John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 7616 v. Sex Offender Registry Board.

CourtMassachusetts Appeals Court
DecidedMay 14, 2024
Docket23-P-0069
StatusUnpublished

This text of John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 7616 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. (John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 7616 v. Sex Offender Registry Board.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Appeals Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 7616 v. Sex Offender Registry Board., (Mass. Ct. App. 2024).

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-69

JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 7616

vs.

SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, John Doe No. 7616, appeals from a judgment

entered in the Superior Court affirming his classification by

the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB or board) as a level three

sex offender. He contends that the board failed to show by

clear and convincing evidence that he posed a high risk of

reoffending. We affirm.

Due process requires that the board's sex offender risk

classifications "must be established by clear and convincing

evidence." Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 380316 v. Sex

Offender Registry Bd., 473 Mass. 297, 314 (2015).

Classification decisions are guided by aggravating and

mitigating factors, which "may be present to varying degrees in

any individual case," and are used "to determine each sex

offender's level of risk of reoffense and degree of dangerousness posed to the public." 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33

(2016). See also G. L. c. 6, § 178K (1) (a)-(l). "A reviewing

court may set aside or modify SORB's classification decision

where it determines that the decision is in excess of SORB's

statutory authority or jurisdiction, violates constitutional

provisions, is based on an error of law, or is not supported by

substantial evidence." Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No.

496501 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 482 Mass. 643, 649 (2019),

citing G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). "Substantial evidence is 'such

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.'" Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No.

10800 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 459 Mass. 603, 632 (2011),

quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 1 (6).

Doe was convicted of committing a sex offense involving his

eight year old niece when he was twenty years old, of raping a

fifteen year old girl when he was twenty-eight, and of

repeatedly raping a fifteen year old girl when he was thirty-

seven. The hearing examiner found that two high-risk factors

applied with full weight. Factor 2, repetitive and compulsive

behavior, 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(2) (2016), applied with

"the most weight" because Doe committed sex offenses with the

third victim after having been charged and incarcerated for sex

crimes with the first two victims. Factor 3, adult offender

with a child victim, 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(3) (2016),

2 applied with "increased weight" because all three victims were

children, and one was prepubescent. The hearing examiner also

found that seven risk-elevating factors applied. She applied

factor 7, relationship between offender and victim, 803 Code

Mass. Regs. § 1.33(7) (2016), because Doe was in a position of

trust with respect to the first victim and because the third

victim was extrafamilial, and she applied factor 19, level of

physical contact, 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(19) (2016),

because two of his offenses involved penetration of the victim's

vagina. Focusing on Doe's sixty-one disciplinary reports while

incarcerated, many of which involved violence against prison

staff and other inmates, the hearing examiner applied factor 12,

behavior while incarcerated or civilly committed, 803 Code Mass.

Regs. § 1.33(12) (2016). She also found applicable factor 10,

contact with criminal justice system; factor 11, violence

unrelated to sexual assaults, factor 21, diverse victim type,

and factor 22, number of victims. See 803 Code Mass. Regs.

§§ 1.33(10), (11), (21), (22) (2016). Doe does not challenge

the hearing examiner's application of any of the risk factors.

Doe does argue that because three risk-mitigating factors

applied -- factor 28, supervision by probation or parole, factor

30, advanced age, and factor 34, materials submitted by the sex

offender regarding stability in the community, 803 Code Mass.

Regs. § 1.33(28), (30), (34) (2016) -- the board failed to meet

3 its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that a

level three classification was warranted. However, the hearing

examiner considered all three of those factors. Because Doe

would be supervised for a ten-year term of probation, she

considered factor 28 to mitigate his risk of reoffense and

degree of dangerousness. See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(28)

("An offender's risk of reoffense and degree of dangerousness

are reduced while he is serving a term of community

supervision"). She found that Doe qualified for factor 30

because of his "advanced age" of fifty-four, but did not give

the factor its full weight because Doe was under sixty. See 803

Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(30) ("the Board considers advanced age

to have a significant mitigating effect when the offender is

fifty years of age or older or, for those with child victims,

when the offender is sixty years of age or older"). Finally,

with respect to factor 34, the hearing examiner considered Doe's

completion of many programs while he was in prison to be a

mitigating factor, but because Doe had a significant history of

noncompliance with the law, rules, and guidelines, both in

prison and the community, she found that his completion of the

programs in prison did not establish that he would be able to

remain stable in the community. See 803 Code Mass. Regs.

§ 1.33(34) ("the Board shall give mitigating consideration to

4 materials submitted by the offender that demonstrate stability

in the community").

The hearing examiner's decision balanced the relevant

aggravating and mitigating factors and is supported by

substantial evidence. Doe, in effect, argues that the hearing

examiner gave too much weight to the high risk and risk-

elevating factors, and too little weight to the risk-mitigating

factors. "A hearing examiner has discretion . . . to consider

which statutory and regulatory factors are applicable and how

much weight to ascribe to each factor, and . . . a reviewing

court is required to 'give due weight to [the examiner's]

experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge.'"

Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 68549 v. Sex Offender

Registry Bd., 470 Mass. 102, 109–110 (2014), quoting G. L.

c. 30A, § 14 (7). We discern no abuse of that discretion.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Massing, Singh & Grant, JJ.1),

Assistant Clerk

Entered: May 14, 2024.

1 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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Related

Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 68549 v. Sex Offender Registry Board
470 Mass. 102 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 2014)
Doe, SORB No. 380316 v. Sex Offender Registry Board
473 Mass. 297 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 2015)
Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board
459 Mass. 603 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 2011)
Chace v. Curran
881 N.E.2d 792 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 2008)
John Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd.
126 N.E.3d 939 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 2019)

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John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 7616 v. Sex Offender Registry Board., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/john-doe-sex-offender-registry-board-no-7616-v-sex-offender-registry-massappct-2024.