John Edward Barnett v. United States

Fifth Circuit

John Edward Barnett v. United States

290 F.2d 795, 1961 U.S. App. LEXIS 4473

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

DecidedMay 17, 1961

Docket18740_1

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 290 F.2d 795 (John Edward Barnett v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

John Edward Barnett v. United States, 290 F.2d 795, 1961 U.S. App. LEXIS 4473 (5th Cir. 1961).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

On May 18, 1959 a complaint was filed with the United States Commissioner at Anniston, Alabama, charging the appellant with violation of the Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2312. At the time the complaint was filed, appellant was in the Calhoun County, Alabama, jail serving a sentence imposed by the State of Alabama. A detainer was filed with the sheriff of Calhoun County by the United States Marshal for the Northern District of Alabama. Upon completion of his sentence at the Calhoun County jail, the State of Alabama released appellant to the United States Marshal, who, pursuant to a writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum issued by a Superior Court of the State of Georgia, delivered appellant to Buchanan, Georgia, to stand trial in the Georgia State Court for assault with intent to murder. Following appellant’s conviction there, he was returned to the Northern District of Alabama, where he remained in the custody of the United States Marshal until the disposition of the pending Dyer Act case.

Appellant complains, in a motion made pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255, that his delivery by the United States Marshal to the Georgia state officials for trial for a state offense was made pursuant to a “deal” between the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Alabama and the County Prosecutor in Buchanan, Georgia, and that in some way this deal has infected the sentence imposed on appellant in the federal court under the Dyer Act count so as to render that sentence void.

Taking the appellant’s allegations as true, we fail to see how, by virtue of the “deal” made by the United States Attorney, the appellant’s sentence for the Dyer Act violation is “open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack,” as is required by § 2255. 1 See Ponzi v. Fessenden, 1922, 258 U.S. 254, 42 S.Ct. 309, 66 L.Ed. 607; Zerbst v. McPike, 5 Cir., 1938, 97 F.2d 253; Hayward v. Looney, 10 Cir., 1957, 246 F.2d 56. See also, Frisbie v. Collins, 1952, 342 U.S. 519, 72 S.Ct. 509, 96 L.Ed. 541.

The judgment of the District Court is

Affirmed.

1

. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255.

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PER CURIAM.

On May 18, 1959 a complaint was filed with the United States Commissioner at Anniston, Alabama, charging the appellant with violation of the Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2312. At the time the complaint was filed, appellant was in the Calhoun County, Alabama, jail serving a sentence imposed by the State of Alabama. A detainer was filed with the sheriff of Calhoun County by the United States Marshal for the Northern District of Alabama. Upon completion of his sentence at the Calhoun County jail, the State of Alabama released appellant to the United States Marshal, who, pursuant to a writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum issued by a Superior Court of the State of Georgia, delivered appellant to Buchanan, Georgia, to stand trial in the Georgia State Court for assault with intent to murder. Following appellant’s conviction there, he was returned to the Northern District of Alabama, where he remained in the custody of the United States Marshal until the disposition of the pending Dyer Act case.

Appellant complains, in a motion made pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255, that his delivery by the United States Marshal to the Georgia state officials for trial for a state offense was made pursuant to a “deal” between the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Alabama and the County Prosecutor in Buchanan, Georgia, and that in some way this deal has infected the sentence imposed on appellant in the federal court under the Dyer Act count so as to render that sentence void.

Taking the appellant’s allegations as true, we fail to see how, by virtue of the “deal” made by the United States Attorney, the appellant’s sentence for the Dyer Act violation is “open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack,” as is required by § 2255. 1 See Ponzi v. Fessenden, 1922, 258 U.S. 254, 42 S.Ct. 309, 66 L.Ed. 607; Zerbst v. McPike, 5 Cir., 1938, 97 F.2d 253; Hayward v. Looney, 10 Cir., 1957, 246 F.2d 56. See also, Frisbie v. Collins, 1952, 342 U.S. 519, 72 S.Ct. 509, 96 L.Ed. 541.

The judgment of the District Court is

Affirmed.

1

. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255.

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290 F.2d 795, 1961 U.S. App. LEXIS 4473, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/john-edward-barnett-v-united-states-ca5-1961.

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