John Fullman v. Phillips 66 Company

CourtDistrict Court, D. New Jersey
DecidedMay 20, 2026
Docket2:26-cv-05613
StatusUnknown

This text of John Fullman v. Phillips 66 Company (John Fullman v. Phillips 66 Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
John Fullman v. Phillips 66 Company, (D.N.J. 2026).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JOHN FULLMAN, Civil Action No. 26-5613 (SDW) (MAH)

Plaintiff,

WHEREAS OPINION & ORDER v.

PHILLIPS 66 COMPANY, May 20, 2026

Defendant.

WIGENTON, District Judge. THIS MATTER having come before this Court upon pro se Plaintiff John Fullman’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint, (D.E. 1 (“Compl.”)), and accompanying application to proceed in forma pauperis, (D.E. 1-2 (“IFP application”)); and this Court having reviewed the Complaint for sufficiency pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 8(a) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); and WHEREAS a district court may allow a plaintiff to commence a civil action without paying the filing fee—that is, in forma pauperis—so long as the plaintiff submits an affidavit demonstrating he is “unable to pay such fees,” but must dismiss a case that is frivolous, “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)(1), (e)(2)(B); see Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021); and WHEREAS Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis sufficiently demonstrates that Plaintiff cannot pay the filing fee as Plaintiff is currently on worker’s compensation and has two dependents. (D.E. 1-2 at 3, 5); and WHEREAS pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), “[a] pleading that states a

claim for relief must contain: (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction . . . ; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought.” The complaint must apprise the defendant with “fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” containing “more than labels and conclusions.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Courts apply the same standard under Rule 12(b)(6) to sua sponte dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim. Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012); and WHEREAS pro se complaints, although “[held] to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972), must still “state a

plausible claim for relief,” Yoder v. Wells Fargo Bank, 566 F. App’x 138, 141 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2013)); and WHEREAS Plaintiff alleges his employer, Defendant Phillips 66 Company, has engaged in violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including “racial discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment, disparate treatment, harassment, and related unlawful employment practices.” (Compl. at 1.) Plaintiff also purports to bring a class action on behalf of thirteen other African American complainants. (Id.); and WHEREAS this Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint is comprised of conclusory statements and fails to even make out “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Each of the four counts asserted is followed by a single sentence stating that Defendant is liable for that given cause of action with nothing more, which does not sufficiently apprise Defendant with fair notice of what the claims are, let alone the grounds upon which they

rest. (See, e.g., Compl. at 2 (“Defendant engaged in lawful discrimination on the basis of race in violation of Title VII.”).); and WHEREAS additionally, “it is well established that non-attorney plaintiffs who proceed pro se may not serve as class representatives in a putative class action.” Pridgen v. Amazon.com Servs. LLC, No. 25-7589, 2026 WL 735250, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 16, 2026); Hogan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 158–59 (3d Cir. 2009). Plaintiff proceeds pro se and is not an attorney; thus, he cannot represent anyone other than himself; therefore IT IS, on this 20th day of May 2026, ORDERED that Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Complaint is sua sponte DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days to amend his complaint; and it is further ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this Order upon Plaintiff by regular U.S. mail. SO ORDERED.

___/s/ Susan D. Wigenton_____ SUSAN D. WIGENTON, U.S.D.J.

Orig: Clerk cc: Parties Michael A. Hammer, U.S.M.J.

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Related

Conley v. Gibson
355 U.S. 41 (Supreme Court, 1957)
Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Clarence Schreane v. Seana
506 F. App'x 120 (Third Circuit, 2012)
Walker v. Schult
717 F.3d 119 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Hagan v. Rogers
570 F.3d 146 (Third Circuit, 2009)
Fowler v. UPMC SHADYSIDE
578 F.3d 203 (Third Circuit, 2009)
Cynthia Yoder v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA
566 F. App'x 138 (Third Circuit, 2014)
Christopher Shorter v. United States
12 F.4th 366 (Third Circuit, 2021)

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Bluebook (online)
John Fullman v. Phillips 66 Company, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/john-fullman-v-phillips-66-company-njd-2026.