John Doe v. Department of Veterans Affairs

Merit Systems Protection Board·Decided June 1, 2023·No. DA-0752-15-0420-A-1·Unpublished

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

JOHN DOE, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DA-0752-15-0420-A-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: June 1, 2023 AFFAIRS, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Tracie Jackson, Esquire, Houston, Texas, for the appellant.

Jeffrey T. Reeder, Esquire, Dallas, Texas, for the agency.

Thomas Herpin, Esquire, Houston, Texas, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The agency has filed a petition for review of the addendum initial decision, which awarded the appellant $28,104.92 in attorney fees and costs. In its petition for review, the agency argues that, under the guidance provided by the U.S.

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

Supreme Court’s decision in Hensley v Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), the attorney fees award should be reduced on two grounds: (1) the appellant failed to prove that the work performed on his involuntary retirement appeal, on which he was not successful, substantially advanced the appellant’s interest in his appeal of a denial of a within-grade increase, on which he was successful; and (2) the appellant failed to prove the relief granted was substantial in comparison to the relief requested. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpreta tion of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an ab use of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner ’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the agency has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting its petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to find that fees are awarded under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g)(2), we AFFIRM the addendum initial decision. ¶2 The administrative judge found that fees were warranted under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g)(1), which authorizes the award of fees under an interest of justice standard and does not allow for an award of costs. However, the administrative judge found during the merits phase of the appellant’s appeal that the appellant established that the agency had discriminated against him on the basis of sex, which is prohibited under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Doe v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. DA-0752-15-0420-I-1, Initial Decision at 19-25 (Sept. 26, 2016). When there is a finding of unlawful 3

discrimination, the award of attorney fees is properly made under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g)(2). Specifically, that provision states that if an employee “is the prevailing party and the decision is based on a finding of discrimination prohibited under section 2302(b)(1) of [Title 5], the payment of attorney fees shall be in accordance with the standards prescribed under section 706(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)).” 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g)(2). The provision at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) states that the court, “in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . as part of the costs . . . .” As noted, the Board is provided with the authority to award fees under that provision by 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g)(2). Thus, fees may be awarded by the Board under section 7701(g)(2) if the appellant is the prevailing party. There is no application of the interest of justice standard to such a fee award. Th erefore, the administrative judge erred in determining whether attorney fees were warranted under the interest of justice standard of section 7701(g)(1). ¶3 Despite the error discussed above, the administrative judge found that the appellant met the interest of justice standard entitling him to fees and also acknowledged that the appellant was entitled to costs under section 7701(g)(2). Thus, notwithstanding the administrative judge’s error in determining the fee award under the interest of justice standard of section 7701(g)(1), the appellant has received all the fees and costs to which he was entitled under the more inclusive standard of section 7701(g)(2). Accordingly, we find that the administrative judge’s error did not harm the appellant’s substantive rights and thus is not a basis to reverse the initial decision. Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984) (stating that an adjudicatory error that is not prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights provides no basis for reversal of an initial decision). 4

ORDER ¶4 We ORDER the agency to pay the attorney of record $28,104.92 in fees and costs. The agency must complete this action no later than 20 days after the date of this decision. Title 5 of the United States Code, section 1204(a)(2) (5 U.S.C. § 1204(a)(2)). ¶5 We also ORDER the agency to tell the appellant and the attorney promptly in writing when it believes it has fully carried out the Board ’s Order and of the actions it has taken to carry out the Board’s Order. We ORDER the appellant and the attorney to provide all necessary information that the agency requests to help it carry out the Board’s Order. The appellant and the attorney, if not notified, should ask the agency about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(b). ¶6 No later than 30 days after the agency tells the appellant or the attorney that it has fully carried out the Board’s Order, the appellant or the attorney may file a petition for enforcement with the office that issued the initial decision on this appeal, if the appellant or the attorney believes that the agency did not fully carry out the Board’s Order.

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John Doe v. Department of Veterans Affairs, (Miss. 2023).

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Related

Hensley v. Eckerhart
461 U.S. 424 (Supreme Court, 1983)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)