John Doe v. United States of America, et al.

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: December 30, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-06482
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JOHN DOE, Case No. 25-cv-06482-WHO 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 9 v. DISMISS AND MOTIONS TO SEAL 10 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Re: Dkt. Nos. 21, 23, 24, 27, 32, 34, 35 ll Defendants. ao 12

13 Defendants seek to dismiss plaintiff John Doe’s complaint for lack of subject matter

14 || jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Because Doe’s claims cannot be

2 15 || addressed by a district court or are moot, I agree that I lack subject matter jurisdiction over this

A 16 || dispute. Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED.!

17 BACKGROUND Z 18 Doe is a J national who entered the Or on a B-2 tourist 19 |} visa. See Complaint (“Compl.”) [Dkt. No. 1] at 7. On Doe filed an I-589 asylum 20 21 | Doe also filed two motions to seal, a motion to file a sur-reply, and a motion to appoint a 27 || Mandarin courtroom reporter. See Dkt. Nos. 14, 27 (motions to seal); 34 (sur-reply); 35 (Mandarin interpreter). Doe’s motions to seal are GRANTED. Doe requests that I seal various 93 || USCIS documents relating to his asylum application, as well as portions of exhibits in his Opposition to the motion to dismiss, as they contain “information that could lead to identification 24 || of Plaimtiff or expose him to safety risks.” Dkt. No. 27 at 1. I agree that such concems satisfy the “compelling reasons” standard for sealing, and that the documents and portions of the exhibits 95 || identified by Doe in Dockets 14 and 27 should be sealed. See Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1096 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (finding compelling reasons to seal documents related to asylum 26 || applications “due to [their] potential to identify Petitioner and the sensitive nature of the allegations”). Doe’s motion to file a sur-reply is also GRANTED; I will consider the sur-reply 97 || attached to his motion when discussing the issue of Doe agreeing to voluntary departure. Finally, Doe’s motion to appoint a Mandarin interpret is DENIED as moot, as I did not hold oral argument 9g || for this motion.

1 application with the United States Customs and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), alleging 2 || political persecution and retaliation by the □□ Id. at 8-9. While his 3 || application was processing, Doe claims that USCIS committed numerous procedural violations 4 || that form the basis of this action. First, he asserts that USCIS allowed for his application to pend 5 || for over a days, despite statutory authority suggesting that asylum applications be “decided 6 || within 180 days of filing”? See id. at 10. He also maintains that the USCIS system showed 7 || contradictory statuses concerning his application, registering it as “closed” in some contexts and 8 || “pending” in others. See id. at 10-11. For instance, Doe received a C08 work authorization card 9 || after the USCIS closed his application, despite such work permits only being available for those 10 || with pending asylum applications. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.7(b). As □ result, Doe filed this action 11 against defendants on August 1, 2025, alleging various violations of the Administrative Procedure 12 || Act (‘APA”) and the Federal Torts Claims Act (“FTCA”). See Compl. at 18-37. 13 On August 22, 2025, USCIS issued a referral notice for Doe’s asylum application and a 14 || Notice to Appear (“NTA”) requiring Doe to appear before an immigration judge in the Executive 3 15 || Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) on September 24, 2025. See Emergency Amended a 16 || Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (“Second TRO”) [Dkt. No. 13] at 2; Second TRO Ex. A = 17 || (‘Referral Notice”) [Dkt. No. 13-4] at 1. In its referral letter, USCIS noted that while Doe failed Z 18 || to provide grounds to show persecution i this decision was “not a denial of [his] asylum 19 || application.” Referral Notice at 1 (emphasis in original). Rather, Doe would have the 20 || opportunity to “request that the immigration judge consider [his] asylum application, and [he] may 21 amend [his] application when [he] appear[ed] before the immigration judge.” Jd. The letter also 22 clarified that the immigration judge in the EOIR would “evaluate [his] asylum claim 23 independently and [was] not required to rely on or follow the decision made by USCIS.” Jd. 24 On August 22, 2025—the same day as the USCIS referral notice—Doe filed a Temporary 25 || Restraming Order (“TRO”), requesting that I (1) stay the removal proceedings, (2) preserve 26 27 > Doe specifically references 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(5)(A) (Gai), which provides: “[T]n the absence of exceptional circumstances, final administrative adjudication of [an] asylum application, not 28 including administrative appeal, shall be completed within 180 days after the date an application is

1 federal jurisdiction over his claim, and (3) cure the alleged procedural violations in the USCIS 2 record. See Second TRO at 4–5. Defendants then filed a joint motion to dismiss and opposition to 3 the TRO on September 3, 2025. See Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for 4 TRO (“Mot.”) [Dkt. No 21]. Doe filed his opposition to the motion to dismiss on September 4, 5 2025, see Plaintiff’s Reply in Support of Emergency TRO (“Oppo.”) [Dkt. No. 24], and 6 defendants filed their reply on September 26, 2025. See Defendant’s Reply in Support of their 7 Motion to Dismiss (“Repl.”) [Dkt. No. 32]. 8 On September 18, 2025, I denied Doe’s request for a TRO on the grounds that the “risk of 9 injury outlined” did not support granting emergency relief. See Order Denying Plaintiff’s 10 Amended Motion for a TRO [Dkt. No. 29] at 1. On the question of jurisdiction, I noted that “to 11 the extent that I have jurisdiction at the moment, I will have it” when deciding the motion to 12 dismiss. Id.3 13 On September 24, 2025, Doe appeared before an immigration judge at the EOIR, who 14 granted him pre-conclusion voluntary departure under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, with a departure deadline 15 of January 22, 2026. See Plaintiff’s Notice of Recent Development (“Notice”) [Dkt. No. 33] at 1; 16 Notice Ex. A (“Order of the Immigration Judge”). Both parties waived their right to appeal the 17 voluntary departure decision. Notice at 2. 18 LEGAL STANDARD 19 A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is a challenge to the court’s subject 20 matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “Federal courts are courts of limited 21 jurisdiction,” and it is “presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. 22 Guardian Life Ins. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The party invoking the jurisdiction of the 23 federal court bears the burden of establishing that the court has the requisite subject matter 24 jurisdiction to grant the relief requested. Id. 25 A challenge pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) may be facial or factual. See Safe Air Safe Air for 26

27 3 Citing to no authority, Doe asserted that “unless emergency relief [was] granted,” I would lose 1 Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In a facial attack, the jurisdictional 2 challenge is confined to the allegations pled in the complaint. See Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 3 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004). The challenger asserts that the allegations in the complaint are 4 insufficient “on their face” to invoke federal jurisdiction. See Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039. To 5 resolve this challenge, the court assumes that the allegations in the complaint are true and draws 6 all reasonable inference in favor of the party opposing dismissal. See Wolfe, 392 F.3d at 362. 7 “By contrast, in a factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by 8 themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039. To resolve 9 this challenge, the court “need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff’s allegations.” Id. 10 (citation omitted). Instead, the court “may review evidence beyond the complaint without 11 converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Id. (citations omitted). 12 “Once the moving party has converted the motion to dismiss into a factual motion by presenting 13 affidavits or other evidence properly brought before the court, the party opposing the motion must 14 furnish affidavits or other evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of establishing subject matter 15 jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch. Dist. No. 205, 343 F.3d 1036, 16 1040 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003)). 17 DISCUSSION 18 The parties’ briefing raises thorny issues regarding immigration law and subject matter 19 jurisdiction. This case is also complicated by how it has developed since defendants first filed 20 their motion to dismiss, as Doe has now been provided with a voluntary departure date of January 21 22, 2026. It is also complicated by the fact that Doe admitted to using artificial intelligence to 22 draft his opposition, which presented challenges to determining the authenticity of his arguments. 23 While I do not downplay Doe’s concerns about the status of his immigration case, as I explain 24 below, I do not see how this case can proceed any further in federal district court. 25 A. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) 26 Defendants first argue that I lack subject matter jurisdiction to consider “any challenge to 27 [their] decision to initiate removal proceedings through the filing of an NTA.” Oppo. at 11. In 1 cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney 2 General to commence proceedings . . . under this chapter,” controls. Id. This provision, as 3 defendants read it, provides the Secretary of Homeland Security (and therefore, the USCIS) with 4 the ultimate “discretion” over matters relating to removal proceedings, and precludes district 5 courts from considering such cases. See id. at 11–12. Instead, judicial review is directed to 6 appellate courts “following issuance of an administratively final removal order.” See id. at 12; 8 7 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). 8 While 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) does establish the jurisdictional boundaries for a district court’s 9 review of immigration proceedings, the Supreme Court has clarified that this provision must be 10 read narrowly. In Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, the Court held that § 11 1252(g) applies “only to three discrete actions”—the “decision or action” to “commence 12 proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.” 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (emphasis in 13 original). Here, Doe raises claims regarding alleged procedural defects that occurred while the 14 USCIS processed his I-589 asylum application. As Doe candidly admits, his complaint does not 15 contest the USCIS’s decision regarding his application; rather, he seeks to “[r]econcile and correct 16 all . . . records regarding [his] asylum case.” Oppo. at 8. In my view, claims regarding procedural 17 defects may not fall squarely within the USCIS “commenc[ing] proceedings, adjudicat[ing] cases, 18 or execut[ing] removal orders.” See Reno, 525 U.S. at 482. Accordingly, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) 19 likely does not bar me from considering Doe’s procedural due process challenges. However, as 20 explained below, other procedural barriers preclude Doe’s claim from proceeding any further. 21 B. APA Final Agency Action 22 Under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), “agency action is subject to judicial 23 review only when it is either: (1) made reviewable by statute; or (2) a ‘final’ action ‘for which 24 there is no other adequate remedy in a court.’” Cabaccang v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration 25 Servs., 627 F.3d 1313, 1315 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 704)). Defendants assert I lack 26 jurisdiction to consider Doe’s challenges to his USCIS asylum application review under the 27 APA—specifically, for Count One (unreasonable delay in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)), Count 1 (arbitrary and capricious agency action in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) & (e))—as no final 2 administrative action has been taken. See Mot. at 9–10. Conversely, Doe claims that at least two 3 decisions by the USCIS constituted a “final action”—first, in June 2024, when the USCIS falsely 4 “closed” his asylum application; and second, in December 2024, when Doe received a C08 work 5 authorization card. See Oppo. at 5. 6 In support of their argument, defendants rely primarily on Caccabang v. U.S. Citizen and 7 Immigration Services, where the Ninth Circuit concluded that decisions on asylum applications by 8 the USCIS do not constitute final administrative action. 627 F.3d at 1318. The court emphasized 9 that the “indicium of finality in the administrative process” rests upon a showing of an “obligation 10 or the fixing of a legal relationship,” which USCIS decisions do not provide. Id. at 1315. After 11 the USCIS transfers jurisdiction of an asylum application to the EOIR, the nonresident still can 12 still “renew their application[]” for asylum and “fully develop their arguments before the 13 immigration judge.” Id. at 1316. The immigration judge similarly retains “unfettered authority to 14 modify or reverse USCIS’s denial” of pending applications. Id. Therefore, denial of an 15 application before the USCIS is “not yet a final agency action” because of the nonresident’s “right 16 to renew” their claims before an immigration judge. Id. 17 Caccabang controls this case. On August 22, 2025, the USCIS issued a Notice to Appear 18 for Doe, referring him to an immigration judge at the EOIR for a hearing on September 24, 2025. 19 See Dkt. No. 13 at 2. In its notice of denial, the USCIS stated that their decision was not final, and 20 that Doe would be able to present his case again before the EOIR. Doe thus retained a “right to 21 renew” and argue his case again, indicating that this decision does not constitute a “final agency 22 action” under Caccabang. 627 F.3d at 1316. 23 Circumstances have notably changed in this case, however. Since defendants filed their 24 motion to dismiss, Doe appeared before the EOIR and was granted a pre-conclusion voluntary 25 departure date of January 22, 2026. See Dkt. No. 33, Ex. A. The parties also agreed to waive their 26 rights to appeal the voluntary departure order. See id. “Except when certified to the Board [of 27 Immigration Appeals], the decision of the Immigration Judge becomes final upon waiver of appeal 1 voluntary departure date has been provided, final agency action has consummated at this point. 2 However, the Ninth Circuit has indicated that final agency action is a jurisdictional question that 3 must be determined at the time of filing. See Doe 1 v. Mayorkas, 505 F. Supp. 3d 893, 910 (N.D. 4 Cal. 2021) (citing S.F. Herring Ass’n v. Dep’t of the Interior, 946 F.3d 564, 571 (9th Cir. 2019)). 5 Doe has failed to show that there was final agency action at the time of filing, so dismissal of the 6 APA claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is proper. Accordingly, Counts One, Two, and 7 Three of Doe’s complaint are DISMISSED. 8 C. Mootness 9 Finally, some of Doe’s claims also fail on grounds of mootness. “A case becomes moot— 10 and therefore no longer a Case or Controversy for purposes of Article III—when the issues 11 presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” 12 Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013) (internal citations omitted). The “heavy burden 13 of persuading the court that the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to start up 14 again lies with the party asserting mootness.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envt’l Servs. 15 (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (cleaned up; internal citations omitted). 16 Defendants argue that Doe’s unreasonable delay claim should be dismissed as moot, as the 17 “relief [he] sought—adjudication of his asylum application”—was rendered by the USCIS upon 18 referring his application to EOIR for removal proceedings. Mot. at 8. In response, Doe argues 19 that his unreasonable delay claim is still “live,” as the Court can still “declare USCIS’s delay 20 beyond the 180-day timeframe unlawful,” “order USCIS to reconcile/correct its internal and A-file 21 records,” or “preclude reliance (in any forum) on erroneous USCIS entries.” Oppo. at 4–5. Doe 22 also alleges that both exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply. Id. at 5. With respect to 23 voluntary cessation, Doe asserts that because defendants failed to show that it was “absolutely 24 clear the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to recur,” his claim is not moot. Id. 25 Similarly, Doe contends that the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception applies 26 since the “underlying defects (e.g., erroneous or unreconciled USCIS records” reasonably threaten 27 recurrence. Id. 1 complaint—alleging unreasonable delays by USCIS in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)—expressly 2 requests for an “[o]rder [of] completion of final asylum adjudication within 30 days, applying 3 correct legal standards and considering all submitted evidence.” Compl. at 23. Since filing their 4 complaint, the USCIS analyzed Doe’s application, concluded it was not sufficient to prove asylum 5 was necessary, and referred the case to the EOIR for removal proceedings. This is sufficient to 6 show that the claim is now moot. 7 Neither exception to the mootness doctrine saves Doe’s claim. The voluntary cessation 8 doctrine does not apply since the USCIS cannot re-refer his case to immigration court, as it lacks 9 jurisdiction to revisit his asylum application. Nor does the capable of repetition yet evading 10 review exception apply—Doe has not established a credible fear that he will be subject to the same 11 procedural defects in the review of his asylum application. Because Doe’s unreasonable delay 12 claim is moot, and no exception applies, his claim must be DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. 13 D. Federal Torts Claim Act (“FTCA”) 14 Doe’s fourth and final cause of action is for violations of the Federal Torts Claims Act 15 (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). Compl. at 34. There, he seeks damages from the USCIS to 16 “compensate [him] for economic losses caused by its negligent conduct, including . . . foreseeable 17 medical, psychiatric treatment, and medication expenses; incurred and foreseeable lost income and 18 employment opportunity losses; [and] [t]ravel, copying, and documentation expenses necessary 19 for administrative appeals and this lawsuit.” Id. at 43. But this is not a proper form of relief for a 20 FTCA claim. The APA only permits injunctive or declaratory relief such as “taking . . . action on 21 the application or petition of . . . a person,” see 5 U.S.C. § 551(11)(C), but does not permit 22 monetary relief. 5 U.S.C. § 702. Accordingly, because the United States waived sovereign 23 immunity for monetary damages under the APA, Doe is barred from bringing any prospective 24 claim for monetary damages. His FTCA claim must therefore be DENIED. 25 CONCLUSION 26 While I acknowledge the real concerns Doe has about his immigration status, this does 27 not overcome the reality that I do not have jurisdiction to hear his claims. Defendants’ motion to 1 dismiss is GRANTED. 2 IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 Dated: December 30, 2025 \ 5 6 William H. Orrick United States District Judge 4 8 9 10 ll ae 12

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