John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance v. Pullins (In Re Pullins)

65 B.R. 560, 1986 Bankr. LEXIS 5269, 15 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 178
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Ohio
DecidedSeptember 23, 1986
DocketBankruptcy 3-86-00345(A)
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 65 B.R. 560 (John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance v. Pullins (In Re Pullins)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance v. Pullins (In Re Pullins), 65 B.R. 560, 1986 Bankr. LEXIS 5269, 15 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 178 (Ohio 1986).

Opinion

WILLIAM A. CLARK, Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter is before the court upon the motions of John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company (“John Hancock”) and Production Credit Association of the Fourth District (“PCA”) for relief from the automatic stay provided by 11 U.S.C. § 362 in order for the movants to foreclose upon property of the debtors, David and Paula Pullins.

FACTS

From the evidence introduced at the hearing it appears that John Hancock is the holder of two mortgages against the farm land of the debtors. The first mortgage is in the amount of $498,039 and covers 399 acres of land. The second mortgage secures an adjacent 80 acres and has an underlying debt of $185,794. 1

William Case, an experienced appraiser and broker of farms, was called as a witness by John Hancock and testified that he has appraised hundreds of farms in the state of Ohio. After careful and extensive consideration of the debtors’ farmland, and using a “market approach” to valuation, it was his opinion that the debtors’ farm has a value of $515,000. 2 In allocating this value to the two portions of land, he found the 399 acres to have a value of $428,600 and the 80 acres to be worth $86,400. In each instance the debt exceeds the value of the property. In addition it was the opinion of Mr. Case that the price of farm land in the debtors’ area of the state could be expected to decline in value by 5% to 6% by the end of 1986.

It was stipulated by the debtors and PCA that PCA holds a security interest in the debtors’ farm equipment and construction equipment, and that the amount of the debt as of the date of hearing was $220,935. By reducing the accrued interest by $52.26 per day for the 118 days between the filing of the petition and the date of hearing, the debt of PCA is approximately $214,770 on the date that the debtors filed their petition in bankruptcy. It was also jointly stipulated that the equipment had an appraised value of $204,000 and is depreciating at the rate of 8% per year.

Near the close of the hearing, the debtors offered to pay $40,000 to John Hancock by the end of November as adequate protection of its interest. No offer of adequate protection was made to PCA.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

11 U.S.C. § 362(d) reads as follows:

(d) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall *562 grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay—
(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of such party in interest; or
(2) with respect to a stay of an act against property under subsection (a) of this section, if—
(A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property; and
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization.

The testimony and stipulations reveal that the debtors do not have equity in either their land nor their equipment. However, as stipulated by PCA, the debtors’ assets are necessary to an effective reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Given that the debtors are attempting to reorganize a farming operation, it is obvious at this stage of the proceedings that the retention of the land and equipment is essential to their reorga-nizational efforts. Thus, the movants are not entitled to relief from the automatic stay pursuant to (d)(2) of 11 U.S.C. § 362.

There remains the question of whether John Hancock and PCA are adequately protected under § 362(d)(1). Section 361 of the Bankruptcy Code contains the following provision regarding adequate protection:

§ 361. Adequate protection. When adequate protection is required under section 362, 363, or 364 of this title of an interest of an entity in property, such adequate protection may be provided by—
(1) requiring the trustee to make a cash payment or periodic cash payments to such entity, to the extent that the stay under section 362 of this title, use, sale, or lease under section 363 of this title, or any grant of a lien under section 364 of this title results in a decrease in the value of such entity’s interest in such property;
(2) providing to such entity an additional or replacement lien to the extent that such stay, use, sale, lease, or grant results in a decrease in the value of such entity’s interest in such property; or
(3)granting such other relief, other than entitling such entity to compensation allowable under section 503(b)(1) of this title as an administrative expense, as will result in the realization by such entity of the indubitable equivalent of such entity’s interest in such property.

It is clear from this section that the creditors are entitled to be protected against any decline in value of their collateral during the period from the filing of the bankruptcy petition to the date of plan confirmation. However, John Hancock asserts that a decline in the value of its collateral is not its only interest entitled to protection. John Hancock maintains that § 361(3) entitles it to its “opportunity costs” caused by the delay in enforcing its lien rights against the debtors’ property, i.e. what it could earn by reinvesting its liquidated interest in its collateral. In support of this position John Hancock cites a leading case, In re American Mariner Industries, Inc., 734 F.2d 426 (9th Cir.1984), which held that in providing adequate protection to an undersecured creditor, the creditor “is entitled to compensation for the delay in enforcing its rights during the interim between the petition and confirmation of the plan.” Id. at 435. Only in this manner is the creditor receiving the value of his bargained-for rights.

Subsequently the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit addressed the identical issue in In re Briggs Transp. Co., 780 F.2d 1339 (8th Cir.1985), in which it adopted a more flexible approach than set forth in American Mariner, and refrained “from shaping a rigid rule that compensation for post-petition interest either must or cannot be required as a component of adequate protection in the context of an automatic stay.” Id. at 1348.

[W]e cannot hold as a matter of law that a creditor is always entitled to compensa *563

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Bluebook (online)
65 B.R. 560, 1986 Bankr. LEXIS 5269, 15 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 178, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/john-hancock-mutual-life-insurance-v-pullins-in-re-pullins-ohsb-1986.