parties.  Hatton seemed to argue that, given such evidence and the fact the 2000 judgment Acast a cloud upon [Hatton=s] adverse and legal titles to [the] road,@ a Agenuine dispute@ still existed as to Athe title to [the road],@ therefore precluding no-evidence summary judgment on the bill of review.  He later alleged in amended pleadings that the trial court committed Aextrinsic fraud@ by allowing Grigar to survey the road when Hatton=s subdivision did not provide an easement on the road to Grigar and further asserted that Grigar actually had an easement to his home from another direction.

In his motion for sanctions, Grigar contended Hatton=s bill of review was groundless and not brought for any purpose other than harassment and/or bad faith because all the issues addressed therein, namely, ownership of the road, had been fully litigated.  In support of the motions, Grigar attached copies of our decision in Hatton and judgments from the various other courts.  He also attached a letter his attorney sent Wallace on November 17, 2004, informing Wallace that the bill of review constituted a groundless, frivolous pleading because the case had already been resolved and asking Wallace to reconsider the bill of review.  Wallace apparently never responded to the letter.  At the sanctions hearing, Wallace maintained that he Aseriously believe[d]@ Hatton had both title and adverse interests in the property, and based on his research, he believed Hatton was entitled to a bill of review Ato get some clarification . . . , if nothing else.@  Wallace added that, although Hatton=s claim Amay not be considered so great, . . . it is still a claim.@  Hatton testified that he hired Wallace to petition for the bill of review, not to cause Aconflict or problems,@ but because he sought Ajustice@ after several Abias[ed] and prejudice[d court] decisions@ ruled against him and felt he had a right to not have his property taken away without due process of law.             

The trial court granted Grigar=s no-evidence motion without specifying any grounds, which dismissed Hatton=s petition for bill of review.  The trial court further granted Grigar=s motion for sanctions and award of attorney=s fees as to both Hatton and Wallace under Rule 13 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and section 10 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code after finding the bill of review was groundless and brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment.  See Tex. R. Civ. P. 13; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. '' 10.001, 10.004 (Vernon 2002).  Specifically, the court sanctioned Hatton because Ahe employed [Wallace] to file the Bill of Review and[,] after being advised that there was no basis to support the allegations in the pleadings . . . , refused to dismiss the pleadings.@  The court sanctioned Wallace because he Asigned the pleadings that requested relief for which there was no basis in law or fact for the court to award such relief.@  The court ordered Hatton and Wallace to pay $10,000, jointly and severally.  The court further ordered Hatton and Wallace to pay Grigar $4,187.50 for attorney=s fees.

Hatton now appeals the trial court=s judgment dismissing his bill of review and order imposing sanctions.  In issues one, three, and five through nine, Hatton challenges the trial court=s grant of summary judgment, arguing fact issues remain regarding whether the trial court properly entered the original declaratory judgment, whether he had notice of the original judgment, and whether the trial court committed extrinsic fraud.  In issues two, four, eight, and ten, Hatton challenges the trial court=s imposition of sanctions, including the award of attorney=s fees, contending his bill of review was not groundless, filed in bad faith, or intended to harass. 

II.  Summary Judgment

A.  Standard of Review

To determine the proper standard of review for the summary judgment points of error, we must initially address Hatton=s sixth issue regarding whether Grigar=s no-evidence motion violated Rule 166a(i) by failing to specifically state the elements of a bill of review for which there was allegedly no evidence.  A no‑evidence motion for summary judgment Amust state the elements as to which there is no evidence,@ and the rule Adoes not authorize conclusory motions or general no‑evidence challenges.@  See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i) & cmt.; Cuyler v. Minns, 60 S.W.3d 209, 212 (Tex. App.CHouston [14 Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).  AWhen a no‑evidence motion for summary judgment does not specifically state which elements lack evidence, the motion should be treated as a motion for a 166a(c) summary judgment.@  Kadhum v. Homecomings Fin. Network, Inc., No. 01‑05‑00705‑CV, ___ S.W.3d ____, 2006 WL 1125240, at *4 (Tex. App.CHouston [1st Dist.] Apr. 27, 2006, pet. filed); see also Brown v. Hearthwood II Owners Ass=n, Inc., 201 S.W.3d 153, 157 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet. h.); Adams v. Reynolds Tile & Flooring, Inc., 120 S.W.3d 417, 420 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.); Amouri v. Sw. Toyota, Inc., 20 S.W.3d 165, 168 (Tex. App.CTexarkana 2000, pet. denied).  This distinction is important because the two forms of summary judgment invoke different standards of review.  Brown, 201 S.W.3d at 157.  In his no-evidence motion, Grigar did not specifically enumerate the elements of Hatton=s bill of review claim which lacked evidence.  As noted, Grigar simply requested the court take judicial notice of prior proceedings and challenged Hatton=s assertion that he lacked notice of the judgment.  Accordingly, we construe Grigar=s Ano-evidence@ motion for summary judgment as a traditional motion for summary judgment under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c) and apply the appropriate standard of review.  See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Kadhum, 2006 WL 1125240, at *4; Brown, 201 S.W.3d at 157; Amouri, 20 S.W.3d at 168.

The standard of review for a traditional motion for summary judgment is whether the successful movant at the trial level carried its burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that judgment should be granted as a matter of law.  See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison County Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. 1999).  A defendant who either conclusively negates at least one of the essential elements of each of the plaintiff=s causes of action or conclusively establishes all elements of an affirmative defense is entitled to summary judgment.  Johnson v. Felts, 140 S.W.3d 702, 706 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied).  In order to conclusively negate at least one of the requisite elements, the motion must identify or address the cause of action or defense and its elements.  Id.  Evidence is conclusive only if reasonable people could not differ in their conclusions.  City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 816 (Tex. 2005).  Under this traditional standard, this court must take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant and must make all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant=s favor.  See id.  Moreover, when the trial court does not specify the basis for its summary judgment, we will affirm the judgment if any one of the theories advanced in the motion is meritorious.  Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150, 157 (Tex. 2004).  In other words, the appealing party must show each independent ground alleged is insufficient to support the summary judgment granted.  See Star‑Telegram, Inc. v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. 1995).^[1]

B.  Analysis

On appeal, Hatton reiterates the same arguments he made to the trial court in his bill of review and his response to Grigar=s motion for summary judgment.  Under the well-established law governing bills of review, however, Hatton=s contentions must fail.  A bill of review is an equitable proceeding brought by a party seeking to set aside a prior judgment that is no longer subject to challenge by a motion for new trial or appeal.  Caldwell v. Barnes, 154 S.W.3d 93, 96 (Tex. 2004).  ABill of review plaintiffs must ordinarily plead and prove (1) a meritorious defense to the underlying cause of action, (2) which the plaintiffs were prevented from making by the fraud, accident or wrongful act of the opposing party or official mistake, (3) unmixed with any fault or negligence on their own part.@  Id.  However, a party who failed to appeal the judgment of which the party had notice, or a party who timely but unsuccessfully appealed the judgment, may not use a bill of review as an additional remedy.  Rizk v. Mayad, 603 S.W.2d 773, 775B76 (Tex. 1980).  AThe grounds upon which a bill of review can be obtained are narrow because the procedure conflicts with the fundamental policy that judgments must become final at some point.@  Transworld Fin. Serv. Corp. v. Briscoe, 722 S.W.2d 407, 407 (Tex. 1987). 

 Grigar conclusively negated the second element of Hatton=s prima facie case for a bill of review by successfully requesting the trial court to take notice of the prior proceedings relating to the 2000 judgment.  In so taking notice, the trial court correctly recognized that Hatton has already tried and unsuccessfully appealed the issues underlying his bill of review, namely, ownership of the road.  Indeed, most of Hatton=s arguments in the trial court and on appeal either simply rehash the settled issue of ownership of the road or are wholly conclusory in nature.  In issues one and five, he contends a fact issue exists because a court may not grant a declaratory judgment Aas an affirmative ground of recovery to alter rights, status, or relationships.@  In issues seven and eight, he contends the trial court improperly granted a declaratory judgment, and by extension, summary judgment dismissing the bill of review, because he had legal and adverse claims to the road.  All of these issues Aeither [were] or should have been litigated [in the trial and appellate courts.]@  Rizk, 603 S.W.2d at 776.  As such, because Hatton timely but unsuccessfully appealed the issues underlying the 2000 judgment, he cannot show he has been prevented from making a claim or defense, and, accordingly, he cannot utilize a bill of review.  Rizk, 603 S.W.2d at 776; see also Nabelek v. C.O. Bradford, No. 14-04-01177-CV, 2006 WL 915824, at *2 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] Apr. 6, 2006, pet. denied) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (affirming denial of bill of review where party had timely but unsuccessfully appealed the same errors underlying the bill of review and thus had not been prevented from asserting claims or defenses); McIntyre v. Wilson, 50 S.W.3d 674, 680 (Tex. App.CDallas 2001, pet. denied) (same).

Hatton=s remaining arguments similarly lack merit, although they invoke theories and doctrines more germane to a bill of review analysis (unlike the above arguments).  In his petition for bill of review, Hatton contended the trial court denied him due process under Peralta and Lopez by failing to give him notice of the date of signing and entry of the 2000 judgment, thereby precluding him from motioning the court to reconsider or to file findings of fact and conclusions of law.^[2]  See Peralta, 485 U.S. at 86B87; Lopez, 757 S.W.2d at 723.  Such contention relies on a misinterpretation of Peralta and Lopez.  Those cases hold that where a defendant fails to receive actual or constructive notice of a lawsuit or judgment and thereby suffers substantial adverse consequences, the defendant has been denied due process and may set aside the judgment without proving a meritorious defense to the underlying cause of action.  See Peralta, 485 U.S. at 86B87; Lopez, 757 S.W.2d at 723; see also Dispensa v. Univ. State Bank, 987 S.W.2d 923, 927 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.).  Here, Hatton had actual notice of the 2000 lawsuit because it is undisputed he participated in the full bench trial.  Moreover, Hatton=s attorney admitted Hatton received notice of the 2000 judgment in time to file notice of appeal, and Hatton thereafter fully appealed the judgment to this court.  See Hatton, 66 S.W.3d at 557.  As such, he cannot complain he had no notice of the lawsuit or judgment.  See Dispensa, 987 S.W.2d at 928 (affirming denial of bill of review where party asserted due process violation under Peralta but received actual notice of default judgment within five days of entry and failed to timely file motion for new trial); Jon v. Stanley, 150 S.W.3d 244, 249 (Tex. App.CTexarkana 2004, no pet.) (affirming denial of bill of review where party had actual knowledge of trial court=s judgment dismissing lawsuit, given that party filed a motion to modify judgment of dismissal within thirty days of entry, but failed to timely appeal dismissal).  

Hatton further asserts that his inability to timely request findings from the trial court somehow relegated our decision in Hatton to a Amere affirmance@ of the trial court, which the trial court could have corrected through a bill of review proceeding.  With this contention, he seems to suggest his previous appeal of the 2000 judgment should not bar his bill of review.  Such argument is unpersuasive.  Hatton cites no authority holding that an appellate decision is vitiated where the trial court did not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law.  In fact, when no findings of fact or conclusions of law are requested or filed, we imply all necessary findings in support of the trial court=s judgment.  Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Tex. 1992).  In addition, when such implied findings are supported by the evidence, it is our duty to uphold the judgment on any theory of law applicable to the case.  Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990).  Thus, Hatton cannot downplay the significance of his previous appeal as prohibiting his bill of review by simply noting that we implied findings in such appeal.  

Finally, in issue nine, Hatton claims the trial court committed extrinsic fraud by allowing Grigar to survey the road as part of the original trial.  Although an allegation of extrinsic fraud will support a bill of review, Hatton=s contention misinterprets the plain definition of extrinsic fraud.  Extrinsic fraud is fraud committed by an adverse party that denies a party the opportunity to fully litigate all the rights or defenses upon trial.  See Vickery v. Vickery, 999 S.W.2d 342, 367 (Tex. 1999).  A >Intrinsic fraud,= by contrast, relates to the merits of the issues which were presented and presumably were or should have been settled in the former action[,] . . . includ[ing] . . . fraudulent instruments, perjured testimony, or any matter which was actually presented to and considered by the trial court in rendering the judgment assailed.@  Tice v. City of Pasadena, 767 S.W.2d 700, 702 (Tex. 1989).  The trial court=s alleged grant of permission to Grigar to survey the road does not constitute extrinsic or even intrinsic fraud because neither Grigar nor any other party adverse to Hatton allegedly took such action.  Moreover, even if we considered the alleged grant of permission as extrinsic fraud, such conduct, as noted, did not prevent Hatton the opportunity to fully litigate all his rights or defenses at trial.  Further, Hatton had the opportunity to complain about the trial court=s action on direct appeal.   

Therefore, because Grigar conclusively negated the second element of Hatton=s prima facie case for a bill of review and Hatton=s contentions lack merit, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Grigar.  We accordingly overrule issues one, three, five, six, seven, eight, and nine insofar as they relate to the trial court=s grant of summary judgment.

III.  Sanctions in the Trial Court

A.  Standard of Review

Regarding the sanctions points of error, we review a trial court=s order imposing sanctions under the abuse of discretion standard.  In re N.R.C., 94 S.W.3d 799, 808 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied).  The court abuses its discretion if it acts without reference to any guiding rules and principles or in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner.  Randolph v. Walker, 29 S.W.3d 271, 276 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).  We examine the entire record in determining whether the order of sanctions constitutes an abuse of discretion.  Id.   

B.  Analysis

In issues two, eight, and ten, Hatton conclusorily asserts that the trial court erred in imposing sanctions:  (1) against him and Wallace under Rule 13 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure because he filed the petition for bill of review to allow the trial court to review the allegedly improper 2000 judgment and not in bad faith or to harass and (2) against Wallace under section 10.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code because Wallace did not sign a pleading that was presented for any improper purpose.  In issue four, Hatton contends the trial court erred in awarding attorney=s fees  (1) because the evidence is factually insufficient to support the summary judgment and (2) because the original lawsuit was not appropriate for declaratory judgment and thus attorney=s fees may not be awarded under article 37.009 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.  

ARule 13 authorizes the trial court to impose an appropriate sanction available under Civil Procedure Rule 215.2(b) against an attorney, a represented party, or both, who filed a pleading that is both: (1) groundless and brought in bad faith; or (2) groundless and brought to harass.@  See Tex. R. Civ. P. 13; Randolph, 29 S.W.3d at 277.  Rule 13 is designed to check abuses in the pleading process.  Randolph, 29 S.W.3d at 277.  A party seeking sanctions has the burden of establishing his right to relief.  Id.  AGroundless@ means no basis in law or fact and not warranted by good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.  Tex. R. Civ. P. 13.  Bad faith is not simply bad judgment or negligence, but means the conscious doing of a wrong for dishonest, discriminatory, or malicious purpose.  Elkins v. Stotts‑Brown, 103 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. App.CDallas 2003, no pet.).  AHarass@ is used in a variety of legal contexts to describe words, gestures, and actions that tend to annoy, alarm, and verbally abuse another person.  Id.  In weighing a Rule 13 motion, the trial court must make factual determinations concerning whether a party=s legal position as stated in the pleadings is substantially justified.  Randolph, 29 S.W.3d at 277.  In addition, section 10.004 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides that A[a] court that determines that a person has signed a pleading or motion in violation of Section 10.001 may impose a sanction on the person, a party represented by the person, or both.@  Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 10.004.  Section 10.001 states that a person signing a motion or pleading certifies that Ato the signatory=s best knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry:@  (1) the motion or pleading is not presented for an improper purpose, (2) each legal contention is warranted, (3) each factual contention is likely to have evidentiary support, and (4) each denial of a factual contention is warranted.  Id. ' 10.001.  Under these provisions, possible sanctions include paying a penalty and paying reasonable expenses, including attorney=s fees.  See Tex. R. Civ. P. 215.2(b)(8); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 10.004(c).  When making its determination to award sanctions on the grounds that a case is frivolous or legally invalid, a trial court should consider the entire history of the case. Falk & Mayfield L.L.P. v. Molzan, 974 S.W.2d 821, 824B27 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).  Further, a party should not be punished for counsel=s conduct unless the party is implicated apart from having entrusted its legal representation to counsel.  TransAmerican Natural Gas v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Tex. 1991).

We note initially that we decided Hatton=s contention in issue four that the original lawsuit was improper for declaratory judgment, and thus attorney=s fees were improper under article 37.009 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, in his prior appeal; therefore, we will not revisit this issue.  See Hatton, 66 S.W.3d at 557 (affirming trial court=s award of attorney=s fees under section 37.009 where Hatton complained the evidence was factually insufficient to support trial court=s judgment).  As to issues two, eight, ten, and the first sub-point under issue four, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in finding that, based on the evidence and entire history of the case, Hatton=s petition for bill of review was groundless and brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment, and in therefore sanctioning Hatton and Wallace. 

Our above analysis supports the trial court=s finding that the bill of review had no grounds in law or fact, and neither Wallace nor Hatton submitted a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.  Indeed, upon imposing sanctions, the court told Hatton his arguments were Apurely frivolous@ under the facts and law because every issue raised in the petition for bill of reviewCnamely, ownership of propertyChad been presented to and taken into consideration by that court, this court on appeal, and Aapparently visited by every other court that has ever taken a look at it.@

Nor can we say the court abused its discretion in finding that Hatton and Wallace brought the bill of review in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment.  The trial court noted that, although Grigar=s attorney advised Hatton and Wallace of the bill of review=s groundlessness and of his intent to seek sanctions, Hatton nevertheless instructed Wallace to continue pursuing the bill of review, and Wallace complied.  See Molzan, 974 S.W.2d at 824 n.3, 827 (affirming order of sanctions under Rule 13 on appellants and noting that appellee=s attorney told appellants and appellants= counsel their claim was frivolous and would forego seeking sanctions if they dismissed claim, but appellees rejected offer).  This indicates that Hatton did not simply entrust the case to Wallace and rely blindly on his legal counsel but committed sanctionable conduct separate and apart from Wallace=s legal representation.  Moreover, Wallace=s contention that he Aseriously believed@ Hatton had an interest in the property based on his research and thus could seek a bill of review is unavailing because even a cursory review of the relevant law would reveal that Hatton=s prior appeal clearly barred a bill of review.  See Davis v. Helm, No. 01‑01‑00110‑CV, 2002 WL 1041314, at *7B8 (Tex. App.CHouston [1st Dist.] May 23, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (affirming order of sanctions for bad-faith pleadings under Rule 13 and section 10.004 where party petitioned for bill of review seeking to set aside judgment that party had previously unsuccessfully appealed, even though attorney researched law governing bills of review and concluded Aample authority@ supported the bill); see also McIntyre, 50 S.W.3d at 680 (affirming order of sanctions under Rule 13 where appellant petitioned for bill of review seeking to set aside judgment that appellant previously unsuccessfully appealed); Hughes v. Aycock, No. 01‑95‑01181‑CV, 1996 WL 396882, at *2B3 (Tex. App.CHouston [1st Dist.] July 11, 1996, writ dism=d w.o.j.) (not designated for publication) (affirming order of sanctions under Rule 13 where appellant petitioned for bill of review on repeatedly litigated issues).

Thus, because we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions on Hatton and Wallace for filing groundless pleadings in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment, we overrule issues two, four, eight, and ten.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.   

/s/      Margaret Garner Mirabal

Senior Justice

Judgment rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed November 21, 2006.

Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges, Justice Seymore, and Senior Justice Mirabal.^[3]

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^[1]  Although Hatton repeatedly claims the trial court Aabused its discretion@ by granting Grigar=s summary judgment and dismissing Hatton=s bill of review, the summary judgment standard of review governs this appeal, rather than the abuse of discretion standard traditionally governing grants or denials of bills of review.  See, e.g., Clarendon Nat. Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 199 S.W.3d 482, 487 (Tex. App.CHouston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (applying traditional and no-evidence summary judgment standards of review where party appealed from grant of summary judgment denying its bill of review); D=Unger v. Woolsey, No. 13-04-110-CV, 2006 WL 871561, at *1 (Tex. App.CCorpus Christi Apr. 6, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (acknowledging that although grant of traditional summary judgment in effect denied bill of review, standard of review for traditional summary judgment applied rather than abuse of discretion standard for bill of review). 

^[2]  Hatton does not appear to specifically renew this assertion on appeal, as he neither cites Peralta or Lopez nor complains about the lack of findings of fact and conclusions of law in his brief to this court.  However, he does generally claim in nine of his ten issues that the trial court denied him due process and recites in issue three the alleged fact that the court=s failure to provide notice of the judgment precluded him from requesting the court to reconsider its judgment.  Thus, in an abundance of caution, we address Hatton=s due process arguments within the Peralta and Lopez framework.  See generally Huckabee v. Time Warner Entm=t Co. L.P., 19 S.W.3d 413, 434 (Tex. 2000); Hintz v. Lowe, No. 14‑03‑00979‑CV, 2004 WL 2359260, at *2 n.3 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] Oct. 21, 2004 2004, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).   

^[3]  Senior Justice Margaret Garner Mirabal sitting by assignment.