John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 529078 v. Sex Offender Registry Board.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: June 16, 2026
• Docket: 24-P-1282
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-1282

JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 529078

vs.

SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, John Doe, appeals from a Superior Court

judgment on the pleadings upholding the Sex Offender Registry

Board's classification of him as a level three sex offender. We

affirm.

Claims raised for the first time in the Appeals Court are

waived. See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 3974 v. Sex

Offender Registry Bd., 457 Mass. 53, 56 (2010); Doe, Sex

Offender Registry Bd. No. 203108 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd.,

87 Mass. App. Ct. 313, 321 (2015), S.C., 89 Mass. App. Ct. 901

(2016) (Doe No. 203108). Here, claims of error raised in the

plaintiff's appellate brief bear little resemblance to the

claims raised in the motion for judgment on the pleadings and supporting memorandum of law. On appeal the plaintiff claims

errors with respect to the applicability of factor 3 (adult

offender with a child victim) and factor 37 (other information

related to the nature of the sexual behavior), and he challenges

the scientific basis for the governing regulations, but the

plaintiff did not raise these claims before the Superior Court

judge. Specifically, he claims for the first time that there

was no evidence showing the victim was prepubescent under factor

3, the examiner inappropriately considered repetitive and

compulsive behavior under factor 37, and the governing

regulations do not reflect the current state of a scientific

knowledge. These arguments will not be considered for the first

time in the Appeals Court because they are waived. To the

extent that he also continues to challenge the constitutionality

of the governing statute and regulations, the plaintiff has

waived this claim by failing to seek declaratory relief in the

Superior Court. See Doe No. 203108, 87 Mass. App. Ct. at 320-

321.

Upon review of the remaining arguments, we discern no error

with respect to the examiner's conclusion that the plaintiff

presented a high risk of reoffense and high degree of

dangerousness and that a substantial public safety interest

would be served by dissemination and Internet publication of his

2 registry information. Contrary to the plaintiff's claim, the

examiner did not apply a mechanical "checklist" to the evidence.

That evidence showed that the plaintiff (who was forty-three

years old at the time of the hearing in 2023) repeatedly raped

and sexually assaulted his stepdaughter when she was ages eleven

to sixteen, was the subject of multiple abuse prevention orders

protecting multiple women, had repeated contact with the

criminal justice system, consumed alcohol daily, and previously

acknowledged having a "problem" with marijuana. In one

affidavit in support of the request for an abuse prevention

order, the affiant stated that the plaintiff grabbed her

forcefully, threw her into a child's crib, grabbed her by the

throat, and threw her out of the room.

The examiner carefully analyzed this evidence, applied the

governing regulations to the facts, and explained the reasons

for assigning degrees of weight to these factors: factor 3

(adult offender with child victim), factor 19 (level of physical

contact), factor 15 (hostility toward women), factor 11

(violence unrelated to sexual assaults), factor 9 (alcohol and

substance abuse), factor 10 (contact with criminal justice

system), and factor 37 (other information including mitigation).

Noting the high risk to reoffend and the high degree of

dangerousness the plaintiff posed to unsuspecting persons,

3 particularly to "the daughter of a romantic partner," the

examiner concluded that Internet publication of the plaintiff's

registry information would serve the interest of public safety.

Thus, the present case did not lack "reasoned analysis" by the

examiner, Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 11204 v. Sex

Offender Registry Bd., 97 Mass. App. Ct. 564, 575 (2020), and

demonstrated a qualitative analysis of the plaintiff's history

and personal circumstances.

Finally, we disagree with the plaintiff's contention that

the examiner "disregarded a scientific article" that he offered.

The research article from 2004 noted that "incest offenders

recidivate at a significantly lower rate than offenders who

target victims outside the family [and] child molesters with

male victims recidivate at a significantly higher rate than

child molesters that only have girl victims." Rather than

disregard the article, the examiner "fully consider[ed] this

article" but gave it little weight in the overall analysis

because the regulatory factors reflect "similar research."

Indeed, the regulatory factors are clear that sex offenders are

not a monolith when it comes to risk of recidivism. See, e.g.,

factor 3 (adult offenders against children generally younger

than thirteen "pose an even higher risk of reoffense"); factor 7

(adult offenders who "target intrafamilial victims may be at a

4 lower risk to reoffend" and offenders against a stranger "have a

higher risk of reoffense"); factor 17 (adult male offenders

against male victims "reoffend at a higher rate"). Given the

research reflected by these regulatory factors, we cannot say

that the examiner erred in his assessment of the article. Nor

can we say that the examiner erred in giving little weight to

the article (beyond what is expressed in the regulatory

factors). The plaintiff contends that the article is supportive

of "his position that he poses a low risk of re-offense," but

factor 7 says otherwise: "having an intrafamilial victim is not

a risk mitigating, nor a risk elevating, factor." Consistent

with the limitation expressed in factor 7, the examiner

concluded, "I give neither risk elevating nor mitigating weight

to this factor." We discern no error.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Desmond, Hand & Hodgens, JJ.1),

Clerk

Entered: June 16, 2026.

1 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.