JOHN DOE1 v. REED

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: October 22, 2009
• Docket: 09-35818
• Status: Published

Opinion

FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHN DOE #1, an individual; JOHN  DOE #2, an individual; PROTECT MARRIAGE WASHINGTON, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. No. 09-35818 SAM REED, in his official capacity  DC No. as Secretary of State of CV 09-5456 BHS Washington; BRENDA GALARZA, in her official capacity as Public records Officer for the Secretary of State of Washington, Defendants-Appellants.  JOHN DOE #1, an individual; JOHN  DOE #2, an individual; PROTECT MARRIAGE WASHINGTON, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. SAM REED, in his official capacity No. 09-35826 as Secretary of State of  DC No. Washington; BRENDA GALARZA, in CV 09-5456 BHS her official capacity as Public records Officer for the Secretary of State of Washington, Defendants, and 

14587 14588 DOE #1 v. REED

WASHINGTON COALITION FOR OPEN  GOVERNMENT,  Defendant-intervenor-Appellant.  JOHN DOE #1, an individual; JOHN  DOE #2, an individual; PROTECT MARRIAGE WASHINGTON, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. WASHINGTON FAMILIES STANDING No. 09-35863 TOGETHER, Intervenor-Appellant,  DC No. CV 09-5456 BHS SAM REED, in his official capacity OPINION as Secretary of State of Washington; BRENDA GALARZA, in her official capacity as Public records Officer for the Secretary of State of Washington, Defendants.  Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted October 14, 2009—Pasadena, California

Filed October 22, 2009

Before: Harry Pregerson, A. Wallace Tashima, and N. Randy Smith, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Tashima DOE #1 v. REED 14591 COUNSEL

James Bopp, Jr., Bopp, Coleson & Bostrom, Terre Haute, Indiana, for the plaintiffs-appellees.

William B. Collins, Deputy Solicitor General, Robert M. McKenna, Attorney General of Washington, Olympia, Wash- ington, for the defendants-appellants.

Leslie R. Weatherhead, Witherspoon, Kelley, Davenport & Toole, Spokane, Washington, for intervenor-appellant Wash- ington Coalition for Open Government.

Amanda J. Beane, Perkins Coie, Seattle, Washington, for intervenor-appellant Washington Families Standing Together.

OPINION

TASHIMA, Circuit Judge:

Washington’s Secretary of State and Public Records Offi- cer (together, the “State”) and Intervenors, Washington Coali- tion for Open Government (“WCOG”) and Washington Families Standing Together (“WFST”), appeal a decision of the district court granting Plaintiffs, Protect Marriage Wash- ington (“PMW”) and two individual signers of the Referen- dum 71 petition, a preliminary injunction prohibiting the State from making referendum petitions available in response to requests made under Washington’s Public Records Act (the “PRA”). Wash. Rev. Code § 42.56.001 et seq.

Under the Washington Constitution, a referendum must be ordered on a bill passed by the legislature if a specified per- centage of voters sign a petition for a referendum. The Refer- endum 71 petition calls for a statewide election on Engrossed Second Substitute Senate Bill 5688 (“SB 5688”), which 14592 DOE #1 v. REED would expand the rights and responsibilities accorded state- registered domestic partners. The PRA makes public records, including referendum petitions, available for public inspec- tion. In seeking a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs argued that, as applied to referendum petitions, the PRA violates the First Amendment. We have jurisdiction over this appeal from the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). We reverse.

BACKGROUND

I. Washington’s Public Records Act

The PRA requires state agencies to make public records available for public inspection and copying. Wash. Rev. Code § 42.56.070. It provides that “[i]n the event of conflict between the provisions of [the PRA] and any other act, the provisions of [the PRA] shall govern.” Wash. Rev. Code § 42.56.030. Although the PRA contains some exemptions, none applies to referendum petitions. The PRA was enacted through the initiative process and includes its own rule of con- struction:

The people insist on remaining informed so that they may maintain control over the instruments that they have created. This chapter shall be liberally con- strued and its exemptions narrowly construed to pro- mote this public policy and to assure that the public interest will be fully protected.

Wash. Rev. Code § 42.56.030.

II. Washington’s Referendum Process

Under the Washington Constitution, although legislative authority is vested in the state legislature, the people reserve to themselves the power to reject any bill or law through the DOE #1 v. REED 14593 referendum process. Wash. Const., art. II, §§ 1 & 1(b).1 To initiate the referendum process, petitions must be filed with the Secretary of State containing the valid signatures of Washington registered voters in a number equal to four per- cent of the votes cast for the Office of Governor in the imme- diately preceding gubernatorial election. Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.72.150. Referendum petition sheets must include a place for each signer to sign and print his or her name, address, city, and county at which he or she is registered to vote. Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.72.130.

Once the referendum petition is filed, the Secretary of State must verify and canvass the names of the voters who signed the petition. Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.72.230. The verification and canvassing “may be observed by persons representing the advocates and opponents of the proposed measure so long as they make no record of the names, addresses, or other infor- mation on the petitions or related records during the verifica- tion process except upon the order of the superior court of Thurston county.” Id. The Secretary of State may limit the number of observers to two opponents and two proponents of the referendum if the Secretary of State deems that “a greater number would cause undue delay or disruption of the verifica- tion process.” Id.

After verification and canvassing, the Secretary of State issues a determination of whether the referendum petition contains the requisite number of valid signatures. Any citizen dissatisfied with that determination may apply to the Thurston County Superior Court for a citation requiring the Secretary of State to submit the petition to the superior court “for exam- ination, and for a writ of mandate compelling the certification of the measure and petition, or for an injunction to prevent the certification thereof to the legislature, as the case may be.” Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.72.240. Within five days of the supe- 1 The Washington Constitution includes some exceptions to this reserved power, but none applies in this case. 14594 DOE #1 v. REED rior court’s decision, a party may seek review by the Wash- ington Supreme Court. Id.

If it is ultimately determined that a petition contains the requisite number of valid signatures, the referendum is sub- mitted to a vote at the next general election. Wash. Const., art. II, § 1(d).

III. Referendum 71

The Washington Governor signed SB 5688 on May 18, 2009. Known as the “everything but marriage act,” the bill expands the rights and responsibilities of state-registered domestic partners. On or about May 4, 2009, Larry Stickney, the campaign manager for PMW,2 filed notice with the Secre- tary of State of his intent to circulate a referendum petition on SB 5688. On July 25, 2009, PMW submitted the petition with more than 138,500 signatures to the Secretary of State for ver- ification and canvassing.3

The petition, entitled “Preserve Marriage, Protect Chil- dren,” includes a table for the following information for each signer: printed name, signature, home address, city and county, and an optional email address. The petition also states:

To the Honorable Sam Reed, Secretary of State of the State of Washington:

We, the undersigned citizens and legal voters of the 2 PMW was organized as a state political committee pursuant to Wash. Rev. Code § 42.17.040. Its purposes are to collect the requisite number of signatures to place Referendum 71 on the ballot and to encourage Wash- ington voters to reject SB 5688. 3 The State asserts that about 122,000 signatures were valid. Presumably, the PRA would make available all 138,500 signatures, however, because all petition sheets, not only valid signatures, comprise the public records. DOE #1 v. REED 14595 State of Washington, respectfully order and direct that Referendum No. 71 . . . shall be referred to the people of the state for their approval or rejection at the regular election to be held on the 3rd day of November, 2009; and each of us for himself or her- self says: I have personally received this petition, I am a legal voter for the State of Washington, in the city (or town) and county written after my name, my residence address is correctly stated, and I have knowingly signed this petition only once.

Pursuant to Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.72.140, the petition warns that “[e]very person who signs this petition with any other than his or her true name, knowingly signs more than one of these petitions, signs the petition when he or she is not a legal voter, or makes any false statement on this petition may be punished by fine or imprisonment or both.”

As of August 20, 2009, the Secretary of State had received public record requests for the Referendum 71 petition from Brian Murphy of WhoSigned.org, Toby Nixon of WCOG, Arthur West, Brian Spencer on behalf of Desire Enterprises, and Anne Levinson on behalf of WFST. Two entities, KnowThyNeighbor.org and WhoSigned.org, publicly stated that they intend to publish the names of petition signers on the internet. Plaintiffs allege that these two groups have encour- aged individuals to contact petition signers to have “personal” and “uncomfortable” conversations.4 4 Plaintiffs appear to be referring to a June 8, 2009, press release: “What does happen,” says [Aaron Toleos, co-director of KnowThyNeighbor.org], “is that conversations are triggered between people that already have a personal connection like friends, relatives, and neighbors.” “These conversations can be uncomfortable for both parties,” he said, “but they are desperately needed to break down stereotypes and to help both sides realize how much they actually have in common.” 14596 DOE #1 v. REED IV. Procedural History

On July 28, 2009, Plaintiffs filed this action, seeking to enjoin the State from publicly releasing documents showing the names and contact information of the individuals who signed petitions in support of Referendum 71. Count I of the complaint alleges that, as applied to referendum petitions, the PRA violates the First Amendment because the PRA is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. Count II alleges that, as applied to the Referendum 71 peti- tion, the PRA is unconstitutional because “there is a reason- able probability that the signatories . . . will be subjected to threats, harassment, and reprisals.”

The district court granted Plaintiffs a temporary restraining order on July 29, 2009, and, after a hearing, granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction on September 10, 2009, enjoining release of the Referendum 71 petition.5 The district court applied strict scrutiny to the PRA and concluded that Plaintiffs established they were likely to succeed on Count I of their complaint.6 The State and Intervenors timely appealed.

On September 14, 2009, the State moved this court for an emergency stay and to expedite its appeal. We consolidated the State’s appeal with those of Intervenors WCOG and WFST. Because the election on Referendum 71 is set for November 3, 2009, we ordered expedited briefing on the con- solidated appeals and heard oral argument on October 14, 2009, on the merits of the appeals, as well as on the stay motion.7 5 On September 3, 2009, the district court granted the motions to inter- vene of WFST and WCOG. 6 The district court based its preliminary injunction only on Count I. Because the district court did not reach the merits of Count II, we likewise do not reach Count II in reviewing the injunction. 7 We appreciate all counsel’s efforts and cooperation in meeting a highly-expedited briefing schedule. DOE #1 v. REED 14597 On October 15, 2009, we granted a stay pending our disposi- tion on the merits of these appeals.8 We now reverse the pre- liminary injunction.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

As recently articulated by the Supreme Court, a “plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish [1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunc- tion is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008).

We review the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunc- tion for abuse of discretion. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of L.A., 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Lands Council v. Martin, 479 F.3d 636, 639 (9th Cir. 2007)). A dis- trict court abuses its discretion if it bases its decision on an erroneous legal standard or clearly erroneous findings of fact. Sierra Forest Legacy v. Rey, 577 F.3d 1015, 1021 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Am. Trucking, 559 F.3d at 1052). Thus, applica- tion of an incorrect legal standard in granting preliminary injunctive relief or with regard to an underlying issue is grounds for reversal. See Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 351 F.3d 1291, 1298 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).

ANALYSIS

We are presented with the novel questions of whether refer- endum petition signatures are protected speech under the First Amendment and, if so, what level of scrutiny applies to gov- 8 On October 19, 2009, the Circuit Justice stayed our stay order. Doe #1 v. Reed, No. 09A356 (U.S. Oct. 19, 2009) (Kennedy, Circuit Justice). The application was thereafter referred to the full Court which confirmed the stay. Id. (Oct. 20, 2009). Nothing in either of those orders affects our con- sideration of the merits of these appeals. 14598 DOE #1 v. REED ernment action that burdens such speech. For the purposes of our analysis, we assume, as did the district court, that the act of signing a referendum petition is speech, such that the First Amendment is implicated.9 See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (noting that when a litigant challenges a statute on First Amendment grounds, the thresh- old question is whether the statute burdens expression the First Amendment protects). Even assuming that speech is involved, however, we conclude that the district court applied an erroneous legal standard when it subjected the PRA to strict scrutiny.

I. District court’s analysis

[1] The district court’s analysis was based on the faulty premise that the PRA regulates anonymous political speech. The signatures at issue, however, are not anonymous. First, the petitions are gathered in public, and there is no showing that the signature-gathering process is performed in a manner designed to protect the confidentiality of those who sign the petition. Second, each petition sheet contains spaces for 20 signatures, exposing each signature to view by up to 19 other signers and any number of potential signers. Third, any rea- sonable signer knows, or should know, that the petition must be submitted to the State to determine whether the referendum qualifies for the ballot, and the State makes no promise of confidentiality, either statutorily or otherwise. In fact, the PRA provides to the contrary. Fourth, Washington law specif- ically provides that both proponents and opponents of a refer- 9 The State contends, with some force, that signing a referendum petition is not speech, but is instead, a legislative act, i.e., that it is an integral part of the exercise of the legislative power reserved to the people by the Washington Constitution. See State ex rel. Heavey v. Murphy, 982 P.2d 611, 615 (Wash. 1999) (“ ‘A referendum . . . is an exercise of the reserved power of the people to legislate . . . .’ ” (quoting Belas v. Kiga, 959 P.2d 1037, 1040-41 (Wash. 1998))). Because we assume, for purposes of this case, that signing a referendum petition is speech, we do not reach this argument and intimate no view on it. DOE #1 v. REED 14599 endum petition have the right to observe the State’s signature verification and canvassing process. Thus, the district court’s finding that the speech at issue is anonymous is clearly errone- ous.10 And, because it was based on that faulty premise, the district court’s application of anonymous speech cases requir- ing strict scrutiny was error.

[2] To the extent the district court did not rely exclusively on anonymous speech cases, the district court nonetheless erred in applying strict scrutiny. Relying on Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 420-21 (1988), and Buckley v. Am. Constitu- tional Law Found. (Buckley II), 525 U.S. 182, 197 (1999), the district court concluded that petition signing, like petition cir- culation, is protected political speech, and suggested that any regulation of protected political speech is subject to strict scrutiny. This suggestion is unsupported by the applicable case law. Even assuming, as we do here, that petition signing is protected political speech, it does not follow that a regula- tion that burdens such speech is necessarily subject to strict scrutiny. See e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 661-62 (1994) (applying intermediate scrutiny for viewpoint- and content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions on speech); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (applying balancing test to election restriction that bur- dened First Amendment rights); Lincoln Club of Orange County v. City of Irvine, 292 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he level of constitutional scrutiny that we apply to a stat- utory restriction on political speech and associational freedom is dictated by both the intrinsic strength of, and the magnitude of the burden placed on, the speech and associational free- doms at issue.”). 10 This appears to be more an assumption than a finding. All that the dis- trict court “found” on this issue was that “at this time, the Court is not per- suaded that waiver of one’s fundamental right to anonymous political speech is a prerequisite for participation in Washington’s referendum pro- cess.” All of the facts underlying this finding are undisputed. We have, nonetheless, applied the deferential clear error standard of review to this finding. 14600 DOE #1 v. REED II. Applicable level of scrutiny

Having concluded that the district court’s basis for applying strict scrutiny was in error, we turn to the PRA and determine what standard should be applied.

[3] As noted above, not all laws that burden First Amend- ment rights are subject to strict scrutiny. A regulation that has an incidental effect on expressive conduct is constitutional as long as it withstands intermediate scrutiny. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968); Jacobs v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419, 434 (9th Cir. 2008).

In O’Brien, a student was arrested for burning his draft card in protest of the Vietnam War. 391 U.S. at 369-70. The stu- dent argued the statute was an unconstitutional infringement upon his right to engage in political speech. Id. at 370. The Supreme Court first assumed that “the alleged communicative element in O’Brien’s conduct [was] sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment.” Id. at 376. The Court then con- cluded that “when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently impor- tant governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech ele- ment can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.” Id. at 376. Applying intermediate scrutiny, the Court concluded that the draft card statute was not unconstitu- tional as applied to O’Brien. Id. at 377.

[4] As in O’Brien, we assume for the purposes of our anal- ysis that signing a referendum petition has a “speech” element such that petition signing qualifies as expressive conduct. We also assume that the PRA’s public access provision has an incidental effect on referendum petition signers’ speech by deterring some would-be signers from signing petitions. Given these assumptions, we conclude that intermediate scru- tiny applies to the PRA.11 11 We note that “election regulations” are subject to a different analysis altogether. Instead of applying O’Brien intermediate scrutiny, courts apply DOE #1 v. REED 14601 [5] Under intermediate scrutiny, as articulated in O’Brien, application of the PRA to referendum petitions is constitu- tional if the PRA is within the constitutional power of the government to enforce, it furthers an important government interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment free- doms is no greater than necessary to justify the interest. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377; see also Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984).

a balancing test to determine whether an election regulation is a permissi- ble infringement on First Amendment free speech rights. See Caruso v. Yamhill County ex rel. County Comm’r, 422 F.3d 848, 859 (9th Cir. 2005) (when an election regulation imposes only “reasonable, nondiscriminato- ry” restrictions upon First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, “the [s]tate’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient” to justify the restrictions) (quoting Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434); see also Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (holding that only when the regulation subjects such rights to severe restrictions must it be narrowly drawn to advance a compelling state interest). We assume, however, that the PRA is not an election regu- lation. No case offers a sound definition of an election regulation, and its meaning is not entirely discernible. However, Justice Thomas, in his Buck- ley II concurrence, provides examples of cases that would likely be elec- tion regulation cases, see 525 U.S. at 207, and none of them seems to parallel the current case. For example, Justice Thomas cites Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992), wherein the Court subjected to strict scrutiny a Tennessee law prohibiting solicitation of voters and distribution of campaign literature within 100 feet of the entrance of a polling place. Id. He also cited Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788-90 (1983), which dealt with a challenge to an Ohio regulation that imposed a filing deadline for independent candidates. Id. He cited several other cases. See e.g. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997); Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1982); Meyer, 486 U.S. at 421. Id. at 206-07. All of these cases, however, dealt with regulations that were content-based; they all dealt directly and specifically with the election pro- cess. The PRA, on the other hand, only incidentally deals with the election process and only has attenuated consequences. It does not prevent the peti- tion signers from signing the petitions or from otherwise lawfully qualify- ing their referendum for a vote. At most, it might deter some voters from signing the petition. 14602 DOE #1 v. REED III. Constitutionality of the PRA

Applying O’Brien, we begin by noting that Plaintiffs do not contend that “aside from its impact on speech, [the PRA] is beyond the constitutional power of the [State] to enforce.” See Clark, 468 U.S. at 298-99. We thus turn next to the govern- ment interests the PRA furthers. The State has asserted two interests: (1) preserving the integrity of the election by pro- moting government transparency and accountability; and (2) providing Washington voters with information about who supports placing a referendum on the ballot. Both interests plainly qualify as important.12

[6] “A [s]tate indisputably has a compelling interest in pre- serving the integrity of the election process.” Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 (1989) (citing Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 761 (1973)); see also Buckley II, 525 U.S. at 191 (“States allowing ballot ini- tiatives have considerable leeway to protect the integrity and reliability of the initiative process . . . .”). In Washington, the PRA plays a key role in preserving the integrity of the refer- endum process by serving a government accountability and transparency function not sufficiently served by the statutory scheme governing the referendum process. The oversight pro- cedure provided by statute allows the Secretary of State to limit observers to two opponents and two proponents of the referendum. See Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.72.230. This proce- dure is insufficient to shift oversight from the special interest groups to the general public. See Progressive Animal Welfare Soc’y v. Univ. of Wash., 884 P.2d 592, 597 (Wash. 1994) (“Without tools such as the [PRA], government of the people, by the people, for the people, risks becoming government of the people by the bureaucrats, for the special interests.”). 12 In making its strict scrutiny analysis, the district court recognized only one of these interests, “preserving the integrity of its election process,” as a “compelling governmental interest.” It did not address the State’s inter- est, furthered by the PRA, of an informed electorate. DOE #1 v. REED 14603 Without the PRA, the public is effectively deprived of the opportunity independently to examine whether the State prop- erly determined that a referendum qualified, or did not qual- ify, for the general election.

Moreover, the PRA is necessary for citizens to make mean- ingful use of the state superior court challenge also provided by statute. See Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.72.240.13 The superior court procedure would be at best inefficient and at worst use- less, if citizens have no rational basis on which to decide whether they are “dissatisfied” with the Secretary of State’s determination before filing a challenge — and they cannot gain that understanding without the right to inspect the peti- tion sheets.

We have also recognized the State’s “informational inter- est” as important. See Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Ran- dolph, 507 F.3d 1172, 1179 nn.8-9 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that the informational interest was “well-established” and that California presented persuasive evidence demonstrating that it was compelling); Canyon Ferry Rd. Baptist Church of E. Helena, Inc. v. Unsworth, 556 F.3d 1021, 1032 (9th Cir. 2009) (having “little trouble” concluding that the state’s infor- mational interest was important).

Plaintiffs correctly note that Cal. Pro-Life and Canyon Ferry dealt with the interest in disclosure of financial backers 13 That statute provides: Any citizen dissatisfied with the determination of the secretary of state that . . . [a] referendum petition contains or does not con- tain the requisite number of signatures of legal voters may, within five days after such determination, apply to the superior court of Thurston county for a citation requiring the secretary of state to submit the petition to said court for examination, and for a writ of mandate compelling the certification of the . . . petition, or for an injunction to prevent the certification thereof . . . . Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.72.240. 14604 DOE #1 v. REED of referenda, not “generally what groups may be in favor of, or opposed to, a particular . . . ballot issue.” Canyon Ferry, 556 F.3d at 1032-33 (holding that requiring disclosure of de minimus in-kind contributions was unconstitutional because the marginal informational gain did not justify the burden of disclosure). Referendum petition signers, however, cannot be considered “generally” in favor of a particular ballot issue. Referendum petition signers have not merely taken a general stance on a political issue; they have taken action that has direct legislative effect. The interest in knowing who has taken such action is undoubtedly greater than knowing gener- ally what groups are in favor of or opposed to a ballot issue.

[7] We conclude that each of the State’s asserted interests is sufficiently important to justify the PRA’s incidental limita- tions on referendum petition signers’ First Amendment free- doms. See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77. We conclude also that the incidental effect of the PRA on speech is no greater than necessary. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798-99 (holding that a restriction need not be the least restrictive means of furthering the State’s interest to survive intermediate scrutiny).

[8] Finally, no one has claimed that the State’s interests are at all related to the suppression or regulation of expression. The stated aim of the PRA, which itself was passed through the initiative process, is to keep the citizens “informed so that they may maintain control over the instruments that they have created.” Wash. Rev. Code § 42.56.030. There is no indica- tion that despite this clear statement, the PRA was nonetheless intended to suppress free expression.

[9] Accordingly, we hold that the PRA as applied to refer- endum petitions does not violate the First Amendment.14 14 Because we conclude that Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the first Winters factor — likelihood of success on the merits — we need not examine the three remaining Winters factors, see supra at 14597 (quoting DOE #1 v. REED 14605 CONCLUSION

The district court applied an erroneous legal standard when it applied strict scrutiny to the PRA. The proper analysis was to apply intermediate scrutiny. Applying this analysis, we conclude that the PRA is constitutional as applied to referen- dum petitions.

The district court’s grant of the preliminary injunction is

REVERSED.

the four-factor Winters test), although we note that the district court’s analysis of the remaining Winters factors relied on presumptions, rather than findings of fact, arising from its erroneous legal conclusion that Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights were likely violated.