John Edgar Crayton, Jr. v. the State of Texas

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin)
• Decided: March 20, 2026
• Docket: 03-24-00777-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-24-00777-CR NO. 03-24-00778-CR

John Edgar Crayton, Jr., Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE 26TH DISTRICT COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY NOS. 22-1624-K26 & 22-1625-K26 THE HONORABLE MELISSA YOUNG GOODWIN, JUDGE PRESIDING

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury found John Edgar Crayton, Jr., guilty of two counts of intoxication

manslaughter with a vehicle. See Tex. Penal Code § 49.08(b). He pleaded true to an enhancing

offense and was found to have been convicted previously of burglary of a habitation with intent

to commit a felony. The jury assessed sentence for each offense at 40 years in prison. The

sentences run concurrently.

Crayton does not challenge the guilty verdicts or prison sentences. By a single

issue, Crayton contends that the trial court erred by assessing court costs without conducting an

ability-to-pay hearing. We will affirm the judgments.

The Code of Criminal Procedure provides that, during or immediately after

imposing a sentence in a case, “a court shall inquire on the record whether the defendant has

sufficient resources or income to immediately pay all or part of the fine and costs.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.15(a-1). If a defendant does not have sufficient resources or income to

immediately pay all or part of the fine and costs, the court shall determine whether the award

should be satisfied in other specified ways. Id.

No hearing during or immediately after imposing sentence on Crayton’s ability to

pay court costs appears in the reporter’s record, but neither do we find a request for such a

hearing or an objection to its absence. At the end of the sentencing hearing, the trial court asked

if anything further was needed. Crayton asked for appointment of appellate counsel but did not

mention a hearing on his ability to pay court costs. The judgments did not state when Crayton

was to pay the costs, much less order him to pay any part of the costs immediately.

Crayton forfeited his appellate complaint about the absence of a hearing when he

failed to object to its absence. See Cruz v. State, 698 S.W.3d 265, 267–68, 271 (Tex. Crim. App.

2024). The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the ability-to-pay inquiry is not fundamental to

proper functioning of the adjudicatory system, that requesting it would not likely be futile, and

that requiring an objection to enforce it would not undermine the public’s perceptions of the

judicial system. Id. at 269. An objection is required to preserve the error for appellate review.

Id. at 266, 271. Crayton’s failure to object forfeited the complaint.

Further, even if the claimed error were preserved for appellate review, it is not

reversible. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2 (defining reversible error on constitutional and other

grounds). In addition to concluding that such error is not fundamental, the Cruz court noted that

relief from costs such as delayed or periodic payments, community service, and fine-and-costs

waiver is “available forever after sentencing.” 698 S.W.3d at 269. Crayton’s complaint is that

his ability to pay was not assessed on the record, but if payment of the costs is demanded and

Crayton is unable to pay court costs, he can seek relief from the trial court then. See Tex. Code

2 Crim. Proc. art. 43.035(a) ) (providing that if defendant notifies trial court that defendant has

difficulty paying fine and costs in compliance with judgment, “the court shall hold a hearing to

determine whether that portion of the judgment imposes an undue hardship on the defendant”),

(b) (listing methods by which defendant may notify trial court of difficulty in making payment),

(e) (providing that trial court “retains jurisdiction” for that purpose). If the trial court determines

that undue hardship exists, the court will consider whether the costs should be satisfied through a

different method. See id. art. 43.035(c); see also Cruz, 698 S.W.3d at 269. Because Crayton’s

ability to pay the assessed costs can be evaluated in the future, Crayton has presented no

meritorious basis to reverse the judgments.

Finding that the error asserted was not preserved and that, even if it had been, the

error asserted is not reversible, we affirm the judgments.

__________________________________________ Darlene Byrne, Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Theofanis and Crump

Affirmed

Filed: March 20, 2026

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