NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3079-23
JOHN FREDLAW,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent. ___________________________
Submitted October 22, 2025 – Decided November 19, 2025
Before Judges Paganelli and Vanek.
On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Corrections.
John Fredlaw, appellant pro se.
Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Donna Arons, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Joseph D. Sams, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM John Fredlaw, a formerly incarcerated individual at Mid-State
Correctional Facility (MSCF), appeals from a final agency decision (FAD) by
the New Jersey Department of Corrections (DOC) finding him guilty of
prohibited act *.203 under N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a)(6)(i). We affirm.
I.
On February 15, 2024, Fredlaw was charged with prohibited act *.203
which penalizes "possession or introduction of any prohibited substance, such
as drugs, intoxicants, or related paraphernalia not prescribed for the inmate by
the medical or dental staff." N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a)(6)(i). The charge was
referred to a hearing officer. At the hearing, Fredlaw pleaded not guilty. After
a counsel-substitute was appointed at his request, he declined the opportunity
to call witnesses or to submit documents.
The hearing officer considered DOC Officer Sullivan's (Officer
Sullivan) observations relative to the *.203 charge. Officer Sullivan reported
that during a "linen compliance check" on the morning of February 15, 2024,
he discovered a defaced, plastic peanut butter jar containing a "brown leafy
substance inside the wall locker of cell 7E-16B[,] belonging to Fredlaw." He
confiscated the container, photographed it, and placed it into the Special
Investigation Department's evidence locker.
A-3079-23 2 DOC medical personnel obtained a urine specimen and tested it for
controlled dangerous substances (CDS). Fredlaw's urine specimen tested
negative for CDS. Officer Sullivan then authored a disciplinary report and
issued the *.203 charge to Fredlaw. Field test results showed the "brown leafy
substance" tested positive for synthetic cannabinoids.
At his disciplinary hearing, Fredlaw testified the substance in the
container was tea he had been drinking because he was sick. Fredlaw asserted
a teabag broke and he emptied the tea leaves out of the bag and into the
container so that he could continue drinking it to mitigate an ailment.
Fredlaw's counsel substitute requested leniency and requested a second test to
confirm whether the substance found in Fredlaw's cell wall locker contained
synthetic cannabinoids.
The hearing officer found no evidence contradicting the DOC's proofs,
other than Fredlaw's testimony. The hearing officer found the substance was
in an altered peanut butter jar and stated tea at MSCF is "neither sold nor
stored" in that manner. The hearing officer further reasoned Fredlaw's storage
of the substance in the altered peanut butter jar appeared consistent with
possession of CDS, which was confirmed by the field test result.
The hearing officer concluded Fredlaw committed prohibited act *.203
by possessing CDS and sanctioned him to sixty days in MSCF's restorative
A-3079-23 3 housing unit, revoked his communication time for sixty days, and permanently
rescinded his contact visitation privileges. Fredlaw agreed to participate in the
DOC's Drug Diversion Program in lieu of some of the sanctions.
The same day, Fredlaw appealed the hearing officer's decision. He once
again asserted the substance was loose tea leftover from a broken teabag and
contested the DOC's decision to not conduct a second test on the substance.
Fredlaw argued the hearing officer's finding was not predicated on substantial,
credible evidence because the DOC failed to establish the field test's reliability
and "[p]rison officials found no other evidence of drug possession ." Fredlaw
also asserted the failure to obtain a second, confirmatory test violated DOC
policy and denied him due process.
On February 23, 2024, the Associate Administrator at MSCF upheld the
hearing officer's finding in a FAD. The FAD found the DOC complied with its
own procedure in handling the evidence, the evidence supporting the charge
was sufficient, and the hearing officer's findings were neither arbitrary,
capricious, nor unreasonable.
II.
Our limited standard of review of the FAD is well settled. In re
Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011). As we have long recognized, "[p]risons
are dangerous places, and the courts must afford appropriate deference and
A-3079-23 4 flexibility to administrators trying to manage this volatile environment."
Blanchard v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 461 N.J. Super. 231, 238 (App. Div. 2019)
(alteration in original) (quoting Russo v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 324 N.J. Super.
576, 584 (App. Div. 1999)).
"A reviewing court 'may not substitute its own judgment for the
agency's, even though the court might have reached a different result. '" Id. at
238-39 (quoting Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 194). "This is particularly true when
the issue under review is directed to the agency's special 'expertise and
superior knowledge of a particular field.'" Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 195 (quoting
In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 28 (2007)).
Our review, however, is not "'perfunctory,' nor is 'our function . . .
merely [to] rubberstamp an agency's decision.'" Blanchard, 461 N.J. Super. at
239 (alteration in original) (quoting Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J.
Super. 186, 192 (App. Div. 2010)). Instead, we "engage in a 'careful and
principled consideration of the agency record and findings,'" and will "disturb
[the DOC's] adjudicatory decision only upon a finding that the decision is
'arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable,' or is unsupported 'by substantial[,]
credible evidence in the record as a whole.'" Ibid. at 237-38 (first quoting
Williams v. Dep't of Corr., 330 N.J. Super. 197, 204 (App. Div. 2000); and
then quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980)).
A-3079-23 5 In determining whether the FAD is arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable, we consider: "(1) whether the [DOC]'s decision conforms with
relevant law; (2) whether the decision is supported by substantial credible
evidence in the record; and (3) whether, in applying the law to the facts,
the[DOC] clearly erred in reaching its conclusion." Conley v. Dep't of Corr.,
452 N.J. Super. 605, 613 (App. Div. 2018) (citing Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 194).
In the context of inmate discipline, N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.15(a) requires a
finding of guilt on a disciplinary charge to be based on "substantial evidence."
We have defined substantial, credible evidence as "such evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion," or as
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3079-23
JOHN FREDLAW,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent. ___________________________
Submitted October 22, 2025 – Decided November 19, 2025
Before Judges Paganelli and Vanek.
On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Corrections.
John Fredlaw, appellant pro se.
Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Donna Arons, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Joseph D. Sams, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM John Fredlaw, a formerly incarcerated individual at Mid-State
Correctional Facility (MSCF), appeals from a final agency decision (FAD) by
the New Jersey Department of Corrections (DOC) finding him guilty of
prohibited act *.203 under N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a)(6)(i). We affirm.
I.
On February 15, 2024, Fredlaw was charged with prohibited act *.203
which penalizes "possession or introduction of any prohibited substance, such
as drugs, intoxicants, or related paraphernalia not prescribed for the inmate by
the medical or dental staff." N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a)(6)(i). The charge was
referred to a hearing officer. At the hearing, Fredlaw pleaded not guilty. After
a counsel-substitute was appointed at his request, he declined the opportunity
to call witnesses or to submit documents.
The hearing officer considered DOC Officer Sullivan's (Officer
Sullivan) observations relative to the *.203 charge. Officer Sullivan reported
that during a "linen compliance check" on the morning of February 15, 2024,
he discovered a defaced, plastic peanut butter jar containing a "brown leafy
substance inside the wall locker of cell 7E-16B[,] belonging to Fredlaw." He
confiscated the container, photographed it, and placed it into the Special
Investigation Department's evidence locker.
A-3079-23 2 DOC medical personnel obtained a urine specimen and tested it for
controlled dangerous substances (CDS). Fredlaw's urine specimen tested
negative for CDS. Officer Sullivan then authored a disciplinary report and
issued the *.203 charge to Fredlaw. Field test results showed the "brown leafy
substance" tested positive for synthetic cannabinoids.
At his disciplinary hearing, Fredlaw testified the substance in the
container was tea he had been drinking because he was sick. Fredlaw asserted
a teabag broke and he emptied the tea leaves out of the bag and into the
container so that he could continue drinking it to mitigate an ailment.
Fredlaw's counsel substitute requested leniency and requested a second test to
confirm whether the substance found in Fredlaw's cell wall locker contained
synthetic cannabinoids.
The hearing officer found no evidence contradicting the DOC's proofs,
other than Fredlaw's testimony. The hearing officer found the substance was
in an altered peanut butter jar and stated tea at MSCF is "neither sold nor
stored" in that manner. The hearing officer further reasoned Fredlaw's storage
of the substance in the altered peanut butter jar appeared consistent with
possession of CDS, which was confirmed by the field test result.
The hearing officer concluded Fredlaw committed prohibited act *.203
by possessing CDS and sanctioned him to sixty days in MSCF's restorative
A-3079-23 3 housing unit, revoked his communication time for sixty days, and permanently
rescinded his contact visitation privileges. Fredlaw agreed to participate in the
DOC's Drug Diversion Program in lieu of some of the sanctions.
The same day, Fredlaw appealed the hearing officer's decision. He once
again asserted the substance was loose tea leftover from a broken teabag and
contested the DOC's decision to not conduct a second test on the substance.
Fredlaw argued the hearing officer's finding was not predicated on substantial,
credible evidence because the DOC failed to establish the field test's reliability
and "[p]rison officials found no other evidence of drug possession ." Fredlaw
also asserted the failure to obtain a second, confirmatory test violated DOC
policy and denied him due process.
On February 23, 2024, the Associate Administrator at MSCF upheld the
hearing officer's finding in a FAD. The FAD found the DOC complied with its
own procedure in handling the evidence, the evidence supporting the charge
was sufficient, and the hearing officer's findings were neither arbitrary,
capricious, nor unreasonable.
II.
Our limited standard of review of the FAD is well settled. In re
Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011). As we have long recognized, "[p]risons
are dangerous places, and the courts must afford appropriate deference and
A-3079-23 4 flexibility to administrators trying to manage this volatile environment."
Blanchard v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 461 N.J. Super. 231, 238 (App. Div. 2019)
(alteration in original) (quoting Russo v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 324 N.J. Super.
576, 584 (App. Div. 1999)).
"A reviewing court 'may not substitute its own judgment for the
agency's, even though the court might have reached a different result. '" Id. at
238-39 (quoting Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 194). "This is particularly true when
the issue under review is directed to the agency's special 'expertise and
superior knowledge of a particular field.'" Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 195 (quoting
In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 28 (2007)).
Our review, however, is not "'perfunctory,' nor is 'our function . . .
merely [to] rubberstamp an agency's decision.'" Blanchard, 461 N.J. Super. at
239 (alteration in original) (quoting Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J.
Super. 186, 192 (App. Div. 2010)). Instead, we "engage in a 'careful and
principled consideration of the agency record and findings,'" and will "disturb
[the DOC's] adjudicatory decision only upon a finding that the decision is
'arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable,' or is unsupported 'by substantial[,]
credible evidence in the record as a whole.'" Ibid. at 237-38 (first quoting
Williams v. Dep't of Corr., 330 N.J. Super. 197, 204 (App. Div. 2000); and
then quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980)).
A-3079-23 5 In determining whether the FAD is arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable, we consider: "(1) whether the [DOC]'s decision conforms with
relevant law; (2) whether the decision is supported by substantial credible
evidence in the record; and (3) whether, in applying the law to the facts,
the[DOC] clearly erred in reaching its conclusion." Conley v. Dep't of Corr.,
452 N.J. Super. 605, 613 (App. Div. 2018) (citing Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 194).
In the context of inmate discipline, N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.15(a) requires a
finding of guilt on a disciplinary charge to be based on "substantial evidence."
We have defined substantial, credible evidence as "such evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion," or as
"evidence furnishing a reasonable basis for the agency's action." Figueroa,
414 N.J. Super. at 192 (internal quotation marks omitted). The substantial
evidence standard permits an agency to apply its expertise where the evidence
supports more than one conclusion. Berta v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 473 N.J.
Super. 284, 302 (App. Div. 2022).
III.
On appeal, Fredlaw asserts the FAD should be reversed because the
*.203 charge was not supported by substantial, credible evidence and that the
disciplinary proceedings denied him due process.
A-3079-23 6 Under our deferential standard of review, we discern no error in the FAD
finding Fredlaw guilty of prohibited act *.203 because it is supported by
substantial, credible evidence in the record and is not arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable.
While Fredlaw's negative urine specimen is evidence he did not use the
substance that tested positive for synthetic cannabinoids, the hearing officer
found the leafy brown substance was secreted in a defaced peanut butter
container inside Fredlaw's cell wall locker. The hearing officer did not find
Fredlaw's testimony credible because MSCF does not provide loose tea and
Fredlaw stored the substance in a manner consistent with hiding CDS. While
the circumstantial evidence does not definitively prove the substance found in
Fredlaw's possession was a synthetic cannabinoid, when coupled with the field
test, there is a substantial, credible basis for the FAD predicated on the hearing
officer's findings.
Fredlaw has not cited any statute or regulation requiring a second field
test in order to sustain the *.203 charge against him. Furthermore, Fredlaw's
reliance on our decision in Blanchard to support his argument is misplaced. In
Blanchard, the DOC did not find any contraband in Blanchard's cell and failed
to provide any factual basis supporting indicia of CDS possession, such as
hiding the substance in an area less susceptible to discovery. 461 N.J. Super.
A-3079-23 7 at 246-47. Blanchard's negative urine screen was also found to constitute
circumstantial evidence that he did not possess narcotics. Id. at 247.
In Blanchard, the DOC's "exclusive reliance on the positive field test[]
and the absence of any other evidence of guilt" supported our conclusion that a
second, confirmatory test was required to assure fundamental fairness. Ibid.
Thus, Blanchard prohibits relying "exclusive[ly] . . . on [a] positive field test"
absent "any other evidence of guilt." Ibid. The FAD here does not implicate
the fundamental fairness concerns addressed in Blanchard because it is
predicated on the field test results and corroborating, circumstantial evidence.
Fredlaw posits a generalized argument that the DOC deprived him of due
process but does not articulate how the disciplinary hearing or the subsequent
review process failed to comport with prevailing law. See McDonald v.
Pinchak, 139 N.J. 188, 194-95 (1995); N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.1 to -9.28. Upon
review, we discern no error with the procedure employed by the DOC in
adjudicating the disciplinary charge.
Affirmed.
A-3079-23 8